JUDGMENT : This appeal arises out of judgment and order dated 21.12.2020 passed by the First Additional Sessions Judge Balod, District Balod CG in S.T. No.03/2019 convicting the accused/appellants under Section 304-B, 34 IPC and sentencing each of them to undergo RI for 10 years with fine of Rs. 1,000 plus default stipulation. 2. As per prosecution case, marriage of the deceased Shail Kumari was solemnized with the appellant No.3 Teeka Ram on 04.02.2018 according to Hindu rites and customs. Appellant No.1 & 2 are the father-in-law and mother-in-law of the deceased. It is alleged that the accused/appellants subjected her with cruelty for bringing less dowry. On several occasions, assurance was given by the father of the deceased that the accused family would not harass her in future but subsequently, she was subjected to harassment for demand of motorcycle, washing machine, sewing machine and refrigerator. She was also harassed for not cooking food properly and ultimately on 23.06.2018, after pouring kerosene oil, she set herself ablaze and died. Information was sent to police station Gurur vide merg No. 51/2018. Panchnama Ex.P-2 was prepared after giving notice Ex.P-1, dead body was sent for postmortem examination to Government Hospital Gurur where the doctor has prepared postmortem report Ex.P-12 and has opined that the cause of death of the deceased was due to 81% burns. FIR Ex.P-24 was registered. During investigation, spot map was prepared vide Ex.P-4 of the place of incident Ex. P-14. Statements of the witnesses were recorded and thereafter, the arrest memo Ex.P-5, 6 & 7 was prepared. Based on this, offence was registered against the accused/appellants under Sections 304-B/34. After filing of the charge sheet, trial judge framed charge against the accused/appellants under Sections 304-B/34 and in alternate Section 302/34IPC. 3. The appellants/accused abjured their guilt and claimed to be tried and took the plea of alibi. In order to substantiate the prosecution case, the prosecution has produced 15 witnesses statements of accused/appellants were recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. 4. After hearing the parties, the trial Court by judgment impugned, has convicted and sentenced the accused/appellants as mentioned in paragraph 1 of the judgment. Hence the present appeal. 5. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the judgment passed by learned trial Court is bad in law and contrary to the facts and evidence of the case. The evidence led by the prosecution witnesses suffers from serious infirmity. Hence the present appeal. 5. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the judgment passed by learned trial Court is bad in law and contrary to the facts and evidence of the case. The evidence led by the prosecution witnesses suffers from serious infirmity. There is no eye-witness to the incident and the case of prosecution is based upon circumstantial evidence. It is also submitted that the prosecution has completely failed to establish that the deceased was subjected to harassment for demand of dowry and no such prior report or complaint with regard to demand of dowry and cruelty committed with the deceased, has ever been made by her or by her relatives. It is submitted that the ingredients of the offence under Section 304-B of IPC are missing. He submits that the prosecution has failed to prove that there was demand of dowry as statement of important witnesses including family members of deceased suffers from material contradictions and omissions. He submits that the witnesses being family members, their statement is not reliable. That, the prosecution failed to prove that the deceased was subjected to cruelty soon before her death. Lastly, the conviction of appellants are based only upon presumption and evidence available on record is not sufficient to convict the accused/appellants. He has placed his reliance upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Biswajit Halder @ Babu Halder and Others Vs. State of West Bengal, (2008) 1 SCC 202 ; Durga Prasad and Another Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2010) 9 SCC 73 and Charan Singh @ Charanjit Singh Vs. The State of Uttarakhand, 2023 SCC Online 454 and submits that the conviction is not sustainable in absence of evidence in connection with cruelty and harassment on the deceased. He submmtis that in the judgment of Biswajit Halder (supra), it has been held that “14. In this case we find that there is practically no evidence to show that there was any cruelty or harassment for or in connection with the demand of dowry. There is also no finding in that regard. This deficiency in evidence proves fatal for the prosecution case. Even otherwise mere evidence of cruelty and harassment is not sufficient to bring in application of Section 304-B IPC It has to be shown in addition that such cruelty or harassment was for or in connection wit the demand of dowry. (See Kanchy Komuramma Vs. This deficiency in evidence proves fatal for the prosecution case. Even otherwise mere evidence of cruelty and harassment is not sufficient to bring in application of Section 304-B IPC It has to be shown in addition that such cruelty or harassment was for or in connection wit the demand of dowry. (See Kanchy Komuramma Vs. State of AP 1995 supp.(4) SCC 118:1996 SCC (Cri.) 31. Since the prosecution failed to prove that aspect, the conviction as recorded cannot be maintained.” 6. Further, in the judgment of Durga Prasad (supra), the Supreme Court has held as under: 7. It was pointed out that the only evidence on which reliance had been placed both by the trial court, as well as the High Court, for convicting the appellants, was the evidence of Vimla Bai, PW 1, the mother of the deceased and Radheshyam, PW 3, the brother of the deceased. In fact, the prosecution story was that since no dowry had been received from the family of the victim, she had been beaten and treated with cruelty. There is no other evidence regarding the physical and mental torture which the deceased was alleged to have been subjected to. 8. Mr Gupta urged that the marriage of Appellant 1 with the deceased was performed as part of a community marriage being celebrated on account of the poverty of couples who could not otherwise meet the expenses of marriage and that even the few utensils which were given at the time of such community marriage were given by the persons who had organized such marriages. 9. Mr Gupta submitted that the evidence in this case was wholly insufficient to even suggest that the victim had been subjected to cruelty or harassment which was sufficient to compel her to commit suicide. In support of his submissions, Mr Gupta firstly referred to the decision of this Court in Biswajit Halder v. State of W.B. wherein, in facts which were very similar, it was held that there was practically no evidence to show that there was any cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, the demands for dowry. There was also no finding in that regard. It was further observed that this deficiency in evidence proved fatal for the prosecution case and even otherwise mere evidence of cruelty and harassment was not sufficient to attract Section 304-B IPC. There was also no finding in that regard. It was further observed that this deficiency in evidence proved fatal for the prosecution case and even otherwise mere evidence of cruelty and harassment was not sufficient to attract Section 304-B IPC. It had to be shown in addition that such cruelty or harassment was for, or in connection with, demand of dowry. Mr Gupta urged that since the appellants had not been convicted under the provisions of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, the charge under Section 304-B would also fail since the same was linked with the question of cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, the demand for dowry. 14. Ms Makhija then contended that as had been laid down by this Court in Anand Kumar v. State of M.P., in order to counter the presumption available under Section 113-B, which is relatable to Section 304-B, a heavy burden has been shifted on to the accused to prove his innocence. Having regard to the language of Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, which indicates that when a question arises as to whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment by such other person or in connection with any demand for dowry, the court shall presume that such person had caused such dowry death. Ms Makhija urged that the aforesaid wording of Section 113-B of Evidence Act and the use of the expression “shall” would clearly indicate that the court shall presume such death as dowry death provided the conditions in Section 113-B were satisfied and it would then be for the accused to prove otherwise. 15. Ms Makhija, thereupon, urged that the order of conviction passed by the trial court holding the appellants guilty under Sections 498-A and 304-B IPC, confirmed by the High Court, did not warrant any interference by this Court. 16. 15. Ms Makhija, thereupon, urged that the order of conviction passed by the trial court holding the appellants guilty under Sections 498-A and 304-B IPC, confirmed by the High Court, did not warrant any interference by this Court. 16. Having carefully considered the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties, we are inclined to allow the benefit of doubt to the appellants having particular regard to the fact that except for certain bald statements made by PWs 1 and 3 alleging that the victim had been subjected to cruelty and harassment prior to her death, there is no other evidence to prove that the victim committed suicide on account of cruelty and harassment to which she was subjected just prior to her death, which, in fact, are the ingredients of the evidence to be led in respect of Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, 1872, in order to bring home the guilt against an accused under Section 304-B IPC. 17. As has been mentioned hereinbefore, in order to hold an accused guilty of an offence under Section 304-B IPC, it has to be shown that apart from the fact that the woman died on account of burn or bodily injury, otherwise than under normal circumstances, within 7 years of her marriage, it has also to be shown that soon before her death, she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry. Only then would such death be called “dowry death” and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused the death of the woman concerned. 18. In this case, one other aspect has to be kept in mind, namely, that no charges were framed against the appellants under the provisions of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 and the evidence led in order to prove the same for the purposes of Section 304-B IPC was related to a demand for a fan only. 19. The decision cited by Mr R.P. Gupta, learned Senior Advocate, in Biswajit Halder case was rendered in almost similar circumstances. In order to bring home a conviction under Section 304-B IPC, it will not be sufficient to only lead evidence showing that cruelty or harassment had been meted out to the victim, but that such treatment was in connection with the demand for dowry. In order to bring home a conviction under Section 304-B IPC, it will not be sufficient to only lead evidence showing that cruelty or harassment had been meted out to the victim, but that such treatment was in connection with the demand for dowry. In our view, the prosecution in this case has failed to fully satisfy the requirements of both Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, 1872 and Section 304-B of the Penal Code.” 7. He has further relied upon the judgment of Charan Singh @ Charanjit Singh (supra), it has been held that : “21. In the aforesaid evidence led by the prosecution, none of the witnesses stated about the cruelty or harassment to the deceased by the appellant or any of his family members on account of demand of dowry soon before the death or otherwise. Rather harassment has not been narrated by anyone. It is only certain averments regarding demand of motor cycle and land which is also much prior to the incident. The aforesaid evidence led by the prosecution does not fulfill the pre-requisites to invoke presumption under Section 304- B IPC or Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act. Evn the ingredients of Section 498-A IPC are not made out fo the same reason as there is no evidence of cruelty and harassment to the deceased soon before her death. xxxx xxxx xxxxxx xxxxx 23. On a collective appreciation of evidence led by the prosecution, we are of the considered view that the prerequisites to raise presumption under Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act having not been fulfilled, the conviction of the appellant cannot be justified. Mere death of the deceased being unnatural in the matrimonial home within seven years of marriage will not be sufficient to convict the accused under Section 304-B and 498-A IPC…….” He submits that mere evidence of cruelty or harassment is not sufficient to bring in application of Section 304-B IPC. It has to be shown in addition that such cruelty or harassment was for or in connection with demand for dowry. He submits that the evidence was wholly insufficient to suggest that the victim had been subjected to cruelty or harassment which was sufficient to compel her to commit suicide. 8. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent-State submits that the prosecution has succeeded to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. He submits that the evidence was wholly insufficient to suggest that the victim had been subjected to cruelty or harassment which was sufficient to compel her to commit suicide. 8. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent-State submits that the prosecution has succeeded to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. There is specific allegation against the appellants for demand of dowry and cruelty soon before death of the deceased. The deceased suffered unnatural death within a period of one year from her marriage, thus, presumption of Section 113-B comes into play which is against the appellant. Admittedly, there were persistent demands put up by the accused right from the solemnization of the marriage which continued till the date of the death of the deceased. He further contended that the accused/appellants were ill-treating, harassing and subjecting her to cruelty for the fulfillment of their demands for additional dowry. It is further submitted that the prosecution witnesses have stated sufficient against the appellant to secure their conviction. They have duly supported the case of prosecution. Learned trial Court has rightly considered the evidence of the case. With the aforesaid submissions, he prays for dismissal of the instant appeal. 9. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 10. Before dealing with the merits of the case, it would be appropriate to discuss the legal aspects first. The offence involved in the case under Section 304-B of IPC which is reproduced hereinunder - "304-B. Dowry death.--(1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called "dowry death", and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. Explanation. For the purpose of this sub-section, "dowry" shall have the same meaning as in section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961).(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life." 11. Explanation. For the purpose of this sub-section, "dowry" shall have the same meaning as in section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961).(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life." 11. Undisputedly, the deceased died of unnatural death within seven years of her marriage, as per Indian Evidence Act, 1872, there is presumption of Section 113-A & 113-B. These provision are also quoted herein-under :- “113-A. Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman.—When the question is whether the commission of suicide by a woman had been abetted by her husband or any relative of her husband and it is shown that she had committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband or such relative of her husband had subjected her to cruelty, the Court may presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, “cruelty” shall have the same meaning as in section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code 113-B. Presumption as to dowry death.—When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman has been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death. Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, “dowry death” shall have the same meaning as in section 304B, of the Indian Penal Code, (45 of 1860)” 12. Further, in catena of judgments, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has summed-up the principle to constitute the offence under Section 304-B IPC. In the case of Kansraj Vs. Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, “dowry death” shall have the same meaning as in section 304B, of the Indian Penal Code, (45 of 1860)” 12. Further, in catena of judgments, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has summed-up the principle to constitute the offence under Section 304-B IPC. In the case of Kansraj Vs. State of Punjab reported in (2000) 5 SCC 207 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has elucidated the following ingredients to prove dowry death - "(a) the death of a woman was caused by burns or bodily injury or had occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances; (b) such death should have occurred within 7 years of her marriage; (c) the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or by any relative of her husband; (d) such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with the demand of dowry; and (e) to such cruelty or harassment the deceased should have been subjected to soon before her death. " 13. Further, in the case of Suresh Kumar Vs. State of Haryana reported in (2013) 16 SCC 353 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court also has held as under - 27. Importantly, Section 304-B IPC does not categorize death as homicidal or suicidal or accidental. This is because death caused by burns can, in a given case, be homicidal or suicidal or accidental. Similarly, death caused by bodily injury can, in a given case, be homicidal or suicidal or accidental. Finally, any death occurring "otherwise than under normal circumstances" can, in a given case, be homicidal or suicidal or accidental. Therefore, if all the other ingredients of Section 304-B IPC are fulfilled, any death (whether homicidal or suicidal or accidental) and whether caused by burns or by bodily injury or occurring otherwise than under normal circumstances shall, as per the legislative mandate, be called a "dowry death" and the woman's husband or his relative "shall be deemed to have caused her death". The section clearly specifies what constitutes the offence of a dowry death and also identifies the single offender or multiple offenders who has or have caused the dowry death 14. The evidentiary value of the identification is stated in Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, 1872 (the Act). The section clearly specifies what constitutes the offence of a dowry death and also identifies the single offender or multiple offenders who has or have caused the dowry death 14. The evidentiary value of the identification is stated in Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, 1872 (the Act). The key words in this section are "shall presume" leaving no option with a court but to presume an accused brought before it of causing a dowry death guilty of the offence. However, the redeeming factor of this provision is that the presumption is rebuttable. Section 113-B of the Act enables an accused to prove his innocence and places a reverse onus of proof on him or her." Therefore, in case, the essential ingredients of such death have been established by the prosecution, it is the duty of the court to raise a presumption that the accused has caused the dowry death.........…" 15. Bare reading of the above mentioned provisions and verdicts given by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it appears that when death of a married woman is caused by burns or bodily injuries or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within a period of seven years of her marriage and the woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband and such cruelty of her husband should be for or in connection with the demand of dowry and such cruelty or harassment, the deceased should have been subjected to soon before her death be called as dowry death and the woman's husband or his relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. Section 304-B of IPC does not categorize death as homicidal or suicidal or accidental. 16. Further, two things have to be seen in respect of offence punishable under Section 304-B IPC; first, to make sure whether the ingredients of the Section have been made out against the accused/appellants and if the findings are affirmative, then secondly, to ascertain that the accused/appellants are deemed to have caused the death of the woman. 17. Further, when a married woman dies of unnatural death either suicidal or homicidal, due to harassment or cruelty made in connection to any dowry demand soon before her death by her husband or relatives of husband, presumption of Section 113-B comes into effect and under such circumstance, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death. 17. Further, when a married woman dies of unnatural death either suicidal or homicidal, due to harassment or cruelty made in connection to any dowry demand soon before her death by her husband or relatives of husband, presumption of Section 113-B comes into effect and under such circumstance, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death. Once the ingredients of Section 304-B IPC are fulfilled by the prosecution, the onus shifts on the defence to produce evidence to rebut the statutory presumption and to prove that the death was in the normal course and the accused was not connected. 18. Since, learned trial Court has given its affirmative finding with regard to dowry death of the deceased by the appellants, therefore, this Court has to examine whether the findings of learned trial Court are correct or not? 19. On perusal of record, it is undisputed that marriage of deceased Shail Kumari was solemnized with the appellant and she died of unnatural death within one year of her marriage in her matrimonial house. As far as demand of dowry is concerned, firstly the statements of the witnesses are to be looked into: Krishnalal Dewangan (PW-2) father of the deceased has stated that soon after marriage of his daughter, her in-laws started treating with cruelty for bringing less dowry and abused her which was informed by his daughter. He has further stated that on Holi festival when he went to the matrimonial house of his daughter, the appellants gave assurance that they will not harass her. However, after few days they again started abusing her for demand of refrigerator, washing machine and motorcycle. They used to torture her to learn tailoring work and threatened her and therefore for 15-20 days she went to her parents house. He has further stated that the in-laws threatened her in phone. Thereafter when he went to leave his daughter to her in-laws house, again he made them understand for behaving properly but they did not stop harassing her and on 23.06.2018, he was informed by the appellant No.3 Teekaram that his daughter has committed suicide after pouring kerosene oil and setting herself ablaze. Thereafter when he went to leave his daughter to her in-laws house, again he made them understand for behaving properly but they did not stop harassing her and on 23.06.2018, he was informed by the appellant No.3 Teekaram that his daughter has committed suicide after pouring kerosene oil and setting herself ablaze. He has stated that on receiving the message, they immediately went and saw that the body was covered with bedsheet and when he removed the bedsheet, he saw that neck was pressed with gunny bag and there was no smell of kerosene oil. He stated that he was having suspicion that after committing her murder, the body has been set on fire. In cross-examination, he has stated that at the time of marriage, the appellants did not demand motorcycle, fridge or any other articles. At the time of marriage, he had given household articles to the appellant No.3 and his daughter. Balram Dewangan (PW-4) uncle of the deceased has stated that on the date of incident, after receiving the information, he went along with his brother to the matrimonial house of the deceased and stated that it appears that she was killed and thereafter set on fire. Dr. Karun Bambeshwar (PW-6) has conducted postmortem examination on the body of the deceased and he noticed that the deceased sustained 81% burn injuries and were ante mortem in nature. Ram Kumar Dewangan (PW-9) uncle of the deceased has stated that when the deceased came to her parents’ house at Holi, she had informed to the family members that she was being subjected to cruelty for demand of dowry. Vijendra Kumar Dewangan (PW-12) brother of the deceased has also made similar statement to that of his uncle that the appellants subjected her to cruelty for bringing less dowry. Tilak Ram Dewangan (PW-15) neighbour of the appellants has stated that on the date of incident ie. 23.06.2018, in the morning at about 5.00 am. when he got up for weaving clothes, he heard some cries and switched off the cooler. He went on the roof and saw that the deceased was lying in burnt condition and when he called the family members of the deceased, brother of the accused Tikaram and his wife namely, Naresh and Shashi came. Thereafter, he brought the gunny bag lying in his roof and extinguished the fire. He went on the roof and saw that the deceased was lying in burnt condition and when he called the family members of the deceased, brother of the accused Tikaram and his wife namely, Naresh and Shashi came. Thereafter, he brought the gunny bag lying in his roof and extinguished the fire. He has stated that when they were extinguishing the fire, at that time, the husband of the deceased, father-in-law and mother-in-law came and after a while, accused Tikaram and Sampat Ram came down and the time they brought the bedsheet, she succumbed to the burn injuries. 20. These witnesses seem to be consistent in their cross-examination on the said point. Moreover, PW-9 and PW-12 uncle and brother of the deceased had deposed that the deceased disclosed that the appellants used to harass her on account of demand of dowry. However, when the father of the deceased made the appellants understand, on the assurance of well-keeping by the father of accused, she got ready to go there. 21. However, being family members of the deceased, the credibility of PW-9 and PW-12 has been doubted by the counsel for the appellants and in that context, in the case of Rohtash Kumar Vs. State of Haryana reported in (2013) 14 SCC 434 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under : "25. It is a settled legal proposition that evidence of a prosecution witness cannot be rejected in toto, merely because the prosecution chose to treat him as hostile and cross-examined him. The evidence of such witnesses cannot be treated as effaced, or washed off the record altogether. The same can be accepted to the extent that their version is found to be dependable, upon a careful scrutiny thereof. 26. In State of U.P. v. Ramesh Prasad Misra [ (1996) 10 SCC 360 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 1278 : AIR 1996 SC 2766 ] this Court held, that evidence of a hostile witness would not be rejected in entirety, if the same has been given in favour of either the prosecution, or the accused, but is required to be subjected to careful scrutiny, and thereafter, that portion of the evidence which is consistent with either the case of the prosecution, or that of the defence, may be relied upon. 27. 27. Therefore, the law permits the court to take into consideration the deposition of a hostile witness, to the extent that the same is in consonance with the case of the prosecution, and is found to be reliable in careful judicial scrutiny." 22. The principle relating to interested witnesses/close relatives has also been laid-down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Surinder Singh Vs. State of Haryana reported in (2014) 4 SCC 129 , relevant para is reproduced herein:- "33. Before closing, the most common place argument must be dealt with. In all cases of bride burning it is submitted that independent witnesses have not been examined. When harassment and cruelty is meted out to a woman within the four walls of the matrimonial home, it is difficult to get independent witnesses to depose about it. Only the inmates of the house and the relatives of the husband, who cause the cruelty, witness it. Their servants, being under their obligation, would never CRIMINAL APPEAL No.554 of 1998 depose against them. Proverbially, neighbours are slippery witnesses. Moreover, witnesses have a tendency to stay away from courts. This is more so with neighbours. In bride burning cases who else will, therefore, depose about the misery of the deceased bride except her parents or her relatives? It is time we accept this reality. We, therefore, reject this submission." 23. The evidence of witnesses (PW-9 and PW-12) cannot be discarded merely because they are relatives of the deceased. Relationship is not a factor to affect credibility of a witness. However, close scrutiny is required before accepting their evidence. 24. Learned counsel for the appellants has also argued that there is no evidence to show that any demand of dowry was made soon before the death of the deceased. In this context, in the case of Kans Raj (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has defined the meaning of phrase 'soon after' used in the provision of Section 304-B of IPC, relevant para is quoted as under:- "151”15. It is further contended on behalf of the respondents that the statements of the deceased referred to the instances could not be termed to be cruelty or harassment by the husband soon before her death. "Soon before" is a relative term which is required to be considered under specific circumstances of each case and no straitjacket formula can be laid down by fixing any time-limit. "Soon before" is a relative term which is required to be considered under specific circumstances of each case and no straitjacket formula can be laid down by fixing any time-limit. This expression is pregnant with the idea of proximity test. The term "soon before"is not synonymous with the term "immediately before" and is opposite of the expression CRIMINAL APPEAL No.554 of 1998 "soon after" as used and understood in Section 114, Illustration (a) of the Evidence Act. These words would imply that the interval should not be too long between the time of making the statement and the death. It contemplates the reasonable time which, as earlier noticed, has to be understood and determined under the peculiar circumstances of each case. In relation to dowry deaths, the circumstances showing the existence of cruelty or harassment to the deceased are not restricted to a particular instance but normally refer to a course of conduct. Such conduct may be spread over a period of time. If the cruelty or harassment or demand for dowry is shown to have persisted, it shall be deemed to be "soon before death" if any other intervening circumstance showing the non-existence of such treatment is not brought on record, before such alleged treatment and the date of death. It does not, however, mean that such time can be stretched to any period. Proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the consequential death is required to be proved by the prosecution. The demand of dowry, cruelty or harassment based upon such demand and the date of death should not be too remote in time which, under the circumstances, be treated as having become stale enough." 25. Therefore, now it becomes clear that the phrase 'soon before her death' in Section 304-B IPC does not mean 'immediately prior to death of deceased'. However, the prosecution must establish the existence of "proximate and live link" between the dowry death and cruelty or harassment for dowry demand by the husband or his relatives. 26. In the present case, the incident took place within one year of marriage and only within a period of four months, she died in her matrimonial house, therefore this is not a case where the allegation was leveled after lapse of more than enough time which would fatal the case of prosecution. 26. In the present case, the incident took place within one year of marriage and only within a period of four months, she died in her matrimonial house, therefore this is not a case where the allegation was leveled after lapse of more than enough time which would fatal the case of prosecution. The aforesaid chain of circumstances proves that there existed a live and proximate link between the instances of demand of dowry and the death of deceased. It is pertinent to mention here that in the statements of the witnesses, it has been stated that the deceased was harassed by her husband as well as her in-laws for bringing less dowry. Krishna Lal Dewangan (PW-1), father of the deceased has stated that on the assurance of well keeping by the father of the accused, the deceased got ready to go to her matrimonial house. However, the deceased was so much depressed as a result of cruelty/harassment meted out to her in the hands of the appellants that she developed the suicidal tendency and ultimately committed suicide. 27. Thus looking to the evidence as discussed above, this Court is of the considered view that learned trial Court has rightly found that the appellants were demanding fridge, washing machine and motorcycle from the deceased and constantly torturing her for the same. From the evidence on record, it appears that the deceased died unnatural death by committing suicide after pouring kerosene oil and setting herself ablaze as she was subjected to cruelty/harassment by her husband and in-laws in connection with the demand for dowry which started from the time of her marriage and continued till she committed suicide. 27. Now, the issue which arises before this Court is as to whether learned trial Court was right in presuming that the accused/appellants caused dowry death of the deceased. 28. Close scrutiny of the above facts makes it clear that the prosecution was able to successfully prove that the death of deceased occurred on account of the burn within seven years of her marriage under other than normal circumstances. It has further been proved that soon before her death, she was subjected to harassment and cruelty pursuant to demand of dowry by the appellants. It has further been proved that soon before her death, she was subjected to harassment and cruelty pursuant to demand of dowry by the appellants. Since, the ingredients of Section 304-B of IPC stand satisfied, the presumption under 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act operates against the appellants, who is deemed to have caused the offence specified under Section 304-B of IPC, therefore, the burden shifts on the accused to rebut the aforesaid presumption. 29. In the light of the above discussion, it appears that the deceased Shail Kumari suffered death at her matrimonial home, otherwise than under normal circumstances, within seven years of her marriage, and the case squarely falls within the ambit of dowry death. It appears that the harassment of the deceased was with a view to coerce her to convince her parents to meet the demands for dowry. 30. Thus, it is clearly established that the legal requirements for an offence falling under Sections 304-B IPC with the aid of Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, 1872 against the appellants is made out and the conviction and sentence imposed, therefore, do not call for interference. Hence, the appeal sans merit and is hereby dismissed. Impugned judgment of conviction and sentence, as passed by the trial Court is affirmed. The appellants 1 & 2 are on bail. Their bail bonds stand cancelled. They are directed to immediately surrender before the trial Court for undergoing the remaining jail sentence failing which, trial Court shall be at liberty to take necessary steps against the appellants. So far as appellant No.3 is concerned, he is in jail. Therefore no order for his surrender or arrest is required. 31. Let a copy of this judgment along with its record, be sent to the trial Court for information and compliance. 32. The appeal fails and is, hereby, dismissed.