ORDER : 1. The present criminal revision has been filed against the judgment dated 30.09.2003 passed by the Principal Judge, Family Court, Dumka in Crl. Misc. No. 70 of 2002 [T.R. No. 5 of 2003 (F.C.) whereby the application filed by the petitioner under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 was dismissed. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner being legally wedded wife of the opposite party no. 2, had filed an application under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. for issuance of direction upon the opposite party no. 2, who was in service of Border Security Force to pay her maintenance of Rs.3,000/- per month. The marriage of the petitioner was solemnized with the opposite party no. 2 on 22nd April, 1986 in accordance with Hindu rites and rituals. After the marriage, the petitioner was brought to the house of the opposite party no. 2, but she was always subjected to torture by the opposite party no. 2 and his parents. She was harassed and assaulted as well as denied proper food and clothing. Therefore, she filed a case under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code against her in-laws and the husband (the opposite party no. 2) which was pending for disposal in a Court at Dumka. Further, on 04.09.2001, in absence of the opposite party no. 2, the father-in-law and mother-in-law of the petitioner forcibly ousted her from the matrimonial home alleging her a witch as she was incapable of bearing a child. Thereafter, the petitioner came to her father's home and since then she is living there and her husband or in-laws never came to take her back. The petitioner claimed that her father was a poor old man who had a big family to maintain and whose only source of income was some agricultural lands. As such, he was unable to maintain her. The petitioner had also no means to maintain herself. On 05.10.2002, the petitioner went to her in-laws house for demanding maintenance, but her in-laws refused to give anything to her. 3. The application of the petitioner filed under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. was registered as Crl. Misc. Case No. 70 of 2002 in which the opposite party no. 2 appeared and filed show cause stating that after solemnizing marriage with the petitioner in the year 1986, they were leading a good and happy conjugal life. 3. The application of the petitioner filed under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. was registered as Crl. Misc. Case No. 70 of 2002 in which the opposite party no. 2 appeared and filed show cause stating that after solemnizing marriage with the petitioner in the year 1986, they were leading a good and happy conjugal life. In the year 1987, when the opposite party no. 2 was selected in B.S.F. as ‘Jawan’ the petitioner started compelling him to get separated from his old parents, however, the opposite party no. 2 pacified her by providing several valuable articles as well as purchasing some land in her name in the State of Bengal. Further, the opposite party no. 2 used to send money orders in the name of the petitioner for meeting the domestic expenses and for looking after his old parents, but she used to keep the entire money without informing her in-laws and used to spend the same as per her wish. The said fact came to knowledge of the opposite party no. 2 only when he arrived at his native place in vacation. It was further stated that the opposite party no. 2 had given enough movable and immovable property to the petitioner to lead a sound life and she was capable enough to maintain herself through the means provided by him. The criminal case for the offence under Section 498-A of the I.P.C. was said to have been filed by the petitioner to put pressure on the opposite party no. 2 with an intention to lead a separate life away from her in-laws whereas the opposite party no. 2 was adamant to live with his old parents. It was also stated that the land which was being possessed by the opposite party no. 2 was rocky and unproductive and his parents were fully dependent on his monthly salary. 4. In the said case, altogether six witnesses were examined on behalf of the petitioner. On the other hand, the opposite party no. 2 examined three witnesses on his behalf. Learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dumka vide judgment dated 30.09.2003, dismissed the application of the petitioner filed under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the Family Court, Dumka has failed to take into consideration that the petitioner being the legally wedded wife of the opposite party no. Learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dumka vide judgment dated 30.09.2003, dismissed the application of the petitioner filed under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the Family Court, Dumka has failed to take into consideration that the petitioner being the legally wedded wife of the opposite party no. 2, is entitled to get maintenance from him. It is further submitted that the learned Family Court, Dumka also failed to take into consideration that the father of the petitioner having no source of income, was unable to maintain her whereas the opposite party no. 2 was employed in B.S.F and had sufficient means to maintain his legally wedded wife i.e. the petitioner. 6. On the contrary, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite party no. 2 submits that the petitioner has failed to show any ground so as to invoke revisional jurisdiction of this Court and as such, the present revision petition is liable to be dismissed. It is further submitted that the petitioner has been living separately from the opposite party no. 2 without any cogent reason and hence, she is not entitled to get maintenance from him. It is further submitted that opposite party no. 2 was always ready and willing to keep as well as maintain the petitioner, however, she has not been interested to live with him. Moreover, no allegation of torture has been levelled against the opposite party no. 2. Apart from that, it is an admitted fact that the opposite party no. 2 was not present in the house on 04.09.2001 i.e. the date of occurrence on which his parents allegedly ousted her from the matrimonial home. It is also submitted that the petitioner had refused to live with the opposite party no. 2 in the ‘panchayati’ held to resolve the dispute between the parties and as such, the Family Court, Dumka rightly did not award maintenance to her. 7. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. 8. Before coming to the merit of the respective contentions of the parties, it would be appropriate to refer few judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court dealing with the scope and power of a Court exercising revisional jurisdiction. 9. In the case of Jagannath Choudhary & Ors. Vs. Ramayan Singh & Anr. 8. Before coming to the merit of the respective contentions of the parties, it would be appropriate to refer few judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court dealing with the scope and power of a Court exercising revisional jurisdiction. 9. In the case of Jagannath Choudhary & Ors. Vs. Ramayan Singh & Anr. (2002) 5 SCC 659 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “9. Incidentally the object of the revisional jurisdiction as envisaged under Section 401 was to confer upon superior criminal courts a kind of paternal or supervisory jurisdiction, in order to correct miscarriage of justice arising from misconception of law, irregularity of procedure, neglect of proper precautions of (sic or) apparent harshness of treatment which has resulted on the one hand in some injury to the due maintenance of law and order, or on the other hand in some undeserved hardship to individuals. (See in this context the decision of this Court in Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary, (1992) 4 SCC 305 . The main question which the High Court has to consider in an application in revision is whether substantial justice has been done. If however, the same has been an appeal, the applicant would be entitled to demand an adjudication upon all questions of fact or law which he wishes to raise, but in revision the only question is whether the Court should interfere in the interests of justice. Where the court concerned does not appear to have committed any illegality or material irregularity or impropriety in passing the impugned judgment and order, the revision cannot succeed. If the impugned order apparently is presentable, without any such infirmity which may render it completely perverse or unacceptable and when there is no failure of justice, interference cannot be had in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. 10. While it is true and now well settled in a long catena of cases that exercise of power under Section 401 cannot but be ascribed to be discretionary - this discretion, however, as is popularly informed has to be a judicious exercise of discretion and not an arbitrary one. 10. While it is true and now well settled in a long catena of cases that exercise of power under Section 401 cannot but be ascribed to be discretionary - this discretion, however, as is popularly informed has to be a judicious exercise of discretion and not an arbitrary one. Judicial discretion cannot but be a discretion which stands “informed by tradition, methodised by analogy and disciplined by system” - resultantly only in the event of a glaring defect in the procedural aspect or there being a manifest error on a point of law and thus a flagrant miscarriage of justice, exercise of revisional jurisdiction under this statute ought not to be called for. It is not to be lightly exercised but only in exceptional situations where the justice delivery system requires interference for correction of a manifest illegality or prevention of a gross miscarriage of justice. In Nosibolla 1951 SCC 184, Logendranath Jha 1951 SCC 856 and Chinnaswamy Reddy AIR 1962 SC 1788 as also in Thakur Das v. State of M.P. (1978) 1 SCC 27 this Court with utmost clarity and in no uncertain terms recorded the same. It is not an appellate forum wherein scrutiny of evidence is possible; neither the revisional jurisdiction is open for being exercised simply by reason of the factum of another view being otherwise possible. It is restrictive in its application though in the event of there being a failure of justice there can be said to be no limitation as regards the applicability of the revisional power.” 10. In the case of CBI Vs. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal, (2013) 15 SCC 222 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held thus: 40. So far as the entertainment of the case at the behest of the respondent by the High Court is concerned, we may state that he may not have a legal right to raise any grievance, particularly in view of the law laid down by this Court in Ranadhir Basu v. State of West Bengal, (2000) 3 SCC 161 However, the revisional powers under Section 397 read with Section 401 Cr.P.C. can be exercised by the court suo motu, particularly to examine the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order and as to the regularity of any proceeding of the inferior court. These two sections in Cr.P.C. do not create any right in the favour of the litigant but only empower/enable the High Court to see that justice is done in accordance with recognised principles of criminal jurisprudence. The grounds of interference may be, where the facts admitted or approved, do not disclose any offence or the court may interfere where the facts do not disclose any offence or where the material effects of the party are not considered or where judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. [See also Everest Apartments Coop. Housing Society Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1966 SC 1449 and State of U.P. v. Kailash Nath Agarwal, (1973) 1 SCC 751 ] 11. It is a trite law that the power of revision is exercised in order to correct miscarriage of justice arising from misconception of law, irregularity of procedure, neglect of proper precautions involving apparent harshness of treatment which on the one hand has resulted in some injury to the due maintenance of law and order, or on the other hand in some undeserved hardship to individuals. Moreover, where the court concerned does not appear to have committed any illegality or material irregularity or impropriety in passing the impugned judgment and order, the revision cannot succeed. If the impugned order is apparently presentable, without any such infirmity which may render it completely perverse or unacceptable and when there is no failure of justice, interference cannot be had in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. 12. The revisional court is not an appellate forum wherein scrutiny of evidence is possible; neither the revisional jurisdiction is open for being exercised simply by reason of the factum of another view being otherwise possible. Sections 397 and 401 of Cr.P.C. do not create any right in favour of the litigant, but only empower/enable the High Court to see that justice is done in accordance with the recognised principles of criminal jurisprudence. The court may interfere where the facts admitted or approved, do not disclose any offence or where the material effects of the party are not considered or where judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. 13. Now, the question before this Court is as to whether any ground exists for exercising revisional power in the facts and circumstance of the present case. 14. I have perused Section 125 of Cr.P.C. which reads as under: 125. 13. Now, the question before this Court is as to whether any ground exists for exercising revisional power in the facts and circumstance of the present case. 14. I have perused Section 125 of Cr.P.C. which reads as under: 125. Order for maintenance of wives, children and parents. (1) If any person having sufficient means neglects or refuses to maintain: (a) his wife, unable to maintain herself. (b) his legitimate or illegitimate minor child, whether married or not, unable to maintain itself. (c) his legitimate or illegitimate child (not being a married daughter) who has attained majority, where such child is, by reason of any physical or mental abnormality or injury unable to maintain itself. (d) his father or mother, unable to maintain himself or herself, a Magistrate of the first class may, upon proof of such neglect or refusal, order such person to make a monthly allowance for the maintenance of his wife or such child, father or mother, at such monthly rate, as such Magistrate thinks fit, and to pay the same to such person as the Magistrate may from time to time direct: Provided that the Magistrate may order the father of a minor female child referred to in clause (b) to make such allowance, until she attains her majority, if the Magistrate is satisfied that the husband of such minor female child, if married, is not possessed of sufficient means. Provided further that the Magistrate may, during the pendency of the proceeding regarding monthly allowance for the maintenance under this sub-section, order such person to make a monthly allowance for the interim maintenance of his wife or such child, father or mother, and the expenses of such proceeding which the Magistrate considers reasonable, and to pay the same to such person as the Magistrate may from time to time direct. Provided also that an application for the monthly allowance for the interim maintenance and expenses of proceeding under the second proviso shall, as far as possible, be disposed of within sixty days from the date of the service of notice of the application to such person. Provided also that an application for the monthly allowance for the interim maintenance and expenses of proceeding under the second proviso shall, as far as possible, be disposed of within sixty days from the date of the service of notice of the application to such person. Explanation - For the purposes of this Chapter - (a) “minor” means a person who, under the provisions of the Indian Majority Act, 1875 (9 of 1875) is deemed not to have attained his majority, (b) “wife” includes a woman who has been divorced by or has obtained a divorce from, her husband and has not re-married. (2) Any such allowance for the maintenance or interim maintenance and expenses for proceeding shall be payable from the date of the order, or, if so ordered, from the date of the application for maintenance or interim maintenance and expenses of proceeding, as the case may be. (3) If any person so ordered fails without sufficient cause to comply with the order, any such Magistrate may, for every breach of the order, issue a warrant for levying the amount due in the manner provided for levying fines, and may sentence such person, for the whole or any part of each month's [allowance for the maintenance] or the interim maintenance and expenses of proceeding, as the case may be, remaining unpaid after the execution of the warrant, to imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month or until payment if sooner made: Provided that no warrant shall be issued for the recovery of any amount due under this section unless application be made to the Court to levy such amount within a period of one year from the date on which it became due: Provided further that if such person offers to maintain his wife on condition of her living with him, and she refuses to live with him, such Magistrate may consider any grounds of refusal stated by her, and may make an order under this section notwithstanding such offer, if he is satisfied that there is just ground for so doing. Explanation - If a husband has contracted marriage with another woman or keeps a mistress, it shall be considered to be just ground for his wife's refusal to live with him. Explanation - If a husband has contracted marriage with another woman or keeps a mistress, it shall be considered to be just ground for his wife's refusal to live with him. (4) No wife shall be entitled to receive an allowance for the maintenance or the interim maintenance and expenses of proceeding, as the case may be, from her husband under this section if she is living in adultery, or if, without any sufficient reason, she refuses to live with her husband, or if they are living separately by mutual consent. (5) On proof that any wife in whose favour an order has been made under this section is living in adultery, or that without sufficient reason she refuses to live with her husband, or that they are living separately by mutual consent, the Magistrate shall cancel the order. 15. Thus, in view of Section 125 of Cr.P.C. the wife who is unable to maintain herself is entitled to get maintenance from her husband, however, if the wife is living in adultery or is refusing to live with her husband without any sufficient reason, then she will not be entitled to get maintenance from her husband. 16. PW-1 Angad Rana had stated in his deposition made on 02.01.2003 that the marriage of the petitioner was solemnized with the opposite party no. 2 about 14-15 years ago according to Hindu rites and customs. The petitioner was living at her paternal home for about 15 (fifteen) months. The opposite party no. 2 was in Army and had landed property also. The petitioner's father was an old infirm man who was incapable to maintain the petitioner whereas the father-in-law of the petitioner was a retired government servant who was getting pension. PW-2 Vakil Soren had stated in his deposition made on the said date that the marriage between the petitioner and the opposite party no. 2 was solemnized in the year 1986 and she had been living at her father’s house for about 1½ - 2 years. The opposite party no. 2 was employed in B.S.F. however, he had no knowledge about the earning of the opposite party no. 2. The father of the opposite party no. 2 was a retired man who was getting pension. They had also sufficient landed property. 17. The opposite party no. 2 was employed in B.S.F. however, he had no knowledge about the earning of the opposite party no. 2. The father of the opposite party no. 2 was a retired man who was getting pension. They had also sufficient landed property. 17. According to PW-2, the petitioner was maintaining herself by working here and there and her father being an old infirm person, was unable to maintain her. PW-3 Chotabudhi Hansda had deposed on 27.01.2003 that the petitioner had been living at her father's home for about six years. He had also deposed that the opposite party no. 2 was in service, however, he did not know whether he had got landed property or not. The father of the petitioner was an old person who was not doing anything. The petitioner was maintaining herself by doing some work here and there as her father was unable to maintain her whereas the opposite party no. 2 was able to maintain her. PW-4 Dhaneshwar Tudu deposed on 27.01.2003 that the marriage of the petitioner was solemnized with the opposite party no. 2 in the year 1986. The opposite party no. 2 was employed in BSF. The petitioner had been living at her father's home for about two years. According to the PW-4, the petitioner’s father was an old person. He further deposed that the opposite party no. 2 was able to maintain the petitioner. PW-5 Shiva Hansda, the father of the petitioner who had declared his age as 45 years in his deposition made on 04.03.2003, had stated that the marriage of the petitioner was solemnized with the opposite party no. 2 according to Hindu rites and custom and she had been living with him for about 1½ - 2 years. During the said period, the opposite party no. 2 or his parents did not come to take back the petitioner. According to him, the opposite party no. 2 was not providing food and cloth to the petitioner. He had further deposed that he had no service or land and as such, he was incapable to maintain the petitioner. The opposite party no. 2 was employed in B.S.F. however, he had no knowledge about his earning. PW-6 is the petitioner herself who had stated in her deposition made on 28.03.2023 that her marriage was solemnized with the opposite party no. The opposite party no. 2 was employed in B.S.F. however, he had no knowledge about his earning. PW-6 is the petitioner herself who had stated in her deposition made on 28.03.2023 that her marriage was solemnized with the opposite party no. 2 on 22.04.1986 according to Hindu rites and custom. On 04.09.2001, there was a quarrel and scuffle between her and her in-laws who used to say that they would remarry their son as she had not been able to conceive. After that incident, she had been living with her old father for last 1½ years. She had further deposed that the opposite party no. 2 was employed in B.S.F who was earning Rs.10,000-12,000/- per month and had got the landed property also. According to her, after the said incident, the opposite party no. 2 or his parents never came to take her back. She did not remarry, however, the opposite party no. 2 had brought one lady named Margaret Marandi to his home. She had also deposed that she had no means of livelihood and was in need of Rs.4000/- per month to maintain herself. 18. The opposite party no. 2 had examined three witnesses on his behalf. OPW-1 Bilasin Murmu had stated in his deposition made on 17.04.2003 that the petitioner and the opposite party no. 2 both were present in the ‘panchayati’ held on 04.01.2002 where the petitioner had refused to live in her in-law's house. Thereafter, a panchnama was prepared whereby it was decided that the parties would lead separate life and opposite party no. 2 was asked by the ‘panchayat’ to file a divorce case in the court. OPW-2 Sunilal Soren had stated in his deposition made on 31.07.2003 that a ‘panchayati’ was held on 04.01.2002. He had proved the panchnama in the Family Court which was marked as Exhibit ‘A’. According to him, the petitioner had not signed the said panchnama and she had left the ‘panchayat’ without information. The opposite party no. 2 had examined himself as OPW-3 and had deposed on 03.09.2003 that the petitioner was his wife who had been living separately since September, 2001. He had also deposed that he used to send Rs.2000/- per month to the petitioner for household expenses and for looking after his old parents, however, she utilized the said money in purchasing a piece of land in the state of West Bengal without intimating him. He had also deposed that he used to send Rs.2000/- per month to the petitioner for household expenses and for looking after his old parents, however, she utilized the said money in purchasing a piece of land in the state of West Bengal without intimating him. In December, 2001, when he came home on leave, it came to light that the petitioner had purchased land in West Bengal. The opposite party no. 2 further came to know that the petitioner used to go to her parental home without informing anyone. The opposite party no. 2 had further deposed that a ‘panchayati’ was held on 04.01.2002 at the instance of his father wherein the petitioner had stated that she would neither live with him nor with his family. He had also deposed that there was a separate bank account in Allahabad Bank in the name of the petitioner in which about Rs.20,000/- was deposited. There was also a joint account in the said bank in his name and in the name of the petitioner in which Rs.15000/- was lying. During cross-examination, he had denied the suggestion stating that he had not married any lady named Margaret Marandi and had not brought her to his house. Moreover, after deductions from salary, about Rs.3000/- per month used to remain in his hand. His basic pay was Rs.3,220/-. So far as the landed property is concerned, he had said that the income from it was insufficient and that his father was a retired person living on his pension. 19. The Family Court, Dumka after going through the evidences adduced by the parties, observed that the complicity of the opposite party no. 2 in the shape of refusal or ill treatment or neglect on his part against the petitioner did not become apparent and all the allegations and accusations were mainly directed against the parents of the opposite party no. 2 which also stood falsified by the own witness of the petitioner i.e. PW-1, who had said that the in-laws of the petitioner treated her like their own daughter prior to filing of this case by her. Moreover, the incident of 04.09.2001 took place in absence of the opposite party no. 2. 20. 2 which also stood falsified by the own witness of the petitioner i.e. PW-1, who had said that the in-laws of the petitioner treated her like their own daughter prior to filing of this case by her. Moreover, the incident of 04.09.2001 took place in absence of the opposite party no. 2. 20. So far as the claim of the petitioner that she had no means to maintain herself was concerned, learned Family Court, Dumka observed that there was a joint as well as separate accounts in her name in Allahabad Bank and according to the petitioner, Rs.16,000/- was deposited at that time in the joint account. The petitioner had herself admitted that the money which was lying in those accounts were being sent by the opposite party no. 2, which corroborated the stand of the opposite party no. 2 that he always used to send money to the petitioner in her bank accounts for domestic expenses and for looking after his old parents, but she kept the said money and purchased a piece land in her name in the State of West Bengal. According to the Family Court, Dumka, the claim of the petitioner that the said land was purchased by her father in her name was not believable since she herself had claimed that her father was old, infirm and poor man having no source of income other than a little agricultural land with which he had to maintain his entire family. The allegation of keeping a lady namely, Margaret Marandi by the opposite party no. 2 in his house had also not been corroborated by any of the witnesses of the petitioner and even in the main application, there was no averment made to that effect. 21. Thus, it appears that on the one hand the petitioner had no sufficient reason to refuse to live with her husband and on the other hand the opposite party no. 2 during his cross-examination had stated that he was ready to keep the petitioner with him. The condition precedent to get maintenance from husband under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. is that the wife should have sufficient reason to refuse to live with her husband. In the present case, no sufficient reason was assigned by the petitioner before the Family Court, Dumka by adducing evidence for refusing to live with her husband i.e. the opposite party no. 2. 22. In the present case, no sufficient reason was assigned by the petitioner before the Family Court, Dumka by adducing evidence for refusing to live with her husband i.e. the opposite party no. 2. 22. Hence, I see no infirmity in the impugned judgment of the learned Family Court, Dumka in rejecting the petitioner’s application for maintenance filed under Section 125 Cr.P.C. The petitioner’s claim that she had no adequate means to maintain herself has no relevance in the present case since she failed to prove that she had adequate reason to live separately from her husband which is one of the pre-requisites for grant of maintenance to wife under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. Moreover, there is sufficient evidence on record to suggest that the opposite party no. 2 was regularly sending money to the petitioner for domestic expenses out of which she had purchased a landed property in her name in the state of West Bengal. Thus, the opposite party no. 2 cannot be held responsible for desertion of the petitioner from her matrimonial home. The petitioner has failed to show any illegality, material irregularity or impropriety in the impugned judgment so as to exercise revisional jurisdiction by this Court. 23. The present criminal revision being devoid of merit is accordingly dismissed.