JUDGMENT : A.Y. KOGJE, J. 1. This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is filed for following relief:- “(A) YOUR LORDSHIPS be pleased to issue appropriate writ, direction or order, quashing and setting aside the detention order dated 06.10.2023 being SERIAL No.-D/MAG/1/PASA/ 171/2023 at Annexure ‘A’, to the petition placing the petitioner under preventive detention, in purported exercise of their powers under the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 1985, as being illegal, null and void and further be pleased to release the petitioner forthwith.” 2. Thus, essentially, the challenge is to the order of detention dated 06.10.2023 passed by the District Magistrate, Banaskantha, respondent No.2 herein, by which the petitioner has been detained as a “bootlegger” based on solitary offence registered against him. 3. Learned advocate for the detenue submits that the order of detention impugned in this petition deserves to be quashed and set aside on the ground of registration of the solitary offence under Sections of the Prohibition Act by itself cannot bring the case of the detenue within the purview of definition under section 2(b) of the Act. Further, learned Advocate for the detenue submits that illegal activity likely to be carried out or alleged to have been carried out, as alleged, cannot have any nexus or bearing with the maintenance of public order. Further, except statement of witnesses, registration of above FIR/s and Panchnama drawn in pursuance of the investigation, no other relevant and cogent material is on record connecting alleged anti-social activity of the detenue with breach of public order. 3.1 Learned advocate for the petitioner further submits that it is not possible to hold on the basis of the facts of the present case that activity of the detenue with respect to solitary criminal case had affected even tempo of the society causing threat to the very existence of normal and routine life of people at large. 4. Learned AGP for the respondent State supported the detention order passed by the authority and submitted that sufficient material and evidence was found during the course of investigation, which was also supplied to the detenue indicate that detenue is in habit of indulging into the activity as defined under section 2(b) of the Act and considering the facts of the case, the detaining authority has rightly passed the order of detention and detention order deserves to be upheld by this Court. 5. 5. Having heard learned advocates for the parties and considering the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that the grounds of detention indicate registration of solitary FIR, the details of which are as under:- Sr.No. Name of Police Station CR No. and date Sections Date of bail order 1 Deesa Rural Umara Police Station 111950192320358 of 2023 dated 11.05.2023 65(A)(E), 116(2), 81, 83, 98(2) of the Prohibition Act and Sections 465, 468 and 471 of IPC ---- 6. The order of detention came to be passed on 06.10.2023. The State could have resorted to due process of law by filing cancellation of bail application and that would have been sufficient to prevent the petitioner from indulging in further offence, particularly when the petitioner has been granted bail in connection with the offence on which the detaining authority has relied upon to arrive at a subjective satisfaction. The fact that the petitioner has been enlarged on regular bail by the Court of competent jurisdiction and the detention order does not reflect application of mind to the fact that the Detaining Authority has considered cancellation of bail to be ineffective method to curtail activities of the petitioner. Therefore, in the opinion of the Court, the Detaining Authority not having taken into consideration the cancellation of bail option. The subjective satisfaction would stand vitiated as is held in recent decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Shaik Nazeen v/s. State of Telanga and Ors. reported in 2023 (9) SCC 633 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has made following observations in para 19 as under:- “19. In any case, the State is not without a remedy, as in case the detenue is much a menace to the society as is being alleged, then the prosecution should seek for the cancellation of his bail and/or move an appeal to the Higher Court. But definitely seeking shelter under the preventive detention law is not the proper remedy under the facts and circumstances of the case.” 7. But definitely seeking shelter under the preventive detention law is not the proper remedy under the facts and circumstances of the case.” 7. The subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority cannot be said to be legal, valid and in accordance with law, inasmuch as the offences alleged in the FIR cannot have any bearing on the public order as required under the Act and other relevant penal laws are sufficient enough to take care of the situation and that the allegations as have been levelled against the detenue cannot be said to be germane for the purpose of bringing the detenue within the meaning of section 2(b) of the Act. Unless and until, the material is there to make out a case that the person has become a threat and menace to the Society so as to disturb the whole tempo of the society and that all social apparatus is in peril disturbing public order at the instance of such person, the act alleged cannot be sufficient to attract detention law. 8. The Court relies upon the observations made by this Court in a reported judgment in the case of Sohanlal Surjaram Visnoi, reported in 2004 (2) GLR 1051 , wherein in para-7 the Court has observed as under:- “7. At the outset, it may be noted that the contention advanced on behalf of the petitioners that no preventive detention order can be recorded in a solitary incident or instance or offence cannot be accepted in toto. The detaining authority can pass the order of detention even on the basis of a solitary incident or instance, provided there is justifiable subjective satisfaction on objective material and consideration that such incident or offence is likely to create disturbance of "public order", and which needs to be controlled and curbed preventively. There must be convincing reasons and justifiable material that the impugned activity or action is likely to cause adverse and prejudicial impact on the maintenance of "public order". Emphasis is laid on "public order" and not "law and order" which belongs to the realm of general law. There must be convincing reasons and justifiable material that the impugned activity or action is likely to cause adverse and prejudicial impact on the maintenance of "public order". Emphasis is laid on "public order" and not "law and order" which belongs to the realm of general law. After having taken into account the statutory definitions of the persons branded as "bootlegger" or "dangerous person" under the PASA Act, and detailed factual matrix of each case, the solitary incident or instance in question in these petitions has not been shown or spelt out from the record as affecting the "public order" or likely to create public disturbance or prejudicial or adverse to the maintenance of "public order", and therefore, the continued detention of the detenus in each case has not been shown to be justifiable, and in this context, in exercise of the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court is left with no alternative in this group of petitions, but to quash and set aside the orders in each matter, with the result that all the petitions are required to be allowed while quashing and setting aside the detention orders passed against detenus in this group. The view which this Court has taken in this group of petitions is also reinforced by the observations and directions contained in the latest decision of the Hon ble Supreme Court in the case of Darpan Kumar Sharma alias Dharban Kumar Sharma V/s. State of Tamilnadu and others, reported in (2003)2 SCC 313 .” 9. In case of Raju Manubhai Lalu Vs. State of Gujarat & Ors. in Special Civil Application No.2322 of 2019 vide order dated 03.05.2019, this Court in para-8 has observed that mere selling or possession any Indian made foreign liquor cannot cause or likely to cause any harm, danger, alarm or feeling of insecurity amongst general public or any section thereof. 10. Coordinate Bench of this Court, in case of Vasava Umeshbhai Laxmanbhai Vs. State of Gujarat & Ors. in para-7 has held as under:- “7. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties ° and having gone through the grounds of detention, ; in my opinion, the detaining authority has failed to substantiate that the alleged antisocial activities of the petitioner-detente adversely affect or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order. in para-7 has held as under:- “7. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties ° and having gone through the grounds of detention, ; in my opinion, the detaining authority has failed to substantiate that the alleged antisocial activities of the petitioner-detente adversely affect or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order. Just because a case has been registered against the petitioner: detenue under the Prohibition Act, by itself, does not have any bearing on the maintenance of public order. The petitioner may be punished for the alleged offences committed by him but, surely, the acts constituting the offences cannot be said to have affected the even tempo of the life of the community much less public health. It . may be that the petitioner-detente is a "bootlegger’ within the meaning of Section 2(b) of the PASA Act, but merely because he is a 'bootlegger’, he cannot be preventively detained under the provisions of the PASA Act unless, as laid down in sub-section (4) of Section 3 of the PASA Act, his activities as a 'bootlegger' affect adversely or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order.” 11. The order of detention does not refer to order of bail granted to the petitioner. However, learned Advocate for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner was enlarged on regular bail on 31.07.2023. Therefore, there is delay of more than two months in passing the order of detention. The Apex Court in the case of Sushanta Kumar Banik Vs. State of Tripura, reported in AIR 2022 S.C. 4715 has observed as under; “11. We are persuaded to allow this appeal on the following two grounds: (i) Delay in passing the order of detention from the date of proposal thereby snapping the "live and proximate link" between the prejudicial activities and the purpose of detention & failure on the part of the detaining authority in explaining such delay in any manner. (ii) The detaining authority remained oblivious of the fact that in both the criminal cases relied upon by the detaining authority for the purpose of passing the order of detention, the appellant detenu was ordered to be released on bail by the special court. (ii) The detaining authority remained oblivious of the fact that in both the criminal cases relied upon by the detaining authority for the purpose of passing the order of detention, the appellant detenu was ordered to be released on bail by the special court. The detaining authority remained oblivious as this material and vital fact of the appellant detenu being released on bail in both the cases was suppressed or rather not brought to the notice of the detaining authority by the sponsoring authority at the time of forwarding the proposal to pass the appropriate order of preventive detention. DELAY IN PASSING THE ORDER OF DETENTION 12. We may recapitulate the necessary facts which have a bearing so far as the issue of delay is concerned. The proposal to take steps to preventively detain the appellant at the end of the Superintendent of Police addressed to the Superintendent of Police (C/S) West Tripura, Agartala is dated 28th of June 2021. The proposal in turn forwarded by the Assistant Inspector General of Police (Crime) on behalf of the Director General to the Secretary, Home Department is dated 14.07.2021. The order of detention is dated 12th of November, 2021. There is no explanation worth the name why it took almost five months for the detaining authority to pass the order of preventive detention. 13. There is indeed a plethora of authorities explaining the purpose and the avowed object of preventive detention in express and explicit language. We think that all those decisions of this Court on this aspect need not be recapitulated and recited. But it would suffice to refer to the decision of this Court in Ashok Kumar v. Delhi Administration and Ors., (1982) 2 SCC 403 , wherein the following observation is made: "Preventive detention is devised to afford protection to society. The object is not to punish a man for having done something but to intercept before he does it and to prevent him from doing." 14. The object is not to punish a man for having done something but to intercept before he does it and to prevent him from doing." 14. In view of the above object of the preventive detention, it becomes very imperative on the part of the detaining authority as well as the executing authorities to remain vigilant and keep their eyes skinned but not to turn a blind eye in passing the detention order at the earliest from the date of the proposal and executing the detention order because any indifferent attitude on the part of the detaining authority or executing authority would defeat the very purpose of the preventive action and turn the detention order as a dead letter and frustrate the entire proceedings. 15. The adverse effect of delay in arresting a detenu has been examined by this Court in a series of decisions and this Court has laid down the rule in clear terms that an unreasonable and unexplained delay in securing a detenu and detaining him vitiates the detention order. In the decisions we shall refer hereinafter, there was a delay in arresting the detenu after the date of passing of the order of detention. However, the same principles would apply even in the case of delay in passing the order of detention from the date of the proposal. The common underlying principle in both situations would be the "live & proximate link" between the grounds of detention & the avowed purpose of detention. xxxxx 20. It is manifestly clear from a conspectus of the above decisions of this Court, that the underlying principle is that if there is unreasonable delay between the date of the order of detention & actual arrest of the detenu and in the same manner from the date of the proposal and passing of the order of detention, such delay unless satisfactorily explained throws a considerable doubt on the genuineness of the requisite subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority in passing the detention order and consequently render the detention order bad and invalid because the "live and proximate link" between the grounds of detention and the purpose of detention is snapped in arresting the detenu. A question whether the delay is unreasonable and stands unexplained depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. 21. A question whether the delay is unreasonable and stands unexplained depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. 21. In the present case, the circumstances indicate that the detaining authority after the receipt of the proposal from the sponsoring authority was indifferent in passing the order of detention with greater promptitude. The "live and proximate link" between the grounds of detention and the purpose of detention stood snapped in arresting the detenu. More importantly the delay has not been explained in any manner & though this point of delay was specifically raised & argued before the High Court as evident from Para 14 of the impugned judgment yet the High Court has not recorded any finding on the same.” 12. In view of above, we are inclined to allow this petition, because simplicitor registration of FIR/s by itself cannot have any nexus with the breach of maintenance of public order and the authority cannot have recourse under the Act and no other relevant and cogent material exists for invoking power under section 3(2) of the Act. 13. In the result, the present petition is hereby allowed and the impugned order of detention dated 06.10.2023 passed by the respondent–detaining authority is hereby quashed and set aside. The detenue is ordered to be set at liberty forthwith if not required in any other case. 14. Rule is made absolute accordingly. Direct service is permitted.