JUDGMENT : (Apurba Sinha Ray, J.) By filing the instant application the decree-holder has prayed for necessary leave to the decree-holder to deposit a sum of Rs. 1,50,048/- before the Original Side in view of the relevant judgment and decree passed in suit no. 258 of 1992, and further for granting leave to the judgment-debtor no. 2 to withdraw the said sum as deposited by the decree-holder in compliance of the terms of decree dated 30th July, 2007. The decree-holder has also prayed for certain directions upon the Taxing Officer of the Original Side as mentioned in the master summons. 2. Mr. Jishnu Choudhury, learned counsel appearing for the decree-holder has contended that by virtue of the decree, the decree-holder is entitled to deposit the relevant sum before this court since there is no time limit imposed upon the decree-holder to deposit the said sum of money. According to him on payment of money by the plaintiff/decree-holder, the judgment-debtor no. 2 is to transfer the relevant shares and debentures to the decree-holder and further to record the name of the decree-holder in the relevant documents. Learned counsel has further argued that though the decree was passed on 30.07.2007, and the present execution case was filed on 12.08.2022, still the instant proceeding is not barred under the provisions of Limitation Act since the decree does not provide the time limit for payment of such amount. The relief granted to the decree-holder in the relevant proceeding is that of a perpetual injunction and the decree is enforceable only when the decree-holder makes the payment. It is also argued that as no time was fixed for paying the money the decree-holder can pay the said sum of money at any point of time. In this regard the learned counsel has referred to the judicial decisions reported at AIR 1974 Allahabad 275 (Abdul Rashid v. Sri. Sitaramji Maharaj Brajman and Ors.), AIR 1974 Calcutta 246 (Ramnath Das & Ors. v. Saha Chowdhury and Co. Ltd. & Ors.). The learned counsel also argues that if the decree is capable of two interpretations, the interpretation in favour of the decree-holder is to be accepted. He relies upon the judicial decision reported at (2000) 6 SCC 259 (Deep Chand Ors. v. Mohal Lal). 3. Mr. Pratik Ghosh appearing on behalf of the judgment-debtor no. Ltd. & Ors.). The learned counsel also argues that if the decree is capable of two interpretations, the interpretation in favour of the decree-holder is to be accepted. He relies upon the judicial decision reported at (2000) 6 SCC 259 (Deep Chand Ors. v. Mohal Lal). 3. Mr. Pratik Ghosh appearing on behalf of the judgment-debtor no. 2 has started his argument by saying that these are the shares of judgment-debtor no. 2 Grasim Industries Limited over which the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor nos. 1 and 3 are fighting with each other. Admittedly the judgment was passed against the judgment-debtor no. 1 Jiyajeerao Cotton Mills Limited which was gone into liquidation in the year 1998. The suit was filed in the year 1992 but no leave for proceeding against the judgment-debtor no. 1 under section 446 of Companies Act, 1956 was obtained by the decree-holder. There is nothing on record to show that such leave was ever granted. Learned counsel has also submitted that judgment-debtor no. 2 has already filed one supplementary affidavit contending that 500 shares were lying with the Investor Education and Protection Fund (IEPF) and the supplementary affidavit also contains the transaction history. If there is any claim of the decree-holder, the same can only be raised against the judgment-debtor no. 1. Learned counsel for the judgment-debtor no. 2 has also submitted that the shares lying in IEPF may be transferred to the decree-holder subject to the order of this court. Learned counsel has also placed before the court the relevant page of GA application wherein the amount has been admitted by the decree-holder. Learned counsel has also drawn the attention of this court to the page no. 207, Volume 2 wherein it has been mentioned that shares have been sold to Citi Bank from the part of the judgment-debtor no. 1. 4. Learned counsel Mr. Pravat Kumar Srivastava appearing for the judgment-debtor no. 3 namely Citi Bank has submitted that the instant proceeding has been barred under the provisions of Limitation Act. In support of his contention, he has cited case laws reported at AIR 2005 SC 2564 (Dr. Chiranjit Lal (D) by L.Rs v. Hari Das (D) by L.Rs) and AIR 2001 SC 279 (Ratan Singh v. Vijay Singh & Ors.). According to him the decree is enforceable from the date of decree. In support of his contention, he has cited case laws reported at AIR 2005 SC 2564 (Dr. Chiranjit Lal (D) by L.Rs v. Hari Das (D) by L.Rs) and AIR 2001 SC 279 (Ratan Singh v. Vijay Singh & Ors.). According to him the decree is enforceable from the date of decree. As per the instant decree there is a time schedule but the decree-holder did not follow the said time limit and as such the execution proceeding cannot be proceeded with. Court's View:- 5. After considering the submission and counter-submission of the learned counsels of the parties, I have gone through the relevant decree which was passed on July 30, 2007 in Suit No. 258 of 1992 between Prem Kumar Chowdhury v. Jiyajeerao Cotton Mills Limited & Ors. and the relevant excerpts of such decree are as follows:- "This cause coming on this day i.e. the Thirteenth day of July, Two thousand Seven for final disposal before the Hon'ble Prabuddha Sankar Banerjee, one of the Judges of this court in the presence of the Advocate for the plaintiff Prem Kumar Chowdhury (defendant no. 1 Jiyajeerao Cotton Mills Ltd. and no. 2 Grasim Industries Limited not appearing either through its representatives or by advocates) and sufficient court fees having been paid and it appears that the defendant no 3 Citi Bank entered appearance but did not contest the suit and upon hearing the evidence given in this suit it is declared that the plaintiff Prem Kumar Chowdhury was and be and he is hereby entitled to the partly convertible debentures numbering 1225 (one thousand two hundred twenty five) in respect of the 'first' series and numbering 887 (eight hundred eighty seven) in respect of the 'second' series and the same is ordered and decreed accordingly and it is further declared that the plaintiff Prem Kumar Chowdhury was and be and he is hereby entitled to the shares numbers 1225 in respect of first and numbers 887 (eight hundred eighty seven) in respect of second series, now stands converted in the capital of the company and the same is ordered and decreed accordingly and upon and/or subject to payment by the plaintiff Prem Kumar Chowdhury to the defendant no.1 Jiyajeerao Cotton Mills Ltd. It is further ordered and decreed that the defendant no. 1 shall return the convertible debentures numbering 2112 (two thousand one hundred twelve) in aggregate and/or shares numbering 2112 (two thousand one hundred twelve) in the capital of defendant no. 2 Grasim Industries Limited. And it is further ordered and decreed that a perpetual injunction be and the same is hereby granted restraining the defendant no. 1 Jiyajeerao Cotton Mills Ltd. and/or its servants and agents to exercise voting rights in respect of Two thousand one hundred and twelve (2112) equity shares in aggregate arising out of two several series of partly convertible debentures and it is further ordered and decreed that the application forms, allotment notice and debentures and/or shares scripts allotted by defendant no.2 Grasim Industries Ltd. to defendant no.1 Jiyajeerao Cotton Mills Ltd. in respect of the aforesaid two series 'first' and 'second' of debentures and/or shares, now converted be and the same are hereby treated as cancelled and be delivered up and the defendant no. 2 Grasim Industries Ltd. is hereby directed to rectify the debenture and/or share register of defendant no. 2 Grasim Industries Ltd. arising out the said 'first' and 'second' series of partly convertible debentures and the same is ordered accordingly and the defendant no. 2 Grasim Industries Ltd is hereby directed to insert the names of the plaintiff Prem Kumar Chowdhury in place and stead of defendant no.1 Jiyajeerao Cotton Mills Ltd. in the shares and debenture register of the company subject to payment of Rupees one lakh fifty thousand forty eight only to defendant no.1 Jiyajeerao Cotton Mills Ltd. being the price paid by the defendant no.1 Jiyajeerao Cotton Mills Ltd. to the defendant no. 2 Grasim Industries Ltd. and the same is further ordered accordingly and it is further ordered and decreed that the defendant no. 1 Jiyajeerao Cotton Mills Ltd. and no.2 Grasim Industries Ltd. do pay to the plaintiff Prem Kumar Chowdhury the cost of this suit (to be taxed by the Taxing officer of this court) and it is further ordered that the defendant no. 1 Jiyajeerao Cotton Mills Ltd. and no. 2 Grasim Industries Ltd. do comply with this order within three months from the date hereof failing which the plaintiff Prem Kumar Chowdhury will be at liberty to proceed as per Law." 6. From the above it is transpired that the judgment-debtor no. 1 Jiyajeerao Cotton Mills Ltd. and no. 2 Grasim Industries Ltd. do comply with this order within three months from the date hereof failing which the plaintiff Prem Kumar Chowdhury will be at liberty to proceed as per Law." 6. From the above it is transpired that the judgment-debtor no. 2 is to insert the name of the plaintiff in place and stead of judgment-debtor no. 1 in the relevant shares and debentures register subject to payment of Rs. 1,50,048/- only to the judgment-debtor no. 1 being the price paid by the judgment-debtor no. 1, Jiyajeerao Cotton Mills Limited to the judgment-debtor no. 2, Grasim Industries Limited. It is also the condition of the decree that the judgment-debtor no. 1 and the judgment-debtor no. 2 are obligated to pay the plaintiff the cost of the suit and the judgment-debtors are to comply with the order within three months from the date of the decree, in default, the decree-holder will be at liberty to proceed as per law. 7. Learned counsel has relied upon Abdul Rashid (supra) and Ramnath Das & Ors. (supra) in support of his contention that when no time limit for payment of money has been mentioned in the decree, the decree-holder can pay the money at any point of time. 8. In the case law of Abdul Rashid (supra) it has been mentioned in paragraph no. 8 as follows:- "8. In our opinion the crucial test for applying the correct rule of limitation to the execution of or the right of applying for execution depends upon fulfilment of certain contingencies. Where the right accrues to the decree-holder immediately and at once limitation must be reckoned, from the date of the decree. On the other hand, where the right to apply depends upon the fulfilment of certain conditions, it must be deemed to be in abeyance until those conditions are fulfilled. This is the essential dictum which can be culled from the decision of the Privy Council in Rameshwar Singh v. Homeshwar Singh, AIR 1921 PC 31 which was adverted to in Sri. Narain Tewari's case (supra). In Rameshwar Singh's case Lord Phillimore ruled: "In order to make the provisions of the Limitation Act apply, the decree sought to be enforced must be in such a form as to render it capable, in the circumstances, of being enforced."" 9. In the case of Ramnath Das & Ors. Narain Tewari's case (supra). In Rameshwar Singh's case Lord Phillimore ruled: "In order to make the provisions of the Limitation Act apply, the decree sought to be enforced must be in such a form as to render it capable, in the circumstances, of being enforced."" 9. In the case of Ramnath Das & Ors. (supra) the Hon'ble Court has been pleased to hold hereunder:- 15. It is true that normally the date of the decree under Order 20, Rule 7 of the CPC shall be the day on which the judgment is pronounced but Article 136 of the new Limitation Act, 1963 provides that the time for execution of any decree is twelve years "when the decree becomes enforceable." In this case the decree is for payment of costs to be taxed by the Taxing Officer of this Court and certain directions were also given to the said Taxing Officer in the decree itself. 16. In my view therefore, the decree so far as it related to the payment of costs to the applicants was not enforceable until the amount of costs were ascertained upon taxation and the directions contained therein to the Taxing Officer were complied with." 10. In the case law reported in Deep Chand & Ors. (supra) in para 5 it has been observed by the Hon'ble Court that:- ".....Generally a decree or order becomes enforceable from its date, but in appropriate cases the court passing the decree may prescribe the time wherefrom the decree becomes enforceable on a future date. It must, however, be remembered that the purpose of an execution proceeding is to enable the decree-holder to obtain the fruits of his decree. In case where the language of the decree is capable of two interpretations, one of which assists the decree-holder to obtain the fruits of the decree and the other prevents him from taking the benefits of the decree, the interpretation which assists the decree-holder should be accepted. The execution of the decree should not be made futile on mere technicalities which does not, however, mean that where a decree is incapable of being executed under any provision of law it should, in all cases, be executed notwithstanding such bar or prohibition. A rational approach is necessitated keeping in view the prolonged factum of litigation resulting in the passing of a decree in favour of a litigant." 11. A rational approach is necessitated keeping in view the prolonged factum of litigation resulting in the passing of a decree in favour of a litigant." 11. Learned counsel for the judgment-debtor no. 3 has relied upon the case of Ratan Singh (supra) and he draws the attention of this court to the paras 8 and 9 which may be quoted as hereunder:- "8. When is a decree becoming enforceable? Normally a decree or order becomes enforceable from its date. But cases are not unknown when the decree becomes enforceable on some future date or on the happening of certain specified events. The expression "enforceable" has been used to cover such decrees or orders also which become enforceable subsequently. 9. Filing of an appeal would not affect the enforceability of the decree, unless the appellate Court stays its operation. But if the appeal results in a decree that would supersede the decree passed by the lower Court and it is the appellate Court decree which becomes enforceable. When the appellate Order does not amount to a decree there would be no supersession and hence the lower Court decree continues to be enforceable." 12. Learned counsel has also relied upon Dr. Chiranjit Lal (D) by L.Rs (supra) in support of his contention that the present suit is barred by the provisions of Limitation Act in this regard the learned counsel has drawn the attention of this court to the para 27 of the said judgment:- "27. Rules of limitation are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. As above noted, there is no statutory provision pre-scribing a time limit for furnishing of the stamp paper for engrossing the decree or time limit for engrossment of the decree, on stamp paper and there is no statutory obligation on the Court passing the decree to direct the parties to furnish the stamp paper for engrossing the decree. In the present case the Court has not passed an order directing the parties to furnish the stamp papers for the purpose of engrossing the decree. In the present case the Court has not passed an order directing the parties to furnish the stamp papers for the purpose of engrossing the decree. Merely because there is no direction by the Court to furnish the stamp papers for engrossing of the decree or there is no time limit fixed by law, does not mean that the party can furnish stamp papers at its sweet will and claim that the period of limitation provided under Article 136 of the Act would start only thereafter as and when the decree is engrossed thereupon. The starting of period of limitation for execution of a partition decree cannot be made contingent upon the engrossment of the decree on the stamp paper. The engrossment of the decree on stamp paper would relate back to the date of the decree, namely, 7th August, 1981, in the present case. In this view the execution application filed on 21st March, 1994 was time barred having been filed beyond the period of twelve years prescribed under Article 136 of the Act. The High Court committed illegality in coming to the conclusion that it was not barred by limitation." 13. After considering the above case laws and the decree in hand, it appears that the decree-holder was directed to make payment of Rs. 1,50,048/- only and on payment of such sum of money, further actions as per the decree will follow. It is found that the time within which the plaintiff/decree-holder is to make such payment is not specifically mentioned in the decree. When there is no mention of the time limit in the decree itself, we cannot ask the decree-holder as to why he has not paid such decreetal amount within a specified time. The case of Abdul Rashid (supra) is squarely applicable in this case. No doubt the decree in our hand can be described as a contingent decree and on fulfillment of condition of paying the amount as stated above by the decree-holder, further actions in connection with the said decree will follow. Therefore, the contentions of the decree-holder have certain merits. However, the learned counsel for the judgment-debtor no. 3 has pointed out that there is a time limit of three months in the relevant decree. Therefore, the contentions of the decree-holder have certain merits. However, the learned counsel for the judgment-debtor no. 3 has pointed out that there is a time limit of three months in the relevant decree. However, it appears that the said condition is in respect of payment of cost by the judgment-debtors after the same is being assessed by the taxing officer and that condition is not relevant so far as the present discussion is concerned. 13.1. Further the case law of Ratan Singh (supra) cited by the judgment debtor no. 3 in fact supports the case of the decree-holder. The said case law has also indicated that some decrees are enforceable on happening of certain events, which is the basis of the decreeholder's contention in this case. That on payment of money by the decree-holder the decree would become enforceable, cannot therefore, be said to be irrelevant. 14. However, it is settled law that period of limitation starts from the date of judgment and decree and not when the decree is drawn up. The case laws reported at AIR 1972 Patna 429 (Devi Kant Mishra and Ors. v. Shri. Kant Pathak & Ors.) can be cited to buttress the above proposition of law. 15. Considering all the aspects I do think that the GA No. 1 of 2024 deserves to be allowed and accordingly the same is allowed. Let there be an order in terms of prayer (a) to (d) of the GA application and the same is thus disposed of on contest. 16. Urgent Photostat certified copies of this order, if applied for, be supplied to the parties on compliance of all necessary formalities.