ORDER : SAMEER JAIN, J. PREFATORY REMARKS 1. By way of the present petition, a twofold challenge is raised against the orders impugned dated 16.08.2023 and 17.10.2023. 2. It is noted that vide order impugned dated 16.08.2023, the respondent-authorities, more particularly, the General Manager (P&A), Hindustan Salts Limited, imposed a penalty upon the petitioner under Rule 23(d) of the Hindustan/ Sambhar Salts Limited (Conduct, Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 2018 (hereinafter, Rules of 2018) and consequently directed the reduction of the petitioner’s salary to the extent of 50% with effect from July’2023 until the Ramnagar Unit (Uttarakhand) of the Hindustan/Sambhar Salt Limited could generate enough cash flow to meet out the pecuniary loss accrued to them on account of the petitioner’s purported negligence/actions. 3. Whereas, vide the subsequent order impugned dated 17.10.2023, the General Manager (Operations), compulsorily retired the petitioner from service with effect from 17.01.2024 in exercise of the powers conferred by Rule 30(B) and 30(C) of the Rules of 2018 and FR 56 Rules in public interest. 4. Being aggrieved of the foregoing orders, the petitioner has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and filed the instant petition, with the following prayers, as reproduced herein-under:- “i) the impugned order dated 17.10.2023 passed by Group General Manager (Operations), Sambhar Salts Limited and Hindustan Salts Limited compulsory retiring humble petitioner from the post of Chief Manager (Marketing) may kindly be declared illegal and arbitrary and therefore, same may kindly be quashed and set aside; ii) the impugned order dated 16.08.2023 imposing penalty under rule 23(d) and impugned order dated 12.09.2023 rejecting the representations of humble petitioner may kindly be declared illegal and arbitrary and therefore, same may kindly be quashed and set aside; iii) Any other appropriate order or direction which this Hon’ble Court deems just and proper in the facts and circumstances of this case may kindly also be passed in favour of the petitioner.” FACTUAL MATRIX 5. In order to be cognizant of the nuances of the dispute at hand, this Court deems it appropriate to briefly delineate its factual matrix, which is noted herein-under:- 5.1 That the petitioner was offered appointment on the post of Executive (Business Development) on 02.08.2011. During the course of his service tenure, the petitioner was transferred several times, whilst being conferred with numerous additional charges/promotions. During the course of his service tenure, the petitioner was transferred several times, whilst being conferred with numerous additional charges/promotions. The service record of the petitioner is noted herein-under:- a. That shortly after the petitioner’s appointment, the petitioner was conferred with the additional charge of Manager (IT) from 23.08.2011 to 23.08.2013. b. That subsequently, the petitioner was transferred from to Sambhar Salt Limited, Sambhar on 08.03.2016. c. That the petitioner was promoted on the post of Senior Manager (Marketing) on 29.03.2016 and was also given the additional charge of Service Cont. Salt Production from 18.05.2016 to 25.11.2019. d. That among other responsibilities, the petitioner was also made in-charge of the Circuit House from 02.01.2017 to 27.02.2020 whilst also being conferred with the additional charge of being the Senior Manager (Civil) from 23.03.2017 to 25.11.2019. e. That the petitioner was eventually tasked with administering the Process Salt Plan and Gudha Salt Refinery on 20.08.2019. Thereafter, the petitioner was given the additional charge of R&D Lab on 11.10.2019 till he was further transferred. The petitioner also served at the General Store from 30.01.2020 to 02.09.2020 till he was eventually transferred to the Head Office, Jaipur on 19.09.2020 in the Marketing Department, where he reported directly to the Chief Managing Director. f. That looking to the petitioner’s service record, the petitioner was promoted as Chief Manager (Marketing) on 26.10.2020 and was transferred to Nawa Salt Refinery and Nawa Salt Production vide order dated 13.12.2021. Eventually, the petitioner was transferred to Salt Stores, Sambhar on 26.03.2022. g. That for the work undertaken by the petitioner at Nawa Salt Refinery, the petitioner was granted an appreciation certificate by Sambhar Salt Limited for producing 251.300 Metric Ton of Salt in one single day. h. That the Annual Performance Assessment Report (APAR) of the petitioner for the Years 2013-2014, 2016-2017, 2017-2018, 2018-2019, 2019-2020 and 2020-2021 has been assessed as either Good, Very Good or Excellent. Whereas, the APAR’s for the Years 2014-2015 and 2015-2016 were not served upon the petitioner. i. That the vide order dated 23.01.2023, the petitioner was transferred from Sambhar Salt Limited, Sambhar to Hindustan Salts Limited, Ramnagar, Uttarakhand, where he was tasked with the duty of enhancing the business development and augmenting the sales of the company in the region. Whereas, the APAR’s for the Years 2014-2015 and 2015-2016 were not served upon the petitioner. i. That the vide order dated 23.01.2023, the petitioner was transferred from Sambhar Salt Limited, Sambhar to Hindustan Salts Limited, Ramnagar, Uttarakhand, where he was tasked with the duty of enhancing the business development and augmenting the sales of the company in the region. 5.2 That shortly after being transferred to Ramnagar, the Group General Manager (Operations), vide orders/communications dated 17.05.2023 and 20.07.2023 intended to reduce the salary of the petitioner to the tune of 50% on grounds of purported negligence whilst being on official duty. 5.3 That against the orders/communications dated 17.05.2023 and 20.07.2023, the petitioner preferred several representations putting forth his defense, whereby it was stated that despite unfavorable and adverse weather, ever since the joining of the petitioner, the sales of the unit at Ramnagar had grown ever month. 5.4 That vide order dated 16.08.2023 (Order Impugned-I), the respondent-authorities imposed penalty upon the petitioner, by way of reducing the petitioner’s salary to the extent of 50% with effect from July 2023. 5.5 That being aggrieved of the order dated 16.08.2023, the petitioner further preferred representations dated 17.08.2023 and 22.08.2023 before the respondent-authorities, stating that the grounds adopted for reducing the petitioner’s salary were unfounded as ever since the petitioner’s joining, the sales of the unit had only increased. It was also mentioned therein that despite continuous rainfall, the petitioner secured two orders of 50MR each for PAN Salt and 1kg salt, after price support from GGM(O). Lastly, it is noted that the said representations also challenged the validity of the order impugned dated 16.08.2023. 5.6 That vide order dated 12.09.2023, the representations so preferred by the petitioner were rejected by the respondent-authorities, whereby it was opined that the penalty so imposed was valid as per Rule 23(d) of the Rules of 2018 and the impugned order dated 16.08.2023 would remain in effect until the Ramnagar Unit generated sufficient cash flow to meet out its revenue requirements. 5.7 That subsequent to the rejection of the petitioner’s representation, the Group General Manager (Operations), Sambhar Salts Limited and Hindustan Salts Limited, vide order dated 17.10.2023 (Order Impugned-II), compulsorily retired the petitioner from service with effect from 17.01.2024, in exercise of the powers conferred by Rule 30(B) and 30(C) of the Hindustan Salts Limited/Sambhar Salts Limited CDA Rules 2018 and FR 56 Rules in public interest. 5.8 That subsequently, the petitioner served a legal notice upon the respondents dated 28.10.2023, challenging the order of compulsory retirement. However, no heed was paid to the same. 5.9 That as a result, the petitioner has invoked the extra-ordinary jurisdiction of this Court. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PETITIONER 6. In the foregoing factual matrix, learned Senior Counsel Mr. Mahendra Shah, appearing for the petitioner, has submitted that the orders impugned dated 16.08.2023 and 17.10.2023 are per se illegal and arbitrary, having been passed in blatant ignorance of the settled position of law and also, in violation of the principles of natural justice insofar as no sufficient audience was given to the petitioner prior to the passing of the said orders. 7. Furthermore, learned counsel contended that the order impugned dated 16.08.2023 imposing penalty upon the petitioner under Rule 23(d) of the Rules of 2018 whereby the petitioner’s salary is reduced to the extent of 50% is illegal and arbitrary for the reason that the same has been passed without actually determining the alleged actual loss which is claimed to have been accrued to the respondents. The order impugned was passed without actually determining the quantum of loss, if any. Therefore, the order impugned was passed pre-maturely, purely based on assumptions and for said count alone, the same ought to be quashed and set aside. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner also submitted that an order of compulsory retirement can only be passed after having given due regard to the entire service record of the employee/officer being compulsorily retired. However, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, while passing the order impugned dated 17.10.2023, the respondent authorities failed to take into consideration the APAR’s of the petitioner for the preceding years, which range from being ‘Good’ to ‘Excellent’ sans any adverse entries. Therefore, the order impugned dated 17.10.2023 compulsorily retiring the petitioner is not passed in public interest. Rather, the same is punitive in nature, to avoid the conduct of disciplinary proceedings, which is de hors the settled position of the law. In this regard, learned counsel placed reliance upon the dictum of the Hon’ble Apex Court as enunciated in Captain Pramod Kumar Bajaj vs. Union of India and Anr. reported in 2023 SCC Online SC 234 and Naval Singh vs. State of U.P. and Ors. reported in (1980) 4 SCC 321 . 9. Mr. In this regard, learned counsel placed reliance upon the dictum of the Hon’ble Apex Court as enunciated in Captain Pramod Kumar Bajaj vs. Union of India and Anr. reported in 2023 SCC Online SC 234 and Naval Singh vs. State of U.P. and Ors. reported in (1980) 4 SCC 321 . 9. Mr. Mahendra Shah further stressed that while passing an order under Section 30B of Rules of 2018, the consideration of the entire service record of the employee is a sine qua non. Therefore, as the ACAR of the petitioner for the preceding years is ‘Good’, ‘Very Good’ and ‘Excellent’ and resultantly, the petitioner has also been granted promotion as recently as in October 2020, the order impugned dated 17.10.2023 ought to be quashed and set aside. 10. Accordingly, in summation of the arguments advanced above, learned counsel for the petitioner conclusively argued that neither the petitioner is a dead wood to the respondent-company and nor is he medically unfit to render his duties timely. Merely on hearsay and sans any order passed in any disciplinary proceedings so conducted, the petitioner cannot be voluntarily retired by the respondent-authorities, as per their own whims and fancies. Therefore, it was prayed that the orders impugned have been passed contrary to the settled position of law and also, the provisions of Rule 23(d) of the Rules of 2018, Rule 30(B) and 30(C) of the Hindustan Salts Limited/Sambhar Salts Limited CDA Rules 2018 and Rule 56 of the DOPT Guidelines and as a result, they ought to be quashed and set aside. SUBMISSIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS 11. Per contra, Mr. Anand Sharma, appearing on behalf of the respondents, has raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the instant petition on the ground of territorial jurisdiction and also, the petitioner having approached this Court with unclean hands. In this regard, it is submitted that both the orders impugned were issued from the petitioner’s place of posting i.e. Ramnagar, Uttarakhand. The cause of action also arose in the State of Uttarakhand. Therefore, the instant petition before this Court is not maintainable, as this Court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the said lis. In this regard, it is submitted that both the orders impugned were issued from the petitioner’s place of posting i.e. Ramnagar, Uttarakhand. The cause of action also arose in the State of Uttarakhand. Therefore, the instant petition before this Court is not maintainable, as this Court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the said lis. In support of said preliminary objection, reliance was placed upon the judgments as passed in Oil and Natural Gas Commission vs. Utpal Kumar Basu reported in (1994) 6 SCC 711; State of Rajasthan vs. M/s Swaika Properties reported in (1985) 3 SCC 217 ; Ram Niwas Bera vs. Union of India reported in (2004) RLW 1235; Madan Lal Chouhan vs. FCI and Ors. reported in 1994 (2) RLR 701 and Dr. Anil Shukla vs. NCTE reported in 2018 (1) WLC 583 . 12. In furtherance of the arguments advanced, Mr. Anand Sharma, submitted that in service jurisprudence, the petition can only be challenged at the place of posting. It was further averred that the petition is also not tenable, as the petitioner has approached this Court with unclean hands. In this regard, learned counsel averred that the petitioner has concealed material information, such as that of filing a representation before the competent authority on 28.10.2023 against the order of compulsory retirement, which was disposed of by the respondents, not being challenged further. Learned counsel also submitted that during the period of Covid19, the petitioner failed to attend to his duties, without any prior intimation whatsoever. Accordingly, the petitioner was duly served with show-cause notices dated 30.06.2020, 25.07.2020, 22.08.2020, 05.09.2020 and the said fact has not been brought on record by the petitioner. 13. Learned counsel for the respondents further argued that an advisory-cum-warning was also issued qua the petitioner on 06.08.2020 qua the reimbursement of equipment/machinery at the unit in Nawa. Furthermore, Mr. Anand Sharma argued that in the Years 2022 and 2023, various complaints were received against the petitioner by the Vigilance Department to the effect of trade/involvement with private vendors and as a consequence thereof, the name of the petitioner was under scrutiny of the Central Bureau of Investigation as well. It was further averred that censure penalty was also imposed upon the petitioner on 05.11.2020 for inappropriately releasing funds to the tune of Rs. 88 lacs for the period subsisting between 23.03.2017 to 31.03.2017. 14. Mr. It was further averred that censure penalty was also imposed upon the petitioner on 05.11.2020 for inappropriately releasing funds to the tune of Rs. 88 lacs for the period subsisting between 23.03.2017 to 31.03.2017. 14. Mr. Anand Sharma further argued that Annexure-15 is merely a show-cause notice and it is a settled position of law that compulsory retirement after periodical assessment of the working conduct of the employee, in ‘public interest’, is not a punishment. Hence, the scope of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in matters of such nature, is very limited. The employer has got the right to invoke his power to issue order of compulsory retirement of any of its employee, who falls within the purview of consideration for such compulsory retirement, in case the management thinks it proper for the administration of the Department. The rationale being the innate need to weed out the dead wood, as it is in the public interest to do so, where the service of the public servant is no longer useful for the general administration. The order impugned dated 17.10.2023 is not stigmatic in nature. 15. Therefore, in conclusion, it was argued that considering the age of the petitioner and his performance/service record not being up to the mark, an order of compulsory retirement was passed with full benefits. As a result, the instant petition should be dismissed with costs, as due procedure has duly been followed by the respondents while passing the orders impugned. In support of the arguments advanced above, learned counsel has primarily placed reliance upon the dictum of the Hon’ble Apex Court as enunciated in Baikuntha Nath Das vs. Chief District Medical Officer reported in (1992) 2 SCC 299 and State of Gujarat vs. Ummedbhai M. Patel reported in (2001) 3 SCC 314 . Additionally, reliance was also placed upon State of U.P. vs. Vijay Kumar Jain reported in (2002) 3 SCC 314 , Union of India vs. Col. J.N. Sinha reported in (1970) 2 SCC 458 , S. Ramachandra Raju vs. State of Orissa reported in (1994) Supp. Additionally, reliance was also placed upon State of U.P. vs. Vijay Kumar Jain reported in (2002) 3 SCC 314 , Union of India vs. Col. J.N. Sinha reported in (1970) 2 SCC 458 , S. Ramachandra Raju vs. State of Orissa reported in (1994) Supp. 3 SCC 424, K. Kandaswamy vs. Union of India reported in (1995) 6 SCC 162 , H.G. Venkatachalliah vs. Union of India reported in (1997) 11 SCC 366 , Union of India vs. Ram Lochan Ram reported in (2002) 8 JT SC 295 and Jugal Chandra Sankhla vs. State of Orissa reported in (2003) 4 SCC 59 . DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS 16. Heard the arguments advanced by learned counsel for both the sides, scanned the record of the petition and perused through the judgments cited at Bar. 17. At this nascent stage of consideration of the arguments recorded herein-above, this Court deems it appropriate to bifurcate its findings into two distinct parts, wherein the relevance of the latter, shall be subject to the findings arrived at in the former. In essence, Part A of the findings shall adjudicate upon the preliminary objection so raised by the counsel for the respondents regarding the maintainability of the instant petition, on the ground of territorial jurisdiction amongst others. If the said objection is found to be worthy and maintainable, Part B i.e. findings on merits, shall not be warranted. Whereas, if the preliminary objections so raised are not countenanced, then Part B of would record findings qua the arguments advanced, on merits. Part A: On the Preliminary Objection(s) raised by the Respondents 18. On the aspect of this Court’s purported lack of jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the lis before this Court, learned counsel for the respondents argued that both the orders impugned dated 16.08.2023 and 17.10.2023 were issued from the petitioner’s place of posting i.e. Ramnagar, Uttarakhand and therefore, the cause of action also arose in the State of Uttarakhand, which inadvertently precludes the initiation of the present proceedings within the territorial realms of the State of Rajasthan. 19. However, upon an assiduous scrutiny of the orders impugned and also, the structure of administration within the respondent-Department, this Court cannot countenance the arguments advanced by the respondents regarding the lack of territorial jurisdiction to preside over the lis before this Court. 20. 19. However, upon an assiduous scrutiny of the orders impugned and also, the structure of administration within the respondent-Department, this Court cannot countenance the arguments advanced by the respondents regarding the lack of territorial jurisdiction to preside over the lis before this Court. 20. It is noted that though the orders impugned dated 16.08.2023 and 17.10.2023 (marked as Annexures 15 and 18 respectively) were issued at Ramnagar in Uttarakhand; the bare perusal of the same, would reflect that the approval of the impugned actions has been granted by the final competent authority i.e. Managing Director, who is situated at Jaipur. Therefore, the final cause of action, essentially arose at Jaipur. 21. In essence, the brain, control and decision making prowess qua the impugned action of compulsory retirement lay with the ‘competent authority’, which happens to be the Managing Director of the respondents, whose office is situated at Jaipur, falling within the realms of the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. 22. The issuing authority, though placed at Uttarakhand, merely acted as a ‘communicator’ of the impugned decision qua the reduction of the petitioner’s salary and his consequent compulsory retirement, which was essentially arrived at by the approval of the Managing Director, who is the ‘competent authority’ placed at Jaipur, Rajasthan. Moreover, the service of the copy of the orders impugned dated 16.08.2023 and 17.10.2023 was also effectuated upon the petitioner within the State of Rajasthan. 23. Therefore, upon a cumulative consideration of the foregoing observations, this Court deems it appropriate to strike down the preliminary objection raised by the respondents regarding the maintainability of the instant petition on the ground of territorial jurisdiction. The reliance placed by the counsel for the respondents upon the dictum of the Hon’ble Apex Court as well this Court, as noted in Utpal Kumar Basu (Supra), M/s Swaika Properties (Supra), Ram Niwas Bera (Supra), Madan Lal Chouhan (Supra) and Dr. Anil Shukla (Supra) is misplaced for the reason that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the actual decision as voiced and communicated by the orders impugned dated 16.08.2023 and 17.10.2023, was arrived at by the ‘competent authority’ as is reflected vide Annexures 15 and 18 respectively, which happens to be the Managing Director holding office at Jaipur, Rajasthan. Therefore, being on different facts, the judgments noted above, are distinguished. 24. Therefore, being on different facts, the judgments noted above, are distinguished. 24. Learned counsel for the respondents further raised a secondary objection regarding the maintainability of the instant petition on the ground that the petitioner has purportedly approached this Court with unclean hands. In this regard, learned counsel had submitted that the petitioner had concealed material information, such as that of filing a representation before the competent authority on 28.10.2023 against the order of compulsory retirement, which was disposed of by the respondents, not being challenged further. Learned counsel also submitted that during the period of Covid19, the petitioner had failed to attend to his duties, without any prior intimation whatsoever. Accordingly, the petitioner was duly served with show-cause notices dated 30.06.2020, 25.07.2020, 22.08.2020, 05.09.2020 and the said fact has not been brought on record by the petitioner. Another purported concealment, as voiced by the respondents, pertained to the petitioner having been served with an advisory-cum-warning on 06.08.2020 qua the reimbursement of equipment/machinery at the unit in Nawa. 25. However, the foregoing secondary preliminary objection, ought to be struck down as well, being entirely contrary to the record placed before the Court. In this regard, it is noted that the petitioner, by way his pleadings and also the corresponding Annexure 19, has duly disclosed the fact of having served a legal notice upon the respondents dated 28.10.2023. Furthermore, the argument pertaining to the concealment of the show cause notices dated 30.06.2020, 25.07.2020, 22.08.2020, 05.09.2020 loses all relevancy, especially looking to the fact that the record before this Court, duly reflects that the respondents themselves, of their own volition and application of mind, granted promotion to the petitioner in October 2020, as is reflected vide order dated 26.10.2020 (marked as Annexure-8), whereby the petitioner was designated with the portfolio of the Chief Manager (Marketing). 26. Hence, the purported concealment of show-cause notices is negated in-toto by the very fact of grant of promotion to the petitioner, subsequent to the issuance of said show cause notices, by the respondent-Department itself, of its own volition and application of mind. Accordingly, the secondary preliminary objection regarding the petitioner having approached this Court with unclean hands is also struck down by this Court. 27. Resultantly, the instant petition is maintainable before this Court for final adjudication on merits. PART B : On merits 28. Accordingly, the secondary preliminary objection regarding the petitioner having approached this Court with unclean hands is also struck down by this Court. 27. Resultantly, the instant petition is maintainable before this Court for final adjudication on merits. PART B : On merits 28. Prior to the discussion on merits qua the legality and/or illegality of the orders impugned dated 16.08.2023 and 17.10.2023, this Court deems it appropriate to take note of the relevant and/or applicable Rules and provisions, in exercise of which, the orders impugned have been passed by the respondent- Department. They are noted herein-under:- Rule 23- PENALTIES The following penalties may be imposed, on an employee, as hereinafter provided, for misconduct committed by the employee or for any other good and sufficient reasons. Minor Penalties a) Censure; b) withholding of increments of pay without cumulative effect; c) withholding of promotion; d) recovery from pay of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to the Company by negligence or breach of order; e) reduction to a lower stage in the time-scale of pay by one state for a period not exceeding 3 years, without cumulative effect and not adversely affecting his/her terminal benefits. Major Penalties f) save as provided in clause (e), reduction to a lower stage in the time scale of pay for a specified period, with further directions as to whether or not the employee will earn increments of pay during the period of such reduction and whether on expiry of such period, the reduction will or will not have the effect of postponing the future increment of pay; g) reduction to a lower time scale of pay, grade, post or Service which shall ordinarily be a bar to the promotion of the employee to the time scale of pay, grade, post from which employee reduced, with or without further directions regarding conditions of restoration to the grade or post from which the employee was reduced and his/her seniority and pay on such restoration to that grade or post; h) compulsory retirement; i) removal from service which shall not be a disqualification for future employment under the Govt. Or the CPSE owned or controlled by the Govt.; j) Dismissal from service which shall ordinarily be a disqualification for future employment under the Govt. Or the CPSE owned or controlled by the Govt.; j) Dismissal from service which shall ordinarily be a disqualification for future employment under the Govt. Or the CPSE owned or controlled by the Govt.; Provided that, in every case in which the charge of possession of assets disproportionate to known sources of income or the charge of acceptance from any person of any gratification, other than legal remuneration, as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act is established, the penalty mentioned in clause (i) or (j) shall be imposed: Provided further that, in an exceptional case and for special reasons to be recorded in writing, any other penalty may be imposed. Rule 25 – Procedure for imposing Major Penalties 1. No order imposing any of the major penalties specified in Clauses (f) to (j) of Rule 23 shall be made except after an inquiry is held in accordance with this rule. 2. Whenever the disciplinary authority is of the opinion that there are grounds for inquiring into the truth of any imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour against an employee, it may itself enquire into, or appoint any inquiring authority to inquire into the truth thereof. Provided that where there is a complaint of sexual harassment within the meaning of Rule 4 (3) above, such complaints should be dealt with in accordance with the Sexual harassment of women at workplace (Prevention, Prohibition & Redressal) Act, 2013 and rules made there under and any amendment thereof. EXPLANATION- Where the disciplinary authority itself holds the inquiry, the inquiring authority shall be construed as a reference to the disciplinary authority. 3. Where it is proposed to hold an inquiry, the disciplinary authority shall deliver or cause to be delivered to the employee a copy of the articles of charge, the statement of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour and a list of documents and witnesses by which each article or charges is proposed to be sustained. 3. Where it is proposed to hold an inquiry, the disciplinary authority shall deliver or cause to be delivered to the employee a copy of the articles of charge, the statement of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour and a list of documents and witnesses by which each article or charges is proposed to be sustained. On receipt of the articles of charge, the employee shall be required to submit his/her written statement of defence, if employee so desires, and also state whether employee desires to be heard in person, within a period of fifteen days, which may be further extended for a period not exceeding fifteen days at a time for reasons to e recorded in writing by the Disciplinary Authority or any other Authority authorized by the Disciplinary Authority on his/her behalf: 15. The inquiring Authority may, after the charged sheeted employee closes his/her case, and shall, if the employee has not examined himself/herself, generally question the charged sheeted employee on the circumstances appearing against the charged sheeted employee in the evidence for the purpose of enabling the charged sheeted employee to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him/her. 16. After the completion of the production of the evidence, the charged sheeted employee and the Presenting Officer may file written briefs of their respective cases within 15 days of the date of completion of the production of evidence. 18. Whenever any inquiring authority, after having heard and recorded the whole or any part of the evidence in an inquiry ceases to exercise jurisdiction therein, and is succeeded, by another inquiring authority which has, and which exercises, such jurisdiction, the inquiring authority so succeeding may act on the evidence so recorded by its predecessor, or partly recorded by its predecessor and partly recorded by itself. Provided that if the succeeding inquiring authority is of the opinion that further examination of any of the witnesses whose evidence has already been recorded is necessary in the interest of justice, it may recall examine; cross-examine and re-examine any such witnesses as herein before provided. Provided that if the succeeding inquiring authority is of the opinion that further examination of any of the witnesses whose evidence has already been recorded is necessary in the interest of justice, it may recall examine; cross-examine and re-examine any such witnesses as herein before provided. 19 (i) After the conclusion of the inquiry report shall be prepared and it shall contain- a. a gist of the articles of charge and the statement of the imputations of misconduct or misbehavior; b. a gist of the defence of the charged sheeted employee in respect of each article of charge: c. and assessment of the evidence in respect of each article of charge; d. The findings on each article of charge and the reasons therefor. Explanation- If in the opinion of the inquiring authority the proceedings of the inquiry establish any article of charge different from the original articles of the charge, it may record its findings on such article of charge. Provided that the findings on such article of charge shall not be recorded unless the charged sheeted employee has either admitted the facts on which such article of charge is based or has had a reasonable opportunity of defending oneself against such article of charge. ii. The inquiring authority, where it is not itself the disciplinary authority, shall forward to the disciplinary authority the records of inquiry which shall include- a) the report of the inquiry prepared by it under sub-clause (i) above: b) The written statement of defence if any submitted by the employee referred to in sub-rule (13) c) The oral and documentary evidence produced in the course of the inquiry; d) Written briefs referred in sub-rule (16) if any, and e) The orders if any made by the disciplinary authority and the inquiring authority in regard to the inquiry 20 (a) The Inquiry Authority should concluded the inquiry and submit his/her report within a period of six months from the date of receipt of order of his/her appointment as Inquiring Authority. Rule 30-B: Scheme/Procedure for Premature Retirement of Employee With a view to weed out the inefficient corrupt and medically unfit officials of the company, and employee who has attained the age of 50 years and is considered to be medically unfit, inefficient or of doubtful integrity may be prematurely retired by the competent authority. Rule 30-B: Scheme/Procedure for Premature Retirement of Employee With a view to weed out the inefficient corrupt and medically unfit officials of the company, and employee who has attained the age of 50 years and is considered to be medically unfit, inefficient or of doubtful integrity may be prematurely retired by the competent authority. The criteria for judging the medical unfitness, inefficiency or doubtful integrity of employee proposed to be prematurely retired, follow:- (i) Inefficiency Inefficiency would be evaluated on the basis of the ACR/Annual performance Reports. An employee, who has secured consecutively "Poor" for three years in his Appraisal Reports, may be deemed as a fit case for premature retirement. (ii) Doubtful Integrity An employee who gets an adverse comment consecutively for three years on his integrity would be recommended for premature retirement. (iii) Medical Unfitness A. If an employee has been continuously on leave on medical grounds for a period of 12 weeks (including Sunday6 and holidays) or he has been on leave for reasons of sickness for a total period of 120 days including Sundays or if a person through attending duties but is found to be mentally deranged, his departmental head may refer him to a medical board for its thorough medical check-up and report. The disease, he is suffering from whether it is curable or incurable, whether the disease is infectous/contagious. In case of curable disease whether the person is likely to be fit to resume his normal duties within a period of 12 months. B. If the person is not fit to resume his duties within a period of 12 months and in cases of employees suffering from curable and infectious/contagious diseases or suffering from lunacy or mental derangement and whose services cannot be utilise by the company or whose attendance is likely to pose health hazard to others as may be certified by the Medical Board, premature retirement will be considered by the Competent Authority on recommendations of controlling officer. C. This premature retirement on medical grounds is independent of and without prejudice to the right of the company under the contract of employment to dispense with service of an employee as per prevalence service rules of the company. The Competent Authority for premature retirement shall be the concerned Disciplinary Authority. Rule 30 C; Periodical Review of Employees Performance for Ascertaining Efficacy and Action thereof As per OM No.25013/1/2013-Estt. The Competent Authority for premature retirement shall be the concerned Disciplinary Authority. Rule 30 C; Periodical Review of Employees Performance for Ascertaining Efficacy and Action thereof As per OM No.25013/1/2013-Estt. (A) dated 21st March, 2014 the company has adopted periodical review of performance of employees with a view to ascertain whether an employee should be retained in service or retired from service in the public interest. The provision in this regards are contained in FR 56(j), FR 56 (l) which is adopted by the company and details of the policy & procedure is mentioned herein below; The appropriate authority has the absolute right to retire an employee, if it if necessary to do so in public interest, an employee of company under FR 56 (j) FR (l). FR 56 Category FR 56 (j) Group 'A & B' officers; Who entered service before 35 years of age and have attained 50 years of age Other cases; Attained 55 years of age FR 56 (l) An employee in Group 'C' post, can also be retired after he has completed 30 years service. Notice 3 months or 3 months' pay allowances in lieu thereof 2. The cases of employees covered by FR 56 (j), 56 (l), shall be reviewed six months before he/she attains the age of 50/55 years, in case covered by FR 56 (j) and on completion of 30 years of qualifying service under FR 56 (l). Time Schedule for review is as under: Sl. No. Quarter in which review is to be made Cases of employees who will be attaining the age of 50/55 years of service, in the quarter indicated below to be reviewed 1. January to March July to September of the same year 2. April to June October to December of the same year 3. July to September January to March of the next year 4. October to December April to June of the next year A register of employees who are due to attain the age of 50/56 years or complete 30 years of service to be maintained. The register shall be scrutinized at the beginning of every quarter by a senior officer. 3. Committee shall be constituted, to which all such cases, shall be referred for review and recommendation as to whether the officer concerned should be retained in service or retired from service in the public interest. The register shall be scrutinized at the beginning of every quarter by a senior officer. 3. Committee shall be constituted, to which all such cases, shall be referred for review and recommendation as to whether the officer concerned should be retained in service or retired from service in the public interest. The committee shall submit its recommendation to the appropriate authority for his decision in the matter. FR 56 (l) Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (I), the Appropriate Authority shall, if it is of the opinion that it is in the public interest to do so, have the absolute right to retire a government servant in Group C service or post who is not governed by any pension rules, after he has completed 30 years of service by giving him notice of not less than three months in writing or three months pay and allowances in lieu of such notice.” 29. Upon a perusal of the order dated 16.08.2023 i.e. Order Impugned-I and the consequent order dated 12.09.2023 (marked as Annexure-17), whereby the representation preferred by the petitioner against the Order Impugned-I was rejected, it is noted that the same has been passed in a cursory manner, being largely non-speaking in nature, passed without paying due heed to the service record of the petitioner. The orders impugned dated 16.08.2023 and the 12.09.2023, whereby a penalty was imposed upon the petitioner by way of reducing the petitioner’s salary to the extent of 50%, is ill-founded for the following reasons, namely:- 29.1. That the order dated 17.05.2023, as issued by the Group General Manager (Operations) of the respondent-Department, which informed the petitioner regarding his poor performance on account of which the penalty of salary reduction was sought to be imposed vide order impugned dated 16.08.2023, was factually incorrect insofar as it stated that the petitioner having rendered services for more than 6 months, was unable to generate good business. As per the record, it is noted that the outgoing officer, whose charge the petitioner assumed, was transferred in December 2022, whereas the petitioner only joined in February 2023. Even in the said subsisting period, the petitioner was absent for some time, albeit with due authority, on account of his recent transfer. As per the record, it is noted that the outgoing officer, whose charge the petitioner assumed, was transferred in December 2022, whereas the petitioner only joined in February 2023. Even in the said subsisting period, the petitioner was absent for some time, albeit with due authority, on account of his recent transfer. 29.2 That the order impugned dated 16.08.2023 citing loss of business and inefficiency on part of the petitioner is also factually unfounded as ever since the joining of the petitioner at the Ramnagar Unit in February 2023, the sales of the said unit only grew exponentially every month, despite persistent rains and unfavorable weather. Moreover, in the said period of service between February 2023 to August 2023, the petitioner even secured two direct orders of 50 MT each for Pan Salt and 1 kg packet salt, after price support by GGM(O). The service record of the petitioner, enhancing the performance of the unit at Ramnagar can be also seen vide Annexure-16. 29.3 That the order impugned dated 12.09.2023, whereby the representation preferred by the petitioner against the order impugned dated 16.08.2023 was rejected is also noted to have been passed in a cursory manner, being non-speaking in nature. No express consideration has been paid to the arguments advanced by the petitioner regarding the growing business of the Ramnagar Unit, pursuant to his joining at the said Unit in February 2023. 30. Upon a further perusal of the record, the following germane stipulations, necessary for adjudicating the lis before this Court have emerged, namely:- 30.1 That the petitioner was offered appointment at the respondent-Department in the Year 2011. 30.2 That during the course of his tenure, looking to the service record of the petitioner, the petitioner was promoted on more instances than one i.e. vide orders dated 29.03.2016 and 26.10.2020 and also, conferred with several additional charges/portfolios, across different spheres including production, business development, stores and research and development. In this regard, reference can be made to Paragraph 5 of the factual matrix noted above. 30.3 That the Annual Performance Assessment Reports (APARs) of the petitioner for the subsisting period between 2013-2014 to 2020-2021 have been assessed as either ‘Good’, ‘Very Good’ or ‘Excellent’. In this regard, reference can be made to Paragraph 5 of the factual matrix noted above. 30.3 That the Annual Performance Assessment Reports (APARs) of the petitioner for the subsisting period between 2013-2014 to 2020-2021 have been assessed as either ‘Good’, ‘Very Good’ or ‘Excellent’. 30.4 That for the work undertaken by the petitioner at Nawa Salt Refinery, the petitioner was even granted an appreciation certificate by Sambhar Salt Limited for producing 251.300 Metric Ton of Salt in one single day. 30.5 That even despite the issuance of the show-cause notices dated 30.06.2020, 25.07.2020, 22.08.2020, 05.09.2020 upon the petitioner in the Year 2020 for not attending office during the period of Covid19, which have not been adjudicated upon till date, the petitioner’s ACAR for the Year 2020-2021 has been described as ‘Very Good’, as is reflected at Page No. 89 (Annexure-11). 30.6 That despite the serving of the show cause notices in the Year 2020 dated 30.06.2020, 25.07.2020, 22.08.2020, 05.09.2020 upon the petitioner in the Year 2020, which have not been adjudicated upon till date, the petitioner was promoted as Chief Manager (Marketing) on 26.10.2020, of the respondent’s own will and volition. 30.7 That the aforesaid pattern reflects that despite the petitioner being served with show-cause notices in the Year 2020, the same have not been adjudicated upon till date and rather, in the meanwhile, the respondents themselves have granted promotion to the petitioner in October 2020 i.e. immediately pursuant to the issuance of the show cause notice dated 05.09.2020 and also, marked his ACAR for the Year 2020-2021 as ‘Very Good’. 30.8 That the foregoing actions of the respondents reflect that the approach adopted by the respondents is self-contradictory. On the one hand, the respondents have argued that the for the period subsisting between the Year 2020-2021, the petitioner’s service was inefficient on account of his continued absence; whereas, on the other hand, the respondents of their own volition have also granted him promotion during the same very period, whilst also marking his APAR as ‘Very Good’. 30.9 It is also glaring that the show cause notices so issued in the said period i.e. notices dated 30.06.2020, 25.07.2020, 22.08.2020, 05.09.2020 are not adjudicated upon by the respondents till date. 31. 30.9 It is also glaring that the show cause notices so issued in the said period i.e. notices dated 30.06.2020, 25.07.2020, 22.08.2020, 05.09.2020 are not adjudicated upon by the respondents till date. 31. Having taken note of the foregoing stipulations, this Court deems it appropriate to note that the order dated 17.10.2023 (Order Impugned-II), whereby the petitioner was compulsorily retired is also ill founded and bad in the eyes of the law, for the following reasons, as noted herein-under:- 31.1 That the impugned order dated 17.10.2023, marked as Annexure-18, whereby the petitioner was compulsorily retired, is a ‘major penalty’ as per Rule 23(h) of the Rules of 2018. 31.2 That for imposing ‘major penalty’, the detailed procedure in respect of imposing of ‘major penalty’ is required to be followed in letter and spirit, whereby the holding of a departmental inquiry as provided under Rule 31 of the Rules of 2018 assumes paramountcy. The said Rule deals with the aspect of conduct of disciplinary proceedings. 31.3 That as per the Rules of 2018, compulsory retirement can only be ordered in three contingencies, namely inefficiency, doubtful integrity and medical grounds. 31.4 That Rule 30B(i) ascertains the eventualities which may permit the categorization of an employee’s service as insufficient. It is noted that the Rules provide for inefficiency to be evaluated on the basis of the APARs of an employee. An employee, who would have secured ‘Poor’ for three consecutive years in his APARs, would be deemed to be inefficient, thereby being eligible for premature/compulsory retirement. 31.5 That Rule 30B(ii) ascertains the eventualities which may permit the categorization of an employee’s service as that lacking integrity. It is noted that the Rules provide that an employee’s service shall be of a doubtful integrity when the said employee would have received adverse comments in his APARs for three consecutive years regarding his integrity. 31.6 That in the facts and circumstances of the case and upon a perusal of the petitioner’s APARs, marked as Annexure-11, it is noted that qua the petitioner, there is no assessment to the effect that would render his integrity doubtful, as no consecutive three APARs have reflected adverse comments against the petitioner. Therefore, the petitioner’s compulsory retirement, on the ground of doubtful integrity, is automatically de hors the provisions of Rule 30B(ii). Therefore, the petitioner’s compulsory retirement, on the ground of doubtful integrity, is automatically de hors the provisions of Rule 30B(ii). 31.7 That in the facts and circumstances of the case and upon a further perusal of the petitioner’s APARs, marked as Annexure-11, it is noted that the APARs of the petitioner for the subsisting period between 2013-2014 to 2020-2021 have been assessed as either ‘Good’, ‘Very Good’ or ‘Excellent’. Contrary to the requirement to assess inefficiency as imposed by Rule 30B(i) of the APARs being ‘Poor’ for three consecutive years, the petitioner throughout his service, has never even secured one ‘Poor’ remark in his assessment reports. Therefore, the petitioner’s compulsory retirement, on the ground of inefficiency, is also automatically de hors the provisions of Rule 30B(i). 31.8 That the order of compulsory retirement gets further nullified by the fact that in the absence of inefficiency and doubtful integrity, for the work undertaken by the petitioner at Nawa Salt Refinery, the petitioner was even granted an appreciation certificate by Sambhar Salt Limited for producing 251.300 Metric Ton of Salt in one single day. The said certificate is marked as Annexure-10. 32. At this juncture, this Court deems it appropriate to note that the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the respondents, in justification of the order of compulsory retirement, to the effect that the petitioner was purportedly involved in and/or dealt with private vendors during his posting at Nawa Salt Refinery, cannot be countenanced as well. The rationale being that the order of compulsory retirement is not stigmatic in nature. If the respondents were notified of certain allegations against the petitioner, then in such an eventuality, the respondents ought to have conducted a disciplinary enquiry, by the procedure established in law, and thereafter, arrived at the appropriate findings. However, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the respondents did not take the route of conducting disciplinary proceedings. Rather, they merely served a show cause notice upon the petitioner dated 16.08.2022, which was duly answered by the petitioner. However, no adjudication qua the same has been done by the respondents till date. Rather, the record suggests that in order to bypass the long drawn and elaborate process of conducting due enquiry and disciplinary proceedings, the respondents took the ‘short-cut’ and compulsorily retired the petitioner from service, which is de hors the established position of law. However, no adjudication qua the same has been done by the respondents till date. Rather, the record suggests that in order to bypass the long drawn and elaborate process of conducting due enquiry and disciplinary proceedings, the respondents took the ‘short-cut’ and compulsorily retired the petitioner from service, which is de hors the established position of law. An order of compulsory retirement cannot be stigmatic in nature and neither can it be punitive in its form. 33. In this regard, reliance can be placed upon the dictum of the Hon’ble Apex Court as enunciated in Captain Pramod Kumar Bajaj (Supra), wherein it was held as under:- “37. Having regard to the fact that the respondents did not take the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the appellant to its logical conclusion and instead issued an order compulsorily retiring him, this Court does not deem it expedient to delve into the allegations levelled in the said Charge Memorandum; all the same, we have cursorily gone through the Charge Memorandum that mentions three charges - one alleging that the appellant failed to seek permission from the department to purchase a flat in relation to the matrimonial dispute between him and his estranged wife and the second one is in respect of the allegation of bigamy levelled against him by his estranged wife. We have already noted earlier that during the course of the matrimonial dispute, the parties had arrived at a settlement and the flat that was agreed to be given to the wife, was not purchased by the appellant but by his brother, which fact is amply borne out from the documents placed on record. The matrimonial dispute between the parties stood closed on a decree of divorce being granted on the basis of mutual consent. That the respondents were also cognizant of the said fact, is apparent from the contents of O.M. dated 15th July, 2015 which records inter alia that the said allegations levelled by the wife had not been established. The third charge was relating to the appellant having attended Court hearings without sanctioned leave. 39. De hors the aforesaid allegations of institutional bias and malice, having perused the material placed on record, we find merit in the other grounds taken by the appellant. The third charge was relating to the appellant having attended Court hearings without sanctioned leave. 39. De hors the aforesaid allegations of institutional bias and malice, having perused the material placed on record, we find merit in the other grounds taken by the appellant. It is noticed that though FR 56(j) contemplates that the respondents have an absolute right to retire a government servant in public interest and such an order could have been passed against the appellant any time after he had attained the age of fifty years, the respondents did not take any such decision till the very fag end of his career. The impugned order of compulsory retirement was passed in this case on 27th September, 2019 whereas the appellant was to superannuate in ordinary course in January, 2020. There appears an apparent contradiction in the approach of the respondents who had till as late as in July, 2019 continued to grade the appellant as `Outstanding' and had assessed his integrity as `Beyond doubt'. But in less than three months reckoned therefrom, the respondents had turned turtle to arrive at the conclusion that he deserved to be compulsorily retired. If the appellant was worthy of being continued in service for little short of a decade after he had attained the age of 50 years and of being granted an overall grade of 9 on the scale of 1 - 10 on 31st July, 2019 it has not been shown as to what had transpired thereafter that made the respondents resort to FR 56(j) and invoke the public interest doctrine to compulsorily retire him with just three months of service left for his retirement, in routine. In such a case, this Court is inclined to pierce the smoke screen and on doing so, we are of the firm view that the order of compulsory retirement in the given facts and circumstances of the case cannot be sustained. The said order is punitive in nature and was passed to short-circuit the disciplinary proceedings pending against the appellant and ensure his immediate removal. The impugned order passed by the respondents does not pass muster as it fails to satisfy the underlying test of serving the interest of the public.” 34. The said order is punitive in nature and was passed to short-circuit the disciplinary proceedings pending against the appellant and ensure his immediate removal. The impugned order passed by the respondents does not pass muster as it fails to satisfy the underlying test of serving the interest of the public.” 34. In furtherance of the observations noted herein-above, it goes without saying that in the facts and circumstances of the case, when the APARs of the petitioner have been ‘Good’, ‘Very Good’ and ‘Excellent’ and no adverse remarks have been included therein regarding his integrity, then in no manner whatsoever, can his compulsory retirement be in the ‘public interest’. No documents have been relied upon by the respondents to exhibit doubtful integrity of the petitioner. Rather, mere assertions have been made regarding the lodging of complaints against the petitioner when he was posted at Nawa Salt Refinery. Moreover, even the show cause notice dated 16.08.2022 qua said allegations, has not been adjudicated upon by the respondents, by conducting disciplinary proceedings, till date. Therefore, on mere whims and fancies of the respondents, the petitioner cannot be compulsorily retired, under the garb of such action being in the ‘public interest’. This Court, whilst exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, ought to pierce the veil of ‘public interest’, as adopted by the respondents, to circumvent the administration of detailed disciplinary proceedings, if warranted at their end. 35. In support of the findings recorded herein-above, reliance can be placed upon the dictum of the Hon’ble Apex Court as enunciated in Baldev Singh Chadda vs. Union of India and Ors. reported in (1980) 4 SCC 321 . The relevant extract is reproduced herein-under:- “8. The Administration, to be competent, must have servants who are not plagued by uncertainty about tomorrow. At the age of 50 when you have family responsibility and the sombre problems of one's own life's evening, your experience, accomplishments and fullness of fitness become an asset to the Administration, if and only if you are not harried or worried by 'what will happen to me and my family?' 'Where will I go if cashiered? 'How will. At the age of 50 when you have family responsibility and the sombre problems of one's own life's evening, your experience, accomplishments and fullness of fitness become an asset to the Administration, if and only if you are not harried or worried by 'what will happen to me and my family?' 'Where will I go if cashiered? 'How will. I survive when I am too old to be newly employed and too young to be superannuated?' These considerations become all the more important in departments where functional independence, fearless scrutiny, and freedom to expose evil or error in high places is the task. And the Ombudsmanic tasks of the office of audit vested" in the C & AG and the entire army of monitors and minions under him are too strategic for the nation's financial health and discipline that immunity from subtle threats and oblique overawing is very much in public interest. So it is that we must emphatically state that under the guise of 'public interest' if unlimited discretion is regarded acceptable for making an order of premature retirement, it will be the surest menace to public interest and must fail for unreasonableness, arbitrariness and disguised dismissal. To constitutionalise the rule, we must so read it as to free it from the potential for the mischiefs we have just projected. The exercise of power must be bona fide and promote public interest. There is no demonstrable ground to infer mala fides here and the only infirmity alleged which deserves serious notice is as to whether the order has been made in public interest. When an order is challenged and its validity depends on its being supported by public interest the State must disclose the material so that the court may be satisfied that the order is not bad for want of any material whatever which, to a reasonable man reasonably instructed in the law, is sufficient to sustain the grounds of 'public interest' justifying forced retirement of the public servant. Judges cannot substitute their judgment for that of the Administrator but they are not absolved from the minimal review well-settled in administrative law and founded on constitutional obligations. Judges cannot substitute their judgment for that of the Administrator but they are not absolved from the minimal review well-settled in administrative law and founded on constitutional obligations. The limitations on judicial power in this area are well-known and we are confined to an examination of the material merely to see whether a rational mind may conceivably be satisfied that the compulsory retirement of the officer concerned is necessary in public interest.” 36. In Ummedbhai M. Patel (Supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court has settled the law relating to compulsory retirement. The relevant principles enunciated therein are reproduced below:- “11. The law relating to compulsory retirement has now crystallized into definite principles, which could be broadly summarized thus: (i) Whenever the services of a public servant are no longer useful to the general administration, the officer can be compulsorily retired for the sake of public interest. (ii) Ordinarily, the order of compulsory retirement is not to be treated as a punishment coming under Article 311 of the Constitution. (iii) For better administration, it is necessary to chop off dead-wood, but the order of compulsory retirement can be passed after having due regard to the entire service record of the officer. (iv) Any adverse entries made in the confidential record shall be taken note of and be given due weightage in passing such order. (v) Even uncommunicated entries in the confidential record can also be taken into consideration. (vi) The order of compulsory retirement shall not be passed as a short cut to avoid departmental enquiry when such course is more desirable. (vii) If the officer was given a promotion despite adverse entries made in the confidential record, that is a fact in favour of the officer. (viii) Compulsory retirement shall not be imposed as a punitive measure.” 37. Placing reliance upon the aforesaid, it is noted that the law on the aspect of compulsory retirement is settled, insofar as an order of compulsory retirement can be examined by a Court on the issue that whether the material relied upon by the competent authority was sufficient to sustain the ground of ‘public interest’ for compulsory retirement of an employee. Placing reliance upon the aforesaid, it is noted that the law on the aspect of compulsory retirement is settled, insofar as an order of compulsory retirement can be examined by a Court on the issue that whether the material relied upon by the competent authority was sufficient to sustain the ground of ‘public interest’ for compulsory retirement of an employee. The question that begs an answer before this Court is that if the applicant was promoted on the subsequent higher posts i.e. in October 2020 and his APARs for the preceding years have been consistently ‘Good’, ‘Very Good’ and ‘Excellent’, then for what reasons, the petitioner suddenly lost complete utility to the respondents and was compulsorily retired from service, by the virtue of his services being no longer in public interest. However, following suit qua the assertion of mere allegations without subsistence, duly exhibited by documents, the respondents have failed to satisfy the Court as to how the petitioner lost utility at the end of the respondents, all at once. 38. The Hon’ble Apex Court, in J.N. Sinha (Supra) has also expounded on the law on compulsory retirement and has held that an order of compulsory retirement can only be passed after having due regard to the entire service record of the employee. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, as is noted above, it can certainly be discerned that the said consideration of the petitioner’s service record has escaped the attention of the respondents. The judgment’s as relied upon by the counsel for the respondents are also distinguished on the mere ground that in the factual matrix of the instant petition, the respondents have acted de hors the Rules of 2018, as noted above. Hence, the impugned actions being contrary to the statutory rules, are worthy to be struck down. CONCLUSIVE REMARKS 39. Therefore, in light of the aforesaid, it can be determinatively inferred that neither is the petitioner a dead wood to the respondent-Company/Department and nor is he medically unfit to render his duties timely. Merely on hearsay and sans any order passed in any disciplinary proceedings so conducted, the petitioner cannot be voluntarily retired by the respondent-authorities, as per their own whims and fancies. Merely on hearsay and sans any order passed in any disciplinary proceedings so conducted, the petitioner cannot be voluntarily retired by the respondent-authorities, as per their own whims and fancies. Taking note of the fact that the order impugned-II dated 17.10.2023 was passed shortly after the issuance of the order impugned-I dated 16.08.2023, it can be inferred that the former is passed being punitive in nature, without having conducted any disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner. It is settled law that an order of compulsory retirement cannot be stigmatic in nature and neither can it be punitive in its form. 40. The action of compulsory retirement is an affirmative action, not a negative disposition; a positive conclusion, not a neutral attitude. 41. Accordingly, upon a cumulative consideration of the foregoing observations, this Court deems it appropriate to quash and set aside the orders impugned dated 16.08.2023 and 17.10.2023 and consequently, allow the instant petition in terms of the prayers so advanced. 42. As a result, the instant petition is allowed. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.