ORDER : Narendra Kumar Vyas, J. 1. The petitioner has filed this writ petition under Article 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India for quashing appointment vide notification dated 05.07.2024 issued by State Government by which respondent No. 3 has been nominated as Member in respondent No. 2/Chhattisgarh Waqf Board and also for issuance of direction to the respondent authorities to appoint members as per Section 14(1)(b)(iv) of the Waqf Act, 1995 (for short “the Act, 1995”). 2. The brief facts as reflected from records are that the petitioner is working as 'Mutawalli' of Masjid Juna Bilaspur Waqf since 1997 which is duly recognized and registered under the relevant provisions of the Act, 1995. The Waqf Board has been constituted as per Section 13 of the Act, 1995, Section 14 of the Act, 1995 provides composition of Board, Section 15 provides terms of office which is five years from the date of notification referred to in Sub-Section (9) of Section 14 of the Act, 1995, Section 16 provides disqualification for being appointment or for continue as a member of the Board. It has been further contended that various members of the Board have been appointed as per the provisions of Section 14 of the Act, 1995 which was published in the official gazette on 06.04.2022 (Annexure P/3). The notification further provides that the members have been nominated from each category as provided in Section 14(1)(b)(ii) & (iii) as well as Section 14(1)(c)(d) & (e) of the Act, 1995. Accordingly, five members were notified. Subsequent to the appointment of aforesaid Board members, they elected a Chairperson as per Section 14(8) of the Act, 1995 vide notification dated 19.04.2022 (Annexure P/4). Since there was no member appointed under Section 14(1)(b)(i) of the Act, 1995, the State Government exercising its power under Section 14(2) & (3) nominated one Mr. Riyaz Hussain as member of the Board vide notification dated 27.10.2022 (Annexure P/5). After the aforesaid appointment, there were six members in the Board, out of which only two members are elected whereas the rest of four members were nominated whereas Section 14 of the Act, 1995 categorically provides that there must be at least one member each under the electoral college provided under Section 14(b)(i) to (iv) of the Act, 1995. Thus, atleast four members must be elected members representing each of the electoral colleges mentioned under Clause 14(b)(i) to (iv). Thus, atleast four members must be elected members representing each of the electoral colleges mentioned under Clause 14(b)(i) to (iv). The respondent authorities constituting the Board on 06.04.2022 have not constituted an electoral college for electing members under Section 14(1)(b)(iv) i.e. members from Mutawallis as per Section 14 (1) of the Act, 1995 which provides that for all times there must be one Mutawalli as the member of the Board. The respondent authorities despite the fact that at the relevant time there appears to be only two elected members respectively under Section 14(1)(b)(ii) & (iii) of the Act, 1995. The impugned notification dated 05.07.2024 has been issued nominating yet another member without making any effort for appointing the member by election under Section 14(1)(b)(iv) of the Act, 1995 amongst the Mutawallis. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the impugned notification dated 05.07.2024 (Annexure P/1), by which another member has been nominated is contrary to the provisions contained under the Act, 1995, therefore, the same is arbitrary, illegal and unsustainable in the law. He would further submit that the legislative intention behind electing such explicit provision for appointment as member to the Board is to ensure that there is fair representation of various classes. However, by the act of omission and commission on the part of the respondent authorities, the mandatory provisions of representation of the Mutawallis as members of the Board are being defeated, hence, the same is illegal. He would further submit that from bare perusal of the impugned notification, it would reveal that no reason has been assigned, which is a pre-requisite for exercising the power conferred under Section 14(2) & (3) of the Act, 1995. As such, the composition of the Board would be rendered illegal and contrary to the express provision contained in Section 14(4) of the Act, 1995. He would further submit that it is incumbent upon the respondent authorities to exercise their power of appointment of the member amongst the Mutawallis by conducting an election from the electoral college of the qualified Mutawallis, thus he would pray for quashing of the impugned notification dated 05.07.2024 (Annexure P/1). 4. He would further submit that it is incumbent upon the respondent authorities to exercise their power of appointment of the member amongst the Mutawallis by conducting an election from the electoral college of the qualified Mutawallis, thus he would pray for quashing of the impugned notification dated 05.07.2024 (Annexure P/1). 4. On the other hand, the State/respondents No. 1 & 4 have filed their reply mainly contending that the impugned notification has been issued strictly in accordance with the power conferred under Section 14 Sub-Section (2) & (3) of the Act, 1995 (as amended Waqf Act, 2013) for a period of five years as per Section 15 of the Act, 1995. It has been further contended that from bare perusal of relief sought by the petitioner, it is quite clear that though the petitioner has assailed the impugned notification but the petitioner has failed to explain as to how he is aggrieved with the said notification as the petitioner has not claimed that he be appointed as the member of the Waqf Board and thus the petitioner is not the aggrieved person, therefore, the petitioner has no locus standi to challenge the impugned order. As such, the instant writ petition deserves to be dismissed on this count alone. It has been further contended that the petitioner claimed himself as Mutawalli of registered Waqf under the Act, 1995 in respondent No.2 Waqf Board and prayed for election of Member, from electorate consisting of Mutawallis only whereas the petitioner is Mutawalli of a Waqf for which account audit and Nigrani Chanda under Section 72 of the Act, 1995 is not paid to the Waqf Board for last more than 10 years, therefore, the petitioner is not eligible for contesting the election of Member of Waqf Board consisting of Mutawallis, having income of more than one lac yearly, therefore, the instant writ petition is liable to be dismissed on this ground also. 5. 5. He would further submit that since the election of Member from Mutwallis is prescribed under Section 14 (1)(b)(iv) of the Act, 1995 and the nomination of respondent No.3 is made under Section 14 (2) & (3) of the Act, 1995, which can be invoked under Section 14(1)(b)(i)(i)(iii) of the Act, 1995, therefore there is no illegality in appointing the respondent No.3 by the respondents/State and election of member of Waqf Board from electorate of Mutawallis thus, the petitioner has no locus standi to challenge the appointment of private respondent. He would further submit that as per the provisions contained in Waqf Act, 1995, the respondent No.3 is appointed as per Section 14(1)(b) (i), which is meant for Member of Parliament elected among members of Parliament and since no member of Parliament is elected from State of Chhattisgarh in this term of year 2024-2029, therefore, one post is lying vacant, as such, the respondents/State has appointed respondent No.3 against the said post lying vacant under Section 14(1)(b)(i) of the Act, 1995. It is crystal clear that the appointment of respondent No.3 is made strictly in accordance with law as per the provisions of section 14(1)(b)(i) of the Act, 1995 (as amended) and in the present case nothing to do with the election of member through elected Mutawallis under Section 14 (1)(b)(iv) and the post of elected Mutawalli is still lying vacant. 6. It has been further contended that the Chairman of the Chhattisgarh State Waqf Board vide its letter dated 04.07.2024 requested the State Government for filling up one post of Member from Mutawalli quota under section 14(1)(b)(iv) of the Act, 1995 which has to be filled by election by an Electoral College consisting of Mutawallis of Auqaf whose annual income is Rs. one lac and presently there are six members in the Chhattisgarh State Waqf Board. Upon request made by the Chairman, the Commissioner, Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe Development vide letter dated 18.07.2024 directed the Chief Executive Officer, Chhattisgarh State Waqf Board to take necessary action for appointment on one post of Member from Mutawalli quota strictly in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Section 14(1)(b)(iv) of the Act, 1995. Accordingly, the Chhattisgarh State Waqf Board issued public notice dated 31.07.2024 which is duly published in the "Dainik Bhaskar” newspaper on 01.08.2024, wherein the Board has initiated proceedings for the appointment of a member from the Mutawalli quota. Accordingly, the Chhattisgarh State Waqf Board issued public notice dated 31.07.2024 which is duly published in the "Dainik Bhaskar” newspaper on 01.08.2024, wherein the Board has initiated proceedings for the appointment of a member from the Mutawalli quota. In the Chhattisgarh State Waqf Board, Raipur, members from Mutawalli quota will be elected from the electoral college constituted for each category stating that if the Mutawalli of a registered Waqf having annual income of Rs. one lac or more wants to be appointed as a Member of Chhattisgarh State Waqf Board, Raipur from Mutawalli quota through election then the income of the Waqf in the previous years and till the current year 2023-24, audit report of expenditure and monitoring of duties, deposit of entire amount of donation without delay in the Board Office within 30 days and get your name registered in the voter list and also necessarily bring your own Aadhar card. 7. It has been further contended that the ground raised by the petitioner with regard to limitation of membership of respondent Waqf Board to the extent of 7 members is concerned, the same is categorically denied as limitation of maximum 7 members is only for Union Territory as provided in proviso to Section 14 (1-A) of the Act, 1995 inserted by amendment w.e.f. 01.11.2013 and not for the States, therefore, in almost all states, the number of Member of Waqf Board is more than 7 like in Uttarakhand 11, Tripura 11, Tamil Nadu 11, Kerala 10, Manipur 10, Meghalaya 10, Punjab 10, Telangana 10 and West Bengal 10 members are functioning in the respective Waqf Boards of the respective States. Similarly, in Union Territories seven or less than seven members are working. It has been further contended that Section 14(3) of the Act, 1995 prescribed that State can nominate such number of persons as the Members of the Board as it deem fit, if the Government is satisfied, for reasons to be recorded in writing, that it is not reasonably practicable to constitute an electoral college for any of the categories mentioned in Section 14 (1) (b) (i)(ii)(iii) and Section 14 (4) of the Act, 1995 prescribes that the number of elected members of the Board shall, at all times, be more than the nominated members of the Board except as provided under Sub-Section (3). It has been further contended that the election of member from electorate of Mutawallis under Section 14 (1)(b)(iv) of the Act, 1995 is to be executed and conducted by the respondent Waqf Board and respondent No.2 has already initiated the proceedings for appointment through election. 8. It has been further contended that no other nomination is challenged by the petitioner except the appointment of the private respondent as Member of the Board. The petitioner has not made any representation for election of member under Section 14 (1)(b)(iv) of the Act, 1995, therefore, the present petition is not tenable and would submit that all the nomination has been done strictly in accordance with law and would pray for dismissal of the writ petition. 9. Respondent No. 2 has filed its reply mainly contending that the appointment of respondent No. 3 has been strictly done in accordance of the provisions of the Act, 1995 and would adopt the stand taken by the State/respondent No. 1 & 4. It has been further contended that notice dated 19.02.2024 was issued to the petitioner for producing audit reports supposed from year 2001-2002 to 2022 to 2023 but the petitioner has not submitted the requisite documents, as such the proceedings under Section 92 of the Act, 1995 has been proposed against him vide notice dated 19.02.2024 (Annexure R/2-1). Thus, he is not eligible for nomination as Member of the Board and would pray for dismissal of the writ petition. 10. Respondent No. 3 has filed its return mainly contending that from bare perusal reliefs sought by the petitioner, it is clear that the petitioner has not prayed for any relief for himself, hence the instant writ petition is not maintainable in its present form as no right of petitioner is being violated and petitioner has not claimed violation of his right requiring issuance of writ of mandamus, therefore, the present petition is in the nature of public interest litigation, thus, the same is liable to be dismissed on this count alone. It has been further contended that the procedure prescribed under the Act, 1995 has been followed scrupulously and would pray for dismissal of the writ petition. 11. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents placed on record with utmost satisfaction. 12. It has been further contended that the procedure prescribed under the Act, 1995 has been followed scrupulously and would pray for dismissal of the writ petition. 11. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents placed on record with utmost satisfaction. 12. This Court has called for the original records from the State/respondents No. 1 & 4 and from perusal of the records, it would reveal that the proceedings were initiated for nomination of member in the Waqf Board immediately after constitution of Waqf Board on 06.04.2022 but no Muslim member of Parliament was available for nomination, therefore, as per the note-sheet, it has been observed that since no Member of Parliament is available, Smt. Mohsina Kidwai has over aged and she is residing at New Delhi and one nomination as per 14(1)(b)(i) lying vacant. On 18.01.2023, the Government has examined the issue of constitution of member of the Board and on 27.02.2023 again it was mentioned in the note-sheet that Mr. Imran Memon has denied about his illness and on note-sheet dated 12.02.2024, it was also considered by the Government that the applications were made regarding nomination of Ex-member of Parliament to be member of the Board and it was found that they are not eligible for nomination. Thereafter on 25.06.2024 again the matter was examined in view of Section 14(1)(b) of the Act, 1995 and name of respondent No. 3 was considered. On 02.07.2024 since no Muslim member was available for nomination, therefore, in view of Section 14(2) & Section 3 of the Act, 1995, name of respondent No. 3 was proposed for nomination, accordingly, gazette notification was issued. Simultaneously, on 11.07.2024, the proceeding for nomination of Mutawalli was also initiated as one post is lying vacant. Thus, there is reason for nomination of respondent No. 3 as member of the Waqf Board. 13. In view of the above factual position and the law applicable to the Waqf Board, the following points emerged for determination of this Court are : Point No. 1: Whether the petitioner who is not eligible to be appointed on the category provided in Sections 14 (2) & (3) of the Act, 1995, can challenge the nomination of respondent No. 3 as member of the Waqf Board where nomination has been made in different categories ? Point No. 2: Whether the nomination of respondent No. 3 as member of the Waqf Board is legal and justified ? Point No. 1 14. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that since the respondent/State has colourable exercise of power by nominating respondent No. 3 as member of the Waqf Board and the limit prescribed under the Act, 1995 that the nominated member should not more than the elected member, has crossed the limit which adversely affect the functioning of the Waqf Board, therefore, the petitioner has right to challenge the same. This was vehemently objected by learned counsel for the respondents and would submit that the petitioner who is not eligible to be considered for nomination under the category of Mutawalli as he has violated the provision of the Act, 1995 as well as he is not eligible to be considered for nominating in the category of member of Waqf Board in which respondent No. 3 has been nominated. As such, he is not an aggrieved person to file this writ petition. Now this submission is being considered by this Court. It is well settled position of law that legal right is an averment of entitlement arising out of law. The aggrieved person by an order, can maintain a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The 'aggrieved person' means a person must show that he has a more particular or peculiar interest of his own beyond that of the general public in seeing that the law is properly administered and such harm or loss is not wrongful in the eye of law because it does not result in injury to a legal right or a legally protected interest. It is demonstratively clear that the petitioner has not been denied or deprived of a legal right. The petitioner has not sustained injury to any legally protected interest. In fact, the impugned order does not operate as a decision against him, much less does it wrongfully effect his title to something. He has not been subjected to legal wrong. He has suffered no grievance. He has no legal peg for a justiciable claim to hand on. Therefore, he is not a "person aggrieved" to challenge the nomination of respondent No. 3. 15. Hon’ble the Supreme Court in various decisions has considered the word ‘person aggrieved’, particularly in case of Babua Ram and others Vs. He has suffered no grievance. He has no legal peg for a justiciable claim to hand on. Therefore, he is not a "person aggrieved" to challenge the nomination of respondent No. 3. 15. Hon’ble the Supreme Court in various decisions has considered the word ‘person aggrieved’, particularly in case of Babua Ram and others Vs. State of U.P. and another reported in (1995) 2 SCC 689 wherein it has been held as under:- “17. In Collins English Dictionary, the word "aggrieved" has been defined to mean "to ensure unjustly especially by infringing a person's legal rights". In Webster Comprehensive Dictionary, International Edition at page 28, aggrieved person is defined to mean "subjected to ill-treatment, feeling an injury or injustice. Injured, as by legal decision adversely infringing upon one's rights". In Strouds Judicial Dictionary, Fifth Ed., Vol. 1, pages 83-84, person aggrieved means "person injured or damaged in a legal sense". In Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Ed. at page 65, aggrieved has been defined to mean "having suffered loss or injury; damnified; injured", aggrieved person has been defined to mean "One whose legal right is invaded by an act complained of, or whose pecuniary interest is directly and adversely affected by a decree or judgment. One whose right of property may be established or divested. The word "aggrieved" refers to a substantial grievance, a denial of some personal, pecuniary or property right, or the imposition upon a party of a burden or obligation." 18. One whose right of property may be established or divested. The word "aggrieved" refers to a substantial grievance, a denial of some personal, pecuniary or property right, or the imposition upon a party of a burden or obligation." 18. The person aggrieved must, therefore, be one who has suffered a legal grievance because of a decision pronounced by Civil Court giving higher compensation for an acquired lands similar to his own while he is denied of such higher compensation for his land because of operation of Section 18 read with Section 31 of the Act resulting in affectation of his pecuniary interest in his acquired land is directly and adversely in that award of the Collector made under s. 11, he becomes as such aggrieved person and entitled to avail of the right and remedy conferred upon him under Section 28A(1) to make good his denied right to receive compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector/L.A.O. Acceptance of the contention of Shri G.L. Sanghi, learned senior counsel and his companions, that person who under protest received payment of compensation for their lands but failed to avail of the right and remedy under Section 18 waiting in the wings for success of the land owners of the adjoining lands to get higher compensation under Section 28-A(1) as person aggrieved robs the poor and inarticulate who by reason of their poverty or ignorance failed to avail of the right and remedy under Section 18, and creates not only invidious discrimination between same class of person similarly situated but would be highly unjust arbitrary offending Article 14 of the Constitution, apart from flying in the face of express animation of the statute as espoused in its Statement of Objects and Reasons and the Financial Memorandum. In this context, we make it clear that we have looked into Statement of Objects and Reasons and the Financial Memorandum to know what is in that induced the introduction of the Bill but not as an aid to interpret Section 28-A(1). In this context, we make it clear that we have looked into Statement of Objects and Reasons and the Financial Memorandum to know what is in that induced the introduction of the Bill but not as an aid to interpret Section 28-A(1). Therefore, we have no hesitation to hold that any interested person in the land acquired under the same Notification published under Section 4(1) who failed to avail the right and remedy under Section 18(1) read with second proviso to Section 31(2), becomes a person aggrieved under Section 28-A(1) of the Act, when the owner of the another land covered by the same notification is awarded higher compensation by the Civil Court on a reference got made by him under Section 18.” 16. Again Hon’ble the Supreme Court in case of Northern Plastics Ltd. Vs. Hindustan Photo Films Mfg. Co. Ltd. and others reported in (1997) 4 SCC 452 has held in paragraph 10 as under:- “10……….But it order to earn a locus standi as 'person aggrieved' other than the arraigned party before the Collector of Customs as an adjudicating authority it must be shown that such a person aggrieved being third party has a direct legal interest in the goods involved in the adjudication process. It cannot be a general public interest or interest of a business rival as is being projected by the contesting respondents before us. In this connection we may refer to a Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Adi Pherozshah Gandhi v. H.M. Seervai, Advocate General of Maharashtra, Bombay [( 1970 (2) SCC 484 ]. Question before the Constitution Bench in that case was as to whether Advocate General of the High Court who was be to issued a notice in disciplinary proceedings by the Bar Council as per the provisions of Section 35(2) of the Advocate Act, 1961 had locus standi to prefer an appeal against the order of the disciplinary authority under Section 37 of the Advocates Act before Bar Council of India. A majority of the Constitution Bench took the view that the Advocate General had no such locus standi. He could not be said to be a 'person aggrieved' by the decision of the disciplinary authority exonerating the concerned delinquent advocate. A majority of the Constitution Bench took the view that the Advocate General had no such locus standi. He could not be said to be a 'person aggrieved' by the decision of the disciplinary authority exonerating the concerned delinquent advocate. Mitter, J., speaking for the majority considered the question in the light of the statutory settings of the Act and observed that to decide the question one had to look at the proceedings of this kind. We may refer to the pertinent observations in this connection made in paras 9 and 10 of the Report of the said judgment of Mitter, J.: "Generally speaking. a person can be said to be aggrieved by an order which is to his detriment, pecuniary or otherwise or causes him some prejudice in some form or other. A person who is not a party to a litigation has no right to appeal merely because the judgment or order contains some adverse remarks against him. But it has been held in a number of cases that a person who is not a party to a suit may prefer an appeal with the leave of the appellate court and such leave would not be refused where the judgment would be binding on him under Explanation 6 to Section 11 of the Code of civil procedure. We find ourselves unable to take the view that because a person has been given notice of some proceedings wherein he is given a right to appear and make his submissions, he should without more have a right of appeal from an order rejecting his contentions or submission. An appeal is a creature of statute and if a statute expressly gives a person a right to appeal, the matter rests there. Innumerable statutes both in England and in India give the right of appeal to 'a person aggrieved' by an order made and the provisions of such statutes have to be construed in each case to find out whether the person prefering an appeal falls within that expression. As was observed in Robinson v Currey [7 QBD 465] the words 'person aggrieved' are 'ordinary meaning put upon them'. As was observed in Robinson v Currey [7 QBD 465] the words 'person aggrieved' are 'ordinary meaning put upon them'. According to Halsbury's Laws of England (Third Edition, Vol.25), page 293, footnote 'h': '…...the expression is nowhere defined and must be contrued by reference to the context of the enactment in which it appears and all the circumstances.' Attempts have however from time to time been made to define the expression in various cases. In Ex parte Sidebotham In re Sidebotham [14 Ch D 458 at 465] it was observed by James L.J.: 'But the words 'person aggrieved' do not really mean a man who is disappointed of a benefit which he might have received if some other order had been made. A 'person aggrieved' must be a man who has suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something, or wrongfully refused him something, or wrongfully affected his title to something." 17. Hon’ble the Supreme Court in recent judgment in case of Shripal Bhati & another Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & others reported in (2020) 12 SCC 87 has examined the issue relating to aggrieved person and has held that unless injury is suffered personally a person cannot be said to be aggrieved and has no locus standi. Hon’ble the Supreme Court in paragraph 25 has held as under:- “25. For the aforesaid facts and reasons the challenge made by the appellants to the appointment and absorption of respondent no. 4 is not tenable and they have no locus standi in the matter. It may be relevant to refer to the observations made by this Court in the case Jasbhai Motibhai Desai Vs. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed & Ors. [ AIR 1976 SC 578 ], relied upon by the High Court, holding that unless injury is suffered personally a person can not be said to be aggrieved and has no locus standi: “48. In the light of above discussion, it is demonstrably clear that the appellant has not been denied or deprived of a legal right. He has not sustained injury to any legally protected interest. In fact, the impugned order does not operate as a decision against him, much less does it wrongfully affect his title to something. He has not been subjected to a legal wrong. He has suffered no legal grievance. He has not sustained injury to any legally protected interest. In fact, the impugned order does not operate as a decision against him, much less does it wrongfully affect his title to something. He has not been subjected to a legal wrong. He has suffered no legal grievance. He has no legal peg for a justiciable claim to hang on. Therefore, he is not a ‘person aggrieved’ and has no locus standi to challenge the grant of ‘No Objection Certificate”.” 18. In view of the law laid down by Hon’ble the Supreme Court, the petitioner has no locus standi to file the writ petition challenging the nomination of respondent No. 3 as member of the Waqf Board as right of the petitioner is not being adversely affected by the nomination of respondent No. 3, thus, the present writ petition deserves to be dismissed on the locus standi of the petitioner to file the petition. Accordingly, Point No. 1 is answered against the petitioner. Point No. 2 19. To appreciate Point No. 2, it is expedient for this Court to extract the provision of Section 14 of the Act, 1995, which reads as under:- “Section 14. Composition of Board.— (1) The Board for a State and the National Capital Territory of Delhi shall consist of— (a) a Chairperson; (b) one and not more than two members, as the State Government may think fit, to be elected from each of the electoral colleges consisting of— (i) Muslim Members of Parliament from the State or, as the case may be, the National Capital Territory of Delhi; (ii) Muslim Members of the State Legislature; (iii) Muslim members of the Bar Council of the concerned State or Union territory: Provided that in case there is no Muslim member of the Bar Council of a State or a Union territory, the State Government or the Union territory administration, as the case may be, may nominate any senior Muslim advocate from that State or the Union territory, and (iv) mutawallis of the auqaf having an annual income of rupees one lakh and above. Explanation I.—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the members from categories mentioned in sub-clauses (i) to (iv), shall be elected from the electoral college constituted for each category. Explanation I.—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the members from categories mentioned in sub-clauses (i) to (iv), shall be elected from the electoral college constituted for each category. Explanation II.—For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that in case a Muslim member ceases to be a Member of Parliament from the State or National Capital Territory of Delhi as referred to in sub-clause (i) of clause (b) or ceases to be a Member of the State Legislative Assembly as required under sub-clause (ii) of clause (b), such member shall be deemed to have vacated the office of the member of the Board for the State or National Capital Territory of Delhi, as the case may be, from the date from which such member ceased to be a Member of Parliament from the State National Capital Territory of Delhi, or a Member of the State Legislative Assembly, as the case may be; (c) one person from amongst Muslims, who has professional experience in town planning or business management, social work, finance or revenue, agriculture and development activities, to be nominated by the State Government; (d) one person each from amongst Muslims, to be nominated by the State Government from recognised scholars in Shia and Sunni Islamic Theology; (e) one person from amongst Muslims, to be nominated by the State Government from amongst the officers of the State Government not below the rank of Joint Secretary to the State Government; (1A) No Minister of the Central Government or, as the case may be, a State Government, shall be elected or nominated as a member of the Board: Provided that in case of a Union territory, the Board shall consist of not less than five and not more than seven members to be appointed by the Central Government from categories specified under sub-clauses (i) to (iv) of clause (b) or clauses (c) to (e) in sub-section (1): Provided further that at least two Members appointed on the Board shall be women: Provided also that in every case where the system of mutawalli exists, there shall be one mutawalli as the member of the Board. (2) Election of the members specified in clause (b) of sub-section (1) shall be held in accordance with the system of proportional representation by means of a single transferable vote, in such manner as may be prescribed: Provided that where the number of Muslim Members of Parliament, the State Legislature or the State Bar Council, as the case may be, is only one, such Muslim Member shall be declared to have been elected on the Board: Provided further that where there are no Muslim Members in any of the categories mentioned in sub-clauses (i) to (iii) of clause (b) of sub-section (1) the ex-Muslim Members of Parliament, the State Legislature or ex-member of the State Bar Council, as the case may be, shall constitute the electoral college. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, where the State Government is satisfied, for reasons to be recorded in writing, that it is not reasonably practicable to constitute an electoral college for any of the categories mentioned in sub-clauses (i) to (iii) of clause (b) of sub-section (1), the State Government may nominate such persons as the members of the Board as it deems fit. (4) The number of elected members of the Board shall, at all times, be more than the nominated members of the Board except as provided under sub-section (3). [****] (6) In determining the number of Shia members or Sunni members of the Board, the State Government shall have regard to the number and value of Shia auqaf and Sunni auqaf to be administered by the Board and appointment of the members shall be made, so far as may be, in accordance with such determination. [****] (8) Whenever the Board is constituted or reconstituted, the members of the Board present at a meeting convened for the purpose shall elect one from amongst themselves as the Chairperson of the Board. (9) The members of the Board shall be appointed by the State Government by notification in the Official Gazette.” 20. [****] (8) Whenever the Board is constituted or reconstituted, the members of the Board present at a meeting convened for the purpose shall elect one from amongst themselves as the Chairperson of the Board. (9) The members of the Board shall be appointed by the State Government by notification in the Official Gazette.” 20. From the note-sheet referred to above, it is quite vivid that no Member of Parliament from Muslim community is available for nomination and from perusal of Section 14(3) of the Act, 1995, it is quite vivid that if the Government is satisfied and reason to be recorded in writing that it is not reasonably practicable to constitute an electoral college mentioned in sub-clause (i) to (iii) of Clause (b) of Section 1 of the Act, 1995, the State Government may nominate such persons as the members of the Board as it deems fit. The petitioner has also not disputed that no Muslim member of Parliament from the State was available, therefore, the name of respondent No. 3 was proposed for nomination. As such, it is quite clear that no member of Parliament from the Muslim category was available, therefore, the State in exercise of its power conferred under Section 14 (3) of the Act, 1995 can nominate anyone. Thus, it cannot be said that the nomination of respondent No. 3 is contrary to the provisions of law. 21. Further submission of counsel for the petitioner is that no reason has been assigned by the State Government while nominating respondent No. 3, therefore, it is violation of the provisions of Section 14(3) of the Act, 1995, is being considered by this Court. From perusal of this Section, it is quite vivid that the reasons have to be assigned by the State Government in nominating respondent No. 3. To ascertain the factual matrix, this Court has called for the record of the nomination proceeding. From perusal the proceedings, it is quite vivid that the reason for nomination was non-availability of member of Parliament from Muslim community and the Section does not provide that in the notification, the reason has to be assigned. Even otherwise by the said nomination of respondent No. 3, the petitioner is not suffering any civil consequence, as such also assigning of reason is not required and assigning of reason in the note-sheet is compliance of Section 14(3) of the Act, 1995. Even otherwise by the said nomination of respondent No. 3, the petitioner is not suffering any civil consequence, as such also assigning of reason is not required and assigning of reason in the note-sheet is compliance of Section 14(3) of the Act, 1995. Hon’ble the Supreme Court in case of The Union of India & others Vs. E.G. Nambudiri reported in (1991) 3 SCC 38 has held in paragraph 9 as under:- “9. There are however, many areas of administrative activity where no reasons are recorded or communicated, if such a decision is challenged before the Court for judicial review, the reasons for the decision may be placed before the court. The superior authority while considering the representation of a Government servant against adverse remarks, is not required by law to act judicially, it is under no legal obligation to record or communicate reasons for its decision to the Government servant. The decision, rejecting the representation does not adversely affect any vested right of the Government servant nor does it visit him with any civil consequences. In many cases having regard to infinite variations of circumstances, it may not be possible to disclose reasons for the opinion formed about the work and conduct or character of the Government servant. In the instant case adverse remarks as contained in item Nos. 1 to 4 were expunged but those at serial numbers 5 and 6 were not expunged and the respondent’s representation to that extent was rejected. On a careful scrutiny of the two remarks, it would appear that observation contained in Item No. 5 "that nothing adverse has come to notice regarding your integrity" is not adverse to the respondent’s work and conduct. These remarks are neutral in nature, and they do not adversely comment upon the respondent’s work, conduct or character, though they are no commendatory in nature. As regards the remarks at Serial No. 6, they are self-explanatory, which show that inspite of oral and written warnings the respondent the respondent did not improve. If the superior authority was not satisfied with the explanation of the respondent as cantained in his representation, what reasons could be stated, except that the authority was not satisfied with the explanation. The superior authority was not obliged to write detail judgment or order giving detais of the warnings or the material on which he formed opinion.” 22. If the superior authority was not satisfied with the explanation of the respondent as cantained in his representation, what reasons could be stated, except that the authority was not satisfied with the explanation. The superior authority was not obliged to write detail judgment or order giving detais of the warnings or the material on which he formed opinion.” 22. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that since category of Muslim member of Parliament mentioned in Section 14(1)(b)(i) of the Act, 1995, Shri Riyaz Hussain has been nominated on 14.02.2022 (Annexure P/19) and in absence of another Muslim Member in the Parliament, no further nomination under Section 14(3) of the Act, 1995 of respondent No. 3 can be done in category of Muslim member of Parliament. He would further submit that Hon’ble Division Bench of Madras High Court in case of M.H. Jawahirullah Vs. Government of Tamil Nadu reported in 2013 (2) L.W. 707 (decided on 25.03.2013)] and also referred to the judgment rendered by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in case of State of Tamil Nadu & another Vs. K. Fazlur Rahman & another reported in (2021) 13 SCC 42 wherein it has been held in paragraph 17, 18 & 19 as under:- “17. It is the State Government which is to establish a Board as per composition provided under Section 14. Section 14(4) is a provision which incorporates democratic principles in constitution of the Board. The Legislature contemplates that Board is to be run by majority of elected members which is to ensure democratic principle and make the voice of elected representatives a determining factor in the decisions of the Board. 18. From the facts as noted above, there can be no dispute that at the time when the Board issued show cause notice as well as notification dated 18.09.2019, the number of elected members was less than the number of nominated members. The provision of Section 14(4) which mandates that number of elected members of the Board shall at, all times, be more than the nominated members of the Board is a provision compliance of which has to be ensured by the State which is authorised to constitute the Board. While constituting the Board, the State Government has to be conscious of the fact that the composition of Board shall be such which may fulfill the objectives enshrined in Section 14(4). While constituting the Board, the State Government has to be conscious of the fact that the composition of Board shall be such which may fulfill the objectives enshrined in Section 14(4). The State Government when makes nomination of two Senior Advocates under Section 14(1)(b)(iii), the said nomination was bound to have adverse effect on requirement of Section 14(4). While constituting the Board as per Section 14, the State has to keep in mind the principles and objectives as enshrined in Section 14(4) and constitution of Board shall be such as to give effect to the democratic principle which is to guide the Board in its functions. 19. In this context, we may also notice a Division Bench judgment of Madras High Court in M.H. Jawahirullah and others vs. Government of Tamil Nadu and others, (2013) 3 MLJ 688 , where the Madras High Court has correctly noticed the legislative intendment while constituting the Board under Section 14 of the Act. Following observation had been made in paragraph 27: "27......Primacy given to democratic process of administration and supervision in Wakf Board Management is apparent. In fact, the Statement of Objects and reasons shows this composition and election is an important feature of the Wakf Act. Since the intention of the Legislature is to have democratic process of administration and supervision in Wakf Board Management, the State cannot avoid election and resort to nomination arbitrarily. The only exception is Section 14(3). In Section 14(3), the Government is given discretion to exercise power to nominate such persons as members of the Board.” 23. He would further refer to the judgment rendered by Hon’ble the Division Bench of High Court of Maharashtra in case of Qamber Jeevaji Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in (2010) 5 MH.L.J. 484 wherein it has been held as under : “15. XXXX XXX XXX “(4) The number of elected members of the Board shall, at all times, be more than the nominated members of the Board except as provided under sub-section (3)". It is therefore apparent that parliament has provided "exception" in said sub-section to take care of exceptional or peculiar situation arising under Section 14(3) and that provision is not made to derogate from mandatory obligation flowing from its main part. This obligation is consistent with entire enactment itself. Parliament has highlighted it by deliberate use of words "at all times" in sub section (4). This obligation is consistent with entire enactment itself. Parliament has highlighted it by deliberate use of words "at all times" in sub section (4). Thus only when in circumstances sustainable under Section 14(3), State Government effects nominations that the rule of elected members being in majority is relaxed. Such nomination instead of election is permissible also in exceptional circumstances. Thus such arrangement made to meet the rare situations can not be used to argue that rule of elected members being in majority is not mandatory. "Exception" carved out in Section 14(4) proves the rule meant by parliament to operate in normal circumstances and it can not be used to elevate said exception itself to the status of such rule.” 24. This submission deserves to be rejected on the count that as per the Act, 1995, the Waqf Board consists of more than seven members for the State of Chhattisgarh and other State as per Section 14(1-A) of the Act, 1995. This fact is fortified from the statement made in the return filed by the respondents wherein they have stated that for various State like Uttrakhand, Tripura, Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Manipur, Meghalaya, Punjab, Telangana and West Bengal are vary from 10 to 11 and this fact has not been rebutted by the petitioner even in the rejoinder and if the constitution of the Waqf Board for the State of Chhattisgarh, it is quite vivid that nominated members are less than the elected members, thus, the submission made by learned counsel for the petitioner that the nominated members are more than the elected members, is in violation of Section 14(4) of the Act, 1995, is illegal and deserves to be rejected and accordingly, it is rejected. Accordingly, Point No. 2 is also answered against the petitioner. 25. It is quit vivid that neither the nomination of respondent No. 3 is dehors the provisions of the Waqf Act, 1995 nor constitution of the Waqf Board is in violation of Section 14(4) of the Act, 1995. The respondents/State have stated that they have already initiated steps for appointment of members of Waqf Board from the category of Mutawalli. Let the proceedings initiated by the State for appointment of members of the Waqf Board in the category of Mutawalli be reached to its logical end within three months from the date of judgment passed by this Court. 26. Let the proceedings initiated by the State for appointment of members of the Waqf Board in the category of Mutawalli be reached to its logical end within three months from the date of judgment passed by this Court. 26. Consequently, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed with a direction to the State to conclude the appointment of members of the Waqf Board from the category of Mutawalli within three months from the date of order passed by this Court. 27. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed. 28. The interim order passed by this Court on 25.07.2024 is vacated.