ORDER : 1. In the captioned petition, petitioner presently working as a Junior Training Officer at Government ITI College, Dhulkhed, Vijayapur District is aggrieved by the endorsement issued by respondent No. 3 in rejecting petitioner’s candidature to the post of Junior Engineer (Mechanical) and Assistant Engineer (Mechanical) under both HK quota and non-HK quota. 2. Facts leading to the case are as under: Respondent No. 1-Corporation issued a notification calling for applications for recruitment of various posts. In response to the recruitment notification, petitioner submitted her application to the post of Junior Engineer (Mechanical) as well as Assistant Engineer (Mechanical) under HK quota and non-HK quota. Pursuant to the scrutiny made by respondent No. 2, petitioner was found eligible to take up written examination and participate in recruitment process. Petitioner was issued with admission ticket for written examination, which was scheduled on 21.01.2018. Petitioner appeared in the examination. 3. The petitioner was required to take a Kannada language test as part of the selection process, and she duly appeared for the same on January 28, 2018. In this test, the petitioner secured an impressive score of 71 marks. However, respondent No. 2 later issued a corrigendum on June 23, 2018, notifying all candidates that the written test conducted on January 21, 2018, was cancelled. During the intervening period, the petitioner secured an appointment as a Junior Training Officer in an ITI college. After a lapse of nearly five years, respondent No. 2 wrote a letter to respondent No. 4, instructing them to take responsibility for conducting a re-examination of all technical papers as well as the Kannada language test. In compliance with these directions, respondent No. 4 issued a fresh notification for re-examinations. 4. Subsequently, the petitioner appeared for the re-examinations held on February 18 and February 19, 2024. In the Kannada language test conducted as part of the re-examination process, the petitioner scored 36 marks out of 150. This marked a significant deviation from her earlier performance in the Kannada test. 5. Though a final score list was eventually published, it did not explicitly indicate whether the petitioner had passed or failed the Kannada language test. Respondent No. 2 issued a notification for document verification, publishing a checklist along with an additional list of candidates eligible to appear for document verification, which was scheduled for August 21, 2024. 5. Though a final score list was eventually published, it did not explicitly indicate whether the petitioner had passed or failed the Kannada language test. Respondent No. 2 issued a notification for document verification, publishing a checklist along with an additional list of candidates eligible to appear for document verification, which was scheduled for August 21, 2024. The petitioner’s name appeared in the additional list at Serial No. 280, leading her to believe she was eligible for further consideration. 6. On the scheduled date, the petitioner appeared for document verification. However, respondent No. 3, during the verification process, endorsed that the petitioner had failed the Kannada language test and, as a result, her candidature could not be processed further. This determination came despite the fact that the cut-off marks for the written examination for each category of post were only published on August 21, 2024, the same day as the document verification process. 7. Feeling aggrieved by the impugned endorsement issued during the document verification, the petitioner has filed the present petition, challenging the rejection of her candidature. The petitioner contends that the process and basis for disqualifying her on the ground of failing the Kannada language test were arbitrary and lacking transparency, particularly given the delay in publishing the cut-off marks. 8. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, while reiterating the grounds raised in the petition, has vehemently argued and contended that neither the cadre or recruitment rules, as evidenced in Annexure-B, nor the recruitment notification issued by respondent No. 1, prescribe any minimum qualifying marks to be obtained in the Kannada language test. He asserts that the petitioner’s performance in the Kannada language test should not be subjected to an unnotified benchmark, as the introduction of such a requirement after the examination has concluded amounts to a fundamental alteration of the selection process. This, he argues, is akin to “changing the rules of the game after the game has been played” a principle consistently disapproved by the Courts. 9. The learned counsel further submits that the alleged prescription of 50 marks as the minimum qualifying criterion for the Kannada language test was neither notified to the candidates nor placed on record before this Hon’ble Court. The absence of prior notification regarding such a qualifying threshold renders the subsequent application of this criterion arbitrary and unjust. 9. The learned counsel further submits that the alleged prescription of 50 marks as the minimum qualifying criterion for the Kannada language test was neither notified to the candidates nor placed on record before this Hon’ble Court. The absence of prior notification regarding such a qualifying threshold renders the subsequent application of this criterion arbitrary and unjust. He contends that this ad hoc fixation of cut-off marks for the Kannada language test directly contravenes the principles established by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of K. Manjusree vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Another, (2008) 3 SCC 512 . 10. Drawing attention to the judgment rendered by the Constitutional Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Tej Prakash Pathak and Others vs. Rajasthan High Court and Others, 2024 INSC 847 the learned counsel argues that the fixation of eligibility criteria for the Kannada language test after the examination process has commenced or concluded is impermissible and contrary to law. He emphasizes that the Hon'ble Apex Court in K. Manjusree (supra) has unequivocally held that introducing new qualifying criteria mid-process violates the principles of transparency and fairness. The Constitutional Bench, while deliberating on the principles laid down in K. Manjusree (supra), affirmed its validity as a binding precedent and clarified its applicability in subsequent cases. 11. Additionally, the learned counsel refers to the judgment in State of Haryana vs. Subash Chander Marwaha and Others, (1974) 3 SCC 220 arguing that the principles established in K. Manjusree (supra) remain distinguishable and have not been overruled. Instead, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has upheld the principle that recruitment processes must adhere to pre-notified rules, and any deviation post facto undermines the integrity of the selection process. On this basis, the learned counsel submits that the prescription of minimum qualifying marks for the Kannada language test, introduced without prior notification or transparency, is legally unsustainable and warrants judicial intervention to protect the petitioner’s rights. 12. Placing reliance on paragraph No. 5 of the Constitutional Bench judgment in Tej Prakash Pathak and Others vs. Rajasthan High Court and Others (supra), the learned counsel for the petitioner has forcefully argued and contended that the Hon’ble Apex Court has clearly delineated two broad categories of power exercisable by recruitment authorities in the context of fixing eligibility criteria among candidates. 13. 13. The learned counsel emphasized these two categories and pointed out that the Hon'ble Apex Court, while examining the recruitment authority’s power, has consistently upheld that any deviation or alteration of the eligibility criteria or selection procedure must be transparent, pre-notified, and within the bounds of fairness. 14. Referring to these two categories, the learned counsel contended that the impugned endorsement rejecting the petitioner’s candidature falls under the first category, which relates to the essential qualifications for employment. He argued that, in the present case, passing the Kannada language test is a fundamental eligibility criterion for selection. According to the learned counsel, any candidate who has not studied Kannada at the SSLC level and fails to pass the Kannada language test conducted as part of the recruitment process is automatically disqualified and cannot be included in the selection list. Thus, the petitioner’s failure to meet this essential qualification, as claimed by the respondents, has been improperly categorized as a procedural shortlisting measure. 15. The learned counsel further distinguished this from the second category mentioned in the judgment, which pertains to the procedural aspects of selection, such as the shortlisting of eligible candidates. To illustrate this distinction, he referred to the judgment in State of Haryana vs. Subash Chander Marwaha (supra), where the recruitment authority followed a shortlisting procedure. In that case, the recruitment notification stipulated that candidates who secured a minimum of 45 marks would be eligible for consideration and placed in the selection list. However, the recruitment authority subsequently applied a higher benchmark of 55% marks as a criterion to further shortlist candidates. The Hon’ble Supreme Court upheld this procedure, recognizing it as falling within the second category defined in Tej Prakash (supra), as it pertained to the manner of selection rather than the fundamental eligibility criteria. 16. The learned counsel argued that the procedure followed in Subash Chander Marwaha (supra) aligns with the latter part of paragraph No. 5 of Tej Prakash (supra) judgment, which relates to procedural shortlisting and does not equate to altering fundamental eligibility criteria. In the present case, however, the respondents have erroneously applied the Kannada language qualification an essential eligibility criterion as though it were a procedural shortlisting measure, thereby violating the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 17. In the present case, however, the respondents have erroneously applied the Kannada language qualification an essential eligibility criterion as though it were a procedural shortlisting measure, thereby violating the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 17. Learned counsel concluded by emphasizing that the petitioner’s disqualification on the ground of failing the Kannada language test, without proper prior notification of the required qualifying marks or adherence to the prescribed eligibility rules, is contrary to the principles of fairness and transparency as laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court. 18. However, he would point out that the impugned endorsement, which is the subject matter of captioned petition squarely falls within the former part where authority having conducted exams, cannot fix a eligibility criteria. Therefore, citing K. Manjusree (supra) judgment, he would contend that eligibility criteria was altered thereby fixing minimum qualifying marks as 50, which was never notified before recruitment process commenced. 19. In distinguishing the principles laid down in K. Manjusree (supra) and Subash Chander Marwaha (supra), the learned counsel for the petitioner has further placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Arunachal Pradesh Public Service Commission and Another vs. Tage Habung and Others, AIR 2013 SC 1601 . In this case, the Court dealt with a situation where a minimum cut-off mark of 40 was initially fixed as the qualifying mark for the English language test in the Arunachal Pradesh Public Service Commission's examination on June 13, 2007. However, by an official memorandum dated January 7, 2008, this threshold was reduced to 33% in each subject of the written examination, with an overall aggregate of 45% marks being required to be eligible for the viva voce. 20. The Hon'ble Apex Court, while referring to Rules 11 and 12 of the Arunachal Pradesh Public Service Combined Competitive Examination Rules, 2001, observed that the Commission had reserved the right to determine the minimum marks required for candidates to qualify in the written examination at any stage. The Court acknowledged that this right was specifically vested in the Commission under the relevant rules, and thus, the modification in the cut-off marks, although made post-examination, was within the authority of the Commission due to the rules granting them such discretion. 21. The Court acknowledged that this right was specifically vested in the Commission under the relevant rules, and thus, the modification in the cut-off marks, although made post-examination, was within the authority of the Commission due to the rules granting them such discretion. 21. Drawing a parallel to the present case, the learned counsel pointed out that the respondents in the current matter have not reserved such a right, nor have they included any such provision in the recruitment rules or the notification issued for the examination. Unlike the Arunachal Pradesh case, where the Commission explicitly retained the power to set and alter the minimum qualifying marks, the respondents in this case have not demonstrated such authority, and therefore, respondent No. 4 could not have unilaterally declared the petitioner ineligible based on a post hoc prescription of minimum qualifying marks for the Kannada language test. 22. In light of this distinction, the learned counsel argues that the endorsement issued by respondent No. 4, declaring the petitioner ineligible due to a 50-mark threshold in the Kannada language test, is fundamentally flawed. The fixation of this threshold was not pre-notified, nor was it backed by any specific eligibility criteria set forth in the recruitment rules or the notification. Thus, the endorsement is inconsistent with the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in K. Manjusree (supra), where it was emphasized that any change in eligibility criteria after the examination process has begun or concluded would violate the principles of fairness and transparency. 23. Furthermore, the learned counsel reiterates that the impugned endorsement, which imposes a 50-mark minimum qualifying criterion for the Kannada language test, falls under the formal part of the first category as discussed in Tej Prakash (supra), which pertains to essential eligibility criteria, rather than the procedural aspect of shortlisting candidates. Given that such a formal eligibility requirement was not notified or pre-determined, the endorsement is legally unsustainable. The learned counsel, therefore, concludes that the endorsement should be quashed as it contravenes the established principles of law and fairness, as articulated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in both K. Manjusree (supra) and Tej Prakash (supra). 24. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos. The learned counsel, therefore, concludes that the endorsement should be quashed as it contravenes the established principles of law and fairness, as articulated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in both K. Manjusree (supra) and Tej Prakash (supra). 24. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 1 to 3 has justified the respondents' action in prescribing 150 marks as the maximum marks for the Kannada language test, despite the provisions of the Karnataka Power Corporation Limited Service (Cadre, Recruitment, Probation, Promotion and Seniority) Rules, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as “C&R Rules of KPCL”). The learned counsel contends that the C&R Rules of KPCL, while governing the service conditions and recruitment processes of KPCL employees, do not have the force of statutory law. Rather, they are of a contractual nature, essentially forming an agreement between KPCL and its employees. As such, the learned counsel argues that the C&R Rules must be understood as a set of internal guidelines designed to govern employment relations, and their interpretation should not be subject to the same rigidity as that of statutory provisions. 25. Specifically, the learned counsel emphasizes that Rule 4.5 of the C&R Rules, which may traditionally set out certain criteria for recruitment, should not be viewed as a provision that limits or rigidly governs the discretion of KPCL. Instead, it is argued that KPCL has the authority to modify or adapt its own internal recruitment process as long as such modifications serve the larger goal of administrative efficiency. The counsel contends that the decision to prescribe 150 marks as the maximum marks for the Kannada language test falls well within the discretion of KPCL, and such a change was permissible under the broader powers granted to the corporation. 26. Furthermore, the learned counsel points out that the petitioner was clearly notified in advance that the Kannada language test would be conducted for a total of 150 marks. Given that the petitioner participated in the examination with full awareness of this prescribed maximum, it is argued that the petitioner cannot now be allowed to raise any grievance regarding the number of marks allocated for the Kannada language test. Given that the petitioner participated in the examination with full awareness of this prescribed maximum, it is argued that the petitioner cannot now be allowed to raise any grievance regarding the number of marks allocated for the Kannada language test. The learned counsel submits that since the marks were clearly communicated in the official notification and the petitioner chose to appear for the examination without objection, the action of prescribing 150 marks for the Kannada language test cannot be considered arbitrary or unreasonable. 27. In light of these arguments, the learned counsel asserts that the action of the respondents in setting the maximum marks at 150 is consistent with the flexibility afforded by the C&R Rules of KPCL, and there is no basis for the petitioner’s complaint in this regard. The respondent further contends that the petitioner, having participated in the examination under the prescribed conditions, must be deemed to have accepted the framework established by the respondents for the recruitment process. Therefore, the challenge to the prescription of 150 marks is without merit and should not be entertained by the Court. 28. The second and substantial issue raised in the captioned petition pertains to the prescription of minimum qualifying marks. The respondent has argued forcefully and contended that the rejection of the petitioner’s candidature by respondent No. 4, on the ground that the petitioner failed to secure the minimum qualifying marks of 50, falls squarely within the latter category as delineated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Tej Prakash (supra). Therefore, the respondent urges that an inference must be drawn to uphold the discretion exercised by the recruitment authority in prescribing 50 marks as the threshold for qualification and in rejecting the petitioner’s candidature accordingly. 29. The respondent asserts that the decision to prescribe 50 marks as the minimum qualifying criteria does not contravene any established legal principle or statutory provision. It is argued that this decision is well within the domain of discretion granted to the recruitment authority, which is empowered to determine the method, manner, and criteria for selecting candidates from among those who meet the eligibility requirements. By applying 50 marks as the qualifying benchmark, the authority has merely exercised its prerogative to ensure a fair and competitive selection process, and such a determination cannot be construed as arbitrary or capricious. 30. By applying 50 marks as the qualifying benchmark, the authority has merely exercised its prerogative to ensure a fair and competitive selection process, and such a determination cannot be construed as arbitrary or capricious. 30. Furthermore, the respondent would emphasize that the issue raised by the petitioner aligns with the second category referenced in Tej Prakash (supra), wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has recognized the authority’s discretion to set qualifying standards in recruitment processes. The respondent maintains that such discretion is an integral aspect of the authority’s role and is subject only to the condition that it does not violate the principles of natural justice or established legal norms. In the present case, there is no evidence to suggest any deviation from these principles. 31. Accordingly, the respondent argues that the rejection of the petitioner’s candidature is fully justified and does not warrant any interference by this Hon’ble Court. The prescribed qualifying marks of 50 are a legitimate exercise of the authority’s discretion, and the issue raised in the captioned petition does not disclose any illegality or irregularity that would necessitate judicial intervention. 32. While addressing the petitioner’s reliance on the judgment in K. Manjusree (supra), the respondent would argue that the basis of the judgment in K. Manjusree (supra) is entirely distinct and, therefore, inapplicable to the present case. He would contend that the facts and circumstances in K. Manjusree (supra) pertained to a situation where the recruitment authority fundamentally altered the selection criteria mid-process, thereby rendering the case incomparable to the one at hand. 33. Specifically, in K. Manjusree (supra), the High Court, through an administrative circular, initially fixed a weightage of 75 marks for the written examination and 25 marks for the viva voce for the recruitment of District and Sessions Judges (Grade-II). However, subsequently, a resolution was passed modifying the scheme, whereby the written examination was allocated 100 marks and the viva voce was assigned 25 marks, effectively altering the assessment structure after the process had been initiated. The Supreme Court, in that case, found that such a post hoc modification of the criteria violated the principles of fairness and transparency in the recruitment process. 34. In contrast, he would submit that the factual matrix of the present case does not involve any such post facto alteration of the recruitment criteria. The Supreme Court, in that case, found that such a post hoc modification of the criteria violated the principles of fairness and transparency in the recruitment process. 34. In contrast, he would submit that the factual matrix of the present case does not involve any such post facto alteration of the recruitment criteria. The process followed here has adhered to the pre-established rules and guidelines, and no deviation has occurred that would warrant a comparison to the circumstances in K. Manjusree (supra). Therefore, he would emphasize that the reliance placed by the petitioner on the said judgment is misplaced and does not provide any substantial basis for their argument in the current context. 35. Learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 1 to 3 has also placed reliance on the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Subash Chander Marwaha (supra). He contended that the fixing of minimum eligibility criteria for recruitment is essentially a matter of administrative policy. The purpose behind setting such criteria is to ensure that candidates meet a certain level of competence and maintain high standards in the recruitment process. According to the learned counsel, this is consistent with the general principle that administrative authorities have the discretion to establish and modify eligibility criteria in the interest of ensuring the recruitment of suitably qualified candidates. The learned counsel further submitted that, in line with this principle, the action of fixing a score as the minimum eligibility threshold is within the permissible bounds of administrative discretion. 36. Additionally, the learned counsel referred to a judgment rendered by the Kerala High Court in K.H. Siraj vs. High Court of Kerala and Others, (2006) 6 SCC 395 . In this case, the Kerala High Court emphasized that recruitment rules provide the competent authority with the latitude to devise its procedure for selection. The Court held that such discretion is necessary for the authority to tailor the selection process to ensure the highest standards of competence. In light of this judgment, the learned counsel argued that the absence of a specific prohibition in the C&R Rules of KPCL regarding the setting of minimum passing marks after the examination gives the recruitment authority the discretion to prescribe such marks, if deemed necessary, to maintain the appropriate standards for the selection process. In light of this judgment, the learned counsel argued that the absence of a specific prohibition in the C&R Rules of KPCL regarding the setting of minimum passing marks after the examination gives the recruitment authority the discretion to prescribe such marks, if deemed necessary, to maintain the appropriate standards for the selection process. Thus, the learned counsel contended that the notification issued by respondent No. 4, which prescribes a minimum score of 50 marks, is a valid exercise of this discretion, intended to supplement the C&R Rules and ensure a fair and rigorous recruitment process. 37. Moreover, the learned counsel cited the judgment in Tage Habung (supra), where the Hon'ble Apex Court reaffirmed the principle that the actions of recruitment authorities, including the fixation of eligibility criteria and procedural norms, must be in line with the authority's discretion and administrative efficiency. In this case, the Supreme Court observed that such actions must not be arbitrary or prejudicial to candidates, and should align with the overall fairness of the recruitment process. Referring to this judgment, the learned counsel for respondent Nos. 1 to 3 argued that the actions taken by the respondents, including the setting of the minimum qualifying marks, were neither arbitrary nor prejudicial to the candidates. Rather, these actions were in furtherance of the administrative objectives of ensuring the recruitment of competent candidates, and thus, they did not violate any principles of fairness or transparency. 38. Both counsels have exhaustively argued their respective contentions, addressing the issues raised in the petition and responding to the arguments presented by the other side. In addition to the oral arguments, both parties have submitted detailed written synopses for the Court’s consideration. This Court has carefully reviewed the petition, the annexure, the rejoinder filed by the petitioner, and the statement of objection filed by respondent Nos. 1 to 3. The Court has also considered the arguments presented by the learned counsel for respondent No. 4, who has supported the actions of respondent Nos. 1 to 3 in the same manner. 39. In light of the comprehensive submissions made by both sides, this Court has given anxious consideration to the legal principles cited, the facts of the case, and the relevant precedents. The Court will now proceed to deliberate on the merits of the case based on the arguments, legal authorities, and factual matrix presented by the parties. 40. 39. In light of the comprehensive submissions made by both sides, this Court has given anxious consideration to the legal principles cited, the facts of the case, and the relevant precedents. The Court will now proceed to deliberate on the merits of the case based on the arguments, legal authorities, and factual matrix presented by the parties. 40. Rule 4.5 of C&R Rules of KPCL is extracted, which reads as under: “4.5 No person who is eligible for appointment to any of the posts in the cadre of Assistant Engineers. Equivalent and below shall be appointed to the post on the ground of his selection unless: (a) he has passed such Kannada Language test as may be prescribed by the Corporation. (b) he has studied Kannada Language as one of the subject for SSLC or equivalent examination. (c) he has passed the said SSLC or equivalent Examination through the medium of Kannada language. (d) he has passed the Kannada language certificate examination held by the Universities established by Law in the State of Karnataka. NOTE: The Language test shall be for 100 marks and its standard will be at the level of third language in SSLC.” 41. Rule 4.5 of C&R Rules of KPCL contemplates maximum marks of 100 while conducting Kannada test. In the light of these two regulations, this Court deems it fit to examine the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Tej Prakash (supra). In relevant paragraph No. 5, the Hon'ble Apex Court has broadly categorized two categories and the same is extracted, which reads as under: “5. In various judicial pronouncements, the law governing recruitment to public services has been colloquially termed as ‘the rules of the game’. The ‘game’ is the process of selection and appointment. Courts have consistently frowned upon tinkering with the rules of the game once the recruitment process commences. This has crystallised into an oft-quoted legal phrase that “the rules of the game must not be changed mid-way, or after the game has been played.” Broadly-speaking these rules fall in two categories. One which prescribes the eligibility criteria (i.e. essential qualifications) of the candidates seeking employment; and the other which stipulates the method and manner of making the selection from amongst the eligible candidates.” 42. One which prescribes the eligibility criteria (i.e. essential qualifications) of the candidates seeking employment; and the other which stipulates the method and manner of making the selection from amongst the eligible candidates.” 42. In the case at hand, learned counsel for the petitioner has strongly relied on the Constitutional Bench judgment rendered in Tej Prakash Pathak and Others vs. Rajasthan High Court and Others (supra), which clearly delineates two broad categories of power exercisable by recruitment authorities when fixing eligibility criteria among candidates. The Hon'ble Apex Court made a clear distinction between these two categories. 43. These categories, as articulated by the Constitutional Bench, are as follows: 1. Eligibility Criteria for Candidates Seeking Employment: This refers to the fundamental qualifications or requirements a candidate must meet to be considered eligible for the recruitment process. Examples include educational qualifications, age limits, language proficiency, and other basic criteria essential for eligibility. 2. Method or Manner of Selection of Suitable Candidates: This pertains to the procedural aspects of the recruitment process, such as prescribing minimum cut-off marks to be secured by candidates in the written examination or viva voce, as was observed in the cases of K. Manjusree vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Another and the present case, or requiring candidates to undergo specific tests relevant to the nature of the employment being offered. 44. Eligibility Criteria for Candidates Seeking Employment: This category pertains to the fundamental qualifications or essential criteria that candidates must fulfill to be eligible for the recruitment process. These criteria include educational qualifications, age limits, language proficiency, and other basic requirements that are necessary for a candidate to be considered for the recruitment process. In this context, the passing of the Kannada language test is one such fundamental eligibility criterion that must be met by candidates applying for the post of Junior Engineer or Assistant Engineer, which are technical positions that also require a proficiency in the Kannada language. In the present case, the rejection of the petitioner’s candidature on the ground of securing only 36 marks in the Kannada language test, without a pre-established and clear minimum qualifying mark for the Kannada test, raises concerns about the fairness and transparency of the process. The petitioner was not made aware of the minimum qualifying criteria for the Kannada test before taking the exam, which resulted in her disqualification after the fact. The petitioner was not made aware of the minimum qualifying criteria for the Kannada test before taking the exam, which resulted in her disqualification after the fact. The action of the respondents, therefore, appears to have contravened the established principles regarding the determination of eligibility criteria, as set out in the first category. 45. Method or Manner of Selection of Suitable Candidates: The former category involves the procedural aspects of the recruitment process, such as the fixation of minimum cut-off marks for written examinations or viva voce, and the method of selecting candidates for further stages. This category encompasses actions like setting passing scores or requiring candidates to undergo specific tests relevant to the job at hand. In cases like K. Manjusree vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (supra), and the present case, the fixation of minimum cut-off marks after the completion of the examinations cannot be termed as procedural discretion, often used by recruitment authorities to filter out candidates for further consideration. 46. In the present case, the petitioner’s disqualification due to her failure to secure the minimum qualifying marks in the Kannada test, which was fixed unilaterally after the completion of the examination, clearly falls under the first category-Eligibility Criteria for Candidates Seeking Employment-and not the second category, as argued by the respondents. The passing of the Kannada language test is an essential qualification to be considered for selection, and any modification of this qualification or prescribing higher qualifying marks after the examination has commenced effectively changes the eligibility requirements that candidates were expected to meet. This action of introducing a minimum qualifying marks of 50 after the examination is akin to altering the eligibility criteria post facto, which clearly violates the principles of legitimate expectations. The candidates, including the petitioner, had no prior notice of such a requirement, and were thus prejudiced by the introduction of this additional eligibility criterion after they had already participated in the recruitment process. 47. Further, while the recruitment notification clearly prescribed a maximum of 150 marks for the Kannada language test, the subsequent unilateral fixation of a minimum of 50 marks as qualifying marks after the examination had already been conducted cannot be considered a fair or transparent action. It falls squarely within the first category-Eligibility Criteria for Candidates Seeking Employment-and not the second category, which pertains to the method or manner of selecting suitable candidates. It falls squarely within the first category-Eligibility Criteria for Candidates Seeking Employment-and not the second category, which pertains to the method or manner of selecting suitable candidates. By introducing this qualifying criterion after the fact, the respondents have effectively changed the rules of the game, which is contrary to the expectations set forth in the recruitment notification. 48. The action of the respondents in unilaterally setting the minimum qualifying marks for the Kannada test after its completion, without prior notice or disclosure to the candidates, is not only arbitrary but also prejudicial to the petitioner’s prospects of being selected. The failure to communicate the qualifying marks before the examination violates the principles of transparency and fairness in the recruitment process, which are foundational to the constitutional guarantee of equality under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 49. The law laid down by the Apex Court in K. Manjusree (supra), although not prescribing minimum marks for written tests or interviews as eligibility criteria, regulates the stage at which eligibility criteria may be introduced. The timing of when the eligibility criteria are set plays a crucial role in ensuring that candidates are not caught unaware or prejudiced by changes made after they have already participated in the process. 50. In the present case, the respondents have clearly introduced eligibility criteria post-examination, which is in contravention of the principles set out by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Tej Prakash (supra). This action falls under the first category, which deals with the fundamental eligibility criteria that must be met by candidates. The rejection of the petitioner’s candidature based on the unilaterally introduced minimum qualifying marks clearly alters the criteria for selection after the commencement of the recruitment process. Therefore, the action of the respondents cannot be justified as a procedural change and is liable to be quashed. 51. Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 have placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Subash Chander Marwaha (supra) to justify the action of setting minimum qualifying marks for the Kannada language test. Respondents contention that fixing of eligibility criteria for recruitment is primarily a matter of administrative policy, aimed at ensuring that candidates meet a certain level of competence and that high standards are maintained throughout the recruitment process and this principle aligns with the general discretion granted to administrative authorities is misconceived. Respondents contention that fixing of eligibility criteria for recruitment is primarily a matter of administrative policy, aimed at ensuring that candidates meet a certain level of competence and that high standards are maintained throughout the recruitment process and this principle aligns with the general discretion granted to administrative authorities is misconceived. Respondents clearly erred in adapting eligibility criteria, Setting a score (50 marks) as the minimum eligibility threshold and therefore is not a valid exercise of this discretion, falling within the permissible bounds of administrative authority. 52. Additionally, the judgment of the Kerala High Court in K.H. Siraj vs. High Court of Kerala (supra), in which the Court emphasized that recruitment rules provide the competent authority with the flexibility to devise and modify its procedure for selection, depending on the needs and objectives of the recruitment process. The judgment confirmed that such discretion is necessary for the authority to tailor the selection process to ensure the recruitment of competent candidates, thereby maintaining high standards of quality in the recruitment process. In this regard, the absence of a specific Regulation in the C&R Rules of KPCL regarding the setting of minimum passing marks after the examination does not give the recruitment authority the discretion to prescribe such marks if deemed necessary. 53. Furthermore, the judgment in Tage Habung (supra), where the Hon'ble Apex Court reaffirmed the principle that the actions of recruitment authorities, including the fixation of eligibility criteria and procedural norms, must align with the authority’s administrative discretion and efficiency. The Hon'ble Supreme Court clarified that such actions must not be arbitrary or prejudicial to candidates, and they should be consistent with the overall fairness of the recruitment process. 54. However, the application of these judgments to the present case is problematic. Unlike the Arunachal Pradesh case, where the Commission explicitly retained the power to set and modify the minimum qualifying marks, the respondents in this case have not demonstrated any such reserved discretion or power in the recruitment notification. In Arunachal Pradesh, the Commission was explicitly authorized to revise the minimum marks for the written examination at any stage, and this authority was part of the recruitment rules. In contrast, the C&R Rules of KPCL and the recruitment notification in this case do not contain any such provision reserving the right to unilaterally set or modify the minimum qualifying marks after the examination process had already begun. 55. In contrast, the C&R Rules of KPCL and the recruitment notification in this case do not contain any such provision reserving the right to unilaterally set or modify the minimum qualifying marks after the examination process had already begun. 55. Therefore, the respondents’ action of prescribing minimum qualifying marks for the Kannada language test after the examination has concluded is not supported by any explicit provision in the recruitment notification or the C&R Rules of KPCL. This failure to establish clear criteria in advance and the imposition of new qualifying marks post-examination creates a situation where the eligibility requirements were introduced in an arbitrary manner, which is contrary to the principles of fairness and transparency. The petitioner, having taken the Kannada language test without prior knowledge of the minimum qualifying marks, was unfairly prejudiced by the subsequent imposition of these marks. The judgments cited by the respondents in Subash Chander Marwaha (supra) and Tage Habung (supra) do not apply to the present case because the respondents in this case did not retain the discretionary power to set such marks after the examination process had commenced. 56. In light of the above, the respondents’ action of prescribing minimum qualifying marks after the Kannada language test, without prior notification or a clear provision in the recruitment rules, is unjustified. The principle of legitimate expectations, as upheld by the Hon'ble Apex Court, requires that candidates are made aware of the eligibility criteria before they participate in the recruitment process. The failure to do so in this case undermines the fairness of the selection process, and the respondents’ reliance on the aforementioned judgments is misplaced. The action of the respondents must, therefore, be deemed arbitrary and in violation of the principles of transparency and fairness in recruitment. 57. The recruitment authority is obligated to set the minimum qualifying marks in advance, providing clear and transparent criteria for all candidates to follow. The fixing of 150 marks as the maximum score, which is contrary to the regulations under the KPTCL (Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Limited) Service Rules, has further complicated the selection process. It is unreasonable to expect aspiring candidates to speculate about the minimum qualifying marks based solely on the maximum score of 150. The fixing of 150 marks as the maximum score, which is contrary to the regulations under the KPTCL (Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Limited) Service Rules, has further complicated the selection process. It is unreasonable to expect aspiring candidates to speculate about the minimum qualifying marks based solely on the maximum score of 150. If the respondents had properly notified the minimum qualifying marks in the recruitment notification, it is only natural that candidates would have tailored their preparation accordingly, aiming to secure the prescribed 50 marks. Furthermore, it is crucial to recognize that the position in question is a technical one, and passing the Kannada language examination should not override the technical qualifications required for the post. The primary focus should be on the technical competencies of the candidates, and the imposition of an arbitrary language proficiency requirement without prior notice undermines the fairness of the process. This failure to communicate the qualifying criteria in advance prejudices the candidates' chances of success and creates an imbalance in the selection process. 58. Conclusion: (a) Drawing from the Constitutional Bench judgment in Tej Prakash Pathak and Others vs. Rajasthan High Court and Others, this Court underscores the two categories of power exercisable by recruitment authorities: (i) Eligibility Criteria for Candidates Seeking Employment: This category pertains to the fundamental qualifications that candidates must satisfy to even be considered for the recruitment process, such as educational qualifications, language proficiency, or other mandatory prerequisites. (ii) Method or Manner of Selection of Suitable Candidates: This relates to the procedural framework governing the selection process, including the setting of cut-off marks or shortlisting criteria after determining the pool of eligible candidates. (b) In the instant case, the action of KPCL in prescribing minimum qualifying marks of 50 for the Kannada language test falls under the “former category”, that is eligibility criteria. The Kannada language test was positioned as an essential qualifying condition, and candidates who failed to achieve the prescribed marks were disqualified outright, irrespective of their technical qualifications. This represents a fundamental eligibility criterion rather than a procedural aspect of selection. (c) The respondents’ assertion that this prescription is procedural and falls under the “latter category” is misplaced. Procedural criteria are intended to refine the selection process among already eligible candidates. However, KPCL’s action altered the basic eligibility requirements post facto, introducing a new threshold without prior notification. This represents a fundamental eligibility criterion rather than a procedural aspect of selection. (c) The respondents’ assertion that this prescription is procedural and falls under the “latter category” is misplaced. Procedural criteria are intended to refine the selection process among already eligible candidates. However, KPCL’s action altered the basic eligibility requirements post facto, introducing a new threshold without prior notification. This contravenes the principle of fairness and legitimate expectations, as aspiring candidates could not have reasonably anticipated or prepared for such a post-examination threshold. (d) Moreover, the Kannada test, although important, cannot be allowed to supersede the technical qualifications required for the post. The fixation of 150 marks contrary to the C&R Rules further compounds the issue, creating unnecessary ambiguity for candidates. Had the minimum qualifying marks been notified in advance, candidates would have had clarity and the opportunity to prepare accordingly. (e) Thus, the KPCL’s unilateral action to prescribe minimum qualifying marks after conducting the test constitutes a substantive alteration of eligibility criteria. This change falls squarely within the first category defined in Tej Prakash Pathak, rendering it impermissible and arbitrary. The respondents' actions are therefore unsustainable under the law. (f) The Hon'ble Apex Court, while adjudicating in Tej Prakash Pathak, has clarified that the judgments rendered in K. Manjusree and Subash Chander Marwaha address distinct legal issues and are not in conflict with one another. Specifically, Subash Chander Marwaha pertains to the right of candidates to be appointed from the select list, whereas K. Manjusree addresses the right to be included in the selection list. Given these entirely different subject matters, the principles laid down in Subash Chander Marwaha are distinguishable and inapplicable to the case at hand. (g) In Subash Chander Marwaha case, all candidates who secured 45% marks, as stipulated in the recruitment notification, were considered eligible and were included in the selection list. The subsequent adoption of a 55% performance criterion for shortlisting candidates was aimed at identifying those who met higher performance standards. This exercise was conducted within the bounds of the recruitment process and did not alter the eligibility criteria initially prescribed. (h) The decision in Arunachal Pradesh Public Service Commission and Another v. Tage Habung and Others, (2013) 7 SCC 737 is based on a materially different set of facts and principles. In that case, the eligibility criteria were altered after the selection process had commenced. (h) The decision in Arunachal Pradesh Public Service Commission and Another v. Tage Habung and Others, (2013) 7 SCC 737 is based on a materially different set of facts and principles. In that case, the eligibility criteria were altered after the selection process had commenced. The Division bench noted that while there was an official memorandum prescribing minimum marks, it could not be retrospectively applied once the recruitment process was underway. However, the Apex Court observed that the relevant rules (Rules 11 and 12) empowered the selection authority to fix minimum marks at any stage. Consequently, the Court upheld the authority’s discretion to establish minimum performance standards under the extant rules. (i) The judgments cited by the respondents in Subash Chander Marwaha (supra) and Tage Habung (supra) are inapplicable to the present case, as the respondents here did not retain any discretionary authority to prescribe or modify qualifying marks after the examination process had commenced. Unlike in Tage Habung, where the relevant rules explicitly empowered the selection authority to fix minimum qualifying marks at any stage, there is no such provision in the recruitment notification or the C&R Rules governing the recruitment process of KPCL. The respondents’ act of introducing minimum qualifying marks for the Kannada language test after the examination was concluded is unsupported by any explicit rule or provision and is, therefore, procedurally improper. This failure to establish clear and transparent criteria in advance, coupled with the post-facto imposition of new qualifying standards, constitutes an arbitrary and unfair alteration of the eligibility requirements. Such actions undermine the principles of fairness and transparency that are fundamental to any recruitment process, rendering the respondents’ actions untenable in law. 59. For the reasons stated above, this Court proceeds to pass the following: ORDER: (i) The writ petition is allowed. (ii) The impugned endorsements vide Annexure-Q and Q1 issued by respondent No. 3 are hereby quashed. (iii) The respondents are directed to re-conduct the Kannada language test, ensuring compliance with Rule 4.5 of the C&R Rules of KPCL by prescribing a maximum of 100 marks for the test. (iv) The respondents are further directed to issue a clear notification specifying both the maximum marks and the minimum qualifying marks for the Kannada test. (iii) The respondents are directed to re-conduct the Kannada language test, ensuring compliance with Rule 4.5 of the C&R Rules of KPCL by prescribing a maximum of 100 marks for the test. (iv) The respondents are further directed to issue a clear notification specifying both the maximum marks and the minimum qualifying marks for the Kannada test. Such notification shall be issued well in advance, providing adequate clarity to the candidates who have already undertaken the technical test and are required to appear for the Kannada test. (v) After giving sufficient time to the candidates and following proper notification procedures, the respondents shall conduct the Kannada test and proceed with further steps in the recruitment process, subject to the outcome of the re-conducted test.