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2024 DIGILAW 696 (PNJ)

Harjeet @ Sonu v. U. T. Chandigarh

2024-04-18

LALIT BATRA, SURESHWAR THAKUR

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JUDGMENT : Sureshwar Thakur, J. The present applicant-Harjeet @ Sonu faced trial along with the other co-accused before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Chandigarh. The said trial became entered into in respect of charges framed for commission of offence embodied under Sections 148, 341, 323, 324, 506 and 302 read with Section 149 of IPC. 2. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, Chandigarh, through a decision made on 24.02.2020 after recording a finding of conviction against the present applicant, and, also against the other co-accused qua the above formulated charges, thus proceeded through an order of sentence made on 29.02.2020, impose upon each of the convict, the hereinafter extracted sentence(s) of rigorous imprisonment and also of fine upon each of the accused. Offence Sentence imposed Section 148 read with Section 149 IPC One year Rigorous Imprisonment and fine of Rs.1,000/- each. In default of payment of fine, convicts shall further undergo rigorous imprisonment for two months each. Section 341 read with Section 149 IPC One month simple imprisonment. Section 323 read with Section 149 IPC Six months Rigorous Imprisonment and fine of Rs.500/- each. In default of payment of fine, convicts shall further undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month each. Section 324 read with Section 149 IPC One year Rigorous Imprisonment and fine of Rs.1,000/- each. In default of payment of fine, convicts shall further undergo rigorous imprisonment for two months each. Section 506 read with Section 149 IPC One year Rigorous Imprisonment and fine of Rs.1,000/- each. In default of payment of fine, convicts shall further undergo rigorous imprisonment for two months each. Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC Imprisonment for life and fine of Rs.25,000/- each. In default of payment of fine, convicts shall further undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year each. 3. The present applicant has challenged the verdict of conviction (supra), as became rendered by the learned trial Judge concerned, besides has challenged the consequent thereto sentence (supra), as became imposed upon him. 4. Be that as it may, during the pendency of the instant appeal before this Court, the applicant has instituted the instant miscellaneous application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., wherebys the applicant has prayed for declaring him to be a juvenile, especially at the time of the commission of the offence (supra). 4. Be that as it may, during the pendency of the instant appeal before this Court, the applicant has instituted the instant miscellaneous application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., wherebys the applicant has prayed for declaring him to be a juvenile, especially at the time of the commission of the offence (supra). Moreover, the applicant has prayed that after the declaration (supra), being made thus subsequently the impugned verdict of conviction, and, subsequent thereto sentence (supra), as became delivered by the learned trial Judge concerned, be quashed, and, set aside, and, the trial be remanded to the Juvenile Justice Board, Chandigarh thus for the said Board making a re-trial upon the child, in FIR bearing No.198 of 15.08.2017, registered under Sections 323, 341, 147, 149 of the IPC, at Police Station Manimajra, Chandigarh. 5. This Court through a decision made on 17.05.2023, upon, the instant miscellaneous application, had passed an order, relevant paragraphs whereof i.e. 3 to 8 become extracted hereinafter. “3. However, during the pendency of the aforesaid appeal, before this Court, one of the co-convicts, namely, Harjeet @ Sonu, made an application bearing No.CRM-47940-2022, wherein, he claimed that since he was a juvenile in conflict with law, at the time of the crime event taking place, on 14.08.2017, therefore he be declared as a juvenile. Moreover, the resultant thereto prayer was also made, that since the trial became entered into against him, rather by the adult court, in terms of the provisions of Cr.P.C., whereas he was to be tried as a juvenile by the Principal Magistrate of the Juvenile Justice Board concerned. Therefore, through the above application, he also claimed that after his being declared as a juvenile, that subsequently, but on the above ground, the impugned verdict of conviction, and, consequent therewith sentence, as became imposed upon him, by the learned trial Judge concerned, rather be annulled. 4. Though the above raised plea of juvenility has been belatedly raised, or, has been raised post the verdict of conviction and consequent therewith sentences (supra) becoming imposed upon him. 4. Though the above raised plea of juvenility has been belatedly raised, or, has been raised post the verdict of conviction and consequent therewith sentences (supra) becoming imposed upon him. However yet since in terms of the verdict made by the Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled “Amrit Singh V/s State of Maharashtra and anr.”, to which Writ Petition (Criminal) No.16 of 2010, has been assigned, thus mandating that the plea of juvenility can be raised at any stage or even post verdict of conviction and imposition of sentence(s) upon the purported juvenile. Resultantly, the instant application, at this stage, is thus maintainable before this Court. 5. Though the said plea of juvenility, as is evident from the records of the learned trial Court, as became produced after theirs becoming requisitioned therefrom, did become raised thus before the learned trial Judge concerned. The said claim was rested upon a matriculation certificate relating to the applicant, wherein, he becomes echoed to be a juvenile, at the stage of the FIR offences becoming committed. However, as apparent, on a reading of the order made by the learned committal court concerned, on 22.09.2017, since only a photocopy of the said document became tendered, therefore the accused, through his counsel, was directed to produce, on 27.10.2017, the original copy of the above stated document. However, it appears that even on 27.10.2017, the original of the said certificate became not produced before the learned committal Magistrate concerned, leading him thus to commit the accused to, through a committal order made on 12.12.2017, thus to face trial in respect of the FIR offences, rather before the court of Session. In other words, the order of committal (supra) was made, but for the above reasons, and, for the said application remained undecided, only for the reason, that despite opportunities becoming granted to the purported juvenile in conflict with law, to produce the original of the CBSE certificate, yet his failing to avail such assigned opportunities to him. 6. Be that as it may, since the plea of juvenility, for above stated reasons, can be raised at any stage, therefore the original of the photocopy of the apposite document, which but comprises the primary evidence, in respect of the plea of juvenility, as raised at this stage, thus requires its being yet adduced by the purported juvenile in conflict with law. However, the said adduction of the above primary evidence, may not take place before this Court, as the respondent-State, thus has to be assigned an opportunity to adduce rebuttal thereto evidence. The said opportunity may not be permissible to become granted to the respondent concerned, thus before this Court. 7. The procedure thus to be adopted, is the one as became adopted by the Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled “Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary and anr. V/s The State of Maharashtra”, to which R.P. (Crl.) Nos.1139-1140 of 2000 in Crl. A. Nos.25-26 of 2000 and Crl. M.P. Nos.5242-5243 of 2016, IA No.5242 of 2016, IA No.5245 of 2016, has been assigned, wherein, the Hon’ble Apex Court, had made a direction, upon, the parties to place the original documents, relating to the plea of juvenility, as raised, thus before the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Pune, and, to whom also the jurisdiction became assigned to decide the plea of juvenility. 8. Therefore, in terms of the verdict (supra), this Court directs the parties to, on 30.05.2023, appear before the learned District and Sessions Judge, Chandigarh, and, on such appearance being caused, before the learned District and Sessions Judge concerned, by both the accused, and, by the prosecution, the applicant, shall produce the original of the relevant document. However, on its production, an opportunity may be granted to the prosecution, to adduce rebuttal thereto evidence, if any. Subsequently, the learned District and Sessions Judge concerned, shall ensure the making of a determination, with respect to the plea of juvenility, as raised before this Court, by the applicant. The above exercise be ensured to be completed within six weeks hereafter, and, the adjudication as made by the learned District and Sessions Judge, Chandigarh, shall accompany his report. All the above be placed before this Court on 12.12.2023.” 6. In pursuance, to the said made directions, upon the learned District and Sessions Judge, Chandigarh, the latter has proceeded to make a report before this Court. A reading of the said report as made by the learned District and Sessions Judge, Chandigarh details with sufficient discharging evidence as comprised in the birth certificate become tendered before him by the mother of the applicant and which emanated from the Chief Registrar of Births, and, Deaths, Punjab, Chandigarh Ex.P-1, whereins, the date of birth of the applicant is recorded as 01.12.1999. Resultantly, when at the time of commission of the offence, the applicant was about 17 years of age, and, as such, was below 18 years of age, thereupon when he was a juvenile, and, then was required to be tried by Court/Board other than the learned trial Judge concerned. However, when the trial in respect of FIR bearing No.198 of 15.08.2017, registered under Sections 323, 341, 147, 149 of the IPC, at Police Station Manimajra, Chandigarh, became entered into by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Chandigarh. Therefore, it is contended before this Court by the learned counsel for the applicant that the trial, as became entered against the present applicant by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Chandigarh rather was vitiated, and/or, was entered into without jurisdictional competence thus vesting in the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Chandigarh. Resultantly, it is contended that after quashing of the impugned verdict of conviction, and, consequent thereto sentence as became imposed upon the applicant, a direction be passed by this Court to the Juvenile Justice Board concerned, (hereinafter referred to as the “JJB”) to enter upon a trial in respect of the offences embodied in FIR bearing No.198 of 15.08.2017, registered at Police Station Manimajra, Chandigarh. 7. Initially, though the learned counsel for U.T. Chandigarh has contested the findings, as carried in the report, as made by the learned District and Sessions Judge, Chandigarh, whereins the latter has depended upon Ex.P-1, as became tendered before him by the mother of the applicant, after the same becoming elicited from the Chief Registrar of Birth and Death, Punjab, Chandigarh. 8. However, the said protest against the report made by the learned District and Sessions Judge, Chandigarh, rather requires rejection. The reason for making the above inference emanates from the factum, that it is forthrightly stated in the said report made dependance upon Ex.P-1, that at the time of the commission of the offence, the applicant was below 18 years of age, thus was a juvenile, especially when no adequate rebuttal evidence thereto became adduced by the learned Public Prosecutor concerned. Resultantly therebys, prima facie the trial as became entered, upon, him by the learned trial Judge concerned, rather was a defectively entered upon trial, especially when the juvenile/child was required to be entered into respectively either by the Juvenile Justice Board concerned, or by the Children’s Court concerned. 9. Resultantly therebys, prima facie the trial as became entered, upon, him by the learned trial Judge concerned, rather was a defectively entered upon trial, especially when the juvenile/child was required to be entered into respectively either by the Juvenile Justice Board concerned, or by the Children’s Court concerned. 9. The reason for making the said conclusion, becomes derived from a reading of the provisions carried in Section 94 of The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act of 2015”), provisions whereof becomes extracted hereinafter, whereins, it becomes spelt that the apt determination vis-a-vis the age of the purported juvenile is required to be well founded upon; a) the date of birth certificate from the school or the matriculation or the equivalent certificate from the concerned examination Board, if available, and in the absence thereof; b) from the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority, or a panchayat. Resultantly when Ex.P-1, as emanated from the Chief Registrar, Birth and Death, Punjab, Chandigarh, whereins echoings occur, that at the time of the commission of the offence, the applicant was 17 years of age. Resultantly the reliance as placed by the learned District and Sessions Judge, Chandigarh is a well placed reliance, and, as such is required to beget countenance form this Court. “94. (1) Where, it is obvious to the Committee or the Board, based on the appearance of the person brought before it under any of the provisions of this Act (other than for the purpose of giving evidence) that the said person is a child, the Committee or the Board shall record such observation stating the age of the child as nearly as may be and proceed with the inquiry under section 14 or section 36, as the case may be, without waiting for further confirmation of the age. (2) In case, the Committee or the Board has reasonable grounds for doubt regarding whether the person brought before it is a child or not, the Committee or the Board, as the case may be, shall undertake the process of age determination, by seeking evidence by obtaining -- (i) the date of birth certificate from the school, or the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the concerned examination Board, if available; and in the absence thereof; (ii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat; (iii) and only in the absence of (i) and (ii) above, age shall be determined by an ossification test or any other latest medical age determination test conducted on the orders of the Committee or the Board: Provided such age determination test conducted on the order of the Committee or the Board shall be completed within fifteen days from the date of such order. (3) The age recorded by the Committee or the Board to be the age of person so brought before it shall, for the purpose of this Act, be deemed to be the true age of that person.” 10. Be that as it may, after assigning credence to Ex.P-1, it has to be determined whether the arguments (supra), as raised before this Court by the learned counsel for the applicant, that in the wake of the applicant, thus at the relevant time, being a juvenile, thereby the verdict of conviction, and, consequent thereto sentence as became imposed upon the applicant, is liable to be quashed, and, set aside, thus on the ground that the same is vitiated, rather does not appeal to the judicial conscience of this Court. 11. The reason for making the above conclusion becomes founded upon paragraphs 18 & 20, as become borne in a verdict rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled as “Karan @ Fatiya V. The State of Madhya Pradesh, to which Criminal Appeal Nos.572-573 of 2019, is assigned, the said paragraphs become extracted hereinafter. “18. 11. The reason for making the above conclusion becomes founded upon paragraphs 18 & 20, as become borne in a verdict rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled as “Karan @ Fatiya V. The State of Madhya Pradesh, to which Criminal Appeal Nos.572-573 of 2019, is assigned, the said paragraphs become extracted hereinafter. “18. Having considered the facts of the case and the findings recorded above, it would also be appropriate to briefly deal with the case law on the point as to whether once an accused after conviction at the stage of appeal is held to be a juvenile/child under the provisions of the 2015 Act, what would be the status of the trial, the conviction and sentence recorded by the Trial Court and the appellate Courts. Whether the trial itself would stand vitiated for lack of jurisdiction by the regular Sessions Court and it would be the JJB alone which could make an inquiry into the offence committed based upon the evidence led by the prosecution. If the inquiry has not been conducted by the JJB, then whether the entire proceedings need to be quashed or only the sentencing aspect would require consideration in accordance with the 2015 Act. 19... 20. There are a series of judgments on the said issue. Some have set aside the conviction, sentence and have terminated the proceedings, others have upheld the conviction but on the basis of sentence already undergone being more than the maximum permissible under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 “2000 Act” have directed for release of the accused and third, where after maintaining the conviction, this Court has referred the matter to the JJB for passing appropriate orders on sentence. All the judgments delivered earlier which are briefly discussed hereunder relate to the 2000 Act. Present case falls under the 2015 Act as the offence itself is of the year 2017.” 12. All the judgments delivered earlier which are briefly discussed hereunder relate to the 2000 Act. Present case falls under the 2015 Act as the offence itself is of the year 2017.” 12. A reading of the above extracted paragraphs reveals, that the Hon’ble Apex Court thereins took to consider whether in the wake of the juvenile/child becoming inaptly tried by the Criminal Court of competent jurisdiction constituted under the Cr.P.C., despite his/her being then not triable by the said Court whether thereby the said trial is to be declared to stand vitiated for lack of jurisdictional competence, and, subsequently whether the Courts can after quashing the verdict of conviction and consequent thereto sentence, proceed to remand the matter to the JJB concerned/Children’s Court, for the said JJB concerned/Children’s Court, making a re-trial of the offence carried in the relevant FIR. 13. Furthermore, the further issue which fell for consideration, was whether the entire proceedings is required to be quashed, and/or only the sentencing aspect thus requires re-consideration, rather in accordance with the Act of 2015. The Hon’ble Apex Court after considering a series of judgments on the said issue, more specifically the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled as “Jitendra Singh alias Babboo Singh V. State of Uttar Pradesh” reported in 2013 (11) SCC 193 , whereins, in paragraph Nos.28 to 30, paragraphs whereof becomes extracted hereinafter, thus echoing occur, that if the juvenile is found guilty of committing the alleged offence, thereupon he cannot go unpunished, but it was also declared thereins, that the punishment to be awarded to the juvenile rather is required to be left to be imposed by the JJB concerned, as constituted under the Act of 2000. “28. The sum and substance of the above discussion is that in one set of cases this Court has found the juvenile guilty of the crime alleged to have been committed by him but he has gone virtually unpunished since this Court quashed the sentence awarded to him. In another set of cases, this Court has taken the view, on the facts of the case that the juvenile is adequately punished for the offence committed by him by serving out some period in detention. In another set of cases, this Court has taken the view, on the facts of the case that the juvenile is adequately punished for the offence committed by him by serving out some period in detention. In the third set of cases, this Court has remitted the entire case for consideration by the jurisdictional Juvenile Justice Board, both on the innocence or guilt of the juvenile as well as the sentence to be awarded if the juvenile is found guilty. In the fourth set of cases, this Court has examined the case on merits and after having found the juvenile guilty of the offence, remitted the matter to the jurisdictional Juvenile Justice Board on the award of sentence. 29. In our opinion, the course to adopt is laid down in Section 20 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. This reads as follows: “20. Special provision in respect of pending cases.-- Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, all proceedings in respect of a juvenile pending in any court in any area on the date on which this Act comes into force in that area, shall be continued in that court as if this Act had not been passed and if the court finds that the juvenile has committed an offence, it shall record such finding and instead of passing any sentence in respect of the juvenile, forward the juvenile to the Board which shall pass orders in respect of that juvenile in accordance with the provisions of this Act as if it had been satisfied on inquiry under this Act that a juvenile has committed the offence: Provided that the Board may, for any adequate and special reason to be mentioned in the order, review the case and pass appropriate order in the interest of such juvenile. Explanation. - In all pending cases including trial, revision, appeal or any other criminal proceedings in respect of a juvenile in conflict with law, in any court, the determination of juvenility of such a juvenile shall be in terms of clause (l) of Section 2, even if the juvenile ceases to be so on or before the date of commencement of this Act and the provisions of this Act shall apply as if the said provisions had been in force, for all purposes and at all material times when the alleged offence was committed.” 30. It is clear that the case of the juvenile has to be examined on merits. If it found that the juvenile is guilty of the offence alleged to have been committed, he simply cannot go unpunished. However, as the law stands, the punishment to be awarded to him or her must be left to the Juvenile Justice Board constituted under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. This is the plain requirement of Section 20 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. In other words, Ashwani Kumar Saxena (2012) 9 SCC 750 , should be followed.” 14. In Karan’s case (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court considering the view (supra), propounded in Jitendra Singh’s case (supra), thus in paragraph 30 thereof, which becomes extracted hereinabove, thus was made when the Act of 1986 or the Act of 2000 were in force. However, it was stated, that when the offence committed by the juvenile in the said case, was committed when the Act of 2015 came into force, as is the situation in the instant case, thereupon the Hon’ble Apex Court proceeded to consider Section 9, as carried in the Act of 2015. Resultantly, the Hon’ble Apex Court in paragraph 30 of Karan’s case (supra), ultimately concluded that since sub-section (3) of Section 9 of the Act of 2015, does not specifically or even impliedly provide that the conviction recorded by any Court with respect to a person who has subsequently after the disposal of the case found to be juvenile or a child, would also lose its effect, rather therein it was declared that it is only the sentence if any passed by the Court would be deemed to have no effect. Therefore, in Karan’s case (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court refrained from declaring the trial entered upon a child or juvenile to be vitiated rather proceeded to only make an interference with the sentencing part but after upholding the verdict of conviction. 30. The above judgments relate to an offence covered by either the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 “the 1986 Act” or the 2000 Act. We now proceed to briefly discuss the provisions under the 2015 Act. Section 9 of the 2015 Act is already reproduced in the earlier part of this judgment. 30. The above judgments relate to an offence covered by either the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 “the 1986 Act” or the 2000 Act. We now proceed to briefly discuss the provisions under the 2015 Act. Section 9 of the 2015 Act is already reproduced in the earlier part of this judgment. According to sub-section (3) of section 9 of the 2015 Act, the Court which finds that the person who committed the offence was a child on the date of commission of such offence would forward the child to the JJB for passing appropriate orders and sentence, if any, passed by the Court shall be deemed to have no effect. This does not specifically or even impliedly provide that the conviction recorded by any Court with respect to a person who has subsequently after the disposal of the case found to be juvenile or a child, would also lose its effect rather it is only the sentence if any passed by the Court would be deemed to have no effect. 15. Furthermore, the additional reason for the Hon’ble Apex Court in Karan’s case (supra), refraining from quashing the conviction delivered to a child or a juvenile by a Court other than the JJB concerned, or the Children’s Court constituted under the Act of 2015, became founded, upon the expostulations made in paragraph 32 of Karan’s case (supra), paragraph whereof becomes extracted hereinafter. 32. The intention of the legislature was to give benefit to a person who is declared to be a child on the date of the offence only with respect to its sentence part. If the conviction was also to be made ineffective then either the jurisdiction of regular Sessions Court would have been completely excluded not only under section 9 of the 2015 Act but also under section 25 of the 2015 Act, provision would have been made that on a finding being recorded that the person being tried is a child, a pending trial should also be relegated to the JJB and also that such trial would be held to be null and void. Instead, under section 25 of the 2015 Act, it is clearly provided that any proceeding pending before any Board or Court on the date of commencement of the 2015 Act shall be continued in that Board or Court as if this Act had not been enacted. Section 25 is reproduced hereunder: “25. Instead, under section 25 of the 2015 Act, it is clearly provided that any proceeding pending before any Board or Court on the date of commencement of the 2015 Act shall be continued in that Board or Court as if this Act had not been enacted. Section 25 is reproduced hereunder: “25. Special provision in respect of pending cases. - Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, all proceedings in respect of a child alleged or found to be in conflict with law pending before any Board or court on the date of commencement of this Act, shall be continued in that Board or court as if this Act had not been enacted.” 16. A reading of the said paragraphs discloses, that if the legislature intended that the conviction delivered upon a juvenile or a child was to be also made ineffective, then either the jurisdiction of the regular Session Court would have been completely excluded thus not only under Section 9 of the Act of 2015, but also in Section 25 of the Act of 2015, provisions would have been made, that on a finding being recorded that the person being tried is a child, whereas, with Section 25, as borne in the Act of 2015, provisions whereof becomes extracted in the above paragraph, rather clearly providing, that any proceeding pending before any Board or Court on the date of commencement of the Act of 2015, shall be continued in that Board or Court as if this Act had not been enacted. 17. Consequently, in view of the above, the Hon’ble Apex Court in paragraph 33 of Karan’s case (supra), paragraph whereof becomes extracted hereinafter, made a conclusion, that the verdict of conviction made upon a juvenile/child by a Court constituted under the Cr.P.C., would not become ineffective, but only the sentence awarded vis-a-vis him, thus in excess of what is permissible under the Act of 2015, rather is required to be accordingly modified. The reason for making the said conclusion becomes sparked from the factum, that the object under the Act of 2015, thus dealing with the rights and liberties of the juvenile, is only to ensure that the child/juvenile is brought into main stream by awarding lesser sentence and also directing for other facilities for welfare of the juvenile in conflict with law during his stay in any of the institutions defined under the Act of 2015. 33. 33. Having considered the statutory provisions laid down in section 9 of the 2015 Act and also section 7A of the 2000 Act which is identical to section 9 of the 2015 Act, we are of the view that merits of the conviction could be tested and the conviction which was recorded cannot be held to be vitiated in law merely because the inquiry was not conducted by JJB. It is only the question of sentence for which the provisions of the 2015 Act would be attracted and any sentence in excess of what is permissible under the 2015 Act will have to be accordingly amended as per the provisions of the 2015 Act. Otherwise, the accused who has committed a heinous offence and who did not claim juvenility before the Trial Court would be allowed to go scot-free. This is also not the object and intention provided in the 2015 Act. The object under the 2015 Act dealing with the rights and liberties of the juvenile is only to ensure that if he or she could be brought into the main stream by awarding lesser sentence and also directing for other facilities for welfare of the juvenile in conflict with law during his stay in any of the institutions defined under the 2015 Act. 18. Preponderantly also, when it has been declared in the said extracted paragraphs, that since the juvenile in conflict with law, did not as in the instant case, produced any credible evidence which he rather subsequently produced before the learned District and Sessions Judge, Chandigarh, in pursuance to a direction (supra), made by this Court, in respect of his well premising his claim for his being a juvenile, at the time of commission of offence. Resultantly, thereby it was also concluded, that the claim for quashing of the verdict of conviction delivered by the learned trial Judge concerned, upon the juvenile concerned, is mis founded and is liable to be rejected. 19. Be that as it may, since the other co-accused along with the present applicant may have also challenged the verdict of conviction, and, subsequent thereto sentence awarded upon them by the learned trial Judge concerned. 19. Be that as it may, since the other co-accused along with the present applicant may have also challenged the verdict of conviction, and, subsequent thereto sentence awarded upon them by the learned trial Judge concerned. Therefore, this Court does not deem it fit, and, appropriate to either upheld or negate the verdict of conviction nor this Court deems it fit, and, appropriate to, in terms of paragraph 33 as carried in Karan’ case (supra), modify the sentence awarded upon the applicant by the learned trial Judge concerned. 20. Consequently, the instant application is dismissed. The appeal reared by the other co-accused against the verdict of conviction delivered on 24.02.2020, by the learned trial Judge concerned, besides the challenge made thereins to the consequent thereto imposition of sentence, upon the co-accused be listed along with the main appeal.