JUDGMENT : THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE MOHAMMED NIAS C.P. The petitioner is stated to be the owner of the property comprised in Survey No.2/193 of Chokli Village in Kannur District covered by Ext.P1 sale deed. The property was not included in the databank. The petitioner preferred Ext.P2 application under Form 6 of the Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wetland Act and Rules, 2008, (for short' the Act and the Rules')seeking permission for a change of user of the property. 2. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that Ext.P4 report submitted by the Village Officer along with a sketch clearly shows that there was no paddy land near the petitioner's property and that, the petitioner's property had coconut trees and other improvements. The Revenue Divisional Officer (RDO) had, again called for a report from the Village Officer who then reported that the property was surrounded by mangroves. By Ext.P9, the RDO rejected the application preferred under Form 6 holding that the Local Level Monitoring Committee (LLMC) had taken a decision, as per Ext.P13, to include the property as a wetland in the databank. The learned counsel for the petitioner challenges Ext.P9 order passed by the RDO under Form 6 on the ground that, none of the requirements needed for including the property as a 'wetland' arises in this case. He also submits that, at any rate, the decision of the LLMC, as seen from Ext.P13, to include the property in the databank is passed without hearing the petitioner and the inclusion of the property after it was not included earlier in the published databank, affects the proprietary rights of the petitioner. The factual positions were also not considered while passing Ext.P9 order as the reports of the revenue officials clearly show that there were no paddy fields near the property and there was no chance of the change of user affecting the water flow to nearby paddy fields. Ext.P12 report obtained from the Agricultural Officer was totally without jurisdiction as he had no authority to file a report in a case where the finding was that the subject property should be treated as a wetland. 3. The Government has filed a counter in which it is stated that the Village Officer found that the land was recently filled up and that the adjacent properties were wetlands apart from the existence of mangroves near the property. 3. The Government has filed a counter in which it is stated that the Village Officer found that the land was recently filled up and that the adjacent properties were wetlands apart from the existence of mangroves near the property. The matter was referred to the Agricultural Officer for getting the remarks of the LLMC on the points suggested by the Village Officer. The Agricultural Officer submitted a report on 15.12.2021 stating that the LLMC had inspected the property and found that the southern and western sides of the property were filled with mangroves and the said fields are marshy lands and that, the conversion of the land in question would adversely affect the ecological system of the nearby mangrove fields and hence, the LLMC decided to include the subject land in the databank as a wetland. 4. The learned Government Pleader submits that the LLMC was within its power to include the property in the databank under Rule 4(5) of the Act and the Rules. The learned Government Pleader also argues that under Rule 4(6) there is a remedy to the petitioner for moving the LLMC within 90 days from the publication of the databank. 5. Heard Sri.M.Sasindran, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Smt.Amminikutty K., Senior Government Pleader appearing for the respondents. 6. After having heard the learned counsel on either side, it is to be noted that Ext.P9 was passed ignoring the earlier report of the Village Officer and relying on the report of the Agricultural Officer, who under the Rules was not entitled to file a report as far as for inclusion of the property as a 'wetland' as per Rule 4(4e) of the Rules which reads as follows: “If the applications received as mentioned in sub rule (4d) is regarding paddy lands, it shall be sent to the Agricultural Officer concerned and if it is regarding wetland, to the Village Officer for a report and as the case may be, the Agricultural Officer or Village Officer shall submit a report on that within one month.” 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that, since the property was not initially included in the databank, the subsequent inclusion in the databank by the LLMC can only be with notice to the owner as his civil rights are affected. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that, since the property was not initially included in the databank, the subsequent inclusion in the databank by the LLMC can only be with notice to the owner as his civil rights are affected. The learned Government Pleader submits that the Act does not contemplate a hearing before including a property in the databank. 8. There cannot be any dispute that, including a property in the databank has 'civil consequences' which expression is wide and encompasses infractions of not merely property or personal rights but of civil liberties, material deprivations and non-pecuniary damages. In its wide umbrella comes everything that affects a citizen in his civil life. Such an order/action cannot be taken without giving the said person notice and disclosing to him the materials relied on by the authorities to subsequently include the property in the data bank. In such cases, it is of fundamental importance to provide an opportunity for hearing before making any decision and the same must be treated as a basic requirement in any legal proceedings. In situations such as the one noted above, the fact that the statute does not provide for a hearing does not matter at all. It is trite that the principles of natural justice must be read into the unoccupied interstices of the statute unless there is a clear mandate to the contrary. 9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. L.K. Ratna and Others [1986 KHC 706], relied on the following observations of Sir William Wade's erudite and classic work on 'Administrative Law', that reads as follows: “Some of those cases are mentioned in Sir William Wade's erudite and classic work on “Administrative Law”. But as that learned author observes, “in principle there ought to be an observance of natural justice equally at both stages", and "if natural justice is violated at the first stage, the right of appeal is not so much a true right of appeal as a corrected initial hearing: instead of fair trial followed by appeal, the procedure is reduced to unfair trial followed by fair trial." And he makes reference to the observations of Megarry J. in Leary v. National Union of Vehicle Builders, (1971) 1 Ch. 34. 34. Treating with another aspect of the point, that learned Judge said: "If one accepts the contention that a defect of natural justice in the trial body can be cured by the presence of natural justice in the appellate body, this has the result of depriving the member of his right of appeal from the expelling body. If the rules and the law combine to give the member the right to a fair trial and the right of appeal, why should he be told that he ought to be satisfied with an unjust trial and a fair appeal? Even if the appeal is treated as a hearing de novo, the member is being stripped of his right to appeal to another body from the effective decision to expel him. I cannot think that natural justice is satisfied by a process whereby an unfair trial, though not resulting in a valid expulsion, will nevertheless have the effect of depriving the member of his right of appeal when a valid decision to expel him is subsequently made. Such a deprivation would be a powerful result to be achieved by what in law is a mere nullity, and it is no mere triviality that might be justified on the ground that natural justice does not mean perfect justice. As a general rule, at all events, I hold that a failure of natural justice in the trial body cannot be cured by a sufficiency of natural justice in an appellate body." The view taken by Megarry, J. was followed by the Ontario High Court in Canada in Re Cardinal and Board of Commissioners of Police of City of Cornwall, [1974] 42 D.L.R. (3d) 323. The Supreme Court of New Zealand was similarly inclined in Wislang v. Medical Practitioners Disciplinary Committee, (1974) 1 N.Z.L.R. 29 and so was the Court of Appeal of New Zealand in Reid v. Rowley, (1977) 2 N.Z.L.R. 472.” 10. It is well settled that the principles of natural justice are grounded in procedural fairness which ensures making correct decisions. The inclusion of the property in a databank after the property was not included in the original notification is certainly prejudicial to the rights of the party. It is well settled that the principles of natural justice are grounded in procedural fairness which ensures making correct decisions. The inclusion of the property in a databank after the property was not included in the original notification is certainly prejudicial to the rights of the party. The opportunity to provide a hearing before making any decision was considered to be a basic requirement initially in court proceedings, but later extended to other quasi-judicial authorities and tribunals and now even to administrative actions where the decision of the authority may result in civil consequences. Though every violation of a facet of natural justice may not lead to the conclusion that the order passed is always null or void, in the instant case, as stated above, the order certainly results in adverse civil consequences to the party. 11. Given the above, the learned Government pleader's argument that even if the property is subsequently included, the party will have an opportunity to agitate the same before the LLMC and therefore, the lack of notice while including the property in the databank will not be material has to be rejected. 12. In view of the above, Exts.P9 & P13 are quashed. In case the LLMC decides to include the property as a 'wetland', it shall issue a notice to the petitioner, hear him and pass appropriate orders in terms of the Act and rules. In case the petitioner obtains favourable orders from the LLMC, it will be open to the petitioner to request the RDO to reconsider Ext.P2 application already filed under Form 6 and the same shall be considered in accordance with law without further delay. In the event the LLMC reconsiders the issue and still decides to include the property as a wetland in the data bank, it will be open to the petitioner to invoke the provisions of the Act seeking deletion from the data bank. The Writ Petition is allowed as above.