ORDER : 1) The challenge in this writ petition is to the removal of the petitioner from the post of Gram Panchayat Secretary on the basis of resolution passed by the Gram Panchayat, Munund, under the Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam whereby it is alleged that the service of the petitioner who was working as Secretary of Gram Panchayat, Munund, has been terminated without any due inquiry and without following the procedure established by law. 2) Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that by resolution dated 14.08.2002 (Annexure P-4) the petitioner has been removed from the post of Secretary on the basis of resolution of the Gram Panchayat. He would submit that once the petitioner was appointed as a Secretary Gram Panchayat, his services would be governed by Chhhattisgarh Panchayat Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules 1999 wherein rule 5(b) prescribed the major penalties of removal from service not disqualifying for future employment and the procedure has been prescribed under Rule 7 which puts an embargo that before dispensing with the service by way of termination/dismissal of service procedure to follow the provisions of Rule 7 of the Rules 1999 would be mandatory to hold a departmental enquiry. He would submit that the petitioner though against such dismissal filed appeal, but the SDO by order dated Annexure P-3 dated 25.04.2003 has dismissed the appeal on the ground that against the resolution of the Gram Panchayat u/s 91 of the Act of Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, appeal or revision would not lie. He submits that the very inception of termination of service was bad in law and since it was with a stigma of allegation, without departmental enquiry the petitioner could not have been removed. He refers to a decision of this Court reported in 2006(2)CGLJ 186 (Dhaluram Kosaria Vs. State of C.G., decided by this court and submits that in the similar situation without departmental enquiry, the dismissal of service was effected where the Court held that the petitioner was entitled to be reinstated in service with back wages to certain extent. Therefore, the present petitioner may be reinstated to the post as he would otherwise due to retire in December of this year i.e., 2024. 3) Mr. Therefore, the present petitioner may be reinstated to the post as he would otherwise due to retire in December of this year i.e., 2024. 3) Mr. Jitendra Pali, Advocate, appears for respondent no.3 would submit that there is no fact on record that the petitioner was ever appointed as Secretary Gram Panchayat, Munund and they could not lay hands as the records were not available. He submits that the records of the proceedings are not available in the Gram Panchayat and the records were available with one Shiv Kumar Sahu who was the earlier secretary of Gram Panchayat. The Gram Panchayat Munund, respondent no. 4 was again directed to be served and the record would show that the service was effected on the Sarpanch named one Dhan Bai has received the notice but no representation is made. The certified copy of resolution Annexure-4 issued by the Sarpanch Gram Panchayat Munund is placed. A perusal of it would show that it is written that a meeting was convened on 14.08.2002 wherein certain allegations were attributed to the petitioner who was working as a Secretary that he did not contribute or co-operate in payment of Nirashrit pension and celebration of 15th of August and despite notice, he did not appear. It further purports that on a complaint when the records were inspected, certain manipulations were also found. Therefore, his services as secretary was dispensed with, meaning thereby he was dispensed with service. 4) The submission of respondent no.3 who is before the Court that the petitioner has not filed any document of his appointment as the appointments are statutory under section 69 of the Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam and he was required to place on record. I am unable to appreciate the fact for the reason that the Gram Panchayat who dispensed the service of the petitioner acknowledged the capacity of petitioner as a Secretary in its resolution. The Gram Panchayat is not before the Court. If at the same time, the services were dispensed with holding the capacity of the petitioner as a Secretary, it cannot be said by C.E.O., Janpad Panchayat that since no appointment letter was filed, it should be held otherwise. It is also not stated by Janpad Panchayat that wrong status of the petitioner was shown. If at the same time, the services were dispensed with holding the capacity of the petitioner as a Secretary, it cannot be said by C.E.O., Janpad Panchayat that since no appointment letter was filed, it should be held otherwise. It is also not stated by Janpad Panchayat that wrong status of the petitioner was shown. On the other hand, the C.E.O has shown its inability to state anything on the ground that no documents are available with them. Instead, a document has been filed to the effect that all the relevant documents are missing. So the C.E.O has no knowledge about the position and status of petitioner. 5) The person who could have clarified the position of Gram Panchayat clearly addressed the respondent in its resolution as a Secretary to dispense with service, would, therefore dominate the track, instead, to hold that the petitioner was not appointed as a Secretary of Gram Panchayat, Murund. The issue can be seen from the other angle that if the petitioner was not appointed as a Secretary then what was the occasion to dispense with the services by resolution. Consequently, the contradictory submission and the resolution cannot go along to hold it otherwise that the petitioner was not working as a secretary. 6) Now coming back to the statutory provisions, under the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, Chhattisgarh Panchayat Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules 1999 have been framed in exercise of power conferred by sub-section (1) of section 95 read with section (2) of Section 70 of Chhattisgarh Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam . Section 2 deals with definitions. Section 2 sub-section (f) defines the member of Panchayat Services or a Panchayat Servant, which means any person appointed to the Panchayat Service and includes an officer or servant allocated to the panchayat service; 7) Rule 5(b) prescribes major penalty which reads as under :- (iv) Reduction in rank including reduction to a lower post or time-scale or to a lower stage in a time-scale. (v) Compulsory retirement (vi) Removal from service no disqualifying for future employment, (vii) Dismissal from service which shall ordinarily be a disqualification for future employment 8) Reading of the resolution of Gram Panchayat would show that the petitioner was appointed to the post of Secretary and it cannot be inferred that he was on probation and reading of the resolution would show that he was not on probation. Rule 7 of the Rules 1999 prescribes the procedure for imposing major penalty. Sub-Rule (1) speaks that major penalty shall be passed after the formal inquiry is held and the manner is also provided. Rule 7 of the Rules 1999 reads as under : 7. Procedure for imposing major penalties.- (1) No order, imposing on a member of the Panchayat Service, any of the penalties specified in clause (iv) to (via) of rule 5 shall be passed except after a formal inquiry is held as far as may be, in the manner hereinafter provided. (2) when an order for formal inquiry has been made, the disciplinary authority shall frame Definite charges on the basis of allegations and shall communicate such charges, along-with the statement of the allegations, to the member of the Panchayat Service and also require him to submit within such time as may be specified a written statement of defence and also to state whether he desires to be heard in person. (3) The person against whom inquiry is to be held shall, for the purpose of preparing toe defence, be permitted to inspect and take extracts from such records as he may specify: Provided that such permission may be refused if, for reasons to be recorded in writing, in the opinion of the Enquiry Officer such records are not relevant for the purpose or it is against the public interest to allow his access thereto. (4) On receipt of the written statement of defence or if any such statement is not received within the time specified, the disciplinary authority may himself enquire into such of charges as are not admitted or appoint an Enquiry Officer to hold the inquiry and forward to him his report and, if advised, his recommendation alongwith all the inquiry papers. (5) The disciplinary authority may nominate any person to present the case in support of the charges before the Enquiry Officer. The member of the Panchayat Service may present his case with the assistance of any other Panchayat Servant of State Government servant approved by the Enquiry Officer but may not engage a legal practitioner for the purpose, unless the person nominated by the disciplinary authority as aforesaid is a legal practitioner or unless the disciplinary authority having regard to the circumstances of the case so permits. (6) If the servant of the Panchayat Service desires to be heard in person, file shall be so heard. If he so desires or if the disciplinary authority so directs, an oral enquiry shall be held by the Enquiry Officer. At such inquiry evidence shall be heard as to such of the allegations as are not admitted and the person charged shall be entitled to cross examine the witness, to give evidence in person, to produce documentary evidence, if any, and to have such witness called as may wish : Provided that the Enquiry Officer may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, refuse to call a witness. (7) At the conclusion of the inquiry, the Enquiry Officer shall prepare a report of the inquiry, recording his findings on each of the charges together with reasons therefor. (8) The proceedings conducted against the persons charged shall contain a sufficient record of : (I) The charges framed against such person and the statement of allegations; (ii) The written statement of defence, if any; (iii) The oral evidence taken in the course of the inquiry; (iv) The documentary evidence considered in the course of the inquiry - (v) The orders, if any, made by the Enquiry Officer or the disciplinary authority as the case may be with regard to the inquiry; (vi) A report setting out the findings on each charge and the reasons therefor. (9) the Enquiry Officer, if he is other than the disciplinary authority, shall submit the records of the proceedings mentioned in clause (8) above to the disciplinary authority without recommendation relating to the penalty to be imposed. The disciplinary authority shall consider the record of the enquiry and its findings on each charge, having regard to the findings on the charges and the record (if the proceedings) if he is of the opinion that any of the penalties specified in clauses (iv) to (vii) of rule 5 should be imposed, it shall furhish to the person charged a copy of the report of the Enquiry Officer, and where the disciplinary authority is not the Enquiry Officer a statement of its findings together with brief reasons for disagreement, if any, with the findings of the Enquiry Officer. (10) The disciplinary authority shall consider the representation, if any, made by the person charged in response to the notice and determine the penalty, if any, should be imposed and shall pass appropriate order on the case. (11) The orders passed by the disciplinary authority shall be communicated to the member of the Panchayat Service, who shall also be supplied with a copy of the report of the Enquiry Officer an where, disciplinary authority is not the Enquiry Officer, with the findings of the Enquiry Officer, unless they have already been supplied to the person charged.” 9) Here in the instant case, the resolution itself would show that no enquiry of any sort as contemplated under Rule 7 was conducted. Similar issue came up for consideration before this Court in Dhaluram Kosaria v. State of CG (supra) reported in 2006 (2) CGLJ 186 wherein the Court held that Rule 7 of Rules 1999 which imposes obligation to conduct an inquiry in consonance with principles of natural justice has not been followed, hence the termination is bad and vitiated on the ground of non-compliance of the procedural fairness. Therefore, if any termination or dismissal of service is effected by not following Rule 7, it would be vitiated. Paras 19 and 20 are relevant and quoted herein below : “19. It is further admitted by all the parties that the procedure for holding an enquiry is prescribed under Rule 7 of the Rules 1999 for imposition of major penalty, that has not been followed. Hence, the termination is bad and vitiated on the ground of non-compliance of the statutory provisions and denial of the principles of natural justice. It amounts to infraction of not only the provisions of Rule 7 of the Rules 1999 but the provisions of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India also. The Order is in fact penal in nature having civil consequences and as such the elaborate provision of Rule 7 of the Rules 1999 was applicable in the case of the Petitioner before terminating his services. 20. With regard to the availability of the alternative remedy, it is well settled that the rule of exclusion of writ jurisdiction by availability of an alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of the compulsion. In the present case the facts are not disputed. 20. With regard to the availability of the alternative remedy, it is well settled that the rule of exclusion of writ jurisdiction by availability of an alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of the compulsion. In the present case the facts are not disputed. The entire case rests on the infraction of constitutional protection prescribed under Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India and non-application of the statutory provisions, as such, the alternative remedy may not be a proper forum. The Supreme Court in the case of Harbanslal Sahnia and Another versus Indian Oil Corporation Ltd MANU/SC/1199/2022 : (2003) 2 SCC 107 in para 7 has held as under : 7. Suffice it to observe that the rule of exclusion of writ jurisdiction by availability of an alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion. In an appropriate case, in spite of availability of the alternative remedy, the High Court may still exercise its writ jurisdiction in at least three contingencies : (i) Where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental rights; (ii) Where there is failure of principles of natural justice; or (iii) where the orders or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction of the vires of an Act is challenged….” 10) Applying the aforesaid principles and reading of provisions of Rule 7, I am of the view that there has been flagrant violation of Rule 7 of Rules 1999 which imposes the condition to conduct inquiry before the services of an employee is dispensed with. Therefore, under the circumstances, the termination which has been effected on the basis of resolution dated 14.08.2003 is set aside. The Order of SDO would further show that one Harish Chandra is appointed as Secretary in place of appellant and he is stated to have expired on 15.07.2008 as per the death certificate placed on record vide Annexure P-6. In absence of presence of Gram Panchayat, it is not clear that presently whether any other person is working as Secretary in the Gram Panchayat or not. 11) For the foregoing reasons discussions made hereinabove, the order of termination dated 14.08.2002 (Annexure P-4) is set aside. 12) In respect of of back wages, no foundation has been laid to establish the fact that whether the petitioner was gainfully employed else-where or not during this period. 11) For the foregoing reasons discussions made hereinabove, the order of termination dated 14.08.2002 (Annexure P-4) is set aside. 12) In respect of of back wages, no foundation has been laid to establish the fact that whether the petitioner was gainfully employed else-where or not during this period. Even otherwise keeping in view that the termination order has been vitiated not on merit but on account of non-compliance of the statutory provisions before terminating the services of the petitioner and following the decision rendered in Dhaluram Kosaria Versus State of C.G (Supra), 30% back wages would be sufficient in the interest of justice. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. No order as to costs.