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2024 DIGILAW 685 (KER)

Subramanian v. Nalini

2024-06-19

ANIL K.NARENDRAN, HARISANKAR V.MENON

body2024
JUDGMENT : Anil K. Narendran, J. This Contempt Appeal is one filed invoking the provisions under Section 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, to set aside the order dated 08.04.2024 of the learned Single Judge in Cont. Case (C)No.943 of 2024 arising out of the interim order dated 01.03.2024 in I.A.No.1 of 2024 in W.P.(C)No.345 of 2024. The 1st respondent herein, who is the 6th respondent in that writ petition, filed I.A.No.1 of 2024 seeking an order to vacate the interim order dated 05.01.2024 granted in that writ petition, which was one filed by Anilkumar Kozhisseri, the Headmaster of A.U.P. School, Karakunnu. The interim relief sought for in that writ petition was a stay of operation of the order dated 17.12.2023 of the Director of General Education (Ext.P9) and to direct the official respondents to allow him to continue as Headmaster of the school during the pendency of that writ petition. By the order dated 05.01.2024, the learned Single Judge granted an interim order directing the respondents therein to maintain the status quo as of that date for a period of one month. By the order dated 01.03.2024 in I.A.No.1 of 2024, the learned Single Judge declined to extend the interim order dated 05.01.2024 and the same was vacated. 2. In the order dated 01.03.2024 in I.A.No.1 of 2024, which is marked as Annexure III in the contempt case, the learned Single Judge noticed that by the judgment dated 16.01.2024 in W.P.(C)Nos.35076 and 44215 of 2023, a copy of which is marked as Annexure I in the contempt case, this Court directed reinstatement of the teacher, the 1st respondent herein, forthwith with a direction to the Director of General Education, to consider her claim for appointment as the Headmistress of the school, in accordance with law, within two weeks from 16.01.2024. The Director of General Education has taken a decision with respect to the entitlement of the 1st respondent herein, vide the order dated 11.11.2023. The appellant herein, who is the Manager of the school, who is arrayed as the 7th respondent in W.P.(C)No.345 of 2024, preferred a revision petition before the Government against that order. In that revision, there is no order of stay of the operation of Annexure I judgment. 3. The appellant herein, who is the Manager of the school, who is arrayed as the 7th respondent in W.P.(C)No.345 of 2024, preferred a revision petition before the Government against that order. In that revision, there is no order of stay of the operation of Annexure I judgment. 3. In Annexure III order dated 01.03.2024 in I.A.No.1 of 2024, the learned Single Judge noticed that, since the Manager of the school was a party to Annexure I judgment, the direction in that judgment and that of the Educational Officer holding the Teacher, the 1st respondent herein, entitled to be appointed as the Headmistress of the school will have to be complied with by him, subject, of course to the decision in the appeal against the same. 4. After Annexure III order dated 01.03.2024 of the learned Single Judge in I.A.No.1 of 2024 in W.P.(C)No.345 of 2024, a Division Bench of this Court by Annexure IV judgment dated 07.03.2024 dismissed W.A.Nos.148 of 2024 and 162 of 2024 filed by the Manager of the school, the appellant herein, against Annexure I judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 16.01.2024 in W.P.(C)Nos.35076 of 2023 and 44215 of 2023. After the dismissal of those writ appeals, the appellant Manager issued Annexure V letter dated 22.03.2024, whereby the 1st respondent herein was informed that the Manager has preferred a Special Leave Petition against Annexure IV judgment of the Division Bench and the Registry of the Apex Court has assigned Diary No.13392 of 2024. The order of the Educational Authorities in declining approval for the appointment of Anilkumar Kozhisseri as the Headmaster of the school is under challenge in a revision petition dated 22.11.2023 filed before the State and the order of the Deputy Director of Education is under challenge in another revision petition dated 28.12.2023 filed before the State. In Annexure V, it was also pointed out that when Anilkumar Kozhisseri was appointed as Headmaster of the school, the 1st respondent herein had not acquired test qualification. 5. In Annexure V, it was also pointed out that when Anilkumar Kozhisseri was appointed as Headmaster of the school, the 1st respondent herein had not acquired test qualification. 5. The document marked as Annexure VI in the Contempt Case is a communication dated 26.03.2024 of the Deputy Director of Education, Manjeri whereby, the Assistant Educational Officer, Manjeri has been instructed to direct the Manager of the school to take necessary steps to appoint the 1st respondent herein as the Headmistress of the school, in view of the dismissal of Writ Appeal Nos.148 of 2024 and 162 of 2024 by Annexure IV judgment and Annexure III order dated 01.03.2024 of the learned Single Judge in I.A.No.1 of 2024 in W.P.(C)No.345 of 2024, whereby the interim order granted in that writ petition on 05.01.2024 to maintain status quo stands vacated. Based on the instructions contained in Annexure VI letter dated 26.03.2024, the Assistant Educational Officer, Manjeri issued Annexure VII letter dated 26.03.2024 whereby the Manager of the school, the appellant herein, was directed to comply with Annexure IV judgment of the Division Bench in W.A.Nos.148 of 2024 and 162 of 2024. 6. On 08.04.2024, when Cont. Case(C)No.943 of 2024 came up for consideration, in which the appellant herein was arrayed as the sole respondent, the learned Single Judge passed the impugned order. The said order dated 08.04.2024 reads thus; “Sri.S.M. Prasanth takes notice for the respondent. Assistant Educational Officer, Manjeri is suo motu impleaded as the additional second respondent. Learned Government Pleader takes notice for the additional second respondent. Learned Government Pleader is directed to ensure that the additional second respondent complies with the orders of this Court, Annexures III and IV as well as the order passed by the Educational Authorities, Annexure II, by the next posting date. Post on 11.04.2024.” 7. Feeling aggrieved by the order dated 08.04.2024 of the learned Single Judge, the appellant-1st respondent is before this Court in this appeal. 8. On 11.04.2024, when this appeal came up for admission, the learned counsel on both sides were directed to address arguments on the maintainability of the appeal under Section 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act. 9. Heard detailed arguments of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant-1st respondent, the learned counsel for the 1st respondent-petitioner and also the learned Senior Government Pleader for the 2nd respondent-2nd respondent. 9. Heard detailed arguments of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant-1st respondent, the learned counsel for the 1st respondent-petitioner and also the learned Senior Government Pleader for the 2nd respondent-2nd respondent. By the order dated 12.04.2024, this Court stayed further proceedings before the learned Single Judge in Cont. Case (C)No.943 of 2024, for the time being. 10. On the question of maintainability of the appeal under Section 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (for brevity ‘the Act’) against the order dated 08.04.2024 of the learned Single Judge in Cont. Case (C)No.943 of 2024, the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant and the learned counsel for the 1st respondent have placed reliance on various decisions of the Apex Court and that of the Division Bench of this Court. 11. Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act deals with appeal. As per sub-section (1) of Section 19, an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt (a) where the order or decision is that of a Single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court. As per the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 19, where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. As per sub-section (2) of Section 19, pending any appeal, the appellate court may order that (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. As per sub-section (3) of Section 19, where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). As per sub-section (3) of Section 19, where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2). As per sub-section (4) of Section 19, an appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed (a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench of the High Court, within thirty days; (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within 60 days from the date of the order appealed against. 12. In Baradakanta Mishra v. Justice Gatikrushna Misra [ (1975) 3 SCC 535 ] a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court noticed that under the law as it stood prior to the enactment of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 no appeal shall lie at the instance of a party moving the High Court for taking action for contempt, if the High Court in the exercise of its discretion refused to take action on the motion of such party. Even if the High Court took action and initiated a proceeding for contempt and in such proceeding, the alleged contemnor, being found guilty, was punished for contempt, the order being one made by the High Court in the exercise of its criminal jurisdiction, was not appealable under Clause 15 of the letters patent, and therefore, no appeal shall lie against it from a Single Judge to a Division Bench and equally, there was no appeal as of right from a Division Bench to the Apex Court. The result was that in cases of criminal contempt, even a person punished for contempt had no right of appeal and he could impugn the order committing him for contempt only if the High Court granted the appropriate certificate under Article 134 of the Constitution of India in fit cases or on the refusal of the High Court to do so, the Apex Court intervened by granting special leave under Article 136. This was a highly unsatisfactory state of affairs and it was largely responsible for the criticism against the large powers of the Court to punish for contempt. This unsatisfactory feature of the law of contempt was adversely commented upon by Sanyal Committee in its report dated February 28, 1963 submitted to the Government of India. This was a highly unsatisfactory state of affairs and it was largely responsible for the criticism against the large powers of the Court to punish for contempt. This unsatisfactory feature of the law of contempt was adversely commented upon by Sanyal Committee in its report dated February 28, 1963 submitted to the Government of India. In para 3.1 in Chapter XI of the Report, the Sanyal Committee recommended that against an order of a Single Judge, punishing for contempt, the appeal should lie, in the High Court, to a Bench of Judges and against a similar order of a Bench of Judges of a High Court, the appeal should lie as of right to the Apex Court. Chapter XII of the Report contained the recommendations of the Sanyal Committee and Clause 25 of the recommendations was in the following terms: “Provision may be made for an appeal as of right from any order or decision of a High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. The appeal should lie to a Bench of Judges of the High Court where the order or decision is of a Single Judge. Where the order or decision is of a Bench the appeal should lie to the Supreme Court.” The Apex Court noticed that it was in pursuance of the above recommendation made by the Sanyal Committee that the Parliament, while enacting the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, introduced Section 19, sub-section (1) in that Act conferring an appeal as of right “from any order or decision of a High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt”. The Apex Court noticed further that where the court rejects a motion of a reference and declines to initiate the proceedings for contempt, it refuses to assume or exercise jurisdiction to punish for contempt and such a decision cannot be regarded as a decision in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Such a decision would not, therefore, fall within the opening words of Section 19, sub-section (1) and no appeal would lie against it as of right under that provision. This of course does not mean that there is no remedy available where the High Court on an erroneous view of the law or unreasonably and perversely refuses to take action for contempt on a motion or a reference. This of course does not mean that there is no remedy available where the High Court on an erroneous view of the law or unreasonably and perversely refuses to take action for contempt on a motion or a reference. Though no appeal lies under Section 19, sub-section (1) as of right against such an order or decision of the High Court, the Advocate General or any other person who has with the consent in writing of the Advocate General moved the High Court can always approach the Apex Court by a petition for special leave to appeal and the power of the Apex Court to interfere with such order or decision in the exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India is unfettered. The Apex Court can always in suitable cases set right any order or decision of the High Court refusing to take action for contempt against the alleged contemnor, if the larger interest of administration of justice so requires. 13. In Purshotam Das Goel v. Justice B.S.Dhillon [ (1978) 2 SCC 370 ], a decision relied on by the learned counsel for the 1st respondent, the challenge before a Two-Judge Bench of the Apex Court, in an appeal filed under Section 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, was against an order dated 02.04.1975 of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana issuing notice to the appellant to show cause, in accordance with the procedure prescribed under Section 17 of the Act, why he should not be proceeded against for committing contempt of the High Court punishable under Section 15 of the Act. A preliminary objection was raised by the learned Solicitor General of India, on behalf of the respondents, that no appeal lies to the Apex Court under Section 19 of the Act from an order issuing notice, as nothing yet has been decided by the High Court. Upholding the preliminary objection, the Apex Court noticed that, as would appear from a plain reading of Section 19 of the Act, an appeal shall lie to the Apex Court as a matter of right from any order or decision of a Bench of the High Court if the order has been made in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. No appeal can lie as a matter of right from any kind of order made by the High Court in the proceedings for contempt. The proceedings is initiated under Section 17 by issuance of a notice. Thereafter, there may be many interlocutory orders passed in the said proceeding by the High Court. It could not be the intention of the legislature to provide for an appeal to the Apex Court as a matter of right from each and every such order made by the High Court. The order or the decision must be such that it decides some bone of contention raised before the High Court affecting the right of the party aggrieved. Mere initiation of a proceeding for contempt by the issuance of the notice on the prima facie view that the case is a fit one for drawing up the proceedings, does not decide any question. The Apex Court, for the first time, cannot be asked in such an appeal to decide whether the person proceeded against has committed contempt of the High Court or not. The matter has to be decided either finally or, may be, even at an earlier stage an order is made, which does decide a contention raised by the alleged contemnor asking the High Court to drop the proceedings. It is neither possible, nor advisable, to make an exhaustive list of the type of orders which may be appealable to the Apex Court under Section 19 of the Act. A final order, surely, will be appealable. If the alleged contemnor, in response to the notice, appears before the High Court and asks to drop the proceedings on the ground of its being barred under Section 20 of the Act but the High Court holds that the proceeding is not barred, it may well be that an appeal would lie to the Apex Court under Section 19 from such an order although the proceedings has remained pending in the High Court. In the said decision, the Apex Court made it clear that, it was not called upon to express its final opinion in regard to such an order, but it merely mention this type of order by way of an example to show that even orders made at some intermediate stage in the proceedings may be appealable under Section 19 of the Act. On the facts of the case on hand, the Apex Court held that, an order merely initiating the proceedings without anything further, does not decide anything against the alleged contemnor and cannot be appealed against as a matter of right under Section 19 of the Act. In a given case special leave may be granted under Article 136 of the Constitution of India from an order initiating the proceedings. But that is entirely a different matter. The Apex Court noticed that in the decision of the Three-Judge Bench in Baradakanta Mishra [ (1975) 3 SCC 535 ] there are no observations by the Court, nor on the facts of that case there can be any, to show that an appeal would lie to the Apex Court from an order of the High Court merely initiating the proceedings by issuance of a notice. It may be a different matter if the order does decide some dispute raised before it by the contemnor asking it to drop the proceedings on one ground or the other. But unless and until there is some order or decision of the High Court adjudicating upon any matter raised before it by the parties, affecting their right, the mere order issuing the notice is not appealable. 14. In R.N. Dey v. Bhagyabati Pramanik [ (2000) 4 SCC 400 ] a Two-Judge Bench of the Apex Court was dealing with appeals filed under Section 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act against the judgment of the High Court of Calcutta, whereby the Court accepted unqualified apology tendered by the appellants in compliance with the orders of the Court for not paying the balance award money due to the respondents. The Court further directed the appellants to deposit with the Registrar (Appellate Side) the compensation money determined in terms of the order of the Land Acquisition Judge in respect of the lands acquired by the State as mentioned in the order and decree within two weeks from the date of the order without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties in such proceedings. Further, the Court did not pass any orders on the application filed by the Collector for vacating the rule issued in the contempt proceeding holding that the Collector cannot go behind the award passed by him as provided under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Further, the Court did not pass any orders on the application filed by the Collector for vacating the rule issued in the contempt proceeding holding that the Collector cannot go behind the award passed by him as provided under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Before the Apex Court, the learned counsel for the respondents submitted that after issuance of notice for contempt proceedings initiated by the respondents, the Court has only issued rule and the matter is not finally decided, therefore, the appeal against such order is not maintainable. It was submitted that the respondents want to take undue advantage of the pending contempt proceedings and coerce the officers of the State in making payment on the basis of the award even though they are not entitled to recover the same as the property had already vested in the State and that the appellants were required to pay in all approximately Rs.50 lakhs to the claimants. The Apex Court found that the aforesaid contention of the learned counsel for the respondents requires to be rejected on the ground that after receipt of the notice, officers concerned tendered unconditional apology and after accepting the same, the High Court rejected the prayer for discharge of the rule issued for contempt action. When the court either suo motu or on a motion or a reference, decides to take action and initiate proceedings for contempt, it assumes jurisdiction to punish for contempt. The exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt commences with the initiation of a proceeding for contempt and if the order is passed not discharging the rule issued in contempt proceedings, it would be an order or decision in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Against such order, appeal would be maintainable. 15. In R.N. Dey [ (2000) 4 SCC 400 ] the Apex Court noticed that in Purshotam Dass Goel [ (1978) 2 SCC 370 ] it was observed that if the alleged contemnor in response to the notice appears before the High Court and asks it to drop the proceedings on the ground of its being barred under Section 20 of the Act but the High Court holds that the proceeding is not barred, it may well be that an appeal would lie to the Apex Court under Section 19 from such an order although the proceeding has remained pending in the High Court. The Court further observed that if the order decides some disputes raised before the Court by the contemnor asking it to drop the proceedings on one ground or the other, the appeal against the said order is maintainable. On the facts of the case on hand, the Apex Court noticed that, in the present proceedings the question whether appeal under Section 19 of the Act is maintainable or not is not required to be decided finally as the facts of the case are grossly inadequate and the contempt proceedings were not required to be initiated at all. In any case, the unconditional apology tendered could have been accepted and further proceedings dropped and the rule ought to have been discharged. 16. In Pallav Sheth v. Custodian [ (2001) 7 SCC 549 ] a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court held that the filing of an application or petition for initiating proceedings for contempt or a mere receipt of such reference by the court does not amount to initiation of the proceedings by court. On receiving any such document, it is usual with the courts to commence some proceedings by employing an expression such as ‘admit’, ‘rule’, ‘issue notice’ or ‘issue notice to show cause why proceedings for contempt be not initiated’. In all such cases, the notice is issued either in routine or because the court has not yet felt satisfied that a case for initiating any proceedings for contempt has been made out and therefore the court calls upon the opposite party to admit or deny the allegations made or to collect more facts so as to satisfy itself if a case for initiating proceedings for contempt was made out. Such a notice is certainly anterior to initiation. The tenor of the notice is itself suggestive of the fact that in spite of having applied its mind to the allegations and the materials placed before it, the court was not satisfied of the need for initiating proceedings for contempt; it was still desirous of ascertaining facts or collecting further material whereon to formulate such opinion. The tenor of the notice is itself suggestive of the fact that in spite of having applied its mind to the allegations and the materials placed before it, the court was not satisfied of the need for initiating proceedings for contempt; it was still desirous of ascertaining facts or collecting further material whereon to formulate such opinion. It is only when the court has formed an opinion that a prima facie case for initiating proceedings for contempt is made out and that the respondents or the alleged contemners should be called upon to show cause why they should not be punished; then the court can be said to have initiated proceedings for contempt. It is the result of a conscious application of the mind of the court to the facts and the materials before it. In the said decision the Apex Court noticed that Section 19 of the Act gives the right of appeal from any order or decision of the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Baradakanta Mishra [ (1975) 3 SCC 535 ] was decided on the interpretation of Section 19 of the Act, namely, there was no right of appeal if the court did not take action or initiate contempt proceedings. 17. In Midnapore Peoples’ Co.op.Bank Ltd. v. Chunilal Nanda [2006 (3) KLT SN 79 (C.No.112) SC = (2006) 5 SCC 399 ], after referring to the law laid down in Baradakanta Mishra [ (1975) 3 SCC 535 ], Purshotam Dass Goel [ (1978) 2 SCC 370 ], State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S. Allibhoy [ (1996) 4 SCC 411 ] and J.S. Parihar v. Ganpat Duggar [ (1996) 6 SCC 291 ] the Apex Court summarised the legal position emerging from those decisions in regard to appeals filed under Section 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act against orders in contempt proceedings. Paragraph 11 of that decision reads thus; “11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus: I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of “jurisdiction to punish for contempt” and, therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases).” (underline supplied) 18. In Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders Welfare Association (2) v. S.C. Sekar 2009 (1) KLT Suppl. In Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders Welfare Association (2) v. S.C. Sekar 2009 (1) KLT Suppl. 1089 (SC) = [ (2009) 2 SCC 784 ], after referring to the decision in Purshotam Dass Goel [ (1978) 2 SCC 370 ], the Apex Court reiterated that it may be a different matter if the court while passing an order decided some disputes raised before it by the contemnor asking it to drop the proceedings on one ground or the other. Thus, in a given situation, an appeal would be maintainable even against a notice to show cause. On the facts of the case on hand the Apex Court noticed that even such a notice has not been issued and thus the question of satisfying the court by showing cause that the respondent contemnors had not committed any contempt did not arise. Allegations had not been made against the Chairman of the meeting. The contempt proceedings had been initiated only against the Managing Director of the Bank. Though the Apex Court found that it need not go into the larger question of maintainability of the appeal, in view of the fact that the matter had been referred to a Three-Judge Bench in Dharam Singh v. Gulzari Lal - SLP(Civil) No.18852 of 2005 decided on 19.09.2005 - but prima facie, in view of the decision in Purshotam Dass [ (1978) 2 SCC 370 ] there cannot be any doubt that in a situation where order has been passed adverse to the interest of the alleged contemnor an appeal would be maintainable particularly where a judgment has been passed by a court which is beyond its jurisdiction. This aspect of the matter has also been considered in R.N. Dey [ (2000) 4 SCC 400 ]. In the said decision, the Apex Court has also referred to the law laid down by the Two-Judge Bench in Midnapore Peoples’ Co.op.Bank Ltd. [ (2006) 5 SCC 399 ]. 19. In Bar Council of India v. Lokanath Behera, ILR (2020) 3 Ker. 666], a decision relied on by the learned counsel for the 1st respondent, a Division Bench of this Court was dealing with a contempt appeal filed under Section 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, challenging the judgment dated 28.03.2019 of the learned Single Judge in Cont. 19. In Bar Council of India v. Lokanath Behera, ILR (2020) 3 Ker. 666], a decision relied on by the learned counsel for the 1st respondent, a Division Bench of this Court was dealing with a contempt appeal filed under Section 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, challenging the judgment dated 28.03.2019 of the learned Single Judge in Cont. Case (C)No.699 of 2019 in W.P.(C)No.34162 of 2018, whereby the learned Single Judge held that no contempt has been committed by the respondents since the statement filed by the respondents through the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Vigilance and Anti-corruption Bureau could not be binding on them and since the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Vigilance and Anti-corruption Bureau has not been made a party in the contempt proceedings. On the aspect as to whether a contempt appeal under Section 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act is maintainable in the absence of any action initiated for inflicting punishment or any punishment imposed by the Court, the Division Bench after referring to the law laid down in various decisions, including the decisions of the Apex Court in D.N. Taneja v. Bhajan Lal, (1988) 3 SCC 26 and State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S. Allibhoy [ (1996) 4 SCC 411 ] relied on by the learned counsel for the 1st respondent, held that when the learned Single Judge, on consideration of the materials on record, dismissed the contempt petition, no contempt appeal is maintainable. 20. In Rajappan Nair v. Stephen Joseph [ 2005 (2) KLT 345 ], a decision relied on by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, a Division Bench of this Court was dealing with a Contempt Appeal filed under Section 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, against the order dated 01.03.2005 of the learned Single Judge in Cont. Case (C)No.1542 of 2004. The direction contained in the judgment dated 31.03.2004 of the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C)No.39412 of 2003 reads thus; “The 2nd respondent will produce a copy of this judgment before the Secretary to Government Co-operative Department along with a copy of the writ petition within a period of one month from today. Case (C)No.1542 of 2004. The direction contained in the judgment dated 31.03.2004 of the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C)No.39412 of 2003 reads thus; “The 2nd respondent will produce a copy of this judgment before the Secretary to Government Co-operative Department along with a copy of the writ petition within a period of one month from today. In case there is no interim order as of now against the implementation of Ext.P2, the 2nd respondent will implement Ext.P2 by reinstating the petitioner subject to the result of the appeal.” The Division Bench disposed of W.A.No.880 of 2004 filed by the 2nd respondent Co-operative Society, by the judgment dated 18.05.2004, stating as follows; “Since the question of stay was not examined by the learned Single Judge and the direction was issued subject to the condition that there was no stay order operating in favour of the appellant, we are clearly of the view that it is open to the latter to approach the appellate authority and ask for stay of the operation of the order passed by the Registrar rescinding the resolution terminating the services of the 1st respondent. We therefore, dispose of this appeal with a direction to the appellate authority to consider the prayer for stay made by the appellant in accordance with law after hearing the parties without being influenced by any of the observations made by the learned Single Judge.” The stay petition was later heard by the Government and was rejected by the order dated 24.08.2004. Since the direction of the learned single Judge was not implemented, the respondent filed Cont. Case (Civil) No.1542 of 2004. Before the learned Single Judge, it was contended by the appellant that in view of the judgment dated 18.05.2004 in W.A.No.880 of 2004, the direction given by the learned Single Judge in the judgment dated 31.03.2004 in W.P.(C)No.39412 of 2003 to reinstate the respondent in service, subject to the result of the appeal pending before the Government, no more survives and the same has merged in the judgment of the Division Bench. Under such circumstances, the learned Single Judge passed an order dated 01.03.2005 in Cont. Under such circumstances, the learned Single Judge passed an order dated 01.03.2005 in Cont. Case (Civil) No. 1542 of 2004, which reads thus; “However, in view of the stand taken by respondents 1 and 2 in the affidavit that the reinstatement is not made due to lack of clarity regarding the direction, pending further orders in the matter, it is only in the interests of justice and for securing the ends of justice that a positive direction is issued. Therefore, there will be a direction to respondents 1 and 2 to reinstate the writ petitioner, who is also the petitioner herein, in service. The order reinstating the petitioner shall be passed within two days from today and the same shall be produced before this court on 04.03.2005.” 21. In Rajappan Nair [ 2005 (2) KLT 345 ], in the Cont. Appeal (C)No.4 of 2005, the appellant contended that the learned Single Judge had exceeded his jurisdiction in giving a positive direction to reinstate the 1st respondent. Before issuing such a positive direction, the appellant was not heard and no notice was issued to him calling for his explanation. Further, the learned Single Judge was not justified in reaching a conclusion that the court was misled by the appellant. On the other hand, the respondent contended that there was deliberate defiance of the orders passed by the learned Single Judge. The first direction of the learned Single Judge was on 31.03.2004. Though a writ appeal was preferred, the Division Bench did not interfere with the direction of the learned Single Judge. Later, they moved the Government and the Government rejected the stay petition. In such circumstances, according to the respondent, the learned Single Judge is justified in giving a positive direction in the contempt case. 22. In Rajappan Nair [ 2005 (2) KLT 345 ], after referring to the provisions under Rule 6 of the Contempt of Courts (High Court of Kerala) Rules, which deals with taking cognizance, and Rule 9, which deals with preliminary hearing and notice, the Division Bench set aside the direction given by the learned Single Judge in the order dated 01.03.2005 in Cont. Case (Civil) No.1542 of 2004. The Division Bench held that the learned Single Judge, in a contempt case, can only examine whether the direction already given has been complied with or not. Case (Civil) No.1542 of 2004. The Division Bench held that the learned Single Judge, in a contempt case, can only examine whether the direction already given has been complied with or not. In a contempt case, no positive direction can be given, lest it would be beyond the jurisdiction of the contempt court exercising powers under Sections 11 and 12 of the Contempt of Court Act, read with Rules 6 of the Contempt of Court (High Court of Kerala) Rules. This legal position is well settled by the decision of the Apex Court in Prithawi Nathram v. State of Jharkhand [ 2004 (3) KLT 407 (SC) = (2004) 7 SCC 261 ]. Under such circumstances, the Division Bench set aside the direction given by the learned Single Judge in his order dated 01.03.2005 and made it clear that the learned Single Judge would proceed with Cont. Case (C)No. 1542 of 2004, in accordance with law. 23. In Prithawi Nathram [ (2004) 7 SCC 261 ] the Apex Court was dealing with a case in which the allegation in the contempt case was that the direction issued by the learned Single Judge of Patna High Court was not complied with. While dealing with the application for contempt, the learned Single Judge passed judgment holding that it would not be proper to take any action for contempt. The learned Single Judge proceeded to examine the correctness of the order and called upon the parties to satisfy him that the direction of the kind contained in the order dated 30.03.1999 could be passed. Later the learned Single Judge gave various directions, the legality of which came up for consideration before the Apex Court. The Apex Court held that if any party is aggrieved by the order, which in his opinion is wrong or against the rules, or its implementation is neither practicable nor feasible, he should always either approach the court that passed the order or invoke jurisdiction of the appellate court. Rightness or wrongness of the order cannot be urged in contempt proceedings. Right or wrong, the order has to be obeyed. Flouting an order of the court would render the party liable for contempt. While dealing with an application for contempt, the court cannot traverse beyond the order, non-compliance with which is alleged. In order words, it cannot say what should not have been done or what should have been done. Right or wrong, the order has to be obeyed. Flouting an order of the court would render the party liable for contempt. While dealing with an application for contempt, the court cannot traverse beyond the order, non-compliance with which is alleged. In order words, it cannot say what should not have been done or what should have been done. It cannot traverse beyond the order. It cannot test the correctness or otherwise of the order or give additional direction or delete any direction. That would be exercising review jurisdiction while dealing with an application for initiation or contempt proceedings. The same would be impermissible and indefensible. 24. In the instant case, the learned Single Judge passed the impugned order on 08.04.2024, when Cont. Case(C)No.943 of 2024 came up for consideration. On receipt of a copy of the contempt petition, the appellant herein, who was the sole respondent in that matter, entered appearance through counsel. The learned Single Judge suo motu impleaded the Assistant Educational Officer as the additional 2nd respondent and the learned Government Pleader was directed to ensure that the additional 2nd respondent complies with Annexures III and IV orders of this Court, as well as Annexure II order passed by the Deputy Director of Education, by the next posting date. 25. As held by the Division Bench in Rajappan Nair [ 2005 (2) KLT 345 ], while dealing with an application for contempt, the Court cannot traverse beyond Annexure III order, non-compliance of which is alleged in that application. The Court cannot test the correctness of Annexure V letter issued by the appellant-Manager or give additional direction to the Educational Officers. On the above legal issue, the submission made by the learned counsel for the 1st respondent was that in case the impugned order dated 08.04.2024 is interfered with by this Court in this appeal, the learned Single Judge may be directed to proceed with the contempt case, in accordance with law. In such circumstances, this contempt appeal is allowed by setting aside the impugned order dated 08.04.2024 of the learned Single Judge in Cont. Case(C)No.943 of 2024 and by directing the learned Single Judge to proceed with that contempt case in accordance with law.