JUDGMENT : (Sandeep V. Marne, J.) 1. These two Civil Revision Applications are filed by the Applicant challenging the judgment and decree dated 3 May 2016 passed by the Court of Small Causes at Mumbai decreeing R.A.E. & R. Suit No. 813/1300 of 2007 and directing the Defendants to deliver possession of the suit premises. The decree of the Trial Court has been confirmed by the Appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court by its judgment and decree dated 5 May 2022 which is also subject matter of challenge in the present Civil Revision Applications. It appears that the cross Appeals were filed against the decree of the Trial Court both by the landlord as well as the tenants and by common judgment and order dated 5 May 2022, the Appeal filed by the Tenant (Applicant) has been dismissed, whereas the appeal filed by the landlord is allowed to the extent of change of user while confirming the decree of eviction. This is how two separate Revision Applications are filed challenging common judgment and order of the Appellate Bench. 2. Facts of the case, as pleaded by the Plaintiff-landlord in R.A.E. & R Suit No. 813/1300 of 2007 are that, Room No.8 situated on 3rd floor of Building No.13 on Plot bearing C.T.S. No.1306, 2nd Agiari Lane, Zaveri Bazar, Mumbai-400 003 are the suit premises. According to the Plaintiff, the suit premises were let out to one, Shah Meghaji Tejraj exclusively for residential purpose in or about the year 1950. That the said tenant-Shah Meghaji Tejraj acquired new residential premises at 90/94, 3rd floor, Zaveri Bazar, Mumbai-400 002' in the year 1995 and shifted in the new premises. That thereafter his son, Chaganlal and his wife-Kamalabai were residing in the suit premises. That Chaganlal and Kamalabai also shifted to the new premises at 90/94, 3rd floor, Zaveri Bazar, Mumbai-400 002' and started residing with Shah Meghaji Tejraj. That the suit premises were locked since the year 2000. That the original tenant- Shah Meghaji Tejraj passed away in the year 2004. That his son-Chaganlal predeceased him in the year 2002. After the death of Shah Meghaji Tejraj and Chaganlal, Defendant No.1-Kamalabai continued to reside at the new premises at Zaveri Bazar and was not in need of the suit premises. 3. That the original tenant- Shah Meghaji Tejraj passed away in the year 2004. That his son-Chaganlal predeceased him in the year 2002. After the death of Shah Meghaji Tejraj and Chaganlal, Defendant No.1-Kamalabai continued to reside at the new premises at Zaveri Bazar and was not in need of the suit premises. 3. Plaintiff further averred that while the suit premises remained locked since the year 2000, the Plaintiff observed that in February 2007, that Defendant No.3-Rakesh Zaverchand Shah (son-in-law of Defendant No.1-Kamalabai) was seen in the suit premises. After making enquires, Defendant No.3 falsely claimed that he is the representative of Defendant No.1-Kamalabai and that Defendant Nos.1, 2 and 4 had transferred and assigned their tenancy rights in the suit premises to Defendant No.3. That Defendant No.3 opened up his own business in the suit premises, which were unauthorisedly sublet to him by the first Defendant. Plaintiff therefore alleged that Defendants changed the use of the suit premises from residential to commercial. Plaintiff further alleged that Defendant No.3, in collusion with Defendant Nos.1, 2 and 4, carried out permanent additions and alterations in the suit premises without the written consent of the Plaintiff-landlord. On the above broad allegations, Plaintiff instituted R.A.E.& R. Suit No. 813/1300 of 2007 against the Defendants seeking recovery of possession. The suit was originally filed against Defendant No.1-Kamalabai, Defendant No.2-Ramesh Tejraj Jain (Tejraj's son), Defendant No.3-Rakesh Zaverchand Shah (son-in-law of Defendant No.1) and Defendant No. 4-'Unknown legal heirs of deceased tenant'. It appears that during pendency of the suit, Manisha Rakesh Shah (Applicant) who is the daughter of first Defendant and wife of Rakesh Shah intervened and got herself impleaded in the suit. 4. Common Written Statements were filed by Defendant Nos.1 and 3. After her impleadment, Defendant No.5 also filed her Written Statement. Rival parties led evidence in support of their respective claims. After considering the pleadings, documentary and oral evidence, the Small Causes Court passed decree dated 3 May 2016 holding that Defendant No.3 was unlawfully inducted as a sub-tenant and that Plaintiff was entitled to recover all arrears of rent and permitted increases from April 2005. The Trial Court therefore directed the Defendants to handover possession of the suit premises to the Plaintiff on the ground of subletting. However, Plaintiff's grounds of additions/alterations and non-user of the suit premises for residential purposes were however rejected. The Trial Court therefore directed the Defendants to handover possession of the suit premises to the Plaintiff on the ground of subletting. However, Plaintiff's grounds of additions/alterations and non-user of the suit premises for residential purposes were however rejected. The Trial Court also negatived the claim of the Defendants that the suit premises were let out for commercial purposes since inception. 5. Both Plaintiff-landlord as well as Defendants/tenants got aggrieved by the decree dated 3 May 2016. The landlord got aggrieved to the extent of rejection of grounds of change of user and unauthorised additions /alterations and filed Appeal No.336/2016 before the Appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court. Defendant No.3-Rakesh Shah and Defendant No.5-Manisha Shah filed Appeal No.334 of 2016 before the Appellate Bench. During the pendency of the Appeal, Defendant No.3- Rakesh Zaverchand Shah passed away and therefore the Appeal was continued by Manisha Rakesh Shah. The Appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court framed an additional issue relating to change of user of the suit premises from residential to commercial purpose and answered the said issue in the affirmative. The Appellate Bench further held that the suit premises were unauthorisedly sublet to Defendant No.3. However, the grounds of non-user and unauthorised additions/alterations to the suit premises are rejected. The Appellate Bench accordingly proceeded to dismiss Appeal No. 334 of 2016 filed by the tenants and allowed Appeal No. 336 of 2016 filed by the Plaintiff-landlord to the limited extent of change of user. 6. Aggrieved by the common judgment and decree dated 5 May 2022 passed by the Appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court, Applicant-Manisha Rakesh Shah has filed the present two Revision Applications on her behalf, as well as on behalf of Defendant No.3- Rakesh Zaverchand Shah. 7. Mr. Dhakephalkar, the learned senior advocate appearing for the Applicant in both the Revision Applications would submit that the suit is erroneously decreed by the Appellate Bench on the grounds of change of user from residential to commercial and subletting to Defendant No.3. That Defendant No.3 is the son-in-law of Defendant No.1 who admittedly succeeded to the tenancy rights in respect of the suit premises. That Defendant No.3 being family member, assisted the original tenants-Tejraj and Kamalabai in the business. Similarly, Kamalabai's daughter (Defendant No.5) who is the wife of Defendant No.3 also remained in occupation of the suit premises as legal heir. That Defendant No.3 is the son-in-law of Defendant No.1 who admittedly succeeded to the tenancy rights in respect of the suit premises. That Defendant No.3 being family member, assisted the original tenants-Tejraj and Kamalabai in the business. Similarly, Kamalabai's daughter (Defendant No.5) who is the wife of Defendant No.3 also remained in occupation of the suit premises as legal heir. That therefore both the Small Causes Court and the Appellate Courts have erroneously inferred subletting of premises by Defendant No.1 to Defendant No.3. That no evidence of subletting is produced by the Plaintiff. That production of such evidence was necessary once it is established that Defendant Nos.3 and 5 are family members of the original tenants and were entitled to remain in use and occupation of the suit premises. 8. So far as the ground of change of user is concerned, Mr. Dhakephalkar would contend that the said issue came to be framed by the Appellate Court at the appellate stage. That the suit premises were let out for commercial purposes since inception. That Shah Meghaji Tejraj was a firm in which Tejraj Hiraji Jain was carrying on business. That the tenancy was acquired in the name of the firm for commercial purposes. That Defendants produced two rent receipts describing the suit premises as 'Shop'. As against this, not even a single piece of evidence is produced by the Plaintiff to prove that the suit premises were let out for residential purposes. That the only evidence produced by the Plaintiff was voters list which depicted name of Jain Tejraj Meghaji as a voter against Room No.7 when infact the suit premises bears Room No.8. That as against the Defendant producing some evidence to show that the suit premises are described as shop, Plaintiff failed to produce any evidence to prove that the suit premises were let out for residential purposes. Mr. Dhakephalkar would also invite my attention to Affidavit-cum-Declaration submitted by the tenants of the building, from which also the suit premises can be treated as commercial one. That the said document has been admitted by the Plaintiff in his evidence. That the said document is not taken into consideration by the Appellate Bench. 9. Mr. Dhakephalkar would accordingly contend that the Plaintiff has miserably failed to prove the grounds of change of user and unauthorised subletting. That the said document has been admitted by the Plaintiff in his evidence. That the said document is not taken into consideration by the Appellate Bench. 9. Mr. Dhakephalkar would accordingly contend that the Plaintiff has miserably failed to prove the grounds of change of user and unauthorised subletting. That the Trial Court erred in decreeing the suit on the ground of subletting, whereas the Appellate Bench erroneously upheld new ground of change of user. He would therefore pray for setting aside the decrees of the Small Causes Court and its Appellate Bench by allowing the Civil Revision Applications. 10. Per-contra, Mr. Jahagirdar, the learned senior advocate appearing for Respondent No.1, would oppose both the Civil Revision Applications submitting once the Defendants came out with a case that the suit premises were out to the firm for commercial purposes, the burden of proving the said assertion rested on the shoulders of the Defendants which they failed to discharge. That not even a single document is produced to prove the so-called firm's existence since the year 1943. On the contrary, Plaintiff produced extract of register of firm of M/s. Shah Meghaji Tejraj which shows that the firm came into existence on 8 October 1984. Furthermore, the said Register indicates that the firm's business was at an altogether different address. So far as reliance of the Plaintiff on voters list is concerned, Mr. Jahagirdar would contend that there was an apparent mistake in reflecting room numbers in the voters list which unequivocally proves that the original tenant was residing at the suit premises. If any commercial activity alone was carried out at the suit premises as alleged by the Defendants, name of the original tenant would not have been included in the voters list against the suit premises. That thus in the light of production of some evidence by the Plaintiff and in absence of any evidence on behalf of the Defendants about existence of the firm or letting out the premises for firm's business since inception, the findings recorded by the Appellate Court about change of user cannot really be found fault with. He would submit that the original tenant and his daughter-in-law had long since shifted their residence to another premises and the suit premises are illegally grabbed by Defendant No. by commencing his own business therein. Mr. Jahagirdar would therefore pray for dismissal of both the Revision Applications. 11. He would submit that the original tenant and his daughter-in-law had long since shifted their residence to another premises and the suit premises are illegally grabbed by Defendant No. by commencing his own business therein. Mr. Jahagirdar would therefore pray for dismissal of both the Revision Applications. 11. Rival contentions of the parties now fall for my consideration. 12. Induction of the original tenant-Mr. Tejraj in the suit premises is not in dispute. However, what is in dispute is the purpose for which the suit premises were let out. Furthermore, it is the case of the Defendants that the suit premises were out in the name of the firm-M/s. Shah Meghaji Tejraj, whereas it is Plaintiff 's case that the tenant was Tejraj in his individual capacity who used to reside in the suit premises. There also appears to be some discrepancy in the name of Mr. Tejraj as in some places, the name appears as 'Tejraj Shah' whereas at some places his name appears as 'Tejraj Jain' or 'Tejraj Meghaji'. Mr. Dhakephalkar has however clarified that both the persons are the same as Tejraj used both the surnames of Shah and Jain. To avoid any further confusion, the original tenant is described by the name 'Tejraj'. So far as the name 'Tejraj' is concerned, there appears to be dispute about the two positions. It is Plaintiff 's case that suit premises were let out to Tejraj himself. As against this, it is the contention of the Defendants that the suit premises were let out in the name of the firm-M/s. Shah Meghaji Tejraj. The second dispute is about the purpose for which the suit premises were initially let out. According to the Plaintiff, Mr. Tejraj was inducted as tenant in the suit premises for his residence. As against this, it is the contention of the Defendants that the suit premises were let out to M/s. Shah Meghaji Tejraj for commercial purposes and that Tejraj never stayed in the suit premises. 13. So far as ground of change of user is concerned, the issue in this regard appears to have been framed by the Appellate Court as the same was never framed by the Trial Court. 13. So far as ground of change of user is concerned, the issue in this regard appears to have been framed by the Appellate Court as the same was never framed by the Trial Court. The Trial Court had mixed the issue of non-user and change of user by framing the following issue: "Whether the Plaintiff proved that Defendants are not using the suit premises as residence for the purpose for which it was let out for more than six months prior to filing of the suit ?" 14. The Appellate Court rightly bifurcated the issues relating to non-user and change of user and framed Issue No.1 as under: "Does Plaintiff prove that Defendants have changed the user of the suit premises from residential to commercial purpose ?" 15. In view of the specific pleadings, it was necessary to frame a separate issue relating to change of user and in my view, the Appellate Court rightly framed separate issue about change of user. In his usual fairness, Mr. Dhakephalkar has not raised any serious challenge to the said course of action adopted by the Appellate Court. 16. After framing of additional issue of change of user, about which there were already pleadings and evidence, the Appellate Court evaluated the evidence on record and has recorded following findings : 35. As noted above, the plaintiff has come with a case that, the suit premises were let to Mr. Shah Meghaji Tejraj for residential purpose and he was residing in the suit premises till the year 1995 and thereafter he shifted to his new residence at Zaveri Bazar. Thereafter, for certain period the elder son of deceased tenant Shah Meghaji Tejraj namely Chhaganlal with the defendant No.1 was residing in the suit premises. They also then shifted to the new residential premises. Then, during the period 2000 to 2006, the suit premises were closed and then they have changed the user of the suit premises from residential to commercial. 36. Against that, defendant No.1 & 3 took defence in short that, Shah Meghaji Tejraj was not individual, but it was a firm in which name Tejraj Hirachand Jain was carrying the business. The tenancy was acquired in the name of the firm in the year 1950 for commercial purpose and since then, it has been used for commercial purpose. 36. Against that, defendant No.1 & 3 took defence in short that, Shah Meghaji Tejraj was not individual, but it was a firm in which name Tejraj Hirachand Jain was carrying the business. The tenancy was acquired in the name of the firm in the year 1950 for commercial purpose and since then, it has been used for commercial purpose. The plaintiff was well aware of the said fact and he also issued rent receipt showing the suit premises as Shop No.8. 37. In background of these contradictory pleadings, the plaintiff has deposed in para No.4 that "Meghaji" was the surname of Mr. Tejraj. He would change his surname 'Jain' or 'Shah' as per his convenience. The suit premises comprises of two rooms as kitchen and divankhana adm. 350 sq.ft. situated on the third floor of the suit building. Accordingly he produced on record deposit receipt of tenancy dated 13.03.1943. He further deposed that the receipt was handwritten by his uncle and this receipt discloses that it was created in the name of individual for residential purpose. He further put on record documents received from Municipal Corporation of Mumbai i.e. voter's list for the period 1962 to 1972 showing the name of deceased tenant and his wife as voters. The said document is at exhibit-45. 38. The plaintiff has been cross examined, but nothing has been elicited from his mouth to disbelieve the fact that the suit premises were let out for residential purpose. No doubt, he was confronted with two rent receipts which are exhibited as Exhibit 60 colly. Those two rent receipts are showing that the suit premises are shop. The plaintiff in cross- examination deposed that he came into picture so far as the suit premises is concerned in the year 1995. These two rent receipts were when confronted with the PW1, he denied that he had mentioned that the suit premises are shop having Shop No.8. Only on the basis of these two rent receipts, it cannot be said that the suit premises were let out for commercial purpose. 39. The plaintiff has put on record as noted above the election roll for the period 1967 to 1972 which is at Exhibit 45. This document is received from the local authority i.e. Municipal Corporation of Mumbai. This document is not denied by defendants. 39. The plaintiff has put on record as noted above the election roll for the period 1967 to 1972 which is at Exhibit 45. This document is received from the local authority i.e. Municipal Corporation of Mumbai. This document is not denied by defendants. In this document, the name of Jain Tejraj Meghaji who is admittedly father-in-law of the defendant No.3 is shown as voter against Room No.7, while against Room No.8 one Mr. Zaveri Nanubhai and his family were shown as voters. During submission, it was tried to show that, it is not the case of the plaintiff that, Shah Meghaji Tejraj is one and same person i.e. Jain Tejraj Hirchand. Further, this document shows that Mr. Jain Tejraj Hirchand was residing in Room No.7 and not in Room No.8 which is the suit premises. 40. Whatever may be, this document discloses that, in the year 1967 to 1972 the suit premises i.e. Room No.8 was used for residence purpose. 41. The plaintiff has also put on record assessment extract on the basis of return submitted by him, wherein earlier the suit premises were shown as residential premises. When the plaintiff put some evidence on record to show what was user of the suit premises, the defendant Nos. 1 & 3 who have come with a specific stand that the suit premises were taken for commercial purpose (though it is situated on third floor of the building), were supposed to lead some evidence on record to that effect. The defendant No.3 has deposed about the said fact, but in cross-examination he admitted in candid words that, he had no knowledge of the facts happened in respect of the suit premises before his marriage with the defendant No.5 who is admittedly adopted daughter of the deceased defendant No.1. Marriage was taken place in the year 1993. If this admission is considered, the defendant No.3 was absolutely unaware of the facts so far as user of the suit premises is concerned prior to the year 1993. 42. The defendant Nos. 1 to 3 have come with a case that, the tenancy was taken in the name of firm 'Shah Meghaji Tejraj', but the actual tenant was Jain Tejraj Hirchand and the tenancy was taken for the business purpose. 42. The defendant Nos. 1 to 3 have come with a case that, the tenancy was taken in the name of firm 'Shah Meghaji Tejraj', but the actual tenant was Jain Tejraj Hirchand and the tenancy was taken for the business purpose. In such situation, the defendant No.1 and 3 were supposed to put on record at least a single document showing that the firm namely 'M/s. Shah Meghaji Tejraj' was in existence in the year 1943 when the tenancy was created. Even they have not made clear 'M/s. Shah Meghaji Tejraj' was a proprietary concern or the partnership firm. They were further supposed to show that in the name of said firm the business was going on in the suit premises. In Mumbai without proper licence under the Shop and Establishment Act or other licences issued under the Municipal Corporation Act none can carry business. It was quite possible for the defendant Nos. 1 & 3 to put on record any such licence showing that the licence was taken in the name of firm 'M/s. Shah Meghaji Tejraj' and on the basis of that licence under the said firm name the business was going on in the suit premises. 43. Even the defendant Nos. 1 & 3 have not put on record any documents in the form of Balance Sheet of said business, and purchase and sale documents of the business under the name of said firm. 44. Per contra, the plaintiff has put on record one document which is at Exhibit 52 which discloses that, the partnership firm in the name of 'Shah Meghaji Tejraj' was registered on 08.10.1984. The defendant No.3 in the cross-examination admitted said document. This document discloses that in the year 1984, said firm came into existence of which partners were Jain Tejraj Hirchand, his wife and son Chhaganlal. Vital fact is that, the address of the business shown in the said document is not of the suit premises. 17. Thus, the Appellate Court had two sets of evidence produced with regard to the purpose for which the premises were let out since inception. Though deposit receipt of tenancy dated 13 March 1943 is apparently produced by the Plaintiff, it appears that the said document has not been exhibited. Therefore, the said document cannot be read in evidence. 17. Thus, the Appellate Court had two sets of evidence produced with regard to the purpose for which the premises were let out since inception. Though deposit receipt of tenancy dated 13 March 1943 is apparently produced by the Plaintiff, it appears that the said document has not been exhibited. Therefore, the said document cannot be read in evidence. However, at Exhibit-45, Plaintiff produced voters list from the records maintained by the M.C.G.M. and the said document is not disputed by the Defendants. In the voters list, names of Jain Tejraj Hirachand and Jain Gissiben Tejraj are reflected against Room No.7, whereas names of Zaveri Nanubhai Bhaichand, Zaveri Padmavati Nanubhai and Zaveri Jayshree Nanubhai are reflected against Room No.8. The suit premises bear Room No.8. Mr. Jahagirdar has clarified that the reflection of Room No.7 against the name of Tejraj and Room No.8 against the names of Zaveri is a mistake. I do not find any difficulty in accepting the said contention of Mr. Jahagirdar as it is not the case of the Defendants that Zaveri family was residing in Room No.8 or that Tejraj, in addition to the suit premises, was also a tenant in respect of Room No.7. What is material is the fact that Tejraj's name appears in the voters list relating to the period 1967 to 1972. Defendant Nos.1 to 3 in their Written Statement took a defence that 'the said Mr. Tejraj Hirachand Zaveri never stayed in the suit premises'. If this was the position, there is no explanation as to why the name of Tejraj could be reflected in the voters list against the suit premises if he was merely doing business therein. No proof is produced to show that Tejraj had residence at any alternate premises. Thus, the Plaintiff has produced some evidence to show that Tejraj was actually residing in the suit premises. 18. Furthermore, if it was Defendants' case that the suit premises were let out to the firm by name 'M/s. Shah Meghaji Tejraj', some evidence ought to have been brought on record about existence of such firm or its business from the suit premises. Plaintiff on the other hand, produced extract of Register of firms in respect of the firm 'M/s. Shah Meghaji Tejraj' which shows that the firm came into existence on 8 October 1984. Plaintiff on the other hand, produced extract of Register of firms in respect of the firm 'M/s. Shah Meghaji Tejraj' which shows that the firm came into existence on 8 October 1984. To make things worse for the Defendants, the place of business of the said firm is described as 'Trishala, 2nd Floor, 122, Shaikh Memon St, Bombay-2'. Thus as against in absence of any evidence by Defendants about existence of the firm at the inception of the tenancy or the firm carrying out business from the suit premises, Plaintiff proved that the firm came into existence in the year 1984 and that the place of its business was at an altogether different premises. Defendants have relied upon two rent receipts at Exhibit-60 colly in support of their contention that the suit premises are described as 'Dukhan No.8' (Shop No.8). In my view, it would be too dangerous to infer that the suit premises were let out for commercial purposes only on the basis of the said rent receipts. The rent receipts at Exhibit-60 is dated 5 August 2000 and is otherwise not useful for drawing an inference about the suit premises being let out to the firm for commercial purposes since inception. 19. Mr. Dhakephalkar's reliance on "Affidavit-cum-Declaration" executed by the tenants of the building does not cut any ice. Based on application of multiplier factor of 2', Mr. Dhakephalkar has contended that the suit premises are commercial in nature as multiplier factor of 1' is applied for residential premises. While this could be true, the document does not assist the case of the Defendants to prove that the suit premises were let out for commercial purposes since inception. The Affidavit-cum- Declaration is executed in January 2006, i.e. few days prior to institution of the suit alleging unauthorised change of user. 20. After considering the evidence on record, as well as the findings recorded by the Appellate Court, I am unable to hold that the Appellate Court has committed any gross error in holding that the Plaintiff has proved change of user by the Defendants from residential to commercial. 21. 20. After considering the evidence on record, as well as the findings recorded by the Appellate Court, I am unable to hold that the Appellate Court has committed any gross error in holding that the Plaintiff has proved change of user by the Defendants from residential to commercial. 21. So far as the ground of subletting is concerned, it is Plaintiff's case that the original Tenant-Tejraj had shifted to new premises at 90/94, 3rd Floor, Zaveri Bazar, Mumbai-400 002' in the year 1995 and his son Chaganlal and wife-Kamalabai (Defendant No.1) also started residing at the new premises since the year 2000. That the suit premises remained locked and unoccupied since the year 2000. That the other sons of Tejraj viz. Ramesh Jain (Defendant No.2) was already residing in a posh location at Altamount Road and was in no need of the suit premises. Defendant No.2 apparently did not resist the suit by filing Written Statement. It is Plaintiff 's further case that after the year 2007 onwards, Defendant No.3 unauthorisedly started occupying the suit premises by shifting his business therein. On the other hand, it is the case of the Defendants that Defendant No.3 always assisted Defendant No.1 in her business in the suit premises. Firstly, Defendant No.1 has not produced any evidence to show that she carried on any business in the suit premises. On the contrary, Defendant No.3 procured a license in the name of 'Tirupati Impex' at the suit premises. Thus, it is proved that Defendant No.3 was doing an altogether different business than the alleged business of Defendant No.1. In my view, therefore parting of possession of the suit premises by Defendant No.1 to Defendant No.3 is conclusively proved. The only issue is whether such an arrangement can be treated as subletting. The Appellate Court has rightly relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Bharat Sales Ltd V/s. Life Insurance Corporation of India, (1998) 3 SCC 1 in which it is held as under: "4. Sub-tenancy or subletting comes into existence when the tenant gives up possession of the tenanted accommodation, wholly or in part, and puts another person in exclusive possession thereof. This arrangement comes about obviously under a mutual agreement of understanding between the tenant and the person to whom the possession is so delivered. In this process, the landlord is kept out the scene. This arrangement comes about obviously under a mutual agreement of understanding between the tenant and the person to whom the possession is so delivered. In this process, the landlord is kept out the scene. Rather, the scene is enacted behind the back of the landlord, concealing the overt acts and transferring possession clandestinely to a person who is an utter stranger to the landlord, in the sense that the landlord had not let out the premises to that person nor had he allowed or consented to his entering into possession over the demised property. It is the actual, physical and exclusive possession of that person, instead of the tenant, which ultimately reveals to the landlord that the tenant to whom the property was let out has put some other person into possession of that property. In such a situation, it would be difficult for the landlord to prove, by direct evidence, the contract or agreement or understanding between the tenant and the sub- tenant. It would also be difficult for the landlord to prove, by direct evidence, that the person to whom the property had been sublet had paid monetary consideration to the tenant. Payment of rent, undoubtedly, is an essential element of lease or sub-lease. It may be paid in cash or in kind or may have been paid or promised to the paid. It may have been paid in lump-sum in advance covering the period for which the premises is let out or sublet or it may have been paid or promised to be paid periodically. Since payment of rent or monetary consideration may have been made secretly, the law does not require such payment to be proved by affirmative evidence and the court is permitted to draw its own inference upon the facts of the case proved at the trial, including the delivery of exclusive possession to infer that the premises were sublet." 22. Thus, it is difficult for a landlord to prove by direct evidence, existence of contract/agreement/understanding between the tenant and the sub-tenant. The law does not require that the landlord must prove the factum of payment of rent by sub-tenant. Therefore, the arrangement of Defendant No.1 parting with possession in favour of Defendant No.3 can safely be assumed as unauthorised subletting of the suit premises. Since Defendant No.1 no longer needed the suit premises, she ought to have returned the same to the landlord. Therefore, the arrangement of Defendant No.1 parting with possession in favour of Defendant No.3 can safely be assumed as unauthorised subletting of the suit premises. Since Defendant No.1 no longer needed the suit premises, she ought to have returned the same to the landlord. She could not have permitted her son- in-law-Defendant No.3 to use the same for his commercial purposes. The theory of Defendant No.3 assisting Defendant No.1 in her business cannot be accepted in the light of the finding recorded about unauthorised change of user from residential to commercial. The Defendants have miserably failed to prove that either Tejraj or Kamalabai carried out any business at the suit premises at any point of time. The Small Causes Court and its Appellate Bench have therefore rightly held that Defendant No.3 unauthorisedly started occupying the suit premises for the purpose of his business on the basis of arrangement made between him and Defendant No.1. So far as claim of Defendant No.5 is concerned, I do not see any reason how she can claim any tenancy rights in the suit premises. There is nothing on record to indicate that Defendant No.5 was a part of business of the firm. Defendant No.3 has commenced altogether different business of Tirupati Impex in the suit premises. Therefore, Defendant No.5 cannot claim any continuation of tenancy rights in her own capacity in respect of the suit premises. 23. After considering the overall conspectus of the case, I am of the view that the Small Causes Court and its Appellate Bench have rightly directed eviction of the Defendants from the suit premises on the grounds of change of user and subletting. No jurisdictional error is noticed in the orders passed by the Small Causes Court and its Appellate Bench. Interference by this Court in revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not warranted in the impugned orders. The Civil Revision Applications must therefore fail. 24. Both Civil Revision Applications are accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Interim Application also stands disposed of.