ORDER : Parth Prateem Sahu, J. 1. Petitioner who is an elected councilor of Municipal Council, Kawardha from Ward No.17 has filed this writ petition with a grievance that respondents are not holding the election for filling of the casual vacancy of President, Municipal Council, Kawardha, which arose on account of resignation of the elected President Shri Rishi Kumar Sharma on 11.12.2023 and has sought for following reliefs:- “10.1 This Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to call for the entire case, file, proceedings etc. from respondent No.2 to 4 concerning holding of election to the office of President Municipal Council Kawardha, for its kind consideration and perusal. 10.2 This Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue an appropriate writ directing respondent No. 2 to 4 to immediately hold elections to the office of 'President', Municipal Council Kawardha, which the authorities deliberately failed despite specific direction by this Hon'ble Court in W.P.(C) No. 1516/2024 vide order dated 02.07.2024. 10.3 This Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue an appropriate writ directing initiation and institution of an enquiry against the officers responsible for not holding the elections to the office of President Municipal Council Kawardha after the casual vacancy to the said office was duly intimated to respondent No 2 and despite specific direction by this Hon'ble Court in W.P.(C) No. 1516/2024 vide order dated 02.07.2024. 10.4 Any other relief, which this Hon'ble Court, may deem fit and proper, in the facts and circumstances of the case.” 2. Learned counsel for petitioner submits that general election of Municipal Council, Kawardha was held in the year 2000. Municipal Council was constituted on 18.01.2020. According to the provisions under the Chhattisgarh Municipalities Act, 1961 (In short ‘the Act, 1961’), term of council is of five years i.e. till 17.01.2025. After municipal elections, Shri Rishi Kumar Sharma was elected as President of Municipal Council, Kawardha, who continued till he resigned from the post of President on 11.12.2023. Resignation submitted by the President was accepted by the State Government and accordingly notification in this regard was issued on 20.12.2023 and it was published in the official gazette. After becoming vacant of office of President, Municipal Council Kawardha, State Government sent letter of information to the Chhattisgarh State Election Commission about arising of the vacancy in Municipal Council, Kawardha, however, respondent No.2 did not hold election of the President for filling of casual vacancy. After becoming vacant of office of President, Municipal Council Kawardha, State Government sent letter of information to the Chhattisgarh State Election Commission about arising of the vacancy in Municipal Council, Kawardha, however, respondent No.2 did not hold election of the President for filling of casual vacancy. It is contention of learned counsel for petitioner that aggrieved with inaction on the part of the State Election Commission, a writ petition was earlier filed bearing WP(C) No. 1516 of 2024, which was dragged on account of the fact that the office of the State Election Commissioner was vacant. Appointment on the post of State Election Commissioner was notified on 21.06.2024, thereafter the writ petition was disposed of vide order dated 02.07.2024 directing the State Election Commission to initiate proceedings for filling up the casual vacancy within period of 7 days from the date of receipt of copy of order. Copy of order dated 02.07.2024 passed in the Writ Petition © 1516/2024 was served in the office of State Election Commission on the next day i.e. on 03.07.2024 along with representation, however, till date, election was not conducted, therefore, this writ petition was filed. 3. It is further submitted that conducting election in the Municipal Council is contemplated under Article 243ZA (1) of the Constitution of India as well as under Section 43 (1) of the Act, 1961. According to the provision under the Act, 1961, post of President (casual vacancy) ought to have been filled up at the earliest immediately after getting information in this regard, in the case at hand in December, 2023. Failure to hold free and fair election by Commission is wholly illegal and reflects deliberate inaction/negligence in discharge of constitutional duty for extraneous considerations. Respondent No.2 failed to perform its pious duty under Article 243ZA (1) of the Constitution of India because the office of the President is vacant, council is unable to work and take decisions, which has resulted in absolute chaos in the entire Municipal Council, and development work also come to stand still. Chief Municipal Officer also does not have power to take policy decision which are to be taken by the council as a democratic body. Inaction on the part of the respondent No.2 has led to frustrate the constitutional goals as contained under Chapter 9-A of the Constitution of India. Chief Municipal Officer also does not have power to take policy decision which are to be taken by the council as a democratic body. Inaction on the part of the respondent No.2 has led to frustrate the constitutional goals as contained under Chapter 9-A of the Constitution of India. He also contended that period of six months as mentioned under the proviso to Section 37 (1) of the Act, 1961 has to be reckoned from the date of office/post became vacant and not from the date when the election is to be declared. It is further contended that for counting the period, man made calamities like non-appointing of State Election Commissioner should not be made circumstances to attract proviso to Section 37 (1) of the Act, 1961. He also contended that proviso is to be read so as to give effective meaning of the main provision under Section 37 (1) of the Act, 1961 and not to defeat/frustrate the object of the main provision as provided under Section 37 (1) i.e. to fill-up the casual vacancy as soon as the office of the President becomes vacant or is declared vacant. In support of this contention he placed reliance upon the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Kishansingh Tomar Vs. Municipal Corporation of the City, Ahmedabad & Ors., reported in (2006) 8 SCC 352 , Mavilayi Service Cooperative Bank Limited & Ors. Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Calicut & Anr., reported in (2021) 7 SCC 90 and in the matter of Special Reference No. 1 of 2002 (Gujrat Assembly Election Matter), reported in (2002) 8 SCC 237 and in the order passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in case of Balkrishna Dubey Vs. State of M.P., WP No.8034 of 2014 decided on 09.06.2014. 4. Learned counsel for respondent No.2, 3 and 5/State Election Commission vehemently opposes the submission of learned counsel for petitioner and would submit that the submission of learned counsel for petitioner that, election was not conducted deliberately, is not correct. After receiving information of casual vacancy of the President in Municipal Council, Kawardha, election could not be held because of non-appointment of the State Election Commissioner, who was appointed only on 21.06.2024. After receiving information of casual vacancy of the President in Municipal Council, Kawardha, election could not be held because of non-appointment of the State Election Commissioner, who was appointed only on 21.06.2024. Writ petition No.1516/2024 was disposed of on 02.07.2024 directing respondents No.2 to 4 therein i.e. State Election Commission to initiate the proceedings for filling-up the casual vacancy of President of Municipal Council, Kawardha, in accordance with law within a period of one week from the date of receipt of the order. The order was received on 03.07.2024. Referring to provision under Section 37 of the Act, 1961 it is argued that casual vacancy are to be filled up, however, the casual vacancy is not to be filled up when the remaining period of council is less than six months as provided under proviso to Section 37 (1) of the Act, 1961. He submits that duration of the municipalities is also prescribed under Section 36 of the Act, 1961, which is for five years from the date appointed for its first meeting and no longer. First meeting of the Municipal Council was held on 06.01.2020, therefore, the term of council was only up till 05.01.2025 and not beyond. He also submits that election of President is governed by the Chhattisgarh Nagarpalika (Adhyaksh Tatha Upadhyaksh Ka Nirvachan), Niyam, 1998 (In short 'the Rules, 1998') and according to Rule 3 (3) of the Rules, 1998, notice of meeting for election has to be sent 7 clear days before the meeting. From the date of notice if after 7 days, election is to be conducted it would have been in contravention of the proviso to Section 37 (1) as election would be for a period less than six months. After receipt of the order passed in WPC 1516 of 2024, the issue was discussed and accordingly thereafter it was informed to the Collector that Election Commission is unable to hold the election on account of proviso under Section 37 (1) of the Act, 1961. The Commission cannot act in contravention of any of the provisions under the Act, 1961. He also submits that pleadings made in the writ petition that first meeting of Municipal Council was held on 18.01.2020 is not correct in view of the proceedings of the first meeting of Municipal Council, Kawardha dated 06.01.2020 (Annexure R-2-2). The Commission cannot act in contravention of any of the provisions under the Act, 1961. He also submits that pleadings made in the writ petition that first meeting of Municipal Council was held on 18.01.2020 is not correct in view of the proceedings of the first meeting of Municipal Council, Kawardha dated 06.01.2020 (Annexure R-2-2). There is no arbitrariness or error on the part of respondents No.2, 3 and 5. 5. Learned State counsel submits that State Government has sent information to the State Election Commission within time i.e. immediately after the post of President became vacant. It was for the Election Commission to hold election and not by the State Government. He also adopts the submission of learned counsel for respondents No.2, 3 and 5 with respect to the provision under the Act, 1961. 6. I have heard learned counsel for parties and also perused the documents placed on record. 7. So far as the submission of learned counsel for petitioner that first meeting of the council was held on 18.01.2020 as pleaded in the writ petition prima-facie appears not to be correct in view of document (Annexure R-2-2) filed by respondents No.2,3 & 5 along with their reply. Above mentioned document is the proceedings of the first meeting of the Municipal Council, Kawardha which is dated 06.01.2020, therefore, the period of five years to be reckoned from the date of first meeting i.e. 06.01.2020 as mentioned in Annexure R-2-2. 8. Filling up the casual vacancy is envisaged under Section 37 of the Act, 1961, which is extracted below for ready reference:- “37 - Filling up of Casual Vacancies-- (1) As soon as the office of a President, or a seat of Councillor elected from ward, becomes vacant, or is declared vacant, or the election of President or the Councillor, as the case may be, is declared void, the State Government shall forthwith inform the State Election Commission for filling up the vacancy and the person so elected shall hold office of President or Councillor, as the case may be, only for the remaining period of the Council: Provided that if the remaining period of the Council is less than six months, such vacancy shall not be filled in. (2) Until the vacancy in the Office of President is filled in under sub-section (1), all the powers and duties of the President shall be performed by such elected Councillor as the State Government may nominate in this behalf: Provided that if the office of President is reserved under Section 29-B the President shall be nominated from the elected Councillors belonging to such reserved category.” 9. Article 243Q of the Constitution of India provides constitution of municipalities, wherein constitution of (a) a Nagar Panchayat for a transitional area, that is to say, an area in transition from a rural area to an urban area (b) a Municipal Council for smaller urban area. 10. Article 243U of the Constitution of India deals with duration of municipalities, which provides that unless sooner dissolved under any law for the time being in force, shall constitute for five years from the date appointed for its first meeting and no longer. 11. Section 36 of the Act, 1961 also have same language as under Article 243U of the Constitution of India, which reads as under :- “36. Duration of the Municipality -- (1) Every Municipality unless sooner dissolved, shall continue for five years from the date appointed for its first meeting and no longer. (2) An election to constitute a Municipality shall be completed :-- (a) before the expiry of its duration specified in sub-section (1); (b) before the expiration of a period of six months from the date of its dissolution: Provided that where the remainder of the period for which the dissolved Municipality would have continued is less than six months, it shall not be necessary to hold any election under this section for constituting the Municipality for such period. (3) A Municipality constituted upon the dissolution of a Municipality before the expiration of its duration shall continue only for the remainder of the period for which the dissolved Municipality would have continued under sub-section (1) had it not been so dissolved.] [(4) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the term of President and every Councillor shall be coterminous with the term of the Council.” 12. Perusal of the provision under Section 36 (1) of the Act, 1961 would show that period of municipality is of five years from the date appointed for its first meeting unless sooner it dissolved meaning thereby the period of five years of municipality is reckoned as five years from the date of first meeting unless sooner it dissolved. Copy of the proceeding of first meeting bears the date on which it held, which is dated 06.01.2020, therefore, the term of Municipal Council, Kawradha is till 05.01.2025 (for five years). 13. Article 243ZA of the Constitution of India deals with the election to the municipalities and superintendence, direction and control of the preparation of the electoral rolls for, and the conduct of, all elections to the Municipalities shall be vested in the State Election Commission referred to in Article 243K. 14. Article 243ZA (2) provides that subject to provisions of Constitution, the Legislature of a State may, by law, make provision with respect to all matter relating to, or in connection with, elections to the Municipalities. 15. Short question which is involved in this petition is whether the period of six months as provided under proviso to Section 37 (1) of the Act, 1961 is to be reckoned from the date of vacancy or from the date when election is to be notified. 16. Undisputedly, the vacancy arose after notification published by the State Government after acceptance of resignation of the then President dated 11.12.2023 vide notification dated 20.12.203. The State Government further gave information about the vacancy of the President, Municipal Council, Kawardha to the State Election Commission vide letter dated 20.12.2023. As per the submission of learned counsel for respondents No.2,3 and 5 that election could not be conducted because the office of the State Election Commissioner was lying vacant. This submission was also not in dispute as in the earlier Writ Petition (C) No.1516/2024, the State Election Commission has initially made same statement, however, during pendency of that writ petition, appointment of State Election Commissioner was notified on 21.06.2024. Copy of the which is also placed on record as Annexure P-9. This submission was also not in dispute as in the earlier Writ Petition (C) No.1516/2024, the State Election Commission has initially made same statement, however, during pendency of that writ petition, appointment of State Election Commissioner was notified on 21.06.2024. Copy of the which is also placed on record as Annexure P-9. From the aforementioned facts, the submission of learned counsel for respondents No.2, 3 & 5 and not opposed by the learned counsel for petitioner in view of Annexure P-9 that at the time of becoming the post of President vacant dated 21.06.2024, office of the State Election Commission was vacant. Post of State Election Commissioner is a constitutional post and it is to be appointed by the Governor. 17. In the decision in case of Kishansingh Tomar (supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with issue with respect to holding of general election of Municipal Corporation has held that there may be certain man-made calamities, such as rioting or breakdown of law and order, or natural calamities which could distract the authorities from holding elections to the Municipality, but they are exceptional circumstances and under no circumstance the Election Commission would be justified in delaying the process of election after consulting the State Govt. and other authorities. But that should be an exceptional circumstance and shall not be a regular feature to extend the duration of the Municipality. 18. So far as the submission of learned counsel for petitioner that provision under Section 37 (1) of the Act, 1961 provides that election is to be held as soon as the office of President or seat of councilor becomes vacant and the proviso will not be made applicable to frustrate the main provision under Section 37 (1) of the Act, 1961, is concerned, Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered the effect of application of the proviso to the provision under the Act, 1961 in case of Tribhovandas Haribhai Tamboli v. Gujarat Revenue Tribunal, reported in (1991) 3 SCC 442 and held as under :- “6. It is a cardinal rule of interpretation that a proviso to a particular provision of a statute only embraces the field, which is covered by the main provision. It carves out an exception to the main provision to which it has been enacted by the proviso and to no other. It is a cardinal rule of interpretation that a proviso to a particular provision of a statute only embraces the field, which is covered by the main provision. It carves out an exception to the main provision to which it has been enacted by the proviso and to no other. The proper function of a proviso is to except and deal with a case which would otherwise fall within the general language of the main enactment, and its effect is to confine to that case. Where the language of the main enactment is explicit and unambiguous, the proviso can have no repercussion on the interpretation of the main enactment, so as to exclude from it, by implication what clearly falls within its express terms. The scope of the proviso, therefore, is to carve out an exception to the main enactment and it excludes something which otherwise would have been within the rule. It has to operate in the same field and if the language of the main enactment is clear, the proviso cannot be torn apart from the main enactment nor can it be used to nullify by implication what the enactment clearly says nor set at naught the real object of the main enactment, unless the words of the proviso are such that it is its necessary effect.” 19. In case of J.K. Industries Ltd. v. Chief Inspector of Factories and Boilers, reported in (1996) 6 SCC 665 , Hon’ble Supreme Court while interpreting the proviso of provision has observed thus :- “33. A proviso to a provision in a statute has several functions and while interpreting a provision of the statute, the court is required to carefully scrutinise and find out the real object of the proviso appended to that provision. It is not a proper rule of interpretation of a proviso that the enacting part or the main part of the section be construed first without reference to the proviso and if the same is found to be ambiguous only then recourse may be had to examine the proviso as has been canvassed before us. On the other hand an accepted rule of interpretation is that a section and the proviso thereto must be construed as a whole, each portion throwing light, if need be, on the rest. A proviso is normally used to remove special cases from the general enactment and provide for them specially. 34. On the other hand an accepted rule of interpretation is that a section and the proviso thereto must be construed as a whole, each portion throwing light, if need be, on the rest. A proviso is normally used to remove special cases from the general enactment and provide for them specially. 34. A proviso qualifies the generality of the main enactment by providing an exception and taking out from the main provision, a portion, which, but for the proviso would be a part of the main provision. A proviso must, therefore, be considered in relation to the principal matter to which it stands as a proviso. A proviso should not be read as if providing something by way of addition to the main provision which is foreign to the main provision itself. 35. Indeed, in some cases, a proviso, may be an exception to the main provision though it cannot be inconsistent with what is expressed in the main provision and if it is so, it would be ultra vires of the main provision and struck down. As a general rule in construing an enactment containing a proviso, it is proper to construe the provisions together without making either of them redundant or otiose. Even where the enacting part is clear, it is desirable to make an effort to give meaning to the proviso with a view to justify its necessity. 36. While dealing with proper function of a proviso, this Court in CIT v. Indo Mercantile Bank Ltd. [ AIR 1959 SC 713 : (1959) 36 ITR 1 ] opined: “The proper function of a proviso is that it qualifies the generality of the main enactment by providing an exception and taking out as it were, from the main enactment, a portion which, but for the proviso would fall within the main enactment. Ordinarily it is foreign to the proper function of a proviso to read it as providing something by way of an addendum or dealing with a subject which is foreign to the main enactment.” 20. From the aforementioned decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court it is explicitly clear that according to the cardinal rule of interpretation proviso to a particular provision of a statute only embraces the filed, which is covered by the main provision. It carves out an exception to the main provision to which it has been enacted by the proviso. From the aforementioned decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court it is explicitly clear that according to the cardinal rule of interpretation proviso to a particular provision of a statute only embraces the filed, which is covered by the main provision. It carves out an exception to the main provision to which it has been enacted by the proviso. The scope of the proviso, therefore, it to carve out an exception to the main enactment and it excludes something which otherwise would have been within the rule. 21. Perusal of the provision under Section 37 of the Act, 1961 provides for filling up of casual vacancy and under the proviso it mentions that if the remaining period of council is less than six months such vacancy should not be filled up. 22. In the case at hand the duration of five years of the Municipal Council, Kawardha starts from 06.01.2020 i.e. from the date of first meeting and five years will come to an end on 05.01.2025. This Court in WPC No.1516 of 2024 directed the State Election Commission to hold election within a period of one week vide its order dated 02.07.2024. As submitted by learned counsel for respondents No.2, 3 and 5 and not disputed by counsel for petitioner that copy of the order received in the office of respondent No.2 on 03.07.2024. After receipt of the order, respondent No.2 informed the Collector that holding of election is not possible because under the Rules, 1998, notice of the meeting of election has to be before seven days of meeting, therefore, date of election would fall within less than six months remaining period of the council. Submission of learned counsel for respondent No.2, 3 and 5 is according to the provisions under the Act, 1961. The intent of the Act, 1961 in particular the proviso appended therein is that filling up of the vacancy shall not be done if period of council remaining is less than six months. The language under the proviso to Section 37 is clear that vacancy shall not be filled up if the period of council is less than six months. Undisputedly, date on which, if the election is to be held at the earliest would fall within the exceptional clause under the proviso of Section 37 (1) of the Act, 1961. The language under the proviso to Section 37 is clear that vacancy shall not be filled up if the period of council is less than six months. Undisputedly, date on which, if the election is to be held at the earliest would fall within the exceptional clause under the proviso of Section 37 (1) of the Act, 1961. The order which is relied upon by learned counsel for petitioner in case of Balkrishna Dubey (supra), learned Single Judge has considered that “however, in case remaining period of council is less than six months from the date of vacancy, the said vacancy shall not be filled in”. The learned Single Judge has not correctly considered the proviso, in fact the consideration is extraneous and therefore, no benefit can be extended to the petitioner of the said order passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in case of Balkrishna Dubey (supra). 23. For the forgoing discussions I do not find any merit in this petition and it is accordingly dismissed.