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2024 DIGILAW 707 (MP)

Hiralal Ahirwar v. State of Madhya Pradesh

2024-11-12

SANJAY DWIVEDI

body2024
ORDER : Sanjay Dwivedi, J. Despite serving notice upon the respondent No. 2, nobody came forward to argue this matter on her behalf and hence it is heard finally on the basis of material available on record. 2. This revision is under Section 397 /401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure challenging the validity of the order passed by the trial court on 05.07.2022 framing charge against the applicants under Section 306 /34 of IPC. 3. As per the submission made by the learned counsel for the applicants, in the facts and circumstances of the case and the material collected by the prosecution and submitted before the trial court alongwith the charge sheet filed under Section 173 of Cr.P.C., the trial court at the time of framing the charge did not appreciate the facts of the case in proper manner and failed to see that even prima-facie no case under Section 306 of IPC is made out against the applicants because the material ingredients for forming the said offence are completely missing in the case and therefore the impugned order of framing charge is liable to be set aside and applicants are liable to be discharged from the said charge. 4. As per the facts of the case, at GRP Station Gadarwara, on the basis of an information received through memo on 05.02.2022, a Murg was registered vide Murg No. 3/2022 under Section 174 of Cr.P.C. and an enquiry was conducted because a body of unknown person was recovered near start signal of railway station of Salichowka up-yard and it was informed that a person had committed suicide by jumping in front of train No. 12192. After preparing Panchnama, postmortem was done in a government hospital of Salichowka and a report was submitted, as per which, the death occurred due to injuries sustained by the deceased in a train accident and on 06.02.2022 the said body was identified to be of one Kamta Prasad Ahirwar, son of Netram Ahirwar, aged about 50 years, r/o Ward No. 9, Patel Ward, Kherua, Police Station Gadarwara, District Narsinghpur. 5. 5. During the course of enquiry it was gathered that on 05.02.2022 in the house of one Purshottam Ahirwar 13th day ceremony (Terhi) was being organized in which the deceased was humiliated and nobody had permitted him to freely participate in the said function because his son namely, Rajesh Ahirwar got married with a girl of Basor community. The deceased was told that due to marriage of his son with a girl of Basor community and no decision was taken about them to be included in their community although he was allowed to take food but his son and daughter-in-law would not be allowed to have food with the other members of the community. As per the allegation, feeling humiliated and insulted, the deceased did not eat the meal and went away and committed suicide by jumping in front of a train. As such, the offence under Section 306 /34 got registered against the applicants on the ground that they compelled the deceased to commit suicide. 6. Learned counsel for the applicants has submitted that in the present case there was disclosure and nobody was knowing the fact as to why the deceased had committed the suicide. It is also a case in which there is no evidence collected by the prosecution to establish that after the alleged incident the deceased had informed anybody that he got humiliated and disturbed by the conduct of the present applicants and because of that he had committed suicide. He has submitted that after the alleged incident, the deceased had also not written any suicide note so as to assign any reason as to what compelled him to take such a drastic step of suicide. 7. Learned counsel for the applicants has submitted that it is not a case in which the situation is so that the alleged incident had left no other option before the deceased but to commit suicide. He has submitted that it is a case in which it was inferred by the family members of the deceased that the reason for committing suicide by the deceased was none other but an action of misbehaving or insulting the deceased by the present applicants which created a situation before the deceased to commit the suicide. He has submitted that it is a case in which it was inferred by the family members of the deceased that the reason for committing suicide by the deceased was none other but an action of misbehaving or insulting the deceased by the present applicants which created a situation before the deceased to commit the suicide. He has submitted that the material ingredients for constituting such offence are completely missing in the present case and there was no occasion for the court to presume that it was a situation before the deceased to commit suicide because continuous harassment of the deceased by the present applicants had left no other option before him but to commit suicide. According to learned counsel, in such a circumstance, the offence of Section 306 of IPC cannot be registered. 8. I have perused the record and also examined the circumstances which is said to be a cause for committing suicide by the deceased and I have not found any material revealing that the reason for committing suicide was explained or disclosed by the deceased by any source of information. Nowhere the deceased has discussed anything to any one about his harassment or insult and he has also not left any suicide note so as to draw any inference or reason for committing suicide. In absence of any specific reason, registration of offence on presumption that the suicide has been committed by the deceased because of the harassment does not seem to be proper. 9. Learned counsel for the respondent/State has submitted that the order of framing charge cannot be quashed at this stage because the trial court at the time of framing charge has to see whether the material produced before the court prima-facie sufficient to register an offence or not. The Court at the time of framing of charge does not evaluate the sanctity of evidence. He has also placed reliance upon a judgment reported in (2009) 16 SCC 605 – Chitresh Kumar Chopra vs. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) and (2012) 9 SCC 734 – Praveen Pradhan Vs. State of Uttaranchal and Another . 10. I have examined the view of the Supreme Court, according to which, the onus is on the prosecution to show the circumstances which compelled the deceased to take the extreme step to bring an end to his life. State of Uttaranchal and Another . 10. I have examined the view of the Supreme Court, according to which, the onus is on the prosecution to show the circumstances which compelled the deceased to take the extreme step to bring an end to his life. At the same time, the Supreme Court has also observed that the duty of the trial court is to presume something at the time of framing of charge and exercising the power under Section 228 of CrPC. The Supreme Court in case of Chitresh Kumar Chopra (supra) dealing with the provisions of Section 228 of Cr.P.C. has observed as under: “25. It is trite that at the stage of framing of charge, the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence or offences. For this limited purpose, the court may sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at the initial stage to accept as gospel truth all that the prosecution states. At this stage, the court has to consider the material only with a view to find out if there is ground for “presuming” that the accused has committed an offence and not for the purpose of arriving at the conclusion that it is not likely to lead to a conviction. (See Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi v. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijjaya [ (1990) 4 SCC 76 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 47] .) 26. In Som Nath Thapa [ (1996) 4 SCC 659 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 820] a three-Judge Bench of this Court explained the meaning of the word “presume”. Referring to dictionary meanings of the said word, the Court observed thus: (SCC p. 671, para 32) “32. … if on the basis of materials on record, a court could come to the conclusion that commission of the offence is a probable consequence, a case for framing of charge exists. To put it differently, if the court were to think that the accused might have [Ed.: The words “might have” were emphasised in the original.] committed the offence it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be that the accused has [Ed.: Emphasis in original.] committed the offence. To put it differently, if the court were to think that the accused might have [Ed.: The words “might have” were emphasised in the original.] committed the offence it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be that the accused has [Ed.: Emphasis in original.] committed the offence. It is apparent that at the stage of framing of a charge, probative value of the materials on record cannot be gone into; the materials brought on record by the prosecution has to be accepted as true at that stage. (emphasis supplied)” 11. From the observation made by the Supreme Court, it is clear that the trial court is required to evaluate the material and the documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence or offences. It is further observed by the Court that for such limited purpose, the court may sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at the initial stage to accept as gospel truth all that the prosecution states. The Supreme Court also observed that “the Court has to consider the material only with a view to find out if there is a ground for ‘presuming’ that the accused has committed an offence and not for the purpose of arriving at a conclusion that it is not likely to lead to a conviction”. 12. In Chitresh Kumar Chopra (supra) , the Supreme Court has also relied upon a case of State of Maharashtra vs. Som Nath Thapa reported in (1996) 4 SCC 659 and observed that if the court were to think that the accused might have committed the offence, it can frame the charge. 13. Likewise in the case of Praveen Pradhan (supra) , the Supreme Court describing the incident and material facts of the case has observed as under: “10. In the FIR, the complainant, who is the brother of the deceased, made several allegations against the appellant, all of which, have also been mirrored in the suicide note left behind by the deceased, and it is also evident from the FIR that the deceased had intimated his family members regarding the ill-treatment and harassment constantly meted out to him, by the appellant. The deceased was very perturbed and the same is evident from the suicide note which reads as under: “I am dying due to Praveen Pradhan. He has done too much atrocities. He is very cunning man. He always humiliated and exploited me all the time. He made me demoralised and made my self-respect hurt too much. He has hurted Mr O.P. Agaral (KPGI) and Mr C.R.K. Gaur (Project Consultant). These persons also had to go before time due to him. He always hurts others feelings as he is a egoistic and cruel man. I have been daily hurted my self-respect. He is always scolding me. I have to die solely due to him. I have told my feelings to Mr Pavan and Mr Raghu earlier. But his attitude do not change. He always scolded and demoralised me. Even in front of Amit (Jaymit) he insulted me. He said Anurag is a ‘chutiya’ as he is working for him and he doubted my dignity. I can't tolerate any way to my dignity. He always forced me to resign. This can be verified from Mr Minesh Dakwe (who is in Mahindra) that he forced me to resign. His attitude can be verified from other officers of factory. He is proving me faulty and incompetent after completing entire project work successfully.” (emphasis added) A plain and simple reading of this suicide note makes it crystal clear that the appellant had not just humiliated and insulted the deceased on one occasion. In fact, it is evident that the appellant perpetually humiliated, exploited and demoralised the deceased, which hurt his self-respect tremendously. The words used are, to the effect that the appellant always hurts the self-respect of the deceased and he was always scolding him. The appellant always made attempts to force him to resign. 11. The statements recorded by the police under Section 161 CrPC, particularly, one made by Smt Kavita Singh, widow of the deceased and also those of various other family members, corroborate the version of events, as given in his suicide note. Therefore, the question that arises is whether the court would be justified in quashing the charge-sheet filed against the accused, in the instant case.” 14. Therefore, the question that arises is whether the court would be justified in quashing the charge-sheet filed against the accused, in the instant case.” 14. As per the above observation, it is clear that the Supreme Court in the aforesaid cases has observed as to what is the duty of the court while exercising the power of Section 228 of Cr.P.C.. The Court has to see whether on the basis of collected material by the prosecution, the alleged offence or offences had committed by the accused person and on presuming them the court could come to the conclusion that the accused might have committed the offence, but without evaluating the material that is sufficient to lead the conviction, the order of framing of charge cannot be said to be proper. In both cases, before the trial court, the prosecution had placed the material indicating that the offense was under Section 306 of the IPC, relating to death due to suicide and the material collected had to be correlated with the alleged offense, and then the court had to presume whether the offense had been committed by the accused or not. It clearly indicates that before the court the cause of death was specified and on the basis of the said cause, the court had to co-relate the material collected by the prosecution and presumption had to be drawn, but, in the present case, the situation is otherwise. Here in this case, the cause of death was indefinite and not specified. The material collected by the prosecution entrusted the court to presume that accused has committed an offence of Section 306 of IPC. It is a case in which there was no disclosure by the deceased that he would be committing suicide; neither by writing a suicide note nor by disclosing his intention to any of the witnesses. Even the postmortem report is also not indicating and giving any definite cause of death; it can be a homicidal death or it can be an accident or it can also be a suicide, but the reason for committing suicide is not specific because the deceased had never disclosed his intention before anybody. Therefore, the moot question before this Court is whether for framing charge of Section 306 of IPC it is not the duty of the court to see the material ingredients of the said offence for which charge is being framed. Therefore, the moot question before this Court is whether for framing charge of Section 306 of IPC it is not the duty of the court to see the material ingredients of the said offence for which charge is being framed. For the purpose of clarity, Section 306 of IPC is reproduced as under: “Abetment of suicide . — If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.” 15. From the aforesaid, it is clear that the offence of Section 306 of IPC contains two requirements; first, for formulating the said charge against an accused there must be ‘abetment’ on his part and; second, ‘commission of such suicide’. 16. In the present case, the death of the deceased cannot be said to be a suicide because there is no material available on record indicating in affirmative that he has committed suicide. If the cause is definite then under Section 228 of Cr.P.C., the court has to frame the charge on the basis of material, but the court cannot presume the offence on the basis of corroboratory material and that presumption of cause by the trial court exercising power under Section 228 of Cr.P.C. does not appear to be proper, especially for an offence of Section 306 of IPC. 17. The Supreme Court in the case of Gurcharan Singh vs. State of Punjab reported in (2017) 1 SCC 433 while dealing with an offence of Section 306 of IPC and its required ingredients observed as under:- “21. It is thus manifest that the offence punishable is one of abetment of the commission of suicide by any person, predicating existence of a live link or nexus between the two, abetment being the propelling causative factor. The basic ingredients of this provision are suicidal death and the abetment thereof. To constitute abetment, the intention and involvement of the accused to aid or instigate the commission of suicide is imperative. Any severance or absence of any of these constituents would militate against this indictment. Remoteness of the culpable acts or omissions rooted in the intention of the accused to actualise the suicide would fall short as well of the offence of abetment essential to attract the punitive mandate of Section 306 IPC. Any severance or absence of any of these constituents would militate against this indictment. Remoteness of the culpable acts or omissions rooted in the intention of the accused to actualise the suicide would fall short as well of the offence of abetment essential to attract the punitive mandate of Section 306 IPC. Contiguity, continuity, culpability and complicity of the indictable acts or omission are the concomitant indices of abetment. Section 306 IPC, thus criminalises the sustained incitement for suicide.” 18. As per the aforesaid observation of the Supreme Court, it is clear that two things are material to constitute an offence of Section 306 of IPC i.e. ‘abetment’ and ‘commission of suicide’ by any person. The very first requirement is to see whether offence of Section 306 of IPC has been committed or not; and second, whether the accused has done anything abetting the deceased to commit suicide. In the present case, it is indefinite as to what offence actually has been committed, but only it is presumed that in the exiting circumstances the deceased must have committed suicide and the available circumstance is a situation creating no other option and alternative before the deceased but to commit suicide, but there is no material indicating that the cause of death was suicide or otherwise. Thus, the required ingredients of formulating an offence of Section 306 of IPC are completely missing in this case. I have no hesitation to say that on the basis of material available at the time of exercising power under Section 228 of Cr.P.C., the court corroborates the said cause with the material collected by the prosecution, but the Court cannot presume the cause and cannot bring about the same from the collected material. In the case at hand, the investigating officer had taken the statement of witnesses who had presumed that since the deceased was insulted in the ceremony took place in the relation of the family and therefore, he might have committed suicide whereas as per the statement of witnesses, especially the wife of the deceased, when the deceased was going out from the house, in that event, he had not given any indication about his intention to commit suicide. It was the duty of the prosecution to first ascertain whether it was a suicide or something else. It was the duty of the prosecution to first ascertain whether it was a suicide or something else. On the basis of preponderance of probabilities, the offence cannot be formed and that presumption of the family members unless supported by cogent evidence collected by the prosecution cannot be given the shape by the court and the court cannot fled away from the said presumption and form the charge of the offence against the accused persons. In my opinion, unless it is ascertained that the deceased had committed suicide for a particular reason and accordingly material was collected by the prosecution to form out an offence of Section 306 of IPC and then the trial court determines whether that material is relevant or prima-facie sufficient to constitute an offence, in that case the interference in the order of the trial court would not seem to be proper but where reason is not disclosed and that is presumed by the prosecution and then collects the material then it is the duty of the trial court to first see whether the material so collected is related with the reason or not but if the reason is not there and before ascertaining the reason for committing suicide any material is collected then the whole exercise of the prosecution is meaningless and implicating anybody in the said offence presuming that he might have committed the offence is not proper. 19. The offence of Section 306 of IPC defines that whosoever abets the deceased for committing suicide is an accused of the offence under Section 306 of IPC. The word abetment is defined under Section 107 of IPC. Undisputably, it is not a case in which there was a direct abetment and it is also not a case of creating a situation before the deceased by continuous conduct of harassment, which had left no other alternative before him but to commit suicide. In my opinion, in absence of any reason for committing suicide in a definite manner and the material, initiating prosecution under Section 306 holding that there is sufficient material to constitute an offence does not appear to be proper and this such prosecution deserves to be quashed. In my opinion, in absence of any reason for committing suicide in a definite manner and the material, initiating prosecution under Section 306 holding that there is sufficient material to constitute an offence does not appear to be proper and this such prosecution deserves to be quashed. The power exercised by the court under Section 228 of Cr.P.C. to proceed further and to frame charge under Section 306 of IPC that they were the present applicants who had abetted the deceased to commit suicide is not proper and therefore in my opinion the order impugned framing charge against the applicants is liable to be set aside. 20. Accordingly, this revision is allowed. The order passed by the trial court which is impugned in this revision set aside. Accordingly, in my opinion, the material and the attempt made by the prosecution for initiating criminal prosecution of the present applicants under Section 306 of IPC is also not proper and the same is also hereby quashed.