JUDGMENT : Raja Vijayaraghavan, J. This appeal is preferred assailing the judgment dated 6.12.2022 in W.P.(C) No. 18575/2022 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court whereby the award dated 3.2.2022 passed by the Industrial Tribunal in I.D. No. 4/2019 ordering the reinstatement of the 1st respondent in service with continuity of service and payment of backwages with effect from the date of termination of service was set aside. The 1st respondent, who is the workman, has come up in appeal. 2. Short facts that are required to be stated for deciding the appeal are as under. For the sake of ease and clarity, the parties shall be referred to as Workman and Management. a) In the claim statement before the Tribunal, the worker contended as under: He was appointed by the Management as a Business Executive in their establishment by order dated 31.3.2018 and he continued to work as such till 31.5.2018. His service was blemishless and there was no case that the workmen had committed any act of indiscipline or misconduct. The Management, without stating any reason and without furnishing him an opportunity to show cause, terminated his service with effect from 31.5.2018, by serving a letter of termination. He contended that the order of termination was illegal and unjustifiable. b) In their counter-statement, the Management contended that they are a Company engaged in the production and marketing of machinery in therapeutic segments. The workman was appointed as a ‘Probationary Business Executive’ on 31.03.2018 to carry out sales promotion. In the offer of appointment, it was made clear that the workman would be on probation for a period of 6 months, which could be extended by a further period of 6 months. The service of the workman could be terminated if the same was unsatisfactory. It is stated that the service was terminated on 31.05.2018 during the period of his probation. No notice was required to be issued for terminating the service of a probationer. The workman was not issued an order in writing confirming him as a worker of the company. It was by invoking the provisions of clause 9(ii)(b) of the appointment letter that the service was terminated. It was contended that the worker was in service only for a period of two months and it was when it was found that there was no marked improvement in his performance that his service was terminated. It was by invoking the provisions of clause 9(ii)(b) of the appointment letter that the service was terminated. It was contended that the worker was in service only for a period of two months and it was when it was found that there was no marked improvement in his performance that his service was terminated. c) The Tribunal framed necessary issues for consideration. The workman was examined as WW1 and Exts.W1 and W9 were marked on his side. On the side of the Management, the Area Business Manager was examined as MW1, and on their side, M1 to M3 were marked. d) The Tribunal, after evaluation of the evidence, came to the conclusion that no acceptable evidence was adduced by the Management to the effect that a letter of appointment detailing the period of probation was served on the workman by them and he accepted it voluntarily. The contention of the workman that the Management had given placement to him without any probationary period was accepted. It was also held that no opportunity was granted to show cause and that the termination of the appointment without service of notice was bad under law. Holding so, the notice dated 31.5.2018 discontinuing probation of the workman was set aside and the workman was held entitled to reinstatement in service. Backwages due to the worker consequent to the order passed by the Tribunal were also ordered to be paid. The above award was challenged by the management in the writ petition. e) The learned Single Judge relied on the Sales Promotion Employees (Condition of Service) Act, 1976, and noted that as per Rule 22 (1) of the Rules, the letter of appointment is required to be issued in Form A. As per the provisions of the Rules, the probation was to be for a period of six months which could be further extended by six months at the discretion of the employer, and within such time, the service could also be terminated. It was also held that there was no need for issuing any show cause notice before disengagement from service. The fact that no fresh appointment order was issued to the workman while he was a probationer and prior to termination was also noted. Holding so, the award passed by the Tribunal was set aside. 3. It was also held that there was no need for issuing any show cause notice before disengagement from service. The fact that no fresh appointment order was issued to the workman while he was a probationer and prior to termination was also noted. Holding so, the award passed by the Tribunal was set aside. 3. Smt.Sruthy Sasidharan, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, submitted that the Tribunal had rightly considered the question as to whether the order of termination is mala fide or whether it amounts to victimization or unfair trade practice. It is submitted that based on the evidence let in, the Tribunal noted that the termination of the appellant was without issuing a show cause and seeking his explanation. According to the learned counsel, the offer of appointment given by the management and marked as Ext.W1 would not disclose that his appointment would be on probation. Furthermore, the signature of the workman was not secured by the management in the said letter of appointment. 4. In response, Sri. E.K. Nandakumar, the learned Senior counsel appearing for the respondent as assisted by Sri. Jaimohan submitted that the respondent was a probationer and was appointed in terms of the Sales Promotion Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1976, and the Rules framed thereunder. It is pointed out by the learned senior counsel that as per Section 5 of the Act, the Management was bound to issue an appointment order in accordance with Rule 22(1) of the Rules and in Form No. A. In the case on hand, the workman was appointed on probation basis for a period of six months, and his service was found unsatisfactory, the same was terminated within two months. According to the learned Senior Counsel, the probation period is insisted to determine the work, ability, sincerity, efficiency, and competence of the probationer and if he is found not suitable for the post, the management is having the right to dispense with his service without anything more during or before the end of the prescribed period. In the case on hand, the discharge of the workman was discharge simpliciter and was not punitive. Only in cases where the termination is punitive after a finding of misconduct pursuant to an enquiry that there is a requirement to issue show cause and call for the objection. In the case on hand, the discharge of the workman was discharge simpliciter and was not punitive. Only in cases where the termination is punitive after a finding of misconduct pursuant to an enquiry that there is a requirement to issue show cause and call for the objection. It is submitted by the learned Senior counsel that the initial order of appointment as a probationer was not followed up with an appointment order and if that be the case, the observation of the Tribunal that the claimant was a proper workman and not a probationer cannot be accepted. 5. We have considered the submissions advanced and have gone through the records. 6. We find from the records that the workman was appointed on 31.3.2018 and the letter of appointment is dated 10.4.2018. There is no dispute that he was discharged from service on 31.5.2018. Ext.P1 is the offer of appointment. It is clearly stated therein that a detailed appointment order containing the terms and conditions will be issued later on joining the service. Ext.P2 is a letter of appointment issued on 10.4.2018. Clause 9(ii)b of Ext.P2 deals with the period of probation and it says that the management reserves the right to terminate the service of a workman at any time during the period of probation. 7. The Tribunal refused to accept Ext.P2 on the ground that it did not contain the signature of the workman. What is obvious that Ext.P2 is an appointment letter issued in accordance with Section 5 r/w. Rule 22(1) and (2) of the Sales Promotion Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1976. Ext.P2 was in fact obtained by the workman under the Right to Information Act. Except for Exts.P1 and P2, no other documents concerning the appointment of the workman were before the Tribunal. As the workman had worked in the company for a period of two months on the strength of Ext.P2, the said document could not have been ignored by the Tribunal for mere want of signature. It is also relevant to note that Ext.P2 was not superseded by a fresh appointment order. The Management had also produced before the Tribunal, Exts.P9 to P11 appointment orders issued to similarly placed employees wherein the period of probation has been mentioned. 8. It is also relevant to note that Ext.P2 was not superseded by a fresh appointment order. The Management had also produced before the Tribunal, Exts.P9 to P11 appointment orders issued to similarly placed employees wherein the period of probation has been mentioned. 8. The Tribunal proceeded under the belief that the workman was a permanent employee in spite of the fact that there were no records to substantiate the said aspect. However, the fact remains that in the order of appointment based on which the workman had commenced his service, it has been explicitly mentioned that he has to complete the probation to the satisfaction of the management. Now the question is whether, the Management has violated the provisions of any law by terminating the services of a probationer. 9. In Progressive Education Society v. Rajendra, AIR 2008 SC 1442 , the Apex Court has held that the appointing authority has the power to terminate the services of a probationer upon finding his performance to be unsatisfactory during the period of probation unless stigma is attached to the termination of the probationer. 1 10. In Unit Trust of India v. T. Bijaya Kumar Patra 1993 (1) LLJ 240 , the Apex Court lucidly pointed out that for ascertaining whether an order of termination of service during probation is stigmatic in nature, firstly it has to be seen whether the order suffers from bias, prejudice or mala fides. The next question is whether the impugned order is intended to penalise the probationer and finally it needs to be ascertained as to whether the order is based upon the suitability or otherwise of the probationer arising from unsatisfactory probationary performance. It was finally held that an order of termination on the basis of unsatisfactory performance of the probationer cannot be said to be of a stigmatic nature. 11. In Pavanendra Narayan Verma v. Sanjay Gandhi P.G.I. of Medical Science, 2002 (1) SCC 520 , it was held that the termination of a probationer would be a termination simpliciter, and would not be stigmatic in nature unless the order of termination imputes something over and above the mere unsuitability for the job. 12. 11. In Pavanendra Narayan Verma v. Sanjay Gandhi P.G.I. of Medical Science, 2002 (1) SCC 520 , it was held that the termination of a probationer would be a termination simpliciter, and would not be stigmatic in nature unless the order of termination imputes something over and above the mere unsuitability for the job. 12. In State of Orissa v. Ram Narayan Das, AIR 1961 SC 177 , it was held that a probationer was liable to be discharged under the terms of his appointment at any time during the period of his probation since the probationer has no right to the post held by him. 13. In Ajith Singh v. State of Punjab, (1983) 2 SCC 217 , it was held that the period of probation gives time and opportunity to the employer to watch the work, ability, efficiency, sincerity, and competence of the servant and if he is found not suitable for the post, the master reserves the right to dispense with his service without anything more during or at the end of the prescribed period, which is styled as period of probation. If an enquiry or an assessment is done with the object of finding out any misconduct on the part of the employee and for that reason, his services are terminated, then it would be punitive in nature. On the other hand, if such an enquiry or an assessment is aimed at determining the suitability of an employee for a particular job, such termination would be termination simpliciter and not punitive in nature. 14. In the case on hand, no enquiry has been conducted to find out whether the petitioner was guilty of any misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification. Only if such an enquiry is conducted, is there any requirement to show cause and call for his explanation. The Management had merely decided that the workman need not be confirmed after a few months of service and such a discharge is discharge simpliciter, and no show cause is required to be issued. 15. We are, therefore, of the view that the Management had acted within the framework of the rules and law as rightly held by the learned Single Judge while overturning the findings of the Tribunal. This Writ Appeal is dismissed.