JUDGMENT : R. Mukhopadhyay, J. Heard Mr. Jitendra S. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Piyush Chitresh, learned A.C. to A.G. 2. In this writ application, the petitioner has prayed for setting aside the order dated 18.05.2024 passed by the Respondent No. 2 in CCA Case No. 2 of 2024 under Section 3 (a)(b)(i)(ii) of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002 whereby and whereunder an order of externment has been passed against the petitioner for a period of three months directing him to remove himself to outside the district and not to enter into the district till 21.8.2024 and also to furnish a bond of Rs.25,000/- with two sureties under section 7 (1)(b) of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act. 3. It has been submitted by Mr. Jitendra S Singh, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, that the order impugned has not at all considered that the petitioner is not a habitual offender and therefore he cannot be termed to be an anti-social element thereby invoking Section 3 of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act and passing an order of externment against the petitioner. It has further been submitted that one of the reasons assigned by the respondent no. 2 in the impugned order is on account of the impending Lok Sabha Election, it was necessary to extern the petitioner on account of his anti social activities and since the Lok Sabha Elections have already been over and there being no further case instituted against the petitioner after 2018, the respondent no. 2 could not have based his findings on some Sanhas lodged against the petitioner in the year 2024. In support of his contention, learned counsel has referred to the case of Vijay Narain Singh Vs. State of Bihar reported in (1984) 3 SCC 14 and the order passed by this Court in W.P.(Cr) (DB) No.380 of 2024. 4. Mr. Piyush Chitresh, learned A.C. to A.G., has submitted that the petitioner is involved in a number of cases and is a habitual offender and therefore an anti social element and consequently the respondent no. 2 was within his rights to have passed an order of externment on 18.5.2024. 5. An averment has been made by the petitioner in reference to the cases instituted against him and which finds place in the impugned order dated 18.5.2024 that in maximum cases, the petitioner has already been acquitted. 2 was within his rights to have passed an order of externment on 18.5.2024. 5. An averment has been made by the petitioner in reference to the cases instituted against him and which finds place in the impugned order dated 18.5.2024 that in maximum cases, the petitioner has already been acquitted. It also appears that earlier C.C.A. Case No.43/22-23 was initiated against the petitioner and a show cause was also issued to him as to why an order under section 3 (i)(a)-(3)(b)(i) of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002 be not made against the petitioner and on a reply being submitted by the petitioner, an order was passed on 21.6.2023 directing the petitioner to mark his attendance every Sunday before Ratu P.S. for a period of three months as also to furnish two security bonds of Rs.10,000/-each. So far as the present case is concerned, on a recommendation being made by the respondent no.3 vide Memo dated 29.3.2024 to the respondent no. 2 giving reference of 31 cases and some station diary entries (Sanhas) a request was made to pass an order of externment against the petitioner as the presence of the petitioner in the district itself was creating a threat to the public in general. A show cause notice was issued to the petitioner, which was duly replied to and subsequent thereto the impugned order dated 18.5.2024 was passed by the respondent no. 2 externing the petitioner from the district for a period of three months. 6. On a perusal of the impugned order dated 18.5.2024 there seems to be a reference made of 31 cases instituted against the petitioner which ranged from the year 2003 to the year 2018. It seems that in order to bring the petitioner within the purview of being a habitual offender thus invoking Section 3 of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002, reference has also been made to various station diary entries having been made in the year 2024 though it seems that two of the station diary entries appears to overlap each other. This would bring us to the question as to whether the petitioner can be said to be a habitual offender in terms of Section 2(d) which defines an anti social element in the facts and circumstances of the case. This would bring us to the question as to whether the petitioner can be said to be a habitual offender in terms of Section 2(d) which defines an anti social element in the facts and circumstances of the case. In order to appreciate the rival contentions, Section 2(d) of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002 is quoted herein, which reads as follows:- “(d) "Anti-social element" means a person who- (i)either by himself or as a member of or leader of a gang, habitually commits or attempts to commit or abets the commission of offences punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code; or (ii)habitually commits or abets the commission of offences under the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956; (iii)who by words or otherwise promotes or attempts to promote, on grounds of religion, race, language, caste or community or other grounds whatsoever, feelings of enmity or hatred between different religions, racial or language groups or castes or communities; or (iv)has been found habitually passing indecent remarks to, or teasing women or girls; or (v)who has been convicted of an offence under sections 25,26, 27, 28 or 29 of the Arms Act of 1959” 7. The word “habitual” seems to be a prominent feature to consider whether a person is an anti social element or not and only then Section 3 of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002 can be invoked. In this context, we may refer to the case of Vijay Narain Singh Vs. State of Bihar and others (Supra) wherein it has been held as follows:- “31. It is seen from Section 12 of the Act that it makes provision for the detention of an anti-social element. If a person is not an anti-social element, he cannot be detained under the Act. The detaining authority should, therefore, be satisfied that the person against whom an order is made under Section 12 of the Act is an anti-social element as defined in Section 2(d) of the Act. Sub-clauses (ii), (iii) and (v) of Section 2(d) of the Act which are not quite relevant for the purposes of this case may be omitted from consideration for the present. The two other sub-clauses which need to be examined closely are sub-clauses (i) and (iv) of Section 2(d). Sub-clauses (ii), (iii) and (v) of Section 2(d) of the Act which are not quite relevant for the purposes of this case may be omitted from consideration for the present. The two other sub-clauses which need to be examined closely are sub-clauses (i) and (iv) of Section 2(d). Under sub-clause (i) of Section 2(d) of the Act, a person who either by himself or as a member of or leader of a gang habitually commits or attempts to commit or abets the commission of offences punishable under Chapter XVI dealing with offences affecting the human body or Chapter XVII dealing with offences against property, of the Penal Code, 1860 is considered to be an anti-social element. Under sub-clause (iv) of Section 2(d) of the Act, a person who has been habitually passing indecent remarks to, or teasing women or girls, is an anti-social element. In both these sub-clauses, the word “habitually” is used. The expression “habitually” means “repeatedly” or “persistently”. It implies a thread of continuity stringing together similar repetitive acts. Repeated, persistent and similar, but not isolated, individual and dissimilar acts are necessary to justify an inference of habit. It connotes frequent commission of acts or omissions of the same kind referred to in each of the said sub-clauses or an aggregate of similar acts or omissions. This appears to be clear from the use of the word “habitually” separately in sub-clause (i), sub-clause (ii) and sub-clause (iv) of Section 2(d) and not in sub-clauses (iii) and (v) of Section 2(d). If the State Legislature had intended that a commission of two or more acts or omissions referred to in any of the sub-clauses (i) to (v) of Section 2(d) was sufficient to make a person an “anti-social element”, the definition would have run as “Anti-social element” means “a person who habitually is. ..”. As Section 2(d) of the Act now stands, whereas under sub-clause (iii) or sub-clause (v) of Section 2(d) a single act or omission referred to in them may be enough to treat the person concerned as an ‘antisocial element’, in the case of sub-clause (i), sub-clause (ii) or sub-clause (iv), there should be a repetition of acts or omissions of the same kind referred to in sub-clause (i), sub -clause (ii) or in sub-clause (iv) by the person concerned to treat him as an “anti -social element”. Commission of an act or omission referred to in one of the sub-clauses (i), (ii) and (iv) and of another act or omission referred to in any other of the said sub-clauses would not be sufficient to treat a person as an “anti-social element”. A single act or omission falling under sub-clause (i) and a single act or omission falling under sub-clause (iv) of Section 2(d) cannot, therefore, be characterised as a habitual act or omission referred to in either of them. Because the idea of “habit” involves an element of persistence and a tendency to repeat the acts or omissions of the same class or kind, if the acts or omissions in question are not of the same kind or even if they are of the same kind when they are committed with a long interval of time between them they cannot be treated as habitual ones”. 8. As we have noted above, the last case which was instituted against the petitioner was in the year 2018 and thereafter for all these six years no regular case has been instituted save and except the station diary entries made in the year 2024. In Vijay Narain Singh Vs. State of Bihar and others (Supra) it has been observed that ‘habitual’ would not include acts if the acts in question are committed after a long interval of time. As it is habitual would mean a persistent or a continuous or a regular chain of acts by the concerned person without there being an unnecessary long gap between each of such acts. Here in the present case, the only basis for passing an order of externment against the petitioner on 18.5.2024 by the respondent no.2 are the station diary entries made coupled with the previous antecedents of the petitioner, which though are substantial in number but as stated above the last of such incident wherein a regular case was instituted against the petitioner relates back to the year 2018. In such situation, therefore, it can be concluded that the petitioner is not a habitual offender and therefore Section 3 of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002 in such circumstances could not have been invoked by the respondent no.2. In such situation, therefore, it can be concluded that the petitioner is not a habitual offender and therefore Section 3 of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002 in such circumstances could not have been invoked by the respondent no.2. The other relevant feature appearing from the impugned order dated 18.5.2024 is of the Lok Sabha Elections which was scheduled to be held when the impugned order was passed and the same having attained finality the said feature also pales into oblivion. It is also to be noted herein that the petitioner has an alternative remedy against the impugned order dated 18.5.2024 in terms of Section 6 of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002 by preferring an appeal before the Commissioner. In such context, we may refer to the case of Godrej Sara Lee Ltd Vs. Excise & Taxation Officer cum Assessing Authority & Ors. reported in 2023 SCC Online SC 95, which reads as follows:- “4. Before answering the questions, we feel the urge to say a few words on the exercise of writ powers conferred by article 226 of the Constitution having come across certain orders passed by the High Courts holding writ petitions as "not maintainable" merely because the alternative remedy provided by the relevant statutes has not been pursued by the parties desirous of invocation of the writ jurisdiction. The power to issue prerogative writs under article 226 is plenary in nature. Any limitation on the exercise of such power must be traceable in the Constitution itself. Profitable reference in this regard may be made to article 329 and ordainments of other similarly worded articles in the Constitution. Article 226 does not, in terms, impose any limitation or restraint on the exercise of power to issue writs. While it is true that exercise of writ powers despite availability of a remedy under the very statute which has been invoked and has given rise to the action impugned in the writ petition ought not to be made in a routine manner, yet, the mere fact that the petitioner before the High Court, in a given case, has not pursued the alternative remedy available to him/it cannot mechanically be construed as a ground for its dismissal. It is axiomatic that the High Courts (bearing in mind the facts of each particular case) have a discretion whether to entertain a writ petition or not. It is axiomatic that the High Courts (bearing in mind the facts of each particular case) have a discretion whether to entertain a writ petition or not. One of the self-imposed restrictions on the exercise of power under article 226 that has evolved through judicial precedents is that the High Courts should normally not entertain a writ petition, where an effective and efficacious alternative remedy is available. At the same time, it must be remembered that mere availability of an alternative remedy of appeal or revision, which the party invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under article 226 has not pursued, would not oust the jurisdiction of the High Court and render a writ petition "not maintainable". In a long line of decisions, this court has made it clear that availability of an alternative remedy does not operate as an absolute bar to the "maintainability" of a writ petition and that the rule, which requires a party to pursue the alternative remedy provided by a statute, is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law. Though elementary, it needs to be restated that "entertainability" and "maintainability" of a writ petition are distinct concepts. The fine but real distinction between the two ought not to be lost sight of. The objection as to "maintainability" goes to the root of the matter and if such objection were found to be of substance, the courts would be rendered incapable of even receiving the lis for adjudication. On the other hand, the question of "entertainability" is entirely within the realm of discretion of the High Courts, writ remedy being discretionary. A writ petition despite being maintainable may not be entertained by a High Court for very many reasons or relief could even be refused to the petitioner, despite setting up a sound legal point, if grant of the claimed relief would not further public interest. Hence, dismissal of a writ petition by a High Court on the ground that the petitioner has not availed the alternative remedy without, however, examining whether an exceptional case has been made out for such entertainment would not be proper”. 9. Hence, dismissal of a writ petition by a High Court on the ground that the petitioner has not availed the alternative remedy without, however, examining whether an exceptional case has been made out for such entertainment would not be proper”. 9. The order impugned to this writ application on the face of it appears to have curtailed the personal liberty of an individual without citing any appropriate reasons for such curtailment, which is violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India and in such circumstances therefore we have considered the merits of the case without confining the petitioner to seek his alternative remedy of appeal under section 6 of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002. 10. As a consequence to the discussions made hereinabove we hereby quash and set aside the order dated 18.05.2024 passed by the Respondent No. 2 in CCA Case No. 2 of 2024. This application stands allowed.