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2024 DIGILAW 709 (CHH)

Ajeet Singh Kanwar, S/o. Shri Samaru Singh Kanwar v. State of Chhattisgarh, through Station House Officer, Bankimongra, District Korba (C. G. )

2024-10-17

AMITENDRA KISHORE PRASAD, SANJAY K.AGRAWAL

body2024
JUDGMENT : Sanjay K. Agrawal, J. 1. Invoking criminal appellate jurisdiction of this Court, the present two criminal appeals, under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘CrPC’) has been filed by three appellants herein i.e. A-1 Manoj Soni and A-2 Monu @ Gajpati Soni, who have filed Criminal Appeal No.372 of 2018, and A-3 Ajeet Singh Kanwar, who has filed Criminal Appeal No.366 of 2018, calling in question the legality, validity and correctness of the Judgment dated 22.2.2018 passed by learned Special Judge under Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, District Korba (Trial Court) in Special Criminal Case No.03 of 2017. 2. By the impugned Judgment dated 22.2.2018, each of the three appellants herein (A-1, A-2 & A-3) has been convicted for offences under Sections 147, 148 and 302/149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, ‘IPC’) and sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for 06 months and to pay Fine of Rs.100/- and in default of payment of fine to suffer additional Rigorous Imprisonment for 15 days for offence under Section 147 of IPC, to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for 01 year and to pay Fine of Rs.200/- and in default of payment of fine to suffer additional Rigorous Imprisonment for 01 month for offence under Section 148 of IPC and further to undergo Life Imprisonment and to pay Fine of Rs.5000/- and in default of payment of fine to suffer additional Rigorous Imprisonment for 06 months for offence under Section 302/149 of IPC, with a direction to run all the substantive sentences concurrently, while acquitting the co-accused person i.e. A-4 Naveen Kashyap of all the aforesaid offences. 3. Case of the prosecution, in a nutshell, is that on 25.11.2016 around 8:00 p.m., at Shantinagar, Balgi under Police Station Bankimongra, the three appellants herein i.e. A-1 Manoj, A-2 Monu and A-3 Ajeet along with other co-accused persons i.e. A-4 Naveen Kashyap (who stands acquitted by the Trial Court) and one juvenile in conflict with law, constituted an unlawful assembly and in furtherance of their common object caused riot and death of Banmali @ Banwari (deceased) assaulting him with knife, bricks and stones, knowing that the deceased Banmali was a member of a Scheduled Tribe. 4. 4. It is the case of the prosecution that PW-9 Kedar Sahu had first informed about the said incident to PW-11 Itwar Singh, father of deceased Banmali, who immediately after 1½ hours of the incident that took place around 8:00 p.m., lodged the FIR (Ex. P-38) at 9:30 p.m. at Police Station Bankimongra, District Korba. Subsequently, Merg Intimation (Ex. P-36) was recorded. Crime Details Form (Ex. P-39) was prepared by PW-15 S.K. Pathak, the Investigating Officer and Nazri Naksha (Ex. P-12) was prepared by PW-5 Chhatrapal Singh Maravi, the Patwari. Inquest (Ex. P-14) was conducted and the dead-body of the deceased Banmali was subjected to post-mortem which was conducted by PW-12 Dr. R.S. Kanwar who submitted his post-mortem report (Ex. P-40) opining the cause of his death to be hemorrhagic shock and the nature of death to be homicidal. Seizure of blood mixed earth, plain earth, a bloodstained stone, four bloodstained bricks and a Karizma motorcycle was made from the spot vide Ex. P-16. Similarly, two shirts and a jacket were also seized from the spot vide Ex. P-17. Statement of the witnesses were recorded under Section 161 of CrPC. Memorandum statement of A-1 Manoj was recorded vide Ex. P-18 pursuant to which, a full-shirt stained with blood like spots was seized vide Ex. P-22. Similarly, pursuant to the memorandum statement (Ex. P-19) of A-2 Monu, a full-shirt and trouser both stained with blood like spots were seized vide Ex. P-23. So also, pursuant to the memorandum statement (Ex.20) of A-3 Ajeet, a shirt and jeans pant both stained with blood like spots were seized vide Ex.24. As per Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) report (Ex. P-66), human blood was found on the stone (Ex. C) & bricks (Ex. D) seized from the spot as well as on the shirt (Ex. H) of A-1 Manoj, shirt (Ex. I) of A-2 Monu @ Gajpati and on the shirt (Ex. K) and full pant (Ex. L) of A-3 Ajeet and in the serology test, ‘O’ blood group was found on the T-shirt (Ex. E) of deceased Banmali and on the full-pant (Ex. L) of A-3 Ajeet. 5. H) of A-1 Manoj, shirt (Ex. I) of A-2 Monu @ Gajpati and on the shirt (Ex. K) and full pant (Ex. L) of A-3 Ajeet and in the serology test, ‘O’ blood group was found on the T-shirt (Ex. E) of deceased Banmali and on the full-pant (Ex. L) of A-3 Ajeet. 5. On completion of the investigation, the three appellants herein and co-accused Naveen Kashyap (who stands acquitted by the Trial Court), except the juvenile in conflict with law who was charge-sheeted before the Juvenile Justice Board, were charge-sheeted before the concerned Magistrate who took cognizance on the charge-sheet and the case, being exclusively triable by the Sessions Court, was committed to the court of Sessions for trial. The accused persons appeared before the Trial Court where charges were framed against them, to which they denied and claimed to be tried. 6. During the course of trial, in order to prove its case, the prosecution examined as many as 17 witnesses as PW-1 to PW-17 and exhibited 66 documents vide Exhibits P-1 to P-66. After closure of the prosecution evidence, statement of the respective accused persons was recorded under Section 313 of CrPC in which they denied the circumstances appearing against them in the evidence of the prosecution, pleaded innocence and false implication. In defence, four documents have been relied on as Exbs. D-1 to D-4. 7. After conclusion of the trial, learned Trial Court, by impugned Judgment dated 22.2.2018, on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence came on record, while acquitting A-4 Naveen Kashyap of all the offences, held the appellants herein i.e. A-1 Manoj, A-2 Monu and A-3 Ajeet guilty of the offences punishable under Sections 147, 148 & 302/149 of IPC acquitting them of offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 and accordingly convicted and sentenced them in the manner as mentioned at the chart given in the opening paragraph of this Judgment, which led to the filing of the present two appeals separately by the appellants herein assailing the impugned Judgment passed by the Trial Court. 8. Mr. 8. Mr. Surfaraj Khan, learned counsel appearing for A-1 Manoj and A-2 Monu in Criminal Appeal No.372/2018, submits as under:- (1) PW-6 Shatruhan and PW-10 Santara Bai, who are brother and sister of deceased Banmali, have only stated of having seen the appellants running away from the spot and therefore, at the best, they can be held to be res gestae witnesses and as such only on the basis of the statement of the res gestae witnesses, in absence of corroboration by any other piece of evidence available on record, conviction of the appellants cannot be made out. (2) PW-11 Itwar Singh, father of deceased Banmali, is not the eye-witness to the incident and he had reached the spot after the incident as according to him, he was informed regarding the incident in question by PW-9 Kedar Sahu, who however has not supported the case of the prosecution. PW-11 Itwar Singh is an interested witness and has improved his version as in the Crime Details Form (Ex. P-39) he is shown to have seen the appellants running away from the spot and in the Nazri Naksha (Ex. P-12) also it is not reflected that at which place he had seen the appellants causing injuries to deceased Banmali. The FIR (Ex. P-38) was lodged by PW-11 Itwar Singh and in the FIR he had only stated that he had seen the appellants running way from the spot but he did not state that the appellants had caused injuries to the deceased. As such, omissions of important facts, affecting the probabilities of the case, are relevant under Section 11 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (for short, ‘Evidence Act’) in judging the veracity of the prosecution case and in view of such vital omissions and contradictions, the statement of PW-11 Itwar Singh cannot be relied upon to base conviction of the appellants for offence under Section 302/149 of IPC and therefore the appellants are entitled to be acquitted of all the offences on the basis of benefit of doubt. 9. Mr. Aditya Khare, learned Counsel appearing for A-3 Ajeet in Criminal Appeal No.366/2018, adopts the submissions put forth by learned Counsel appearing for A-1 Manoj and A-2 Monu and accordingly prays for acquittal of A-3 Ajeet Singh also of all the offences giving him benefit of doubt. 10. Mr. 9. Mr. Aditya Khare, learned Counsel appearing for A-3 Ajeet in Criminal Appeal No.366/2018, adopts the submissions put forth by learned Counsel appearing for A-1 Manoj and A-2 Monu and accordingly prays for acquittal of A-3 Ajeet Singh also of all the offences giving him benefit of doubt. 10. Mr. Sharad Mishra, learned Panel Lawyer, appearing for the Respondent/State, however, submits that the prosecution has been able to bring home the offence beyond reasonable doubt and supports the impugned Judgment passed by the Trial Court being well merited and absolutely justified, praying for dismissal of the two appeals filed by the appellants herein. 11. We have heard learned Counsel for parties, considered their rival submissions and also perused the record of the case with utmost care and circumspection. 12. The first and foremost question, as to whether the death of deceased Banmali was homicidal in nature, has been answered by the Trial Court in affirmative relying upon the statement of PW-12 Dr. R.S. Kanwar who has conducted the post-mortem examination of deceased Banmali and also proved the post-mortem report (Ex.40) in which he has opined the cause of death of deceased Banmali to be hemorrhagic shock due to multiple injuries on vital organs and the nature of his death to be homicidal, which, in our considered opinion, is correct finding of fact based on evidence available on record and which is neither perverse nor contrary to the record. We, therefore, affirm the said finding of learned Trial Court, holding that the death of deceased Banmali was homicidal in nature. 13. Now, the question is as to whether the Trial Court is justified in holding the appellants to be author of the crime in question? 14. In order to base conviction of the appellants for the said offences, learned Trial Court has basically relied on the testimony of PW-6 Shatruhan, PW-10 Santara Bai and PW-11 Itwar Singh (who are brother, mother and father respectively of deceased Banmali) as eye-witnesses to the incident and on the basis of their testimony, conviction of the appellants has been recorded the correctness of which has been challenged by the appellants in the present two appeals. 15. The genesis of the offence, as disclosed by PW-11 Itwar Singh, is that at Village Shanti Nagar, Balgi, a Nawdha Ramayan Katha was organized by his son, deceased Banmali. 15. The genesis of the offence, as disclosed by PW-11 Itwar Singh, is that at Village Shanti Nagar, Balgi, a Nawdha Ramayan Katha was organized by his son, deceased Banmali. According to the prosecution, on the date and time of offence i.e. 25.11.2016 around 8:00 p.m., A-1 Manoj, A-2 Monu A-3 Ajeet along with other co-accused persons had reached the spot i.e., Bazar Pasra, where Nawdha Ramayan was being organized, wearing shoes which was objected by deceased Banmali and on account of which an altercation took place between them that turned violent and culminated into death of deceased Banmali. Further case of the prosecution is that at Nawdha Ramayan pavilion, PW-11 Itwar Singh was informed about the incident in question by PW-9 Kedar Sahu and then PW-11 Itwar Singh collected a wooden stick and rushed to the spot and as per the prosecution case, PW-11 Itwar Singh had seen the appellants herein (A-1, A-2 & A-3) along with two co-accused persons assaulting his son, deceased Banmali. However, in the FIR (Ex. P-38) lodged by PW-11 Itwar Singh at 9:30 p.m., which was lodged just after 1½ hours of the incident that occurred at 8:00 p.m. on 25.11.2016, he has only stated that PW-9 Kedar Sahu had informed him that his son, deceased Banmali, was being assaulted by some persons at Bazar Pasra and then he immediately rushed to the spot carrying a small wooden stick and saw the appellants herein along with other co-accused person running from the spot. PW-11 Itwar Singh did not say in the FIR (Ex. P-38) that he had seen the appellants herein (A-1, A-2 & A-3) assaulting his son, deceased Banmali. FIR (Ex. P-38) has been proved by PW-11 Itwar Singh himself. Thereafter, at 10:20 p.m., on the same day, Merg (Ex.36) was recorded which was also proved by PW-11 Itwar Singh. Crime Details Form (Site Map) was prepared by the Investigating Officer (PW-15) vide Ex. FIR (Ex. P-38) has been proved by PW-11 Itwar Singh himself. Thereafter, at 10:20 p.m., on the same day, Merg (Ex.36) was recorded which was also proved by PW-11 Itwar Singh. Crime Details Form (Site Map) was prepared by the Investigating Officer (PW-15) vide Ex. P-39 on 26.11.2016 and was proved by PW-11 Itwar Singh himself and in which it is mentioned that from Spot No.2, PW-11 Itwar Singh had seen the appellants (A-1, A-2 & A-3) running away from the place of incident; from Spot No.3 his son, PW-6 Shatruhan, had seen the incident and also the appellants running away from the place of incident and, from Spot No.4, his wife, PW-10 Santra Bai, is shown to have seen the incident and there are two electric poles also have been shown at the place of incident. Nazri Naksha (Ex. P-12), the another Site Map, was prepared by the Patwari (PW-5) at the instance of PW-11 Itwar Singh and in which also the dead-body of deceased Banmali has been shown to be lying at Spot No.1 and at the Spot No.2 an electric pole has been shown at the distance of 7 meter from Spot No.1 with no electricity. In the said Nazri Naksha (Ex. P-12), it has not been shown as to from which spot, PW-11 Itwar Singh, PW-6 Shatruhan and PW10 Santara Bai had seen the incident. 16. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, the question that has been raised on behalf of the appellants to be considered is, as to whether the Trial Court is justified in relying upon PW-6 Shatruhan, PW-10 Santara Bai and PW-11 Itwar Singh as eye-witnesses to the incident to base conviction of the appellants (A1, A-2 & A-3) for the said offences. 17. In this regard, we will first consider the statement of PW-6 Shatruhan, brother of deceased Banmali, one of the alleged eye-witnesses. Though in paragraph-3 of his statement, PW-6 Shatruhan has supported the case of the prosecution stating that he had seen the appellants (A-1, A-2 & A-3) and other co-accused person assaulting the deceased, but in paragraph-4 he has stated that when he and his mother (PW-10) reached the spot the said accused persons were running away from the spot after assaulting the deceased. But, the fact remains that since PW-6 Shatruhan had reached the spot after the incident and had seen the appellants running away from the spot after the incident, he can be termed as a res gestae witness and his testimony is admissible under Section 6 of the Evidence Act. 18. PW-10 Santara Bai, mother of deceased Banmali and the another so-called eye-witness, though supporting the statement of PW-6 Shatruhan Singh has stated in paragraph-2 of her statement that when she and her younger son (PW-6) had reached the spot, she had seen the appellants (A-1, A-2 & A-3) and other co-accused person running away from the spot after assaulting her son, deceased Banmali, with bricks and stone, but in paragraph-19 of her statement she has clearly stated that she had not seen the incident. As such, PW-10 Santaran Bai, not being an actual eye-witness to the incident, she also can be branded as a res gestae witness in terms of the provisions of Section 6 of the Evidence Act. 19. Thus, considering the statement of PW-6 Shatruhan and PW-10 Santara Bai, at the best, they would fall under the category of res gestae and though their statement is admissible under Section 6 of the Evidence Act and is relevant fact, but in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court rendered in the matters of Badruddin Rukonddim Karpude v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1981 SC 1223 and Sukhar v. State of UP, (1999) 9 SCC 507 , their statement at the most being an admissible evidence and relevant fact under Section 6 of the Evidence Act, no conviction can be recorded on that basis unless it is corroborated by direct or circumstantial evidence. 20. In the matter of Sukhar (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court, while considering Section 6 of the Evidence Act, have held that for conviction on the basis of admissible evidence under Section 6 of the Evidence Act, it must be corroborated either from oral evidence or from any other circumstances, and observed in paragraphs 10 & 11 as under:- “10. Applying the ratio of the aforesaid two cases to the evidence of PW 2, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that his statement indicating that the injured told him that his nephew has fired at him, would become admissible under Section 6 of the Evidence Act. Applying the ratio of the aforesaid two cases to the evidence of PW 2, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that his statement indicating that the injured told him that his nephew has fired at him, would become admissible under Section 6 of the Evidence Act. We are, therefore, unable to accept the first submission of Ms Goswami, learned counsel appearing for the appellant. 11. The next question that arises for consideration is whether even if the statement becomes admissible, can the statement be held to be so reliable that a conviction under Section 307 can be based thereupon. PW 2 in the cross-examination candidly admitted that Sukhar, the present appellant and he are inimical to each other since long before. It was also elicited in the cross-examination of the said witness that by the time he reached the scene of occurrence, more than 20 persons had gathered next to Nakkal and yet none of them has been examined by the prosecution to corroborate PW 2 as to what was told to him by the injured. The witness also stated in the cross-examination that Nakkal was naming the accused as his assailant in front of all those people who had gathered but it is not understood as to why the prosecution has chosen not to examine any one of them but to examine only PW 2 who was admittedly inimically disposed towards the accused/appellant. In this view of the matter, the evidence of PW 2 cannot be held to be of such an unimpeachable character on whose testimony alone the conviction can be based without any corroboration. On the other hand, the witness being inimical to the accused and on account of what has been elicited in his cross-examination, his evidence requires corroboration before being accepted. Admittedly there is not an iota of corroboration either from any oral evidence or from any other circumstances. In this view of the matter, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the conviction of the appellant on the unreliable and shaky evidence of PW 2 without any corroboration, cannot be sustained. We accordingly set aside the conviction and sentence of appellant and acquit him of the charges levelled against him. The accused who is in jail should be released forthwith. The appeal is allowed accordingly.” 21. We accordingly set aside the conviction and sentence of appellant and acquit him of the charges levelled against him. The accused who is in jail should be released forthwith. The appeal is allowed accordingly.” 21. In view of above, it is quite established that even if PW-6 Shatruhan and PW-10 Santara Bai are held to be the witnesses who have seen the appellants running away from the spot, but in absence of corroboration they could only be considered as res gestae witnesses and as held in Badruddin Rukonddim Karpude (supra) and Sukhar (supra), conviction cannot be maintained in absence of corroboration either from oral evidence or from circumstantial evidence, which seems to be not there in the present case. 22. Now, so far as PW-11 Itwar Singh is concerned, he has also been relied upon by the Trial Court as an eye-witness to the incident. Before considering the statement of PW-11 Itwar Singh as eye-witness, it has to be borne in mind that he is father of deceased Banmali and as such he being a relative witness of the deceased, his testimony as an eye-witness is required to be scrutinized with great care and caution. According to PW-11 Itwar Singh, he was informed regarding the incident in question by PW-9 Kedar Sahu and then he immediately took a wooden stick and rushed to the spot. However, the said witness PW-9 Kedar Sahu did not state in his statement that he had informed PW-11 Itwar Singh about the incident. In paragraph-3 of his statement, PW-11 Itwar Singh has stated that when he reached the spot carrying a small wooden stick, he saw the appellants (A-1, A-2 & A-3) and other co-accused all were assaulting the deceased and when he shouted then all of them ran away from the spot after leaving the deceased Banmali who was lying on the spot in a pool of blood. PW-10 Itwar Singh has lodged and proved the FIR (Ex. P-38). Crime Details Form (Ex. P-39) and Nazri Naksha (Ex. P-12), the two site maps, both have also been prepared at the instance of PW-11 Itwar Singh himself. 23. Given the aforesaid statement of PW-11 Itwar Singh, the first objection that has been raised by learned counsels appearing for the appellants is that PW-11 Itwar Singh has himself lodged the FIR (Ex. P-39) and Nazri Naksha (Ex. P-12), the two site maps, both have also been prepared at the instance of PW-11 Itwar Singh himself. 23. Given the aforesaid statement of PW-11 Itwar Singh, the first objection that has been raised by learned counsels appearing for the appellants is that PW-11 Itwar Singh has himself lodged the FIR (Ex. P-38) in which he has only stated that he was informed by PW-9 Kedar Sahu that his son, deceased Banmali, was being assaulted by some persons at Bazar Pasra and then he immediately rushed to the spot carrying a small wooden stick and when reached the spot he had seen the appellants (A-1, A-2 & A-3) and other co-accused running away from the place of incident. However, PW-11 Itwar Singh did not say in the FIR (Ex. P-38), which was lodged at 9:30 p.m., just after 1½ hours of the incident that had occurred around 8:00 p.m., that he had seen the appellants (A-1, A-2 & A-3) assaulting the deceased Banmali. 24. It is well settled law that FIR is a previous statement which can, strictly speaking, be only used to corroborate or contradict the maker of it. But, omissions of important facts, affecting the probabilities of the case, are relevant under Section 11 of the Evidence Act in judging the veracity of the prosecution case. In this regard, the decision of the Supreme Court rendered in the matter of Ram Kumar Pande v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1975 SC 1026 may be noticed of which paragraph-9 reads as under:- “9. No doubt, an F.I.R. is a previous statement which can, strictly speaking, be only used to corroborate or contradict the maker of it. But, in this case, it had been made by the father of the murdered boy to whom all the important facts of the occurrence, so far as they were, known up to 9.15 p.m. on 23-3-1970, were bound to have been communicated. If his daughters had seen the appellant inflicting a blow' on Harbinder Singh, the father would certainly have mentioned it in the F.I.R. We think that omissions of such important facts, affecting the probabilities of the case, are relevant under Section 11 of the Evidence Act in judging the veracity of the prosecution case.” 25. If his daughters had seen the appellant inflicting a blow' on Harbinder Singh, the father would certainly have mentioned it in the F.I.R. We think that omissions of such important facts, affecting the probabilities of the case, are relevant under Section 11 of the Evidence Act in judging the veracity of the prosecution case.” 25. Similarly, in the matter of Sujit Biswas v. State of Assam, (2013) 12 SCC 406 , it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that the omission of important facts affecting the probability of the case, is a relevant factor under Section 11 of the Evidence Act to judge the veracity of the case of the prosecution and observed in paragraph-24 as under:- “24. Undoubtedly, the FIR lodged has disclosed the previous statement of the informant which can only be used to other corroborate or contradict the maker of such statement. However, in the event that the informant is a person who claims to know the facts, and is also closely related to the victim, it is expected that he would have certainly mentioned in the FIR, all such relevant facts. The omission of important facts affecting the probability of the case, is a relevant factor under Section 11 of the Evidence Act to judge the veracity of the case of the prosecution. (Vide: Ram Kumar Pandey v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1975 SC 1026 ).” 26. Likewise, in the matter of Balaka Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1975 SC 1962 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held in paragraph-10 as under:- “10. In view of these circumstances and the evidence discussed above, we are clearly of the opinion that the prosecution case against the five appellants has also not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and the manner in which the FIR and the inquest report have been made throws considerable doubt on the complicity of the five appellants in the crime.” 27. In the instant case, PW-11 Itwar Singh, claims to be an eye-witness to the incident and closely related to the deceased being his father, was expected to clearly mention in the FIR that his son, deceased Banmali, was assaulted by the accused persons but he omitted to mention that in the FIR (Ex. P-38) which has been proved by him. As such, the omission in the FIR (Ex. P-38) which has been proved by him. As such, the omission in the FIR (Ex. P-38) that the three appellants (A-1, A-2 & A-3) had assaulted the deceased Banmali is vital omission and is relevant fact under the provision of Section 11 of the Evidence Act. 28. Another fact which needs consideration is that the incident is of around 8:00 p.m. in the night. According to Crime Details Form (Ex. P-39) there were two electric poles near the place of incident. However, as per the statement made by PW-9 Kedar Sahu in paragraph-13, there was no electricity but darkness at the spot. Similarly, PW-11 Itwar Singh has also admitted in paragraph-33 of his statement that it had become dark outside at the time of incident, and he has failed to disclose whether there was light coming from the two electric poles at the spot. As such, on account of darkness at the spot, there was no possibility of PW-11 Itwar Singh having seen the appellants (A-1, A-2 & A-3) of committing any overt-act. Furthermore, PW-9 Kedar Sahu, who is the star witness and is said to have first informed about the incident to PW-11 Itwar Singh, has stated in paragraph-4 of his statement that when he reached the place of incident, by that time the deceased Banmali was already lying dead at the spot. He was subjected to cross-examination but nothing could be extracted so as to hold that he had seen the appellants (A-1, A-2 & A-3) assaulting the deceased Banmali and had informed that fact to PW-11 Itwar Singh. 29. The Supreme Court in the matter of Shingara Singh v. State of Haryana and Another, (2003) 12 SCC 758 has held that the omission to show essential feature in the site plan is a lapse on the part of the Investigating officer and observed in paragrph-29 as under:- “29. The evidence on record with regard to the existence of cots in the court-yard of Gurdeep Singh, the existence of a bicycle, as also about the existence of a ladder is rather unsatisfactory and creates a serious doubt as to whether the prosecution witnesses are telling the truth. The omission to show them in both the site plans cannot be attributed to a mere lapse on the part of the investigating agency. The omission to show them in both the site plans cannot be attributed to a mere lapse on the part of the investigating agency. In fact so far as the site plans are concerned, the case of the prosecution is that they were prepared in the presence of PW 5 and another witness and on their pointing. However, PW 5 denied that the plans were prepared in his presence. The other witness was not examined.” 30. Similarly, in the matter of Baldev Singh and Another v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2003) 9 SCC 45 it has been held by the Supreme Court that the site plan is not a mere formality and it is essential feature to highlight the importance of the site and held as under:- “13…..The site plan prepared by Arvind Khare does not show the presence of cycles or the bushes although the site plan mentions the place wherefrom the two witnesses claim to have seen the incident.” 31. The Supreme Court also in the matter of Criminal Trials Guidelines Regarding Inadequacies and Deficiencies, In Re v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others, (2021) 10 SCC 598 , in paragraph-3, has issued the following guidelines regarding site plan:- “3. SCENE MAHAZAR/ SPOT PANCHANAMA i. A site plan of the place of occurrence of an incident shall be appended by the Investigating Officer to the scene mahazar or spot panchnama. ii. The site plan shall be prepared by the Investigating Officer by hand, and shall disclose a. the place of occurrence, b. the place where the body (or bodies) was/were found, c. the place where material exhibits and/or weapons, d. blood stains and/or body fluids had fallen, e. the place where bullet shells, if any, were found or have caused impact, f. the source of light, if any and g. adjoining natural and man-made structures or features such as walls, pits, fences, trees/bushes, if any and h. elevation of structures and their location. iii. The preparation of this sketch by the Investigating Officer shall be followed by a scaled site plan prepared by police draftsman, if available, or such other authorized or nominated draftsman by the State Government, who shall prepare the scaled site plan after visiting the spot. iv. The relevant details in the mahazar or panchnama shall be marked and correlated in the said site plan.” 32. Coming to the Crime Details Form (Ex. iv. The relevant details in the mahazar or panchnama shall be marked and correlated in the said site plan.” 32. Coming to the Crime Details Form (Ex. P-39) i.e. the Site Plan of the place of incident proved by PW-11 Itwar Singh and prepared in his presence by the Investigating Officer (PW-15), it is mentioned that from Spot No.2, PW-11 Itwar Singh had seen the appellants running away from the premises. As such, according to Crime Details Form (Ex. P-39), PW-11 Itwar Singh has only seen the appellants (A-1, A-2 & A-3) running away from the premises and he has not seen the appellants assaulting the deceased. From the another Site-Map i.e. Nazri Naksha (Ex. P-12) prepared by the Patwari (PW-5) at the instance of PW-11 Itwar Singh, also it does not reflect that at which place PW-11 Itwar Singh was standing and had seen the appellants causing injuries to the deceased. As such, from the two Site Maps (Ex. P-39 & P-12) also it is not duly established that PW-11 Itwar Singh had seen the appellants assaulting his son, deceased Banmali. 33. Further, according to the statement made by PW-1 Santoshi Bai, wife of deceased Banmali, at the time of incident she was at Nawdha Ramayan program and after enquiring about her husband when she reached the spot she found the mutilated dead body of her husband, deceased Banmali, lying there and then she ran towards the pavilion where Nawadh Ramayan was going on and informed the said incident to the persons present there and thereafter when she again reached the spot, she found A-1 Manoj and A-2 Monu standing near the dead body of her husband and where A-1 Manoj and A-2 Monu had confessed extra-judicially before her to have killed the deceased by themselves. However, it is beyond belief that the persons against whom there was an allegation of killing the deceased would make extra-judicial confession to the wife of the deceased of killing her husband. As such, the extra-judicial confession alleged to have been made by A-1 Manoj and A-2 Monu before PW-1 Santoshi Bai cannot be held to be reliable and trustworthy. 34. Though, in FSL report (Ex. P-66), human blood was found on the blood mixed earth (Ex. A), stone (Ex. C) & bricks (Ex. D) seized from the spot; T-shirt (Ex. E), shirt (Ex. F) & jacket (Ex. 34. Though, in FSL report (Ex. P-66), human blood was found on the blood mixed earth (Ex. A), stone (Ex. C) & bricks (Ex. D) seized from the spot; T-shirt (Ex. E), shirt (Ex. F) & jacket (Ex. G) and also on the shoes (Ex. N) and jeans pant (Ex. O) of deceased Banmali; shirt (Ex H) of A-1 Manoj, shirt (Ex. I) of A-2 Monu @ Gajpati except for his trouser (Ex. J) in which blood was found to be disintegrated and on the shirt (Ex. K) and full pant (Ex. L) of A-3 Ajeet and, in serology test, ‘O’ blood group was found on the T-shirt (Ex. E) of deceased Banmali and on the full-pant (Ex. L) of A-3 Ajeet, other than the articles on which the results of blood group were found to be inconclusive. However, as is evident from the record that the aforesaid articles were seized on 26.11.2016 but they were sent for forensic examination to the FSL by the Superintendent of Police, Korba on 9.2.2017 vide Ex. P-9, after more than two months from its siezure, and which were received by the FSL office on 10.2.2017 as per receipt (Ex. P-8). There is no legal evidence on record that the seized articles were kept in a safe custody during the said period and no reason has been shown for keeping the seized articles for more than two months with the police without any rhyme or reason and therefore possibility of fabrication and tampering with the seized articles cannot be ruled out. Nonetheless, the FSL report is a corroborative piece of evidence, but not a standalone piece of evidence and unless blood found on the articles seized from the accused is connected to the murder, conviction of the accused only on the basis of FSL report which is a corroborative piece of evidence cannot be made out. 35. Concludingly, in view of the aforesaid discussion of evidence, we can safely held that PW-11 Itwar Singh is not an eye-witness to the incident for the reason that he was informed about the incident by PW-9 Kedar Sahu and the said witness (PW-9) has not supported the case of the prosecution and has not stated that he had informed about the incident to PW-11 Itwar Singh. Furthermore, as per the statement of PW-9 Kedar Sahu as well as PW-11 Itwar Singh, there was darkness at the place of incident and as such there was no possibility of PW-11 Itwar Singh to have seen the appellants causing injuries to the deceased. Moreover, the site map (Ex. P-39) only suggests that PW-11 Itwar Singh had seen the appellants running away from the place of incident. PW-11 Itwar Singh also while lodging of the FIR (Ex. P-38) omitted the fact that he had seen the appellants assaulting the deceased, which is a relevant fact under Section 11 of the Evidence Act. So also, PW-6 Shatruhan and PW-10 Santara Bai are res gestae witnesses in light of Badruddin Rukonddim Karpude (supra) and Sukhar (supra), but there is no corroboration of their testimony by any corroborative piece of evidence except the FSL report in which though human blood has been found on the clothes seized from the appellants but there is possibilty of tampering and fabrication of the seized articles as they were seized on 26.11.2016 and after more than two months from its seizure they were sent for forensic examination on 9.2.2017 and received by the FSL office on 10.2.2017, and therefore only on the basis of the FSL report, which is a corroborative piece of evidence, conviction of the appellants is hard to be sustained. 36. Accordingly, we set-aside the conviction and sentence of all the three appellants herein i.e. A-1 Manoj, A-2 Monu and A-3 Ajeet for offences under Sections 147, 148 and 302/149 of IPC recorded by the impugned Judgment dated 22.2.2018 by Trial Court and acquit them of the said offences on the basis of benefit of doubt. They are stated to be in jail since 26.11.2016. We direct them to be set at liberty forthwith, if their detention is not required in any other offence. 37. As a consequence, both the Criminal Appeals are allowed. 38. Let a certified copy of this Judgment along with the original record be transmitted forthwith to the Trial Court and the concerned Superintendent of Jail be also supplied with a copy of this Judgment, for information and necessary action, if any, at the earliest.