JUDGMENT : Rajani Dubey J. 1.The present appeal has been filed by the appellants/plaintiffs against the order dated 14.09.2022 passed by the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Janjgir, District Janjgir-Champa (C.G.) in Filing No.466/2022, whereby the suit of the plaintiffs has been dismissed as time barred. (The parties herein shall be referred as per their status before the Trial Court.) 2.Brief facts of the case are that on 12.09.2022, the appellants/plaintiffs filed suit claiming compensation to the tune of Rs.22,44,000/- from the respondents/defendants for the death of Ravi Suryawanshi occurred due to electrocution. The deceased Ravi Suryawanshi was working as Mason and on 24.06.2020 the deceased along with friend Mason Chaitram Suryawanshi went to Kulipota for mason work, where during work, the foot of deceased slipped and he fell in the transformer, due to which he suffered electric shock and he was taken to District Hospital, Janjgir, where he declared dead. At the time of accident, the deceased was aged about 26 years and he used to earn Rs.400/- per day. The learned Trial Court vide impugned order dated 14.09.2022 dismissed the case of the appellants on the ground of limitation, against which the present appeal has been filed. 3.Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the learned Trial Court has wrongly dismissed the suit of the appellants/plaintiffs on the ground of limitation. while filing suit, it was specifically mentioned that due to pandemic Covid-19, the appropriate government had declared lockdown time to time. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has registered Suo-Motu Writ Petition (C) No.3 of 2020 and the period from 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 has been excluded for counting limitation for filing suit, appeal, revision or any application before the courts and in the instant case, the deceased died during pandemic period on 24.06.2020, therefore the limitation is going to be counted from 28.02.2022 for filing suit and therefore the suit filed by the appellants/ plaintiffs on 12.09 2022 is within limitation, as such the impugned order is illegal and against the provisions of the Limitation Act as well as guidelines of the Hon’ble Apex Court and this Court. Reliance has been placed on the order passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court dated 10.01.2022 passed in Misc Application No.21/2022 in suo motu WPC No.3/2020, this Court’s order dated 27.01.2022 passed in FA No.63/2021 in case of Chhattisgarh State Power Distribution Company Limited vs Smt. Hemlata Netam and others, and order dated 24.01.2024 passed in FA No.151/2023 in case of Rameshwari and others vs Junior Assistant Engineer and others. 4.Learned counsel for the respondents strongly oppose the submission made by the appellants’ counsel and jointly submit that the learned Trial Court has rightly dismissed the case of the appellants on the limitation ground. The deceased Ravi Suryavanshi died on 24.06.2020 and the limitation for filing the suit had already expired on 23.06.2021, whereas the Hon’ble Apex Court extended the limitation for 90 days after 01.03.2022 as such the limitation would have expired on 30.05.2022 therefore the suit of the plaintiffs is highly time barred, thus this appeal is without any merit and is liable to be dismissed. Learned counsel further submit that the suit was filed by the appellants for compensation of Rs.22.44 Lakhs so in this appeal ad valorem court fee is required to be paid as such this appeal is not maintainable without paying the requisite court fees. 5.Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 6.It is not disputed in this case that the deceased Ravi Suryavanshi died due to electrocution on 24.06.2020 and the appellants filed the case before the Trial Court on 12.09.2022. 7.The Hon’ble Apex Court held in Misc Application No.21/2022 in Para 5 as under:- “5.Taking into consideration the arguments advanced by learned counsel and the impact of the surge of the virus on public health and adversities faced by litigants in the prevailing conditions, we deem it appropriate to dispose of the M.A. No. 21 of 2022 with the following directions: I. The order dated 23.03.2020 is restored and in continuation of the subsequent orders dated 08.03.2021, 27.04.2021 and 23.09.2021, it is directed that the period from 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022 shall stand excluded for the purposes of limitation as may be prescribed under any general or special laws in respect of all judicial or quasi- judicial proceedings. II. Consequently, the balance period of limitation remaining as on 03.10.2021, if any, shall become available with effect from 01.03.2022. III. II. Consequently, the balance period of limitation remaining as on 03.10.2021, if any, shall become available with effect from 01.03.2022. III. In cases where the limitation would have expired during the period between 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022, notwithstanding the actual balance period of limitation remaining, all persons shall have a limitation period of 90 days from 01.03.2022. In the event the actual balance period of limitation remaining, with effect from 01.03.2022 is greater than 90 days, that longer period shall apply. IV. It is further clarified that the period from 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022 shall also stand excluded in computing the periods prescribed under Sections 23 (4) and 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and provisos (b) and (c) of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and any other laws, which prescribe period(s) of limitation for instituting proceedings, outer limits (within which the court or tribunal can condone delay) and termination of proceedings.” 8.This Court observed in FA No.151/2023 in paras 10 to 17 as under:- “10. The law of limitation is found upon maxims such as “Interest Reipublicae Ut Sit Finis Litium” which means that litigation must come to an end in the interest of society as a whole, and “vigilantibus non dormientibus Jura subveniunt’ which means that the law assists those who are vigilant with their rights, and not those who sleep thereupon. The law of limitation in India identifies the need for limiting litigation by striking a balance between the interests of the state and the litigant. So when the beneficiaries, for a cause of action, are minors, it cannot be said that they are sleeping over their rights. 11. The term “period of limitation” has been defined in Section 2(j) of the Act as the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application in the Schedule of Limitation Act; further, “prescribed period’ means the period of limitation computed in accordance with the provisions of the Limitation Act. Section 3(2) prescribes the general rule that, subject to the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (both inclusive ) of the Act, every suit instituted, appeal preferred and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence. 12. Section 3(2) prescribes the general rule that, subject to the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (both inclusive ) of the Act, every suit instituted, appeal preferred and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence. 12. The expression ‘Claim Petition’ is synonymous with ‘the Applications’ and therefore an aggrieved person would mean legal heirs or through agent cannot be deprived of claiming the compensation if not preferred within a stipulated period of time. 13. Further more perusal cause title of the suit would show that four of the claimants were minors when the suit was filed in 2019. This fact is not in dispute that they are legal representatives/dependents of being children of the deceased Hemant Dhruw. This case does not arise out of a fatal accident as has been argued by the learned counsel for the respondent that Article 82 of the Act would apply, therefore, we are not in agreement with such submission for the reason that the majority of the claimants were minors i.e. the children of the deceased Hemant Dhruw. Therefore, it would be a case of continuous cause of action. 14. The Concept of continuing cause of action arose principally in regard to the point of time up which damages could be assessed in a given action and way back in the year 1804, the decision Hole v. Chard Union2, Lord Lindely had observed: “What is continuing cause of action? Speaking accurately, there is no such thing; but what is called continuing cause of action is a cause of action which arises from the repetition of acts or omission of the same kind as that for which the action was brought”. 15. That, the cause of action normally accrues when there is in existence a person who can sue and another who can sued and in the present case when the notice was sent in the year then only right to sue has accrued in the favour of the plaintiff, therefore the present case is not barred by limitation. 16. As per the Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol. 28, Para 822 & 825 it is particularly stated that: 822. Persons capable of suing or of being sued. Acause of action cannot accrue unless there is someone in existence capable of instituting the action and another person in existence who can be sued. 16. As per the Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol. 28, Para 822 & 825 it is particularly stated that: 822. Persons capable of suing or of being sued. Acause of action cannot accrue unless there is someone in existence capable of instituting the action and another person in existence who can be sued. If a person is in such position that, even if an action were brought and judgment given against him, the judgment could not be enforced, a cause of action cannot accrue against him.” 825. When Time Continues to run……..if the time has begun to run against a person entitled to sue, or in favour of a person capable of being sued, the fact of his death and that there is an interval between his death and the grant of administration does not prevent time from running against or in favour of the administrator, as the case may be. 17. Section 9 of the Limitation Act speaks about Continuous Running of Time. It provides that the general principle that where time has begun once to run, no subsequent disability or inability to institute a suit or make an application stops it, is incorporated in Section 9. There is a proviso to the section, very limited in its operation, to the effect that where letters of administration to the estate of a creditor have been granted to his debtor, the running of the period of limitation for a suit to recover the debt is suspended while the administration continues. The proviso becomes necessary since the same person cannot be both the plaintiff and the defendant in the same suit.” 9.In light of the above, it is clear that as per the guidelines of the Hon’ble Apex Court, the learned Trial Court did not appreciate the limitation period properly, as such the impugned order is not sustainable. 10.As regards objection of the respondents regarding court fees, this Court observed in FA No.63/2021 in paras 19 & 20 as under:- “19. Further in the matter of New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. NUSLI Neville Wadia and Another, it is further held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court at para 51 : “51…..With a view to read the provisions of the Act in a proper and effective manner, we are of the opinion that literal interpretation, if given, may give rise to an anomaly or absurdity which must be avoided. So as to enable a superior court to interpret a statute in a reasonable manner, the court must place itself in the chair of a reasonable legislator/ author. So done, the rules of purposive construction have to be resorted to which would require the construction of the Act in such a manner so as to see that the object of the Act is fulfilled, which in turn would lead the beneficiary under the statutory scheme to fulfill its constitutional obligations as held by the court inter alia in Ashoka Marketing Ltd. (1990) 4 SCC 406 .” 20. Accordingly, when the damages caused due to electrocution by live wire lying on road the rule of strict liability would be applicable. Accordingly, when the damage to person or property is caused which is otherwise caused a tortuous liability, and is covered under strict liability where the death caused by electrocution, due to live wire or any incident which escapes and caused damage or injury to a person or property to claim damages, we are of the opinion that the purposive interpretation of notification would be required and accordingly instead of putting it out from the reach of vast, we deem it proper to hold that by virtue of notification dated 02.08.1986 payment of court fees would be exempted.” Thus, in view of the same, the objection of the respondents regarding court fees is overruled. 11.In view of the foregoing discussions, it is clear that the deceased died due to electrocution and the learned Trial Court dismissed the case of the appellants the ground of limitation, but while dismissing the same the learned Trial Court did not appreciate the guidelines of the Hon’ble Apex Court as well as this Court, as such the impugned order dated 14.09.2022 is hereby set aside and the case is remitted back to the learned Trial Court with a direction to decide the case afresh on merits after providing opportunity of hearing to adduce evidence to the parties. 12.Both the parties are directed to appear before the Trial Court on 21.10.2024. 13.The appeal stands allowed.