JUDGMENT : 1. The present writ appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent has been preferred against judgment and order, dated 05.12.2019, passed in W.P. No. 7401 of 2018. 2. Briefly stated, the material facts are that, the petitioner, on account of having served in the Animal Husbandry Department in the State of Andhra Pradesh, was admitted as the member of the Animal Husbandry Employees’ Cooperation House Building Society. It is not denied that the petitioner was admitted as a member of the Society in the year, 2000, and continues to remain as such till date. 3. By virtue of Government Order bearing G.O.Ms. No. 158, Revenue (Assignments-I (2) Department), dated 13.02.2006, land measuring eighteen acres and seventy eight cents in Sy. No. 133/P of Chinagadili Village, Visakhapatnam District came to be allotted in favour of the President of the appellant Society, which was subject to payment of the value fixed by the said Government Order. Upon the land having been allotted to the Society, the members were considered for allotment, however the petitioner was not found eligible for allotment of a plot in the aforementioned allotted land by the Board of Directors in accordance with the bye-laws. This decision was challenged before the Assistant Registrar of Cooperative Societies, in terms of the provisions of Section 61 of the A.P. Cooperative Societies Act, 1964. By virtue of order dated 23.08.2008, the petition came to be dismissed. 4. The petitioner even when he had a remedy of challenging the order passed by the Assistant Registrar of Cooperative Societies before the Tribunal under Section 76 of the Act of 1964, he did not choose to do so. However, having waited for a period of almost 10 years, without availing the remedy before the Tribunal, in the year 2018, preferred a writ petition bearing No. 7401 of 2018 challenging the order dated 23.08.2008 as being contrary to the provisions of the Act of 1964 and with a further relief of mandamus for direction to the respondent to allot one plot to the petitioner. 5. It appears the reason advanced in the writ petition by the petitioner for not challenging the order dated 23.08.2008 in time was that he had been awaiting the result of the appeals filed by other affected members. 5. It appears the reason advanced in the writ petition by the petitioner for not challenging the order dated 23.08.2008 in time was that he had been awaiting the result of the appeals filed by other affected members. It is stated that certain other employees, who are other members of the society were also refused the plots, had approached the Assistant Registrar by way of Arbitration cases, which were dismissed. The orders of dismissal were challenged before the Tribunal under Section 76 of the Act of 1964 and by virtue of which, the Tribunal issued directions in favor of the said members of the society declaring them to be eligible to receive the plots in question. It was further averred that the writ petition filed by the Society challenging the order of the Tribunal was subsequently dismissed. It is only after the dismissal of the writ petition the petitioner states that he chose to file the Writ Petition before the learned Single Judge vide W.P. No. 7401 of 2018. 6. The appellant society in its response in the writ proceedings had taken a stand that there was an equal and efficacious alternate remedy which is available to the petitioner before the Tribunal under Section 76 of the Act of 1964 which had not been availed and that the Writ Court ought not to entertain the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India without first permitting the petitioner to exhaust the alternate remedy. The second ground which had been urged was that the petition in any case was barred by delay and laches and therefore ought not to be entertained. 7. By virtue of the judgment and order impugned, the learned Single Judge rejected the objections so raised firstly on the ground that alternate remedy was not a bar as there was a violation of principles of natural justice and secondly that even delay and laches would not stand in the way of the petitioner as he had been awaiting the outcome of the appeals filed by similarly situated individual members of the society. 8. Finally, by virtue of the judgment and order impugned while allowing the petition, directions were issued to the appellant to consider the case of the petitioner for allotment of the plot without reference to the fact that the petitioner was not residing in Visakhapatnam at the time of his admission as a member. 8. Finally, by virtue of the judgment and order impugned while allowing the petition, directions were issued to the appellant to consider the case of the petitioner for allotment of the plot without reference to the fact that the petitioner was not residing in Visakhapatnam at the time of his admission as a member. The Society was given liberty to consider the issue of continuance of the petitioner as a member and till then one plot was directed to be reserved for the petitioner. 9. In the Writ Appeal, the judgment and order impugned is challenged primarily on the ground of delay and laches. It is stated that the petitioner was a fence sitter and could not have chosen to avail the extraordinary Writ remedy at the time of his own choosing. In any case, it is stated that there were no plots which could be allotted to the petitioner and that consideration of this case for such allotment would be an exercise in futility. 10. Learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand reiterated the stand which was otherwise taken before the learned Single Judge and urged that delay and laches would not come in the way of granting substantive relief to the petitioner as his case had wrongly been rejected by the Society for purposes of the allotment of the plot. A number of grounds have been taken by the appellant including inter alia that the petitioner was even otherwise not eligible for allotment of plot in question inasmuch as the Society bye-laws did not permit the allotment of a house site to a member who had already obtained a plot on account of being member of another society. It is stated that the petitioner being a member of the Guntur District Veterinary Officers Mutually Aided Cooperative House Building Society Limited had been allotted a plot in Guntur and therefore would not be eligible in any case for allotment of a plot in Visakhapatnam. 11. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. 12. Admittedly, the petitioner had not challenged the order passed by the Assistant Registrar of Cooperative Societies dated 23.08.2008 either before the Tribunal which was a comprehensive remedy envisaged under the Act of 1964 or approached the Writ Court immediately thereafter. 11. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. 12. Admittedly, the petitioner had not challenged the order passed by the Assistant Registrar of Cooperative Societies dated 23.08.2008 either before the Tribunal which was a comprehensive remedy envisaged under the Act of 1964 or approached the Writ Court immediately thereafter. The petitioner was a fence sitter, who having accepted the decision of the Assistant Registrar of Cooperative Societies in the year 2008 took a chance by filing a writ petition in the year 2018 after a lapse of approximately 10 years. The view expressed by the learned Single Judge that an alternate remedy is not a bar to the exercise of writ jurisdiction, on a matter of principle, is correct. 13. In the case of M/s. Radha Krishan Industries vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2021) 6 SCC 771 it was held that existence of an alternate remedy would not be a bar in case an order under challenge was passed without jurisdiction and was violative of the principles of natural justice. Reference in this regard can be made to the principles as under: “27.1. The power under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue writs can be exercised not only for the enforcement of fundamental rights, but for any other purpose as well. 27.2. The High Court has the discretion not to entertain a writ petition. One of the restrictions placed on the power of the High Court is where an effective alternate remedy is available to the aggrieved person. 27.3. Exceptions to the rule of alternate remedy arise where: (a) the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of a fundamental right protected by Part III of the Constitution; (b) there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice; (c) the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction; or (d) the vires of a legislation is challenged. 27.4. An alternate remedy by itself does not divest the High Court of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution in an appropriate case though ordinarily, a writ petition should not be entertained when an efficacious alternate remedy is provided by law. 27.5. When a right is created by a statute, which itself prescribes the remedy or procedure for enforcing the right or liability, resort must be had to that particular statutory remedy before invoking the discretionary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution. 27.5. When a right is created by a statute, which itself prescribes the remedy or procedure for enforcing the right or liability, resort must be had to that particular statutory remedy before invoking the discretionary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution. This rule of exhaustion of statutory remedies is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion. 27.6. In cases where there are disputed questions of fact, the High Court may decide to decline jurisdiction in a writ petition. However, if the High Court is objectively of the view that the nature of the controversy requires the exercise of its writ jurisdiction, such a view would not readily be interfered with.” 14. However, while testing the view expressed by the learned Single Judge on the touchstone of the principle laid down above, it can be seen that the petitioner had already availed the alternate remedy by approaching the Assistant Registrar of Cooperative Societies under Section 61 of the Act of 1964 and therefore ought to have followed that route to the Tribunal if at all he was aggrieved of the order. But from the conduct of the petitioner, it appears that he had accepted the view expressed in the order of the Assistant Registrar of Cooperative Societies and rested his case till he took a chance when he saw others similarly situated succeeding before various heirarchial Fora under the Act of 1964 as also before the High Court under the Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 15. The petitioner was clearly a fence sitter in terms of the judgment of the Apex Court in Shiba Shankar Mohapatra vs. State of Orissa, (2010) 12 SCC 471 case. The Apex Court has consistently discouraged entertaining Stale Claims in granting relief to fence sitters who approach the Court after inordinate delay. In the case cited supra, the Apex Court was considering whether the Writ challenging the preparation of a seniority list would be maintainable after a long lapse of time. The Apex Court held: “29. It is settled law that fence-sitters cannot be allowed to raise the dispute or challenge the validity of the order after its conclusion. No party can claim the relief as a matter of right as one of the grounds for refusing relief is that the person approaching the Court is guilty of delay and the laches. It is settled law that fence-sitters cannot be allowed to raise the dispute or challenge the validity of the order after its conclusion. No party can claim the relief as a matter of right as one of the grounds for refusing relief is that the person approaching the Court is guilty of delay and the laches. The Court exercising public law jurisdiction does not encourage agitation of stale claims where the right of third parties crystallizes in the interregnum.” 16. Reference in this regard can also be made to the basic judgment on delay and laches as rendered by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Bhailal Bhai, AIR 1964 SC 1006 where the Apex Court considered whether the Writs filed seeking refund of taxes collected under void provisions, were maintainable in view of the long delay. It was those circumstances held: “It appears to us however that the maximum period fixed by the legislature as the time within which the relief by a suit in a Civil Court must be brought may ordinarily be taken to be a reasonable standard by which delay in seeking remedy under Article 226 can be measured. The Court may consider the delay unreasonable even if it is less than the period of limitation prescribed for a civil action for the remedy but where the delay is more than this period, it will almost always be proper for the Court to hold that it is unreasonable.” 17. Subsequent judgments from the Apex Court have held that if the delay is unexplained and is also coupled with creation of third party rights, then entertaining a claim under Article 226 of the Constitution of India belatedly would cause confusion and public convenience and may have the effect of effecting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. Reference in this regard can be made to State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Nandalal Jaiswal, (1986) 4 SCC 566 . 18. Reference in this regard can be made to State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Nandalal Jaiswal, (1986) 4 SCC 566 . 18. Considering the facts of the present case on the touchstone of the judgments supra, it can clearly be seen that the explanation rendered by the petitioner in the writ petition for filing the petition belatedly is an explanation which by no means can be stated to be reasonable warranting entertainment of the petition for exercise of extraordinary Writ jurisdiction but boldly declares the petitioner to be nothing but a fence sitter not warranting the exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The delay in the present case has certainly caused third party rights as the appellant has also taken ground that there were no plots available for allotment to the petitioner to which no rebuttal has been filed by the petitioner. 19. Be that as it may, the Writ Appeal is allowed. The judgment and order impugned is accordingly set aside. No costs. 20. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed.