JUDGMENT: G. Radha Rani, J. This Second Appeal is filed by the appellants-respondents-plaintiffs aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 17.01.2007 passed in A.S.No.30 of 2006 by the IV Additional District Judge, Warangal, reversing the judgment and decree dated 28.02.2006 in O.S No.323 of 2001 passed by the Principal Junior Civil Judge, Warangal. 2. The parties are hereinafter referred as arrayed before the trial court as plaintiffs and defendants. 3. The plaintiff No.1 filed the suit in O.S No.323 of 2001 seeking the relief of permanent injunction restraining the defendant, his agents, workmen and all the persons acting on his behalf from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the plaintiff over the suit schedule property, open land admeasuring Ac.0-34 guntas situated in part of Sy.No.89 situated at Rangashaipet Village, Warangal Mandal and District. 4. The contention of the plaintiff was that the plaintiff was the absolute owner and possessor of the land admeasuring Ac.0-34 guntas forming part of Sy.No.89 situated at Rangashaipet Village, Warangal Mandal and District. The land in Sy.No.89 was consisting of Ac.1-27 guntas. The plaintiff got the same in partition with his brothers decades ago. Ever since then, the name of the plaintiff was mutated as pattedar and he was paying land revenue to the concerned authorities. The State Government had issued Raithu passbook, recognized the title, interest and right of the plaintiff in Sy.No.89. Out of Ac.1-27 guntas, the plaintiff sold an extent of Ac.0-33 guntas to Sri Gade Veeraiah (now late) and delivered the possession of the same, which was towards the North and West sides of the suit land. The name of Gade Veeraiah was recorded in the revenue records as having been purchased from the plaintiff. The right, title and interest of the plaintiff over the entire Sy.No.89 was undisputed. Towards Eastern side of the said land, a 100 feet wide road was laid connecting the hunter road with Khammam road by constructing a flyover Railway Track, near Warangal Railway Station in 1999. Because of the developmental activities adjacent to the said property, the price of the said land escalated catching the eyes of the land grabbers including the defendant. The defendant was a toddy tapper by caste and profession and he was also a land grabber. Because of the developmental activities adjacent to the said property, the price of the said land escalated catching the eyes of the land grabbers including the defendant. The defendant was a toddy tapper by caste and profession and he was also a land grabber. Because of the increase of market value and illegal attempts of land grabbers in the near vicinity, the plaintiff wanted to erect fencing around the suit land and collected stone pillars for erection of barbed fencing. On 06.03.2001 and 11.03.2001, the defendant with an intention to obstruct the laying of fencing, came over the suit land with un-social elements. The plaintiff was aged 75 years. With the help of his sons, the plaintiff could protect his possession on the spot. The defendant was residing in the village, but the plaintiff was a resident of a nearby town. To protect his right and possession over the suit land, the plaintiff filed suit for permanent injunction. 5. The defendant filed written statement contending that the plaintiff was neither the owner nor the possessor of any inch of land in Sy.No.89 situated at Rangashaipet, much less, the suit land at any point of time till date. He denied that the plaintiff got the alleged suit land in partition with his brother. He contended that the defendant and his brother got the land through their ancestors and they were peacefully enjoying the same. The same was evidenced with revenue records. The Government acquired the land to an extent of Ac.0-4 ½ guntas vide RC.No.M/933/94, LAO (RDO), Warangal out of Sy.No.89 for laying 100 feet road and paid compensation to the defendant family and to Gade Veeraiah family for their respective extents after thorough enquiry. Taking advantage of the name of the plaintiff wrongly recorded in the revenue records, the suit was filed with a malafide intention for illegal gain. The plaintiff was intending to grab the land of the defendant. The defendant had already filed an application for rectification of wrong entries made by the Patwari in the pahanies which was pending. It was the defendant who purchased the pillars and the barbed wire of 160 Kgs., by expending an amount of Rs.3,680/- to fix the same around his land in Sy.No.89. Meanwhile, the plaintiff obtained an ex-parte injunction order by misrepresenting the facts. The said barbed wire was still in the house of the defendant. It was the defendant who purchased the pillars and the barbed wire of 160 Kgs., by expending an amount of Rs.3,680/- to fix the same around his land in Sy.No.89. Meanwhile, the plaintiff obtained an ex-parte injunction order by misrepresenting the facts. The said barbed wire was still in the house of the defendant. Due to the interim order, the said work could not be completed. Neither the plaintiff nor his sons had right and title over the suit land nor they came to the spot at any point of time. The bare suit for injunction without seeking declaration of title was not maintainable. The defendant’s family was having ownership and possession of the schedule property since more than 35 years and prayed to dismiss the suit. 6. During the pendency of the suit, the plaintiff died and his wife and sons were brought on record as plaintiff Nos.2 to 6. 7. Basing on the pleadings, the following issues are settled for trial : (i) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for permanent injunction as prayed for? (ii) To what relief? 8. The plaintiff No.6 was examined as PW.1 and Exs.A1 to A19 were marked on behalf of the plaintiffs. A third party was also examined as PW.2 on behalf of the plaintiffs. The defendant examined himself as DW.1 and got marked Exs.B1 to B30. 9. On considering the oral and documentary evidence on record, the trial court decreed the suit granting the relief of perpetual injunction restraining the defendant, his agents, workmen and all the persons acting on his behalf from interfering with the possession and enjoyment of the plaintiffs over the suit schedule property. 10. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree passed by the trial court on 28.02.2006, the defendant preferred an appeal. The appeal was heard by the learned IV Additional District Judge, Warangal vide A.S. No.30 of 2006 and by judgment and decree dated 17.01.2007, the lower appellate court allowed the appeal by setting aside the judgment and decree of the trial court in O.S No.323 of 2001 dated 28.02.2006. Aggrieved by such reversal judgment, the plaintiffs preferred this second appeal raising certain substantial questions of law. 11. The second appeal was admitted on 23.02.2007 on the following substantial questions of law : 1. Aggrieved by such reversal judgment, the plaintiffs preferred this second appeal raising certain substantial questions of law. 11. The second appeal was admitted on 23.02.2007 on the following substantial questions of law : 1. Whether the lower appellate court is justified in giving finding of title to the respondent-defendant on the basis of Ex.B1 in the absence of valid document or title? 2. Whether the lower appellate court is justified in recording the finding of possession in favour of respondent-defendant in respect of suit vacant land contrary to the evidence on record and settled principles of law? 3. Whether the lower appellate court is justified in holding that the appellant-plaintiff failed to establish his title to the suit property incidentally without reversing and answering the finding of the trial court when admittedly plaintiffs are real owners of the property? 12. Heard Sri B. Venkat Rama Rao, learned counsel for the appellants and Sri Kiran Palakurthy, learned counsel for the respondent. 13. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that the lower appellate court erred in observing that Ex.B1 order passed by the Land Acquisition Officer (LAO) and Revenue Divisional Officer (RDO), Warangal, dated 29.06.1996 was sufficient to establish prima facie title in favour of the respondent without considering that the land covered by Ex.B1 was separate and would not form part of the suit schedule land. The lower appellate court failed to consider that the respondent (defendant) clearly admitted the title of the appellants (plaintiffs) and claimed that his grandfather purchased the property under unregistered sale deeds, but failed to produce the said sale deeds. The lower appellate court failed to observe that the appellants were not parties to the acquisition proceedings, as such the finding if any in Ex.B1 was not binding on the appellants. The documents produced by the appellants as well as the respondent would clearly show that the appellants were the pattedars of the land and they were presumed to be in possession of the same as the said land was kept fallow. The observation of the lower appellate court that by virtue of Ex.B1, the respondent-defendant had dismantled the claim of the appellants-plaintiffs was baseless and perverse in view of the fact that the Ex.B1 covered only a small extent of land which did not form part of the remaining land succeeded by the appellants and they were in possession and enjoyment of the same. The lower appellate court gravely erred in reversing the judgment and decree of the trial court without considering that the trial court gave a well reasoned order in granting injunction in favour of the appellants having satisfied that the appellants have proved their prima facie title and possession of the property as the land in question was not under cultivation. The conclusion drawn by the lower appellate court was without any basis and contrary to record. The lower appellate court failed to pursue that the evidence on record would clearly show that originally the grandfather of the appellants was the pattedar of the land to an extent of Ac.1-27 guntas and during his life time, he sold only an extent of Ac.0-33 guntas of land to Sri Gade Veeraiah and the remaining land had been succeeded by the appellants and they were in possession and enjoyment of the same. The respondent who claimed to have acquired the property by virtue of the sale deeds executed in favour of his grandfather, failed to prove the same by adducing any evidence and prayed to allow the appeal by setting aside the judgment and decree of the first appellate court in A.S No.30 of 2006, dated 17.01.2007. 14. Learned counsel for the appellants relied upon the following citations : 1. M. Kallappa Setty Vs. M.V. Lakshminarayana Rao, AIR (1972) SC 2299, 2. Chepana Peda Appalaswamy Vs. Chepana Appalanaidu and others, 1996 (2) ALD 499 , 3. P. Buchi Reddy and others Vs. Ananthula Sudhakar, AIR 1999 AP 188 , 4. Mahendra C. Mehta and others Vs. Kousalya Co-op. Housing Society Limited., Hyderabad and others, 2001 (5) ALD 102 , 5. Kuturu Narasimha Reddy Vs. Pusala Venkataiah and others, 2011 (4) ALD 567 , 6. Rangammal Vs. Kuppuswami and other, 2011 (5) ALD 38 (SC), 7. Rukmini Bai @ Laxmi Bai and others Vs. K.Mohanlal, 2011 (4) ALD 537 and 8. Biraji alias Brijraji and another Vs. Surya Pratap and others, AIR (2020) SC 5483. 15. Learned counsel for the respondent-defendant, on the other hand, contended that the father of the appellants-plaintiffs sold the property by way of a simple sale deed and put the respondent and one Veeraiah in possession of the suit property. Both of them were paid compensation by the land acquisition officer after due enquiry. Thus, the State recognized the respondent-defendant as owner under Exs.B1, B26 and B27. Both of them were paid compensation by the land acquisition officer after due enquiry. Thus, the State recognized the respondent-defendant as owner under Exs.B1, B26 and B27. The plaintiffs failed to prove the essential requirement i.e., possession over the suit property hence, were not entitled for injunction. The plaintiffs failed to place any evidence to prove that their father was in possession as on the date of filing of the suit. On the other hand, the respondent proved his possession over the suit property by filing the latest pahanies. The relief of perpetual injunction was a discretionary relief and the plaintiffs suppressed the land acquisition proceedings which would disentitle them from claiming the relief of injunction. The suit for mere injunction without seeking the relief of declaration of title was not maintainable. The respondent vehemently denied the title of the plaintiffs. In such an event the suit for injunction simplicitor was not maintainable. Having failed to ask the relief of declaration of title and failed to prove the possession as on the date of filing the suit, the appellants were not entitled for the relief of perpetual injunction. No amendment was sought during the pendency of the suit so as to include the relief of declaration of title. No question of law, much less substantial question of law was involved. The first appellate court gave a positive finding with regard to the ownership and possession of the respondent. The said factual aspects could not be gone into in the second appeal under Section 100 of C.P.C. The land acquisition proceedings under Ex.B1 were not challenged by the appellants. No person would remain silent if compensation was paid to others in respect of the property owned and possessed by him. Ex.B1 disproves the claim of the plaintiffs that they were in possession. The plaintiffs had to prove their case on the strength of their own, but should not rely on the weakness of the case of the defendant. 16. Learned counsel for the respondent relied upon the following citations : 1. Lisamma Antony and another Vs. Karthiyayani and another, (2015) 11 SCC 782 , 2. Syeda Rahimunnisa Vs. Malnan Bi (dead) by legal representatives and another, (2016) 10 SCC 315 , 3. Jharkhand State Housing Board Vs. Didar Singh and another, (2019) 17 SCC 692, 4. Tahsildar, Urban Improvement Trust and another Vs. Lisamma Antony and another Vs. Karthiyayani and another, (2015) 11 SCC 782 , 2. Syeda Rahimunnisa Vs. Malnan Bi (dead) by legal representatives and another, (2016) 10 SCC 315 , 3. Jharkhand State Housing Board Vs. Didar Singh and another, (2019) 17 SCC 692, 4. Tahsildar, Urban Improvement Trust and another Vs. Ganga Bai Menariya (dead) through legal representatives and others, (2024) SCC Online SC 169, 5. Ananthula Sudhakar Vs. P. Buchi Reddy (dead) by legal representatives and others, (2008) 4 SCC 594 , 6. T.V. Ramakrishna Reddy Vs. M. Mallappa and another, AIR (2021) SC 4293, 7. Saurav Jain and another Vs. A.B.P. Design and another, (2021) SCC Online SC 552, 8. Prakash (dead) by legal representatives Vs. G. Aradhya and others, (2023) SCC Online SC 1025. 17. Admittedly, the second appeal could not be decided on question of facts. It is settled principle of law that the second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 cannot be admitted unless there is substantial question of law involved in it. A question of law having a material bearing on the decision of the case (i.e. a question, answer which effects the rights of the parties to the suit) will be a substantial question of law, if it is not covered by any specific provisions of law or settled legal principle emerging from binding precedents and involves a debatable legal issue. The substantial questions of law will also arise in a contrary situation where the legal possession is clear either on account of express provisions of law or binding precedents, but the court below has decided the matter either ignoring or acting contrary to such legal principle. In the second type of cases, the substantial question of law arises not because the law is still debatable, but because the decision rendered on a material question, violates the settled principle of law. 18. The Hon’ble Apex Court has enumerated some of the basic ingredients for constituting a substantial question of law. Those circumstances are as under : (1) The question of law on which there is a conflict of judicial opinion and not finally decided by Supreme Court, Privy Council; or by federal court. (2) The finding which has been arrived at by court below without any evidence on record. (3) Inference from or legal effect of proved or admitted facts. Those circumstances are as under : (1) The question of law on which there is a conflict of judicial opinion and not finally decided by Supreme Court, Privy Council; or by federal court. (2) The finding which has been arrived at by court below without any evidence on record. (3) Inference from or legal effect of proved or admitted facts. (4) Disregard or non-consideration of relevant or admissible evidence. (5) Taking into consideration irrelevant or inadmissible evidence. (6) Misconstruction of evidence or document. (7) Interpretation or construction of material documents. (8) A question of admissibility of evidence. (9) Disposal of appeal by first appellate court by allowing application to adduce additional evidence by one party without giving opportunity of rebuttal to the other party. (10) New plea on pure question of law going to the root of the matter. (11) Rejection of admissible evidence on flimsy ground. (12) Gross miscarriage of justice. (13) Biased approach of the court below. (14) Reversal of finding by first appellate court without evidence. (15) Perverse finding recorded by the courts below. (16) Inconsistent and contradictory finding of the court. (17) When appeal is decided only on equitable ground and without application of mind. (18) When the court has no jurisdiction. 19. Learned counsel for the respondent-defendant relied upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Jharkhand State Housing Board Vs. Didar Singh and another (11 supra), Tehsildar, Urban Improvement Trust and another Vs. Ganga Bai Menariya (dead) through legal representatives and others (12 supra), Ananthula Sudhakar Vs. P. Buchi Reddy (dead) by legal representatives and others (13 supra), T.V. Ramakrishna Reddy Vs. M. Mallappa and another (14 supra) on the aspect that when the defendant raises the dispute with regard to the title and raises a cloud over the title of the plaintiff, then necessarily the plaintiff has to file a suit for declaration of title and could not maintain the suit for bare injunction. 20. Learned counsel for the appellants, on the other hand, relied upon the judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court in M.Kallappa Setty (1 supra), Chepana Peda Appalaswamy (2 supra) and P.Buchi Reddy and others (3 supra) wherein a mere suit for injunction is maintainable without seeking the relief of declaration. 21. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Ananthula Sudhakar Vs. 20. Learned counsel for the appellants, on the other hand, relied upon the judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court in M.Kallappa Setty (1 supra), Chepana Peda Appalaswamy (2 supra) and P.Buchi Reddy and others (3 supra) wherein a mere suit for injunction is maintainable without seeking the relief of declaration. 21. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Ananthula Sudhakar Vs. P. Buchireddy (13 supra) clarified that : (a) Where a cloud is raised over the plaintiff's title and he does not have possession, a suit for declaration and possession, with or without a consequential injunction, is the remedy. Where the plaintiff's title is not in dispute or under a cloud, but he is out of possession, he has to sue for possession with a consequential injunction. Where there is merely an interference with the plaintiff's lawful possession or threat of dispossession, it is sufficient to sue for an injunction simpliciter. (b) As a suit for injunction simpliciter is concerned only with possession, normally the issue of title will not be directly and substantially in issue. The prayer for injunction will be decided with reference to the finding on possession. But in cases where de jure possession has to be established on the basis of title to the property, as in the case of vacant sites, the issue of title may directly and substantially arise for consideration, as without a finding thereon, it will not be possible to decide the issue of possession. (c) But a finding on title cannot be recorded in a suit for injunction, unless there are necessary pleadings and appropriate issue regarding title (either specific, or implied). Where the averments regarding title are absent in a plaint and where there is no issue relating to title, the court will not investigate or examine or render a finding on a question of title, in a suit for injunction. Even where there are necessary pleadings and issue, if the matter involves complicated questions of fact and law relating to title, the court will relegate the parties to the remedy by way of comprehensive suit for declaration of title, instead of deciding the issue in a suit for mere injunction. (d) Where there are necessary pleadings regarding title, and appropriate issue relating to title on which parties lead evidence, if the matter involved is simple and straightforward, the court may decide upon the issue regarding title, even in a suit for injunction. (d) Where there are necessary pleadings regarding title, and appropriate issue relating to title on which parties lead evidence, if the matter involved is simple and straightforward, the court may decide upon the issue regarding title, even in a suit for injunction. But such cases, are the exception to the normal rule that question of title will not be decided in suits for injunction. But persons having clear title and possession suing for injunction, should not be driven to the costlier and more cumbersome remedy of a suit for declaration, merely because some meddler vexatiously or wrongfully makes a claim or tries to encroach upon his property. The court should use its discretion carefully to identify cases where it will enquire into title and cases where it will refer the plaintiff to a more comprehensive declaratory suit, depending upon the facts of the case. 22. As seen from the record, the contention of the plaintiffs was that the plaintiff No.1-V.Rangarao got Ac.1-27 guntas in Sy.No.89 including some other properties to his share in a partition effected between him and his brothers and his name was mutated in the revenue records as pattedar and possessor and the plaintiff No.1-V.Rangarao sold the land to an extent of Ac.0-33 guntas out of Ac.1-27 guntas in Sy.No.89 to one G.Veeraiah under an unregistered sale deed, but his name continued to appear in the revenue records as pattedar to an extent of Ac.1-27 guntas. But, in the possessory column G.Veeraiah’s name was recorded as possessor to an extent of Ac.0-33 guntas and the name of V.Ranga Rao was recorded for the remaining extent of Ac.0-33 guntas up to the year 2005-06. The plaintiffs contended that towards East of the suit land the government acquired land for laying 100 feet road to connect the Hunter road with the Khammam road in the year 1999. Some portion of the land of G.Veeraiah was affected in road widening. Because of laying of 100 feet road, the market value of the lands increased multifold. 23. The contention of the plaintiffs was that the defendant might have purchased some extent from out of Ac.0-33 guntas from G.Veeraiah, but no part of the suit land was acquired from the plantiffis and the plaintiffs were no way concerned with the land acquisition proceedings. 24. 23. The contention of the plaintiffs was that the defendant might have purchased some extent from out of Ac.0-33 guntas from G.Veeraiah, but no part of the suit land was acquired from the plantiffis and the plaintiffs were no way concerned with the land acquisition proceedings. 24. In his cross examination P.W1 stated that he had not received any notice in respect of the suit land from the Land Acquisition Officer and as such, not filed any objections before the L.A.O. He stated that he was not aware whether the defendant and G.Veeraiah were given compensation in respect of Ac.0-4 ½ guntas in Sy.No.89 by L.A.O and whether any enquiry was conducted in respect of the said land acquisition. 25. The defendant examined himself as D.W1 and he filed his evidence affidavit stating that his grandfather late Balaramulu purchased the land in Sy.No.89 of Rangashaipet Village including the suit schedule property to an extent of Ac.0-33 guntas along with one G.Veeraiah through simple sale deeds dated 14.04.1974 and 17.02.1974 from Late V. Narahari Rao through V.Ranga Rao and Puppala Sambaiah and Yakaiah, whose names appeared in revenue records in the patta and occupation columns respectively prior to the entry of his grandfather’s name in the occupation column of the said record. The said land was purchased in the name of his father V.Srirangam. But there are no pleadings in the written statement with regard to the said effect. Any evidence lead by the parties without any pleadings cannot be looked into. 26. As per the evidence affidavit filed by D.W1, the plaintiff No.1 V.Ranga Rao was the nominal pattedar in Sy.No.89 since long time and was never in possession of the same. DW.1 stated in his cross examination that he filed the said simple original sale deeds before the Revenue Divisional Officer during the enquiry under Ex.B1. He stated that the original documents dated 08.02.1974 and 17.02.1974 were in the custody of his earlier counsel who was his counsel in the proceedings under Ex.B1. But, no efforts were made by him to file the said documents before the Civil Court, before which the present case was filed. He admitted in his cross examination that as per the pahanies filed by him also Sri V.Ranga Rao (original plaintiff) was the pattedar and his father’s name was recorded in the possessory column in Exs.B10 to B14. But, no efforts were made by him to file the said documents before the Civil Court, before which the present case was filed. He admitted in his cross examination that as per the pahanies filed by him also Sri V.Ranga Rao (original plaintiff) was the pattedar and his father’s name was recorded in the possessory column in Exs.B10 to B14. He stated that he could not file the original simple sale deeds before the court. He also admitted that he had not obtained any documents such as pattedar passbook or title deed after receiving compensation from L.A.O. (Land acquisition Officer) and that he had not taken any legal action against the original plaintiff seeking declaration of his rights nor filed any suit for specific performance nor filed any documents to show that his father was put in possession by the original plaintiff by receiving any consideration. 27. As per the contention of the learned counsel for the appelants, in view of escalation of land prices in the vicinity of Survey No. 89 of Rangasaipet village, the respondent-defendant managed the lower rank revenue officials and got their names illegally entered in the possessory column of revenue records vide proceedings B2/4141/2000 of the M.R.O. Warangal, during the years 1998-99 and 1999-2000. However, the said entries were subsequently deleted by the orders of the R.D.O. Warangal, vide proceedings E3/13646/2001, after due enquiry finding that the defendant was not in possession of the said land since 1970-71. The defendant failed to file the simple original sale deed through which his grandfather purchased the property from Sri V.Ranga Rao, the plaintiff No.1 herein. 28. The trial court on considering the said evidence observed that : “16. It is the case of the defendant that the original plaintiff sold the property but he failed to produce any document i.e., simple sale deed before this court to show that whether the late original plaintiff executed any simple sale deed or deeds. It is stated by the D.W1 that the original documents under which his grandfather purchased were handed over to his advocates who appeared in Land Acquisition proceedings under Ex.B1. DW1 has also admitted that he does not know whether the name of V. Venkateshwar Rao is recorded in Ex.Bl having appeared on his behalf. It is stated by the D.W1 that the original documents under which his grandfather purchased were handed over to his advocates who appeared in Land Acquisition proceedings under Ex.B1. DW1 has also admitted that he does not know whether the name of V. Venkateshwar Rao is recorded in Ex.Bl having appeared on his behalf. Whatever the case it may be, D.W1 is required to produce the simple sale deeds before this court to prove his contention that the property was purchased from the original plaintiff or his agnates and simple sale deed was executed in his favour coupled with delivery of possession. 17. It is obvious from record itself that as on this date, the patta stands in the name of the original plaintiff and in some documents more particularly, the documents under Exs. Al to A12, Exs.B11 to B25 name of original pattedar was recorded who is none other than original plaintiff. 19. On careful reading of the pahanies filed by both the parties, there is no record of cultivation in column nos. 19 to 35 of the pahanies. It is also clear that both the parties failed to lead any evidence before this court to show what were the crops cultivated in the respective years. It is also clear from the evidence of both the parties that the suit schedule property falls in Warangal Urban Agglomeration and several establishments like colleges have come up within the vicinity of the suit schedule property. The defendant/DW1 failed to adduce any legal evidence to show what were the crops that were cultivated and that they were exercising their possession effectually. In these circumstances, mere mentioning of names in the possession column would not confer any right of possession on both the parties and this court is required to adjudicate the possession of the parties on the basis of title”, and by placing reliance upon the judgment of High Court of A.P. in Mahendra C. Mehta and others Vs. M/s. Kousalya Cooperative Housing Society Limited, Hyderabad and others [ 2001 (5) ALT 197 ], wherein it was held that : “Entries in revenue records do not confer any title on the person whose name is entered therein nor they extinguish the right of the real owner. M/s. Kousalya Cooperative Housing Society Limited, Hyderabad and others [ 2001 (5) ALT 197 ], wherein it was held that : “Entries in revenue records do not confer any title on the person whose name is entered therein nor they extinguish the right of the real owner. When the land is shown to be fallow and uncultivated, the mentioning of the names of the persons as actual cultivators does not confer any title on the said person.” 29. The trial court further observed that : “Therefore, it is obvious from the plain reading of the pahanies filed by both the parties that the land is lying vacant. Ex.B26 would also clearly reveal that the land is vacant land and nobody is cultivating the land and the same is said to have reported by MRO. It is crystal clear from the documentary evidence also that the suit schedule plot is abutting to 100’ main road and there are several colleges and other establishments are coming up within the vicinity. It appears clear from the evidence that the suit schedule property is lying vacant as on this date also and for the past several years. Therefore, by following the principle of the above referred Judgment, it is clear that the possession follows the title and the original plaintiff was deemed to be in possession of the schedule property as on the date of the suit and subsequent to it also as on this day. Therefore, the contentions raised by the counsel for the defendant that the possession of the defendant and his grandfather cannot be accepted as the land is open and vacant land and the patta stands in the name of the original plaintiff which is not disputed before this court”. 30. Even with regard to Ex.B1, orders passed by the Land Acquisition Officer, the trial court observed that : “It was clearly recorded in Ex.B1 that the patta stands in the name of V.Ranga Rao (original plaintiff) and G. Veeraiah was the possessor of the land. It was mentioned in Ex.B1 that V. Sudhershan (defendant) and G. Veeraiah made written claim stating that they were exclusive possessors of the property and requested for compensation in equal shares. It was also mentioned therein that the defendant had filed the relevant copies of the ordinary sale documents dated 08.02.74 and 17.02.74. It was mentioned in Ex.B1 that V. Sudhershan (defendant) and G. Veeraiah made written claim stating that they were exclusive possessors of the property and requested for compensation in equal shares. It was also mentioned therein that the defendant had filed the relevant copies of the ordinary sale documents dated 08.02.74 and 17.02.74. There was no doubt that the compensation was received by the defendant. But the defendant failed to produce the original sale documents dated 08.02.74 and 17.02.74 before this court or before any other authority. If really the suit schedule property was purchased under simple sale deed, the defendant/DW1 ought to have produced the said documents”. 31. The trial court also observed that Ex.B1 was the document to which the original plaintiff was not a party and the amounts were received by defendant/D.W1 behind the back of the original plaintiff. 32. The lower appellate court, on the other hand, observed that Ex.B1 filed by the defendant was sufficient to establish prima facie title in favour of the defendant. The lower appellate court placed reliance upon Ex.B1 alone to consider that the defendant had title over the suit schedule property. The land acquisition proceedings cannot be considered as proof of title. Whenever there is a dispute with regard to the title, the Land Acquisition Officer has to refer the matter to civil court to decide the title dispute, but his proceedings cannot be considered as proof of title of the defendants. The said proceedings were passed behind the back of plaintiffs as rightly observed by the trial court. The written statement of the defendant is silent as to the source of his title. If at all the grandfather of the defendant had purchased the suit schedule property in 1974, the defendant would have mentioned the same in his written statement. No evidentiary value can be given to the Award passed by the L.A.O. and the lower appellate court erred in giving a finding of title to the respondent – defendant on the basis of Ex.B1 without the defendant filing even the copies of the simple sale deeds through which they were claiming their right and title to the suit schedule property. The simple sale deeds had not seen the light of the day. 33. The defendant had relied upon Exs.B26 to B30, the order of the R.D.O and the passbooks issued in his favor. The simple sale deeds had not seen the light of the day. 33. The defendant had relied upon Exs.B26 to B30, the order of the R.D.O and the passbooks issued in his favor. But the trial court as well as the lower appellate court also rejected the said evidence observing that the said documents were issued in favour of the defendant during the pendency of the proceedings in O.S. No.323 of 2001, as such, the same could not be relied on by the defendant to support his contention that he was in possession of the suit schedule property. 34. This Court in Kuturu Narasimha Reddy Vs. Pusala Venkataiah and others (5 supra) held that : “12. The authorities under A.P. Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books Act, 1971 are not competent to adjudicate upon the rights or title of contending parties. The proceedings before them are for limited purpose of making/amending/maintaining true and consistent entries in the revenue records basing on the enquiry conducted under the provisions of 1971 Act. Thus they are Court of limited jurisdiction. The entry in Record of Rights is only a piece of evidence in proof of title or possession, before the civil Court. Although it cannot be said that during the pendency of a civil suit, the authorities under the Act shall not make any entries in the record of Rights by making enquiry under the provisions of the Act, such entries are certainly subject to scrutiny by the civil Court. The civil Court while deciding the rights, title or possession of the parties apart from considering the entries in revenue records, will take into consideration several other aspects such as documents of title, oral evidence and pleadings of parties. In the adjudicatory process, the civil Court may hold that an entry is made incorrectly or improperly or without notice to the party having rights in the subject matter of dispute. The civil Court is also competent to declare the proceedings before the authorities under the Act as void. The submission made by the learned Counsel for the defendant about the lack of the competence of the civil Court to pronounce upon the genuineness or validity of the entries made in the revenue records therefore has no legal force. 13. The civil Court is also competent to declare the proceedings before the authorities under the Act as void. The submission made by the learned Counsel for the defendant about the lack of the competence of the civil Court to pronounce upon the genuineness or validity of the entries made in the revenue records therefore has no legal force. 13. Here is a case, where the plaintiffs asserted that the plaint schedule property is their ancestral property and that they are in possession of the said property. In view of the contentions urged by the defendant, at best, it can be said that the title of the plaintiffs is under dispute, in which event the plaintiffs can maintain a suit for injunction simplicitor. Further, basing on the evidence on record, the learned first appellate Court held that on the date of filing of the suit, the plaintiffs are in possession of the property. Therefore, the learned first appellate Court is justified in granting temporary injunction reversing the decree and judgment passed by the trial court and decreeing the suit of the plaintiffs in respect of entire suit schedule property.” 35. The lower appellate court observed that on a perusal of Exs.A1 to A12 and Exs.B10 to B25 they would clearly show that most of the said documents reveal the names of different persons in the possessory column including the name of G.Veeraiah, father of the defendant, and the defendant was shown as being in possession of the lands in Sy.No.89 of Rangashaipet, the said documents would not show that it was the plaintiffs, who were in possession of the suit schedule property. But, the lower appellate court had not considered that the lands were left fallow and for vacant land, it was well settled proposition of law that possession follows title and the defendant, who was examined as D.W1 also admitted that the plaintiff was the original pattedar of the land and his name was recorded as pattedar in Sy.No.89. 36. In Mahendra C. Mehta and others Vs. Kousalya Co-op. Housing Society Limited, Hyderabad and others (4 supra), this Court held that, “It is well settled that entries in revenue records do not confer title. Title to a property of a person would not be lost merely because his name is not mutated in the revenue registers. 36. In Mahendra C. Mehta and others Vs. Kousalya Co-op. Housing Society Limited, Hyderabad and others (4 supra), this Court held that, “It is well settled that entries in revenue records do not confer title. Title to a property of a person would not be lost merely because his name is not mutated in the revenue registers. So entry showing the name of a person as owner of the property, in the column relating to ‘owner’ does not confer title on him in relation to that property, if he is not really the owner of that property. Similarly, because the name of an individual is entered in column No.16 of the pahani, relating to ‘person in actual possession’, when the land is kept fallow or vacant, that entry by itself would not help him in establishing his possession during that year. The question as to who is in possession of a land kept fallow or vacant, mainly has to be decided on title. In respect of lands kept fallow or vacant, or the like, merely because the owner is not physically present thereon the land, or merely because somebody else made use of the land for a short span for temporary purpose, it cannot be said that the owner lost his possession over such land. Pahanies are maintained mainly for purpose of revenue collection, and statistics as to who raised what crop on what extent of land. Therefore when a land is kept fallow or vacant, column No.16 need not, and should not, be filled in as the name of the person who “actually cultivated” the land. So merely because a person who is not the owner could manage to get his name entered in column No.16 of pahani, when the land is kept fallow, or when it is a vacant land, it cannot, merely on the basis of that entry without his establishing or proving positive overt acts of possession thereon, be held that he is in possession of such vacant land, of which he is not the owner.” 37. Thus, recording the name of the defendant or his ancestors in the possessory column in some of the pahanies when the land is kept fallow does not establish or prove his possession thereon, when he is not the owner of the said land. Thus, recording the name of the defendant or his ancestors in the possessory column in some of the pahanies when the land is kept fallow does not establish or prove his possession thereon, when he is not the owner of the said land. As such, the substantial questions of laws 2 and 3 are also answered holding that the lower appellate court is not justified in recording the finding of possession in favour of the respondent – defendant in respect of the suit vacant land, contrary to the evidence on record and the settled principles of law, when admittedly the plaintiffs are the real owners of the property. 38. In the result, the Second Appeal is allowed by setting aside the judgment and decree dated 17.01.2007 passed in A.S No.30 of 2006 by the IV Additional District Judge, Warangal, confirming the judgment and decree dated 28.02.2006 in O.S No.323 of 2001 passed by the Principal Junior Civil Judge, Warangal. There shall be no order as to costs. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed.