JUDGMENT : [WP(C) Nos.16460/2024, 15363/2024] Both these Writ Petitions are being considered together since they impugn the same order of the Government, namely GO(RT)36/2024/DD dated 02.04.2024 – produced as Ext.P6 in WP(C)No.16460/2024 and as Ext.P11 in WP(C)No.15363/2024 respectively. 2. I propose to be brief in the recording of facts because, the controversy between the parties is in a very narrow compass, namely as regards the decision of the Malabar Regional Cooperative Milk Producers’ Union Ltd (‘MRCMPU’ for short), in imposing ‘conversion charges’ on its member Societies – two of which are the petitioners herein. 3. It transpires that the petitioners approached the Deputy Director of Dairy Development [who is the jurisdictional Joint Registrar, as per the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for short)], through a representation, which was directed to be disposed of by this Court, through the judgment in WP(C)No.22196/2021 – produced as Ext.P2 in WP(C)No.16460/2024. Subsequently, there was a correction to the judgment, by which, the afore exercise was ordered to be done by the Director of Dairy Development, because he is the jurisdictional Registrar under the ‘Act’. 4. However, in the meanwhile, even before the afore correction could be done, it transpires that the Deputy Director issued certain orders, which persuaded one of the petitioners herein to challenge the original judgment of the learned Single Judge, through W.A.No.460/2022; which culminated in another judgment, whereby, the order of the Deputy Director was construed to be reinstated because, by then, the Director – in terms of the modified judgment – had issued notice to the parties; but leaving them liberty to invoke any remedies against it, as they are advised. 5. The afore led to the ‘MRCMPU’ approaching the Government through an Appeal against the order of the Deputy Director, invoking their powers under Section 83 1 (J) of the ‘Act’ and the Government has now taken a decision, holding that the Deputy Director had no power to intervene in the issue, but that the parties ought to have approached the statutory Arbitrator, under Section 70A of the ‘Act’. 6. The petitioners assail the afore order of the Government as being untenable and illegal and based on irrelevant considerations; while, the ‘MRCMPU’ supports it on the ground that only the statutory Arbitrator has any competence in matters relating to the disputes between the Societies. 7. 6. The petitioners assail the afore order of the Government as being untenable and illegal and based on irrelevant considerations; while, the ‘MRCMPU’ supports it on the ground that only the statutory Arbitrator has any competence in matters relating to the disputes between the Societies. 7. Sri.G.Hariharan and Sri.K.Mohanakannan – learned counsel for the petitioners in these Writ Petitions, vehemently argued that when the learned Division Bench of this Court had directed ‘reinstatement of the order of the Deputy Director’, the ‘MRCMPU’ could not have filed a statutory Appeal against the same, nor could the Government have intervened in it. They thus pray that both these Writ Petitions be allowed and the order of the Deputy Director be directed to be implemented by the competent Authorities. 8. However, Smt.Latha Anand – learned Standing Counsel for the ‘MRCMPU’, argued that the learned Division Bench did not ‘reinstate’ the order of the Deputy Director in its semantic sense, but used the word ‘restore’ only in the context of the factum that, after such order had been issued, the Director – on the basis of the modified judgment of the learned Single Judge – had issued notice to the parties. She pointed out that, what the learned Division Bench has done is to say that it was not necessary for the Director to have taken any further decision when the Deputy Director had already issued such order and that the parties can, therefore, challenge the same in any manner as they are advised. She submitted that in such circumstances, her client was fully competent to have filed an Appeal before the Government, which they did, thus culminating in the fresh order. She thus prayed that these Writ Petitions be dismissed. 9. Smt.C.S.Sheeja – learned Senior Government Pleader, affirmed most of the afore submissions of Smt.Latha Anand, however, supplementing it saying that, even a close reading of the judgment of the learned Division Bench would not lead to any conclusion that an imprimatur to the opinion of the Deputy Director had been granted in any manner therein. She submitted that, therefore, it was fully within the power of the Government to have considered the Appeal and to have issued any order as they felt necessary, as has been now done. 10. Sri.Vishnu J. -learned counsel for the 6th respondent in both these cases, adopted the afore submissions of Smt.Latha Anand. 11. She submitted that, therefore, it was fully within the power of the Government to have considered the Appeal and to have issued any order as they felt necessary, as has been now done. 10. Sri.Vishnu J. -learned counsel for the 6th respondent in both these cases, adopted the afore submissions of Smt.Latha Anand. 11. I have evaluated and considered the afore rival submissions, on the touchstone of the various materials available on record. 12. No doubt, a learned Single Judge of this Court initially directed the Deputy Director to take a decision on the representation of the petitioners, against the decision of the ‘MRCMPU’ in imposing ‘conversion charges’; but this judgment was thereafter modified to direct the Director of Dairy Development to take such decision. However, in the meanwhile, even before such correction had been made, the Deputy Director had issued an order and one of the petitioners herein took up the judgment of the learned Single Bench in Appeal before a learned Division Bench and the said Bench found that since the Deputy Director had already taken a decision, further decision by the Director was unnecessary; and in such context, used the word ‘restore’, to mean that the order of the Deputy Director would continue to be in operation, until such time as it is challenged by any of the parties, subject to their rights. 13. It is obvious from the appellate judgment, as has been correctly argued by Smt.Latha Anand and Smt.C.S.Sheeja, that the learned Division Bench never granted approval to any of the findings of the Deputy Director, but left it to be decided by the competent Authorities, if any person was to challenge the same. Obviously, therefore, the argument that the order of the Deputy Director had been granted concurrence by learned Division Bench of this Court, is surely untenable. 14. That said, the Government has now taken a view that the Deputy Director had no jurisdiction to have intervened in the matter, because the petitioners impugn the policy decision taken by the ‘MRCMPU’ which is a regional Society. The opinion of the learned Additional Advocate General to such effect has also been reflected in the order and the Government then arrives at a final opinion that the proper remedy for the petitioners ought to have been to invoke Section 70A of the ‘Act’ and initiate arbitration proceedings. 15. The opinion of the learned Additional Advocate General to such effect has also been reflected in the order and the Government then arrives at a final opinion that the proper remedy for the petitioners ought to have been to invoke Section 70A of the ‘Act’ and initiate arbitration proceedings. 15. Therefore, as matters now stand, the crux of the controversy between the parties is whether the Government is right in relegating the parties to the arbitration procedure, or not. 16. Pertinently, the learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the Deputy Director had jurisdiction to have issued his order because, Section 66 of the ‘Act’ entrusts him with the power of Superintendence. They argued that, in such circumstances, the opinion of the Government – that the remedy of the petitioners was to invoke arbitration proceedings – is incorrect and contrary to law. 17. I am afraid that I cannot find favour with the afore submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioners because, Section 66 of the ‘Act’ does not use the word ‘Superintendence’, but only authorises the statutory Authorities to ‘supervise’ the functioning of a Society and not to micromanage it. When a Society takes a decision, which is normally through Resolutions adopted by it, then the opposing party would obtain the alternative remedies of either seeking it to be rescinded by the competent Authority under Rule 176 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules; or in approaching the Arbitrator for having the same adjudicated and settled. 18. In the case at hand, unfortunately, the Deputy Director took upon himself the burden of adjudicating the disputes between the parties, as if he was acting as an Appellate Authority, but without mentioning the power he has invoked for doing so in his order. As I have already said above, the learned Division Bench of this Court did not grant approval to it, but permitted the parties to challenge it, if they are so advised. 19. As I have already said above, the learned Division Bench of this Court did not grant approval to it, but permitted the parties to challenge it, if they are so advised. 19. In such circumstances, I am left without doubt that the Government has acted correctly in having issued the orders impugned in these Writ Petitions and that the petitioners must invoke their remedies under Section 70A of the ‘Act’, if they are to assail the decision taken by the ‘MRCMPU’; for which purpose, I leave open every contention/liberty to the parties, to be invoked and pursued by them, as per law; and clarify that none of my observations herein would trammel or fetter it, in any manner, whatsoever. These Writ Petitions are thus ordered.