ORDER : Sachin Shankar Magadum, J. In the captioned petition, petitioner is assailing the endorsement dated 23.08.2016 issued by respondent No.2 vide Annexure-A denying conversion of petition land. The said order is under challenge. 2. The facts leading to the case are as under: The petitioner’s father, Late Maurice D’Souza, filed Form No.7 under the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961, claiming occupancy rights over the petition lands, as he was cultivating them. Simultaneously, one Martin Inthru D’Souza also filed Form No.7, asserting his occupancy rights over the same land. Given the existence of rival claims for tenancy, this Court, by its order dated 07.04.2006, referred the matter to the Land Tribunal, Udupi, for adjudication. Subsequently, both the petitioner and the rival claimant, Martin Inthru D’Souza, filed a joint compromise petition before the Land Tribunal, Udupi. In terms of the compromise reached between the parties, the Land Tribunal, Udupi, passed an order based on the joint compromise petition. Consequently, the earlier independent orders, dated 16.09.1981 in favour of the petitioner’s father and 09.09.1981 in favour of the rival claimant, were restored. This compromise was duly recorded on 18.12.2012. 3. The petitioner contends that the 1981 order, which granted occupancy rights to the petitioner’s father, was restored through the compromise recorded in 2012. According to the petitioner, the 2012 order merely reaffirmed and validated the occupancy rights that were already granted to his father in 1981. The petitioner asserts that this reaffirmation of occupancy rights in favour of his father entitles him to apply for conversion of the petition lands. However, the Deputy Commissioner, through the impugned endorsement, rejected the petitioner’s application for conversion. The petitioner claims that the rejection is without proper consideration of the restored 1981 order and the subsequent compromise. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the 1981 order, being restored and reaffirmed through the 2012 compromise, conclusively grants occupancy rights in favour of the petitioner’s father. Therefore, the rejection of the conversion application by the Deputy Commissioner is unsustainable in law. 5. On the other hand, the learned Additional Government Advocate (AGA), appearing for the respondent-State, contended that the Deputy Commissioner acted within his authority while rejecting the petitioner’s application and justified the impugned endorsement. 6. Heard learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and learned AGA for the respondents. 7. 5. On the other hand, the learned Additional Government Advocate (AGA), appearing for the respondent-State, contended that the Deputy Commissioner acted within his authority while rejecting the petitioner’s application and justified the impugned endorsement. 6. Heard learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and learned AGA for the respondents. 7. Upon perusal of the records, it is observed that the petitioner has only produced the latest Land Tribunal order dated 18.12.2012, wherein occupancy rights were granted based on the terms of the joint memo filed by both the petitioner and the rival claimant. The petitioner’s contention is that the occupancy rights initially granted by the Land Tribunal in 1981 were sought to be restored through the joint memo submitted before the Tribunal in 2012. However, this argument does not hold ground in view of the pleadings made in paragraph 3 of the writ petition. 8. The petitioner unequivocally acknowledges in paragraph 3 of the writ petition that the occupancy rights granted by the Land Tribunal on 16.09.1981 were set aside by this Court in W.P.No.40085/1993 vide order dated 07.04.2006. Once the order granting occupancy rights was set aside, the petitioner’s argument that the 2012 order granting occupancy rights in terms of the joint memo would date back to the original 1981 order is fundamentally misconceived and legally untenable. The 2012 order stands as an independent grant based on the compromise entered into between the parties, and it cannot retrospectively validate or revive the 1981 order that was already set aside by this Court. 9. Furthermore, the petitioner has failed to place on record Form No.10, which is a statutory document of significance under the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961. Form No.10 serves as the certificate of registration of a tenant as an occupant under Section 55(1) of the Act and is issued by the jurisdictional Tahsildar. The petitioner has not furnished any details regarding whether such a certificate was issued, and the reasons for this omission are best known to the petitioner. The date of issuance of Form No.10 is particularly relevant in determining the commencement of the 15-year period during which alienation of the land is restricted. This restriction prohibits the transfer of the land by sale, gift, exchange, mortgage, lease, or assignment, except for partition among the members of a joint family. The relevant non-alienation clause in Form No.10 reads as follows: “9. This restriction prohibits the transfer of the land by sale, gift, exchange, mortgage, lease, or assignment, except for partition among the members of a joint family. The relevant non-alienation clause in Form No.10 reads as follows: “9. Provided also that the land of which the occupancy has been granted to any person shall not within fifteen years from the date of certificate under Section 55 is issued, be transferred by sale, gift, exchange, mortgage, lease, or assignment, but the land may be partitioned among members of the holders of joint family subject to the condition that no fragment shall be created by any such partition. Any transfer or partition of land in contravention of Land Reforms Law will be invalid. It shall be lawful for the occupant registered as such or his successor-in-title to take a loan and mortgage or create a charge on his interest in the land in favour of the State Government, a Scheduled Bank, a Co-operative Land Development Bank or a Company as defined in Section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956] in which not less than fifty-one per cent of the paid up share capital is held by the State Government or a Corporation owned or controlled by the Central Government or the State Government or both for development of land or improvement of agricultural practices; and without prejudice to any other remedy provided by any law; in the event of his making default in payment of such loan in accordance with the terms and conditions on which such loan was granted, it shall be lawful to cause his interest in the land to be attached and sold and the proceeds to be utilised in the payment of such loan.” 10. The non-alienation clause imposed in Form No.10 serves as a statutory safeguard under Section 55(1) of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961. This clause ensures that the land granted to tenants is retained for agricultural purposes and is not misused or transferred in contravention of the Act. The primary objective of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961, is to abolish intermediaries, promote equitable distribution of agricultural land, and encourage agricultural development. In light of these objectives, Section 95(3) of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act empowers the Deputy Commissioner to refuse conversion of agricultural land if such conversion defeats the provisions of any existing law. 11. The primary objective of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961, is to abolish intermediaries, promote equitable distribution of agricultural land, and encourage agricultural development. In light of these objectives, Section 95(3) of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act empowers the Deputy Commissioner to refuse conversion of agricultural land if such conversion defeats the provisions of any existing law. 11. Before proceeding further, this Court deems it appropriate to extract the relevant provisions of Section 95(3) of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act and Section 83 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act: "Section 95(3):- Permission to divert may be refused by the Deputy Commissioner on the ground (that the diversion is likely to defeat the provisions of any law for the time being in force or that it is likely to cause a public nuisance) (Substituted by Act 2 of 1991 w.e.f. 20.03.1991) or that it is not in the interests of the general public or that the occupant is unable to unwilling to comply with the conditions that may be imposed under sub-section (4)." 83. Inquiry regarding illegal transactions:— The prescribed authority shall, after a summary inquiry, determine whether the transaction reported to it under section 82 or coming to its notice in any other manner is in contravention of or is unlawful or invalid under the provisions of this Act, as they stood before or as they stand after the date of commencement of the Amendment Act and make a declaration accordingly. Any transaction so declared to be in contravention of or is unlawful or invalid under any of the provisions of this Act, as they stood before or as they stand after the date of commencement of the Amendment Act shall be null and void. The land in respect of which such transaction has taken place shall, as penalty, be forfeited to and vest in the State Government free from all encumbrances. No amount is payable therefore" 12. Allowing conversion of the petition lands in the present case would render the non-alienation clause in Form No.10 ineffective and would directly contravene the provisions of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961. If permission for conversion is granted, the agricultural character of the land would be lost, thereby defeating the very intent and purpose of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961. The Hon'ble Apex Court, in the case of D.L.F. Universal Ltd. vs. Prof. If permission for conversion is granted, the agricultural character of the land would be lost, thereby defeating the very intent and purpose of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961. The Hon'ble Apex Court, in the case of D.L.F. Universal Ltd. vs. Prof. A.Lakshmi Sagar & Ors., AIR 1998 SC 3369 , has categorically held that permission for conversion must be granted by the Deputy Commissioner only in accordance with Section 95(3) of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act and that such permission may be refused in public interest. 13. The petitioner’s argument that an enquiry as to whether granting a conversion order would violate the provisions of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act is beyond the scope of Section 95 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act is wholly misconceived and contrary to the express provisions of Section 95(3). Sub-clause (3) of Section 95 specifically empowers the Deputy Commissioner to reject an application for conversion if it defeats the provisions of any existing law, including the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961. The power vested in the Deputy Commissioner under Section 95(3) is not merely procedural but substantive in nature, designed to safeguard the agricultural purpose and character of the land. This provision ensures that the objectives of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, such as preventing fragmentation, restricting alienation, and promoting agricultural development, are not undermined through conversion. Therefore, the Deputy Commissioner is well within his statutory authority to examine whether a proposed conversion violates the provisions of the Land Reforms Act and to refuse permission if such violation is found. Any attempt to limit the scope of enquiry under Section 95(3) would render the provision redundant and defeat the very purpose of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act. 14. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds that the Deputy Commissioner’s order rejecting the petitioner’s application for conversion is legally justified and in consonance with the objectives of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961. The refusal to grant conversion strictly aligns with the powers vested in the Deputy Commissioner under Section 95(3) of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act. Allowing conversion in the present case would not only violate the statutory safeguards imposed under the Karnataka Land Reforms Act but would also undermine the primary purpose of the Act. Therefore, this Court upholds the Deputy Commissioner’s order under challenge and finds no merit in the petitioner’s claims. 15. Allowing conversion in the present case would not only violate the statutory safeguards imposed under the Karnataka Land Reforms Act but would also undermine the primary purpose of the Act. Therefore, this Court upholds the Deputy Commissioner’s order under challenge and finds no merit in the petitioner’s claims. 15. Accordingly, the writ petition is devoid of merit and stands dismissed.