JUDGMENT : SAMIR J. DAVE, J. 1. By way of this petition, the petitioner - detenue has challenged the order of detention dated 06.10.2023 passed by the Commissioner of Police, Vadodara City, in exercise of powers conferred on him under sub-section(1) of Section 3 of the Gujarat Prevention of Antisocial Activities Act, 1985 (for short, 'the PASA Act') and has also prayed for an order to set him free from detention. 2. This Court has taken note of the fact that the petitioner has been detained as a 'Immoral Traffic Offender'. It also appears that in the grounds of detention order dated 06.10.2023, the detaining authority has relied upon one offence registered with the Sama Police Station, District Vadodara City being C.R. No.11196013230246 of 2023 for the offence punishable under Sections 3, 4, 5, 7 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act. 3. Section 2(g) of the PASA Act defines the term 'immoral traffic offender', which reads as under:- “S.2(g) "immoral traffic offender" means a person who habitually commits or abets the commission of any offence under the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956; 3.1 Section 3 of the PASA Act speaks about the power to make orders detaining certain persons. It reads as under: “Sec.3 Power to make orders detaining certain persons: (1) The State Government may if satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained. (2) If having regard to the circumstances prevailing or likely to prevail in any area within the local limits of the jurisdiction of a District Magistrate or a Commissioner of Police, the State Government is satisfied that it is necessary so to do, it may, by order in writing, direct that the District Magistrate or the Commissioner of Police, may also, if satisfied as provided in sub-section (1), exercise the powers conferred by the said sub-section. (3) When any order is made under this section by an authorised officer, he shall forthwith report the fact to the State Government, together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as, in his opinion, has a bearing on the matter, and no such order shall remain in force for more than twelve days after the making thereof, unless, in the meantime, it has been approved by the State Government. (4) For the purpose of this section, a person shall be deemed to be "acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order" when such person is engaged in or is making preparation for engaging in any activities, whether as a bootlegger or dangerous person or drug offender or immoral traffic offender or property grabber, which affect adversely or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order. Explanation:- For the purpose of this sub-section, public order shall be deemed to have been affected adversely or shall be deemed likely to be affected adversely inter alia if any of the activities of any person referred to in this subsection directly or indirectly, is causing or is likely to cause any harm, danger or alarm or feeling of insecurity among the general public or any section thereof or a grave or widespread danger to life, property or public health." 4. The Court has also taken in to consideration the fact that the petitioner was arrested on 03.10.2023 and released on bail on 05.10.2023 and thereafter, the order of detention was passed on 06.10.2023 and therefore, the order of detention is passed on the very next day of the order of bail. 5. The Apex Court in the case of Kalidas C. Kahar Vs. State of Gujarat and Ors., reported in 1989 Supple. II SCC 155, has held that the detaining authority has to undertake a meaningful exercise and apply the mind to the documents placed alongwith the sponsoring proposal and then come to the conclusion by subjectively satisfying itself. Looking to objectively to the documents on record and conclude that the detention is the only option available to the petitioner, this exercise is not evident from either from the grounds of detention, the documents accompanying order of detention or any affidavit of the detaining authority in this regards. 6. Looking to objectively to the documents on record and conclude that the detention is the only option available to the petitioner, this exercise is not evident from either from the grounds of detention, the documents accompanying order of detention or any affidavit of the detaining authority in this regards. 6. In this connection, this Court may refer to a decision of the Supreme Court in Pushker Mukherjee v/s. State of West Bengal [ AIR 1970 SC 852 ], where the distinction between 'law and order' and 'public order' has been clearly laid down. The Court observed as follows : “Does the expression "public order" take in every kind of infraction of order or only some categories thereof ? It is manifest that every act of assault or injury to specific persons does not lead to public disorder. When two people quarrel and fight and assault each other inside a house or in a street, it may be said that there is disorder but not public disorder. Such cases are dealt with under the powers vested in the executive authorities under the provisions of ordinary criminal law but the culprits cannot be detained on the ground that they were disturbing public order. The contravention of any law always affects order but before it can be said to affect public order, it must affect the community or the public at large. In this connection we must draw a line of demarcation between serious and aggravated forms of disorder which directly affect the community or injure the public interest and the relatively minor breaches of peace of a purely local significance which primarily injure specific individuals and only in a secondary sense public interest. A mere disturbance of law and order leading to disorder is thus not necessarily sufficient for action under the Preventive Detention Act but a disturbance which will affect public order comes within the scope of the Act.” 7. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and having gone through the grounds of detention, in the opinion of this Court, the detaining authority has failed to substantiate that the alleged antisocial activities of the petitioner-detenue adversely affect or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order. Just because a case has been registered against the petitioner-detenue under the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, by itself, does not have any bearing on the maintenance of public order. Just because a case has been registered against the petitioner-detenue under the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, by itself, does not have any bearing on the maintenance of public order. The petitioner may be punished for the alleged offences committed by him but, surely, the acts constituting the offences cannot be said to have affected the even tempo of the life of the community much less public health. It may be that the petitioner-detenue is a “immoral traffic offender” within the meaning of Section 2(g) of the PASA Act, but merely because he is a 'immoral traffic offender’, he cannot be preventively detained under the provisions of the PASA Act unless, as laid down in sub-section (4) of Section 3 of the PASA Act, his activities as a 'immoral traffic offender' affect adversely or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order. 8. In the result, this Special Civil Application is allowed. The impugned order of detention dated 06.10.2023 passed by the respondent authority is hereby quashed and set aside. The detenue is ordered to be set at liberty forthwith if not required in any other case. Rule is made absolute accordingly. Direct service is permitted.