JUDGMENT : SyamKumar V.M., J. This appeal is filed by the sole accused in S.C.No.440 of 2011 before the Additional Sessions Judge, Neyyattinkara, challenging the judgment dated 08.09.2016 which found him guilty under Section 302 IPC and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.50,000/-, with a default sentence of rigorous imprisonment of one year. 2. The prosecution case is that the accused had, on 21.08.2010, at 6.20 P.M., caused the death of a fellow fisherman Arogyadas, by fatally stabbing him on the right side of his neck. The provocation for the act was that on the fateful day, while Arogyadas was having a shave seated in the open along the seashore, the accused, who was sitting alongside mending fishing nets with other fisher folk, had purportedly on a lighter vein, ridiculed Arogyadas by calling him a local epithet “chakka poonji” which roughly translates as “loser”. Irked by this ignominy, Arogyadas, once his shave was done, approached the accused and questioned his impertinence. The accused, it is alleged, had at that point got up and stabbed Arogyadas on the right side of his neck using the steel knife with which he was mending the fishing net. The injury proved fatal and Arogyadas died at 10.35 P.M. on the same day at the Medical College Hospital, Thiruvananthapuram. 3. An FI Statement was lodged by PW1, the brother of the victim at the jurisdictional Police Station at Pozhiyoor. Based on the same, Crime No.324 of 2010 was registered and an investigation was commenced by the Police. The weapon alleged to have been used for the commission of the offence was recovered on the next day from the seashore. Accused was arrested at 11 A.M., on 25.08.2010, and was remanded to judicial custody. Charge was laid by the Circle Inspector of Police, Parassala, before the jurisdictional Magistrate who committed the case to the concerned Sessions Court. 4. After due framing of charge and upon the accused pleading not guilty, trial commenced before the Sessions Judge. Prosecution examined PW1 to PW9 and marked Exts.P1 to P15. MO1 to MO5 were also identified. 5. Charge was laid by the Circle Inspector of Police, Parassala, before the jurisdictional Magistrate who committed the case to the concerned Sessions Court. 4. After due framing of charge and upon the accused pleading not guilty, trial commenced before the Sessions Judge. Prosecution examined PW1 to PW9 and marked Exts.P1 to P15. MO1 to MO5 were also identified. 5. After closure of the prosecution evidence, appellant was questioned under Section 313 Cr.P.C., to which he stated that he was innocent of all the charges levelled and that on the relevant day, a drunken brawl had taken place between the deceased and certain fisher folk, some of whom are witnesses arrayed in the crime laid against him. Deceased was injured in the said scuffle and appellant had nothing to do with the incident. However, after three days, appellant was picked up from his house by the police and falsely implicated as the accused. 6. Though opportunity was extended, no evidence was tendered from the side of the appellant. 7. The learned Sessions Judge, after trial, relying principally on the deposition of PW2 who was an eyewitness to the incident and basing on the deposition of PW6 doctor who had issued Ext.P6 Postmortem Certificate who had, interaliastated the cause of death as due to stab injury to the neck of the deceased, found the appellant guilty of the charge laid. He was consequently convicted under Section 302 IPC. 8. After due compliance with the sentencing procedure, the learned Judge sentenced the appellant to imprisonment for life and to a fine of Rs.50,000/-and in case of default of payment of fine, to rigorous imprisonment for a further period of one year. The learned Judge also directed that out of the fine amount, if realised, an amount of Rs.40,000/-shall be paid to the wife and children of the deceased. 9. Challenging the said conviction and sentence, the appellant has filed this appeal. 10. The learned counsel for the appellant assails the conviction and sentence mainly on the following grounds: (i) Testimony of the sole eyewitness PW2 is unsubstantiated and there is no sufficient evidence to find a conviction. (ii) Recovery of MO1 knife is illegal and its use as a weapon of offence not validly proved. (iii) Nature of injury No.1 and circumstances leading to its infliction do not reveal ingredients to attract Section 300 IPC. 11. (ii) Recovery of MO1 knife is illegal and its use as a weapon of offence not validly proved. (iii) Nature of injury No.1 and circumstances leading to its infliction do not reveal ingredients to attract Section 300 IPC. 11. We proceed to consider each of these contentions in detail. Evidentiary value of the sole testimony of PW2: The offence as alleged by the prosecution had occurred along the seashore, ie., out in the open in front of many fisher folk. Admittedly, there were more than one eyewitness to the incident. Prosecution has examined only one among them viz., Shiluva Pilla, examined as PW2. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that the appellant while tendering his statement under Section 313, had submitted that the stabbing of the deceased had occurred during a melee that had broken out among a group of drunken fishermen. He had further specifically stated the names of the persons in the said group as Cleetus Nayakom, Mikhael Kunju, Simon, Bosco, Shiluva Pilla (PW2), and the deceased Arogyadas. According to the learned counsel, the prosecution had a bounden duty to examine the said other eyewitnesses or any one among them so as to substantiate and corroborate the statement of PW2. Examining PW2 alone in the facts and circumstances was improper and this has caused serious prejudice to the appellant as he lost the valuable opportunity to contradict and crosscheck the statements of PW2 with those of other eyewitnesses, submits the learned counsel. To appreciate this contention, we need to examine the worth and reliability of the deposition of PW2 and ascertain whether it lacked clarity or was in any manner deficient, thus necessitating corroboration or substantiation. 12. It is relevant to note that PW2 was an eyewitness not only to the incident of stabbing, but also to the entire events leading up to the same. That the appellant, while engaged in the task of mending fishing net with others along the seashore, had called out the deceased who was having a shave nearby, using his pejorative nick name and that the deceased had after completing his shave, approached the appellant and questioned him, upon which the appellant had rose to his feet leading to a scuffle between the two is clearly deposed by PW2. That the appellant had during the scuffle that ensued, struck the deceased on the right side of his neck with MO1 knife which was already in his hands as the tool used to repair the fishing net, is also unequivocally stated by PW2. He has further stated that the stab injury caused the deceased to bleed from his neck and to fall down, upon which the onlookers carried the deceased to the hospital. PW2 has identified MO1 knife shown to him in the court as the one used by the appellant in the incident. Though he was cross examined in detail, nothing could be brought out to impeach the credit and worth of his testimony. He has narrated the incident he witnessed with precision and clarity. His deposition conveys that he had witnessed to the whole incident from very close quarters. The evidence tendered by PW2 is clear, cogent and remains uncontroverted. The precision and clarity with which it was rendered leads us to conclude that it did not by itself call for any clarification or corroboration. Thus the prosecution cannot be faulted for having not examined any additional witness to corroborate PW2 for the reason that the deposition of PW2 was of sterling quality and devoid of any need for corroboration. 13. The law and precedents on the point are also settled. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has in Rohtash Kumar vs. State Of Haryana [ (2013) 14 SCC 434 ] held that it was entirely up to the prosecution to field witnesses to establish its case and the court would not interfere unless the case was exceptional. "The prosecution is not bound to examine all cited witnesses, and it can drop witnesses to avoid multiplicity or plurality of witnesses. It is the discretion of the prosecutor to tender witnesses to prove the case of the prosecution and the court will not interfere with the exercise of that discretion unless, perhaps, it can be shown that the prosecution has been influenced by some oblique motive." It is also trite that rather than the number of witnesses, it is the content and worth of their deposition that weighs with the court. Deposition of a solitary eyewitness can be the basis for conviction provided the testimony is of sterling quality. Deposition of a solitary eyewitness can be the basis for conviction provided the testimony is of sterling quality. In Amar Singh vs. State (NCT of Delhi) (2020 SCC Online SC 826), the Supreme Court has held that conviction can be based on the sole eyewitness’s testimony so long he/she is found to be wholly reliable. In facts of that case, it was held that “ Finding of guilt of the two accused-appellants recorded by the two Courts is based on the sole testimony of eyewitness PW-1. As a general rule, the Court can and may act on the testimony of a single eyewitness provided he is wholly reliable. There is no legal impediment in convicting a person on the sole testimony of a single witness. That is the logic of Section 134 of the Evidence Act, 1872.” In Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade and Anr. vs. State Of Maharashtra (1973 SCC (Cri) 1033), it was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that “Even if the case against the accused hangs on the evidence of a single eye-witness it may be enough to sustain the conviction given sterling testimony of a competent, honest man, although as a rule of prudence courts call for corroboration. It is a platitude to say that witnesses have to be weighed and not counted since quality matters more than quantity in human affairs.” 14. Thus it is settled that prosecution need not examine all the eyewitnesses in a case. Prosecutor has the discretion to decide on the witnesses to be examined to support the prosecution case. As long as this discretion is exercised by the prosecutor in such a way as to promote the interests of justice and to ensure a fair trial, there exists no cause or reason to interfere with it or to deduce therefrom a contrary view while appreciating evidence. PW2 has unequivocally deposed regarding the incident and the events prior to the occurrence. His testimony had withstood thorough cross examination. No prejudice has been shown to have occasioned to the appellant on the ground of PW2 being the sole eyewitness examined by the prosecution. By the nature of the testimony rendered by PW2, which was clear precise and cogent, no corroboration or substantiation of his testimony with that of any other eyewitnesses was required. No prejudice has been shown to have occasioned to the appellant on the ground of PW2 being the sole eyewitness examined by the prosecution. By the nature of the testimony rendered by PW2, which was clear precise and cogent, no corroboration or substantiation of his testimony with that of any other eyewitnesses was required. In the light of the above and the settled precedents on the point, the contention of the counsel for the appellant that the testimony of PW2 cannot be relied on and ought to have been further substantiated or corroborated by other eyewitnesses, is unsustainable. 15. Recovery of the MO1 knife: The learned counsel for the appellant then proceeded to impress upon us the imperfections in the prosecution case surrounding MO1 knife, alleged to have been used to as a weapon to stab the victim. He submits that the knives like MO1 are commonly used by all fisher folk for tending to the broken fishing nets which incidentally is an everyday group activity indulged in by the fisher folk by sitting along the seashore after returning from the sea. The purported recovery of such a random knife, commonly found in every fishing household, from the sea shore does not incriminate or connect it to the appellant, submits the learned counsel. Further, the learned counsel submits that the facts leading to MO1’s recovery, as put forth by the prosecution also takes it beyond the realm of probability. As per the prosecution version, MO1 knife was recovered on the next day of the incident ie., on 22.08.2010, at around 12.00 P.M., from the seashore. That makes it a recovery made more than 18 hours after the alleged stabbing incident, which is said to have occurred on 21.08.2010, at around 6.00 P.M. The improbability of the knife being left at the crime scene for such a long period of time coupled with the fact that such a knife would be in the possession of any fisherman who uses it as part of his avocation, makes it probable that it could be just any other knife found along the seashore. It would also, according to the learned counsel, provide impetus to the proposition that MO1 was subsequently planted by the police to give credence to the prosecution version. It would also, according to the learned counsel, provide impetus to the proposition that MO1 was subsequently planted by the police to give credence to the prosecution version. Additionally, the fact that the FSL report dated 26.10.2023 (Ext.P15) detected no blood on MO1, according to the learned counsel, buttresses the fact that the said knife was never used as alleged by the prosecution. As per the learned counsel, the above facts all incontrovertibly substantiate his contention that MO1 knife does not at all relate to the alleged incident or alternatively it had been planted subsequent to the incident thus making it totally unreliable or irrelevant in deciding the culpability of the appellant. 16. We note that MO1 was recovered from the scene of occurrence along with other MOs from the scene, including blood stained sand by PW8 (S.I. of Police). He has deposed in detail the facts leading to its recovery. PW3, who was witness to the recovery of MO1 knife and a signatory to Ext.P3 scene mahazar, in which the recovery of MO1 was recorded, has deposed to the witnessing of the recovery of MO1 knife from the scene of occurrence by the police. He has also identified MO1 in court as the knife which was thus recovered from the scene of occurrence. PW2, the eyewitness to the incident also has in his deposition specifically identified MO1 as the knife seen by him as used by the appellant to stab the deceased on the very day of the incident. PW2 who had occasion to see in MO1 knife from close quarters has also elaborated on the nature of the knife, its colour (as blue) and also its approximate length. He has also clearly identified MO1 as the same knife used in the stabbing by the appellant, while it was shown to him in court. Though PW2, PW3 and PW8 were cross examined in detail, nothing to discredit their testimony could be brought out. He has also clearly identified MO1 as the same knife used in the stabbing by the appellant, while it was shown to him in court. Though PW2, PW3 and PW8 were cross examined in detail, nothing to discredit their testimony could be brought out. As regards the fact that no blood stains were noted on MO1 in the FSL report, the same by itself would not justify throwing MO1 out of the realm of reliable evidence, especially since the absence of blood stains could be explained by circumstances wherein MO1 was remaining all through the night and till around noon of the next day, in the open, along the seashore permitting it to be affected by the forces of nature, the sea, air and water. It is also relevant to note here that PW6 (Dr.Salini R.) who had carried out the postmortem of the victim and had issued Ext.P6 certificate, was while in box, shown MO1 knife and was asked whether the fatal injury viz., injury No. 1 on the right side of the neck could have been caused by MO1. She had answered to the same in the affirmative. In the light of the above, we do not find any merit in the contentions of the learned counsel for the appellant to discredit the prosecution case based on recovery of MO1 knife and on the FSL report relating to the same. 17. Nature of injury No.1 and the absence of ingredients to attract Section 300 IPC: The next contention put forth by the learned counsel on behalf of the appellant concerns the very laying of a charge under Section 300 IPC against the appellant and his conviction and sentencing under Section 302 IPC. This according to the learned counsel is erroneous and unsustainable. He contends that even assuming that all facts put forth by the prosecution stands proved by evidence, it does not attract an offence liable to be punished under Section 302 of the IPC. It would, according to the learned counsel, at the most reveal the commission of an offence chargeable under Section 299 of the IPC, thus attracting a lesser punishment under the second limb of Section 304 IPC. He proceeds to substantiate this by taking us through the facts of the case as proved by the prosecution evidence. It would, according to the learned counsel, at the most reveal the commission of an offence chargeable under Section 299 of the IPC, thus attracting a lesser punishment under the second limb of Section 304 IPC. He proceeds to substantiate this by taking us through the facts of the case as proved by the prosecution evidence. The evidence of the sole eyewitness PW2, has brought out that the appellant had during the tussle that occurred between him and the deceased upon being confronted by the deceased over his impertinent remark, stuck the deceased with MO1 knife which happened to injure the deceased on the right side of his neck. There was thus only a single overt act from the part of the appellant using MO1 knife, which happened to be a chance weapon in his hands, which during the relevant time was being used by him as a tool of avocation. The incident thus, according to the learned counsel was not intentional, premeditated nor deliberate and had happened in the spur of the moment. The injury that resulted was, according to the counsel, a cut and not a stab, as is made out to be by the prosecution. That the sole eyewitness examined, spoke only of the appellant striking at the deceased once and does not say that he had followed it up with more attacks, according to the learned counsel reveals that the appellant had no intention to kill or to even cause an injury that he had knowledge or reason to believe would lead to a likelihood of death. That the said cut injury which occurred during the tussle between the appellant and the deceased happened to be fatal was a mere unlucky chance, fateful both for the deceased as well as the appellant, who till then used to work on the same fishing boat and have even the day before went to the sea together, submits the learned counsel. 18. The above contention of the learned counsel, we note, is put forth to enable his client to avail the benefit of a lesser punishment that would be attracted if the offence is demoted from that of murder under 300 IPC (which attracts a graver punishment under Section 302) to one under Section 299 IPC (which would only lead to a lesser punishment under the second limb of 304 IPC). 19. 19. Before proceeding to consider the said contention of the learned counsel, it may be relevant to take a closer look at the nature of Injury No.1 which according to PW6 doctor, is the lone fatal injury that caused the death of the deceased. Injury No.1 has been explained in Ext.P6 Postmortem Certificate as follows: Incised penetrating wound 1.2x0.5 cm obliquely placed on the right side of front of neck, with its upper inner end 5 cm above collar bone and 5.5 cm outer to midline. Two superficial side cuts 0.4x0.1 cm and 0.2x0.1 cm, placed 0.2 cm apart, parallel to each other, directed down wards and inwards on the lower margin, the smaller upper one being 0.2 cm below its upper end. The total minimum depth of the wound was 3.5 cm. The wound was directed upwards, backwards and to the left and entered into the trachea after cutting external jugular vein, sterno mastoid muscle just behind the thyroid gland and cutting the cricoid cartilage. Air embolism was demonstrated in the right ventricle of the heart. PW6 doctor in her deposition has reiterated the nature of injury No.1 in full detail. She had thereafter explained the cause of the death of the deceased as the said injury (No.1) occasioned to his neck. She also deposed that Injury No.1 can be caused with MO1 knife which was shown to her and she cross checked and confirmed her said statement by measuring MO1 in the court using a scale. She has in Ext.P6 reported that the wound from injury No.1 is “deep” and had a “totalminimumdepthof3.5cm.”. It had pierced the tracheal wall of the deceased and had gone deep into the passage. It is true that she had in her statement, in the context of comparing it with the two parallel side cuts beneath, termed injury No.1 to be “plainly cut”. Though the counsel for the appellant relies on this statement to contend that the injury was only a ‘cut’ injury and was not a ‘stab’, such a conclusion cannot be drawn from the said statement of PW6 since she was only differentiating Injury No.1 from the other two superficial minor cuts underneath. That injury No.1 was a ‘stab’ and not a ‘cut’ is discernible from its depth of nearly 3.5 cms. That injury No.1 was a ‘stab’ and not a ‘cut’ is discernible from its depth of nearly 3.5 cms. and the fact that it had entered into the trachea after cutting external jugular vein, sterno mastoid muscle just behind the thyroid gland and also leading to the cutting of the cricoid cartilage. During cross examination, though a suggestion was put to PW6 that withdrawing a weapon like MO1, can only lead to a punctured single wound, she had denied and added that a punctured wound and a wound caused during withdrawal are different. Thus PW6 doctor has in very clear terms deposed that the wound No. 1 caused was a deep wound capable of leading to fatality and not a plain cut. She has also deposed that the only other injury ie., injury No. 2 was a wound caused in the hospital. In view of the above, the contention put forth by the learned counsel that the injury was not a ‘stab’ but only a ‘cut’ cannot be countenanced. 20. However, there is prima-facie merit in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that prosecution evidence reveals only a single isolated injury caused by the appellant upon the deceased using MO1 weapon, that too during a tussle which occurred at the fit of the moment, leading to a chance injury to the jugular vein which had turned out to be fatal. He contends that even if the nature of the injury is that of a ‘stab’ and not a ‘cut’, the prosecution has not been able to prove that the appellant had an intention to cause death of the deceased. No evidence has been put forth by the prosecution to prove any prior enmity or hatred between the appellant and the deceased. The stab injury arising out of the incident spoken of by prosecution witnesses, according to the learned counsel for the appellant, cannot be termed as premeditated act from the part of the appellant, intended to kill the deceased. Neither does it prove that appellant was possessing or harboring an intention to kill or of even having knowledge of a likelihood that the said specific injury would lead to death of the deceased. 21. Neither does it prove that appellant was possessing or harboring an intention to kill or of even having knowledge of a likelihood that the said specific injury would lead to death of the deceased. 21. The practical effect of this contention raised by the appellant’s counsel is to lead this court to examine whether the subtle and intricate difference that law envisages between culpable homicide (under Section 299 IPC) and murder (under Section 300 IPC) had been overlooked by the learned Sessions Judge, thus leading to a wrong conviction of the appellant under Section 302 (for murder), when the prosecution evidence had only merited a charge under Section 299, which if at all proved, could have only led to a lesser conviction under the second limb of Section 304 IPC. For ascertaining the above, it would be necessary to succinctly examine the perennial quagmire of differentiating between ‘culpable homicide’ and ‘murder’ and assigning the offence committed by the appellant to either of these categories and sentencing him / her based solely on the existence or absence of the rather nebulous concepts of ‘intention’ and ‘knowledge’. 22. Homicide is generally defined as the killing of one human being by another. All homicides are not unlawful. There are justifiable or excusable homicides as could be seen in the exceptions recognized to Section 302 IPC. All other homicides are unlawful, punishable or ‘culpable’ thus leading to the term ‘culpable homicide’ (Section 299). A culpable homicide is thus the act of causing death by doing an act with the intention of causing death, or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death or an act with the knowledge that it was likely to cause death. Within the generic term ‘culpable homicide’, there are sub categories, of which one is ‘murder’. It can thus be generally stated that all murders are culpable homicides. However, the reverse is not true. All culpable homicides are not murders. There could be culpable homicides that do not graduate to the level of murder. What leads to this difference is the presence or absence of some mental attributes/attitudes. If these mental attributes are present, a lesser offence becomes a greater one ie., a culpable homicide becomes murder. These mental attitudes, four in number, have been enumerated in Section 300 of IPC. They come in handy while distinguishing murder from culpable homicide. What leads to this difference is the presence or absence of some mental attributes/attitudes. If these mental attributes are present, a lesser offence becomes a greater one ie., a culpable homicide becomes murder. These mental attitudes, four in number, have been enumerated in Section 300 of IPC. They come in handy while distinguishing murder from culpable homicide. Unless it is proved that at least one among these four mental attributes are present, the offence will remain just a culpable homicide and not a murder. The first of these mental attributes is ‘intention’ and the second is ‘knowledge’. A culpable homicide is murder if done with the intention to cause death. Sometimes the intention to cause death per semay be absent and the act of culpable homicide might have been done with the intention to cause bodily injury which the offender knows to be likely to cause death. Thus it is done with a subjective knowledge that the offender possess, vis-a-vis, the victim. The third mental attitude that elevates a culpable homicide to murder discards this subjective knowledge and substitutes it with the objective understanding of the offender that the bodily injury intentionally done, will in the ordinary course of nature, cause death. The fourth mental attitude that elevates a culpable homicide to murder is when the offender knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death. If the offence does not possess any of these mental attributes, the same is not murder and is relegated to the category of culpable homicide. Five exceptions are enumerated in Section 300 explaining that such of the culpable homicides meeting the mandates of the exceptions are not murders and would remain culpable homicide. Punishments imposed for the offence of murder are graver (under Section 302) than those imposed for culpable homicide not amounting to murder (under Section 304). Further within Section 304 two limbs have been provided with two different punishments for two different circumstances. If the offender harbours an intention then the same would be a case of Section 304 Part I being attracted and if it is only a case of knowledge and not intention to cause death or bodily injury, then the same would fall under Section 304 part II. 23. If the offender harbours an intention then the same would be a case of Section 304 Part I being attracted and if it is only a case of knowledge and not intention to cause death or bodily injury, then the same would fall under Section 304 part II. 23. Much judicial ink has been spent in interpreting the inter play between culpable homicide and murder and regarding the sentence to be imposed once it is proved that the accused has committed either of them. The limited consensus arrived at can be found in the observation of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rampal Singh V. State of Uttar Pradesh ( 2012 (8) SCC 289 ). In the context of applying 304 Part I and Part II, it was held by the Hon’ble Court therein that “every case must essentially be decided on its own merits. The court has to perform very delicate function of applying the provisions of the Code to the facts of the case with a clear demarcation as to under what category of cases, the case at hand falls and accordingly punish the accused.” The lex classicuson the topic remains the judgment of Vivian Bose, J. in Virsa Singh V. State of Punjab (1958 KHC 451) which pithily stated the essentials to be proved to decide on the applicability of Section 300 as follows: “To put it shortly, the prosecution must prove the following facts before it can bring a case under s. 300, “thirdly" ; First, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present ; Secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved; These are purely objective investigations. Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was intended. Once these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry proceeds further and, Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three elements set out above is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender. This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender. Once these four elements are established by the prosecution (and, of course, the burden is on the prosecution throughout) the offence is murder under s. 300, 3rdly. It does not matter that there was no intention to cause death. It does not matter that there was Do intention even to cause an injury of a kind that is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature (not that there is any real distinction between the two). It does not even matter that there is no knowledge that an act of that kind will be likely to cause death. Once the intention to cause the bodily injury actually found to be present is proved, the rest of the enquiry is purely objective and the only question is whether, as a matter of purely objective inference, the injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. No one has a licence to run around inflicting injuries that are sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature and claim that they are not guilty of murder. If they inflict injuries of that kind, they must face the consequences; and they can only escape if it can be shown, or reasonably deduced that the injury was accidental or otherwise unintentional.” 24. Recently in Anbazhagan V. State represented by the Inspector of Police ( AIR 2023 SC 3660 ), the Hon’ble Supreme Court had occasion to consider the question whether the conviction of the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 304 Part I of the IPC should be further altered to Section 304 Part II of the IPC. After a detailed survey of the precedents on the point, the Hon’ble Court summed up as follows: “Few important principles of law discernible from the aforesaid discussion may be summed up thus:- (1) When the court is confronted with the question, what offence the accused could be said to have committed, the true test is to find out the intention or knowledge of the accused in doing the act. If the intention or knowledge was such as is described in Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC, the act will be murder even though only a single injury was caused. If the intention or knowledge was such as is described in Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC, the act will be murder even though only a single injury was caused. To illustrate : ‘A’ is bound hand and foot. 'B' comes and placing his revolver against the head of 'A', shoots ‘A’ in his head killing him instantaneously. Here, there will be no difficulty in holding that the intention of 'B' in shooting ‘A’ was to kill him, though only single injury was caused. The case would, therefore, be of murder falling within Clause (1) of Section 300 of the IPC. Taking another instance, 'B' sneaks into the bed room of his enemy ‘A’ while the latter is asleep on his bed. Taking aim at the left chest of 'A', 'B' forcibly plunges a sword in the left chest of ‘A’ and runs away. ‘A’ dies shortly thereafter. The injury to ‘A’ was found to be sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death. There may be no difficulty in holding that 'B' intentionally inflicted the particular injury found to be caused and that the said injury was objectively sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. This would bring the act of 'B' within Clause (3) of Section 300 of the IPC and render him guilty of the offence of murder although only single injury was caused. (2) Even when the intention or knowledge of the accused may fall within Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC, the act of the accused which would otherwise be murder, will be taken out of the purview of murder, if the accused's case attracts any one of the five exceptions enumerated in that Section. In the event of the case falling within any of those exceptions, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder, falling within Part 1 of Section 304 of the IPC, if the case of the accused is such as to fall within Clauses (1) to (3) of Section 300 of the IPC. It would be offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case is such as to fall within Clause (4) of Section 300 of the IPC. It would be offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case is such as to fall within Clause (4) of Section 300 of the IPC. Again, the intention or knowledge of the accused may be such that only 2nd or 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC, may be attracted but not any of the clauses of Section 300 of the IPC. In that situation also, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 of the IPC. It would be an offence under Part I of that Section, if the case fall within 2nd part of Section 299, while it would be an offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case fall within 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC. (3) To put it in other words, if the act of an accused person falls within the first two clauses of cases of culpable homicide as described in Section 299 of the IPC it is punishable under the first part of Section 304. If, however, it falls within the third clause, it is punishable under the second part of Section 304. In effect, therefore, the first part of this Section would apply when there is ‘guilty intention,’ whereas the second part would apply when there is no such intention, but there is ‘guilty knowledge’. (4) Even if single injury is inflicted, if that particular injury was intended, and objectively that injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the requirements of Clause 3rdly to Section 300 of the IPC, are fulfilled and the offence would be murder. (4) Even if single injury is inflicted, if that particular injury was intended, and objectively that injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the requirements of Clause 3rdly to Section 300 of the IPC, are fulfilled and the offence would be murder. (5) Section 304 of the IPC will apply to the following classes of cases: (i) when the case falls under one or the other of the clauses of Section 300, but it is covered by one of the exceptions to that Section, (ii) when the injury caused is not of the higher degree of likelihood which is covered by the expression 'sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death' but is of a lower degree of likelihood which is generally spoken of as an injury 'likely to cause death' and the case does not fall under Clause (2) of Section 300 of the IPC, (iii) when the act is done with the knowledge that death is likely to ensue but without intention to cause death or an injury likely to cause death. To put it more succinctly, the difference between the two parts of Section 304 of the IPC is that under the first part, the crime of murder is first established and the accused is then given the benefit of one of the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC, while under the second part, the crime of murder is never established at all. Therefore, for the purpose of holding an accused guilty of the offence punishable under the second part of Section 304 of the IPC, the accused need not bring his case within one of the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC. (6) The word 'likely' means probably and it is distinguished from more 'possibly'. When chances of happening are even or greater than its not happening, we may say that the thing will 'probably happen'. In reaching the conclusion, the court has to place itself in the situation of the accused and then judge whether the accused had the knowledge that by the act he was likely to cause death. (7) The distinction between culpable homicide (Section 299 of the IPC) and murder (Section 300 of the IPC) has always to be carefully borne in mind while dealing with a charge under Section 302 of the IPC. (7) The distinction between culpable homicide (Section 299 of the IPC) and murder (Section 300 of the IPC) has always to be carefully borne in mind while dealing with a charge under Section 302 of the IPC. Under the category of unlawful homicides, both, the cases of culpable homicide amounting to murder and those not amounting to murder would fall. Culpable homicide is not murder when the case is brought within the five exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC. But, even though none of the said five exceptions are pleaded or prima facie established on the evidence on record, the prosecution must still be required under the law to bring the case under any of the four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC to sustain the charge of murder. If the prosecution fails to discharge this onus in establishing any one of the four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC, namely, 1stly to 4thly, the charge of murder would not be made out and the case may be one of culpable homicide not amounting to murder as described under Section 299 of the IPC. (8) The court must address itself to the question of mens rea. If Clause thirdly of Section 300 is to be applied, the assailant must intend the particular injury inflicted on the deceased. This ingredient could rarely be proved by direct evidence. Inevitably, it is a matter of inference to be drawn from the proved circumstances of the case. The court must necessarily have regard to the nature of the weapon used, part of the body injured, extent of the injury, degree of force used in causing the injury, the manner of attack, the circumstances preceding and attendant on the attack. (9) Intention to kill is not the only intention that makes a culpable homicide a murder. The intention to cause injury or injuries sufficient in the ordinary cause of nature to cause death also makes a culpable homicide a murder if death has actually been caused and intention to cause such injury or injuries is to be inferred from the act or acts resulting in the injury or injuries. The intention to cause injury or injuries sufficient in the ordinary cause of nature to cause death also makes a culpable homicide a murder if death has actually been caused and intention to cause such injury or injuries is to be inferred from the act or acts resulting in the injury or injuries. (10) When single injury inflicted by the accused results in the death of the victim, no inference, as a general principle, can be drawn that the accused did not have the intention to cause the death or that particular injury which resulted in the death of the victim. Whether an accused had the required guilty intention or not, is a question of fact which has to be determined on the facts of each case. (11) Where the prosecution proves that the accused had the intention to cause death of any person or to cause bodily injury to him and the intended injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, then, even if he inflicts a single injury which results in the death of the victim, the offence squarely falls under Clause thirdly of Section 300 of the IPC unless one of the exceptions applies. (12) In determining the question, whether an accused had guilty intention or guilty knowledge in a case where only a single injury is inflicted by him and that injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the fact that the act is done without premeditation in a sudden fight or quarrel, or that the circumstances justify that the injury was accidental or unintentional, or that he only intended a simple injury, would lead to the inference of guilty knowledge, and the offence would be one under Section 304 Part II of the IPC.” 25. The legal position pertaining to the matter being as discussed above, we now proceed to consider the contention of the counsel for the accused that the learned Sessions Judge erred in convicting and sentencing the appellant under Section 302 IPC overlooking the fact that the prosecution case did not reveal commission of any offence under Section 300 IPC. The legal position pertaining to the matter being as discussed above, we now proceed to consider the contention of the counsel for the accused that the learned Sessions Judge erred in convicting and sentencing the appellant under Section 302 IPC overlooking the fact that the prosecution case did not reveal commission of any offence under Section 300 IPC. If we conclude that Section 302 was not attracted and only Section 299 could be maintained against the appellant based on the facts proved, we then have to consider the question whether appellant has committed an offence punishable under Section 304 Part I of the IPC or under Part II of the same Section. 26. The prosecution evidence and the testimony of PW2 reveal that there was no premeditation on the part of the appellant to commit the offence. The evidence tendered reveal that on the date of occurrence, appellant along with others were mending fishing nets, as they usually do in the evenings, along the seashore. MO1 knife, which was the common tool used in the said activity were in the hands of all fisher folk, including the appellant. The evidence put forth by the prosecution prove that a scuffle had erupted spontaneously between the appellant and the deceased upon the latter questioning the former regarding the calling of a disparaging nick name and in the melee that followed, the appellant had in the heat of passion, stabbed the deceased on the neck leading to injury No.1 which proved to be fatal. Counsel for the appellant submits that the above facts brought out by prosecution evidence, does not reveal that the appellant had intended to cause death of the deceased or that he had intended to cause a bodily injury as of the nature of injury No.1 which he knew was sufficient to cause the death of the deceased. Hence according to the counsel, appellant could not have been charged under Section 300 at all and the conviction under Section 302 is legally unsustainable. The prosecution evidence tendered could at the most only have attracted a charge under Section 299 of the IPC and consequently the conviction and sentence that could be imposed against the appellant was only under the second limb of Section 304. 27. We find merit in the said contention. The prosecution evidence tendered could at the most only have attracted a charge under Section 299 of the IPC and consequently the conviction and sentence that could be imposed against the appellant was only under the second limb of Section 304. 27. We find merit in the said contention. The sole eyewitness testimony of PW2 and the entire prosecution evidence only point to a sudden and spontaneous altercation between the appellant and the deceased which lead to the stab injury and consequent death. Prosecution has not placed on record any evidence to reveal that the death of the deceased was a premeditated murder. Prosecution evidence does not reveal any intention in the appellant to cause death of the deceased or to cause injury No.1 as one that is likely to cause death. Intention is a question of fact which is to be gathered from the acts of the parties. The learned Public Prosecutor submits that the proven fact that the appellant had aimed at the neck and the jugular vein of the deceased reveals that he had an intention to cause death or at least that he knew that such an injury is ‘likely in the ordinary course to cause death’. This contention of the learned Public Prosecutor is countered by the learned counsel for the appellant pointing out that nature of the offence cannot depend solely on the location of the injury caused by the accused and that intention is to be gathered from all the facts and circumstances of the case. We are in agreement with the counsel for the appellant on the said point. It is trite that when the court is called upon to arrive at a finding as to the real intention of the accused in committing a particular offence, the court is expected to consider every available circumstance and should accept only that conclusion which could be arrived at beyond reasonable doubt. 28. We cannot lose sight of certain admitted facts in this case, which we note are relevant pointers for deciding the presence or absence of intention in the appellant. Appellant and the deceased are members of the fisher folk who live in the same neighborhood. PW2 has deposed that he along with others, including both the appellant as well as the deceased, had been going for fishing together in the same boat owned by PW2’s brother, Bosco. Appellant and the deceased are members of the fisher folk who live in the same neighborhood. PW2 has deposed that he along with others, including both the appellant as well as the deceased, had been going for fishing together in the same boat owned by PW2’s brother, Bosco. They had together gone fishing on 20.8.2010 and had returned at 4.00 pm on 21.08.2010 ie., on the very day of occurrence. PW2 has specifically stated that all of them had returned from fishing at the sea that day on very friendly terms. The stabbing incident that had happened at 6.00 pm on the very same day ie., within 2 hours of return from the sea, was only a random spur of the moment incident which led to the unfortunate death of the deceased. The contentions put forth by the counsel for the appellant on the said ground are well supported by the evidence tendered by the prosecution. We find the ingredients essential to attract a charge under Section 302 IPC totally lacking in the evidence put forth by the prosecution against the appellant. We also find that the prosecution evidence does not reveal that the appellant had an intention to cause death or to cause a bodily injury, akin to Injury No.1, which he knew is likely to cause death. 29. In the entirety of the evidence and facts and circumstances of the case, we are unable to sustain the conviction and sentence of the appellant under Section 302 of IPC and are satisfied that it deserves to be altered to Section 304 Part –II IPC. It is ordered accordingly. Considering the period of custody already undergone after his conviction, and finding that the appellant has already suffered eight years of sentence subsequent to the conviction by the learned Sessions Judge, we alter the sentence of the appellant under Section 304 Part II IPC to the period of custody already undergone. The appellant may be released forthwith, if not required in any other case. The Criminal Appeal is allowed in part with aforesaid modification of the conviction and sentence.