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2024 DIGILAW 71 (ORI)

Tankadhar Behera v. Lingaraj Lenka

2024-06-26

MURAHARI SRI RAMAN

body2024
JUDGMENT Murahari Sri Raman, J. The challenge: Assailing the Judgment dated 01.12.2009 of the Additional District Judge, Fast Track Court, Dhenkanal rendered in RFA No.61 of 2006 directed against the Judgment and decree dated 14.09.2006 and 21.09.2006 respectively passed by the Civil Judge (Junior Division), Dhenkanal in CS No.50 of 2005, though second appeal, RSA bearing No.102 of 2010, was preferred under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ('CPC', for brevity), being allowed to be converted vide Order dated 30.09.2010 to Civil Revision Petition, the petitioner (Respondent-Plaintiff) approached this Court invoking provisions of Section 115, with a prayer to set aside the Judgment and Order of the Appellate Court.The facts: 2. The facts as adumbrated by the petitioner in the civil revision petition reveals that in the Civil Suit bearing No.50 of 2005 instituted before the Civil Judge (Junior Division), Dhenkanal it was the case of the petitionerrespondent-plaintiff that on 02.07.2005 at about 9.00 P.M. during a quarrel that ensued between two groups in which one Subhendu Kumar Nayak while mercilessly being assaulted, the petitioner was present at that relevant time and place of occurrence. He intervened and rescued Subhendu Kumar Nayak from the clutches of miscreants. Thereafter, at around 10.00 P.M. the petitioner and said Suvendu Kumar Nayak went to Dhenkanal Town Police Station for lodging First Information Report, but the present opposite party, the Diary Charge Officer (for short, 'DCO') on that day at Dhenkanal Town Police Station, refused to receive the First Information Report ('FIR'). When asked, the opposite party suddenly became violent and tore the FIR. Said opposite party not only abused using filthy language but also wrongfully confined the petitioner and put him inside the hazat (lock up) of the Dhenkanal Town Police Station. Later the opposite party released from the confinement and forcibly obtained an undertaking from the petitioner though the latter had not committed any offence. It was the case of the petitioner that he was threatened of facing dire consequence, if he would divulge the incident to any other person. 2.1. However, the matter got reported in the daily newspapers, viz., Sambad and Dharitri etc. which the petitioner, an Advocate by profession and practising in the locality, considered to have got his reputation tarnished. It was the case of the petitioner that he was threatened of facing dire consequence, if he would divulge the incident to any other person. 2.1. However, the matter got reported in the daily newspapers, viz., Sambad and Dharitri etc. which the petitioner, an Advocate by profession and practising in the locality, considered to have got his reputation tarnished. Being confused the petitioner tried to bring the matter to the notice of Superintendent of Police, Dhenkanal by sending a copy of the FIR, which was denied to be registered by the DCO at the Dhenkanal Town Police Station, by registered post with A.D. incurring an expense of Rs.35/-. Therefore, the petitioner has valued the suit at Rs.36/-. 2.2. In the suit instituted against Sub-Inspector of Police, Dhenkanal Town Police Station, the petitioner has prayed for relief of Re.l/- in token of his loss of prestige and dignity in the society and also Rs.35/- for sustaining loss on account of expense made towards sending the FIR by registered post with A.D. 2.3. It was the case of opposite party-defendant before the trial court that the suit was not maintainable not only in absence of service of notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but also for non-joinder of necessary party inasmuch as the Superintendent of Police, Dhenkanal, to whom the petitioner-plaintiff claimed to have sent the copy of the FIR by registered post with A.D incurring an expense of Rs.35/-, was not arrayed as party to the suit. Hence, the suit being defective, is liable to be dismissed. 2.4. It is elicited from the written statement filed by the opposite party-defendant that he has denied the presence of the petitioner with Subhendu Kumar Nayak at Dhenkanal Police Station on 02.07.2005 for lodging the FIR. It is clarified by the opposite party that there was altercation between two groups and both the groups came to Dhenkanal Police Station to report allegation against each other. Later both the groups amicably settled the matter and accordingly, the petitioner along with other persons furnished undertaking assuring not to create any further disturbance. This fact has been entered by the opposite party who was DCO in the Station Diary vide entry No.43, dated 02.07.2005. The Judgment in the suit: 3. On such pleadings, the trial court framed the following issues: 1. Is the suit as laid maintainable in law? 2. This fact has been entered by the opposite party who was DCO in the Station Diary vide entry No.43, dated 02.07.2005. The Judgment in the suit: 3. On such pleadings, the trial court framed the following issues: 1. Is the suit as laid maintainable in law? 2. Has the plaintiffany cause of action to file the suit? 3. Does the suit suffer from non-joinder of necessary party and non-compliance of the statutory notice under Section 80 of the C.P. Code? 4. Whether the defendant being the DCO of Dhenkanal Town Police Station at the relevant time had wrongfully confined the plaintiff inside Thana Hazat and had misbehaved him by abusing him in filthy language and by physically assaulting him? 5. Whether the alleged act of the defendant has lowered the prestige and dignity of the plaintiff in the Society? 6. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the reliefs as prayed for or any other reliefs under the facts mad circumstances of the case?' 3.1. After taking note of facts and discussing the depositions, the trial Court came to hold as follows with regard to issue Nos.4 and 5: 'Therefore, I am not inspired to hold that the undertaking has been executed by the plaintiff. It might be that the same have been manufactured for the purpose of this case as well as the criminal case started against the defendant and to falsify the news published in Ext.2. This being a civil suit, the court is to decide the same or preponderance of probability and not beyond all reasonable doubt as a criminal case. Therefore, in consideration of the materials available on record, I hold that the defendant being the Diary Charge Officer of Dhenkanal Town Police Station at the relevant time had misbehaved the petitioner, an Advocate and citizen of Dhenkanal in the matter as stated by him. ' 3.2. So far as issue Nos.l and 3 are concerned, observing that the misdeeds of the opposite party, who manhandled and abused the petitioner, did not act in a manner recognised by any statute nor did it form part of any official act. As such no notice under Section 80 of the CPC was required nor is the Government necessary party in terms of Order 27, Rule 5-A of the CPC. As such no notice under Section 80 of the CPC was required nor is the Government necessary party in terms of Order 27, Rule 5-A of the CPC. In this connection, the trial Court came to hold that: 'Section 42 of the said Act (Police Act) says that a notice is required before taking any action or prosecution for anything done or intended to be done under the provisions of the said Act. But Police Act does not authorise a police officer to manhandle any citizen who approaches the police station with some problems as the plaintiff has done in this case. Therefore, in my opinion, the suit of the plaintiff does not suffer under any provision of the Police Act. On the other hand, the defendant having misbehaved and manhandled the plaintiff he being a citizen has every right to bring action against such misdeeds as the plaintiff has done in this case. Under the above circumstances his suit is maintainable in law. Thus, both the issues are decided in his favour.' 3.3. With respect to issue No. 2, the Civil Judge (Junior Division) has come to find that the action of the opposite party-defendant having tarnished the prestige and dignity of the petitioner-plaintiff, an Advocate, the suit for damages against the defendant is maintained under Law of Torts. Having observed that the opposite party 'did not accept his FIR but tore it' which prompted the petitioner to send the copy of the FIR to the Superintendent of Police by incurring expenses, the trial Court held that the petitioner-plaintiff had cause of action for filing the suit against the opposite partydefendant. 3.4. With regard to issue No.6, the trial Court though observed that the petitioner has not claimed any relief against the Superintendent of Police, as the sending of FIR by registered post with A.D. was 'not due to any act of the Superintendent of Police, Dhenkanal', but for the action of the opposite party-defendant who tore the FIR, as a result of which the petitioner had to incur loss on account of expenses met for sending the said FIR by registered post with A.D. The opposite party is, therefore, liable to make good the loss of prestige and dignity as well as the expenses incurred. 3.5. 3.5. Accordingly, the trial Court decreed the suit on contest against the defendant and directed to pay Re.l/- to the petitioner-plaintiff as 'token damage for loss of his prestige and dignity and pay Rs.35/- to him towards the expenses in sending the complaint to the Superintendent of Police, Dhenkanal by registered post in total Rs.36/-, within a period of two months'.The Judgment of the Appellate Court: 4. The opposite party-defendant carried the matter before the learned Additional District Judge, FTC, Dhenkanal in appeal under Section 96 of the CPC, registered as RFA No.61 of 2006 (39/2008) challenging the aforesaid decree and order, which came to be disposed of by Judgment dated 01.12.2009, wherein the Appellate Court set aside the Judgment and Order dated 14.09.2006 and decree dated 21.09.2006 passed in Civil Suit No.50 of 2005 by the Civil Judge (Junior Division), Dhenkanal. 4.1. After analysing the evidence vis-a-vis facts, the Appellate Court observed that no evidence having been put forth with regard to the reputation in the society and damage sustained by the act of the opposite party, the finding of the trial Court with regard to issue Nos. 4 and 5 has been nullified as it is found to be opposed to the evidence and based on improper appreciation of fact. 4.2. There being no evidence to show that the petitioner was ever been confined in hazat, and there was no plausible material on record to show that the undertaking alleged to have been taken forcibly and such fact is not believable inasmuch as the petitioner is an advocate. 4.3. Pleadings being not supported by evidence it was difficult to believe that the petitioner was misbehaved and confined to hazat. 4.4. The Appellate Court has come to a definite finding by perusing the Station Diary Book and undertaking given by the petitioner came to hold that any act or omission made by the opposite party in due discharge of his duty cannot give rise to cause of action to claim for damage. Furthermore, unless it is established by evidence that the petitioner enjoys reputation of a particular level and such reputation was tarnished by the high-handed action of the opposite party, it cannot be said that damage was caused to his reputation. 4.5. Accordingly, the appeal has been allowed on contest.Hearing of the civil revision: 5. Furthermore, unless it is established by evidence that the petitioner enjoys reputation of a particular level and such reputation was tarnished by the high-handed action of the opposite party, it cannot be said that damage was caused to his reputation. 4.5. Accordingly, the appeal has been allowed on contest.Hearing of the civil revision: 5. Initially challenging the Judgment dated 01.12.2009, the petitioner preferred second appeal under Section 100 of the CPC, which was registered as RSA No.102 of 2010, but on objection being raised, the same is directed to be converted to civil revision vide Order dated 30.09.2010. Having not amended the petition, Sri Sisir Kumar Purohit, learned advocate advanced argument based on 'substantial question of law': 'Whether non-substantiation of the prestige and reputation of a member of the Bar would debar payment of token damage of Rs.1/- only'. 5.1. Heard Sri Sisir Kumar Purohit, learned Advocate for the petitioner, who confined his argument to the aforesaid question and though Sri Saroj Kumar Mishra, learned Advocate entered appearance by filing Vakalatnama for the opposite party, at the time of hearing did not represent. 5.2. Since this matter has been lying since 2010 in this Court, and is posted for final hearing, this Court proceeded to hear the matter and dispose of the revision petition based on arguments advanced by Sri Sisir Kumar Purohit, learned Advocate and material available on record. 5.3. Hearing being concluded on 19.05.2024, the matter is kept reserved for preparation of Judgment and delivery thereof.Arguments: 6. Sri Sisir Kumar Purohit, learned counsel for the petitioner during the course of hearing submitted that the petitioner, being practising Advocate, has dignity and prestige in the society which does not require any proof to be adduced before the court of law. Therefore, the Appellate Court fell in error in disbelieving such a fact while reversing the finding returned by the Civil Judge (Junior Division). Sri Sisir Kumar Purohit, learned counsel for the petitioner insisted for restoring the Judgment and Decree passed in Civil Suit No.50 of 2005 by the Civil Judge (Junior Division), Dhenkanal vacating the Judgment dated 01.12.2009 of the learned Additional District Judge, Fast Track Court, Dhenkanal. 6.1. Sri Sisir Kumar Purohit, learned counsel for the petitioner insisted for restoring the Judgment and Decree passed in Civil Suit No.50 of 2005 by the Civil Judge (Junior Division), Dhenkanal vacating the Judgment dated 01.12.2009 of the learned Additional District Judge, Fast Track Court, Dhenkanal. 6.1. Sri Sisir Kumar Purohit, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the trial Court was justified in awarding token damage of Re.l/- with respect to causing damage of the prestige and reputation of a member of the Bar.Analysis and discussion: 7. On perusal of Judgment of the trial Court, the oral evidence of the P.W.2, Subhendu Kumar Nayak, whom the petitioner is stated to have rescued, reveals that, 'He has stated about abusing of the defendant to the plaintiff in filthy language and manhandling him and putting him inside the hazat and releasing him thereafter. During cross-examination, he stated that the defendant had torn he written report presented by the plaintiff. '. But the P.W.3, District Correspondent of newspaper 'Dharitri' appears to have stated contradictory fact to the effect that, 'On 02.07.2005 at about 10 P.M., when he had been to the police station, he found the plaintiff who presented written report before the defendant and the defendant after going through, the same, abused the plaintiff and threw away the report. When the plaintiff asked the defendant as to why his written report was not received and why he was abused, the defendant again scolded him in filthy language and asked the plaintiff and another young man with him to leave the place with a threat to put them inside the hazat. ' While the pleading of the plaintiff vide paragraph 1 of the civil revision petition is that he was 'wrongfully restrained and put the appellant (petitioner) inside he hazat of the Dhenkanal Town Police Station'. It is manifest from the above that the petitioner has never been kept in confinement inside hazat. The Appellate Court has, therefore, rightly stated as follows: 'But the learned trial Court lost sight of the evidence that the plaintiff though, a lawyer did not inform the incidence immediately to the Bar Association or to the Superintendent of Police. He has admitted in the crossexamination that on 04.07.2005, he gave intimation to the Superintendent of Police, but failed to produce the office copy of the same. He has admitted in the crossexamination that on 04.07.2005, he gave intimation to the Superintendent of Police, but failed to produce the office copy of the same. On the other hand, the journalist, P.W.3 whom the learned trial Court accepted as the most trustworthy witness has stated during his examination that the defendant-Sub-Inspector of Police abused and drove out the plaintiff from the police station. His evidence does not reveal that the plaintiff has ever put to the lock up by the defendant. When this witness has claimed to be present at the police station from start to finish of the alleged occurrence and does not speak, about the confinement of the plaintiff in the hazat, it is not understood why the learned trial Court failed to accept this part of evidence.' 8. The Appellate Court at paragraph 6 of its Judgment stated that, 'On the other hand, the appellant-defendant examined himself as D.W.2 and one ASI of the Police Station who produced the station diary book and who was also present when the plaintiff-respondent had been to the police station as D.W.l. The station diary entry book, and the undertaking given by the plaintiff-respondent and Sk. Nizamuddin were also produced and proved during the trial of the suit'. 8.l. It is further recorded at paragraph 7 by the Appellate Court that, 'On the other hand, when on behalf of the defendant a station diary book has been produced and when the same reveals about the amicable settlement entered between the plaintiff and Sk. Nizamuddin and when both the parties wrote the undertaking in their own hand-writing, it is not understood why the Court failed to accept the said evidence, The allegation made by the plaintiff that he was forced to give the undertaking is. Not believable since the plaintiff is an advocate and without any protest he wrote an undertaking in his hand-writing, The learned trial Court should have appreciated the evidence to accept the plea taken by the defendant, The evidence since does not support the pleading of the plaintiff; it is difficult to believe that he was misbehaved and confined in the hazat. ' 8.2. The reason that the petitioner is a practising lawyer cannot give rise to belief that he could be coerced to sign the undertaking, particularly when the same was furnished by reducing it to writing with own hand. ' 8.2. The reason that the petitioner is a practising lawyer cannot give rise to belief that he could be coerced to sign the undertaking, particularly when the same was furnished by reducing it to writing with own hand. Mere overwriting in the station diary book would also not give rise to any presumption that there was manipulation in the station diary entry, as there was sufficient material before the Appellate Court to appreciate that there was no force applied to procure the undertaking from the petitioner. 8.3. The Appellate Court at paragraph 7 of his Judgment recorded as a matter of fact that the plaintiff-petitioner had been to Dhenkanal Police Station on 02.07.2005 at 9.00 P.M. has been admitted by the defendant with explanation that the plaintiff and Sk. Nizamuddin Bux had a fight among themselves with their respective follower and on the alleged night both the party came to the Police Station and expressed their willingness for recording a compromise. Accordingly, a compromise was effected and the said fact was entered in Station Diary Book and both the plaintiff-petitioner herein and Sk. Nizammuddin Bux gave written undertaking not to indulge in such activities in future. The Station Diary Book was evidenced. 8.4. It is trite as noted down by the Appellate Court that in a suit for damage the burden of proof lies on the person who claims the wrong done to him. Therefore, the petitioner was under obligation to prove that he was enjoying reputation in the society and his dignity was lowered by the act of the opposite party-defendant and further the fact remained unbelievable that written undertaking could be taken by use of coercion. It is queer to notice from the 'List of witnesses examined for the plaintiff' and 'for the defendant' appended to the Judgment of the trial Court that the name of Sk. Nizammuddin Bux, who was one of the parties to the settlement and stated to have furnished written undertaken, does not find place. The 'List of documents admitted in evidence for the plaintiff' in the suit reveals that compromise petition of the petitioner and Sk. Nizammuddin Bux and their signatures were marked exhibits. The alleged tampering or otherwise of the Station Diary Book could have been proved through evidence of said Sk. Nizamuddin Bux.Conclusion & decision: 9. The 'List of documents admitted in evidence for the plaintiff' in the suit reveals that compromise petition of the petitioner and Sk. Nizammuddin Bux and their signatures were marked exhibits. The alleged tampering or otherwise of the Station Diary Book could have been proved through evidence of said Sk. Nizamuddin Bux.Conclusion & decision: 9. It is emanating from the Judgments of the trial Court and the Appellate Court that, i. The petitioner, an Advocate by profession, who claimed damages for loss reputation in the society, could not have been forced to furnish written undertaking to the DCO. ii. Whereas Subhendu Kumar Nayak, P.W.2, who was stated to have been rescued from clutches of miscreants by the petitioner, deposed that the latter was put inside hazat, the independent witness, namely the newspaper Correspondent, P.W.3, has deposed that the opposite party 'asked the plaintiff and another young man with him to leave the place with a threat to put him inside the hazat'. iii. While the trial Court proceeded on the basis of undertaking being furnished by Sk. Nizamuddin Bux was in English, the undertaking of the petitioner was in Odia and merely stating that the petitioner has denied to have furnished the undertaking marked Exhibit A/l and signature thereon marked Exhibit A/4. But has not examined Sk. Nazamuddin Bux with respect to admission of compromise petition, Exhibit A/2, and signature thereon marked as Exhibit A/5. Mere making of statement of denial would not suffice. iv. The act of the opposite party in illegally confining in the hazat being published in the newspaper caused damage to the reputation of the petitioner which was quantified as Re.l/- by him. But no witness of the locality where the petitioner resides or works has been examined to speak about his reputation. It is natural corollary, as observed by the appellate Court, that unless it is established by evidence that he enjoys reputation of a particular level and such reputation was damaged by the high-handed action of the defendant, it cannot be said that damage was caused to his reputation. 9.1. As it seems from the Judgment of the Appellate Court that, it is the newspaper which published that the petitioner-plaintiff was put inside the hazat. However, from the deposition of P.W.3 it is clearly elicited that the petitioner was threatened to be put inside the hazat. 9.1. As it seems from the Judgment of the Appellate Court that, it is the newspaper which published that the petitioner-plaintiff was put inside the hazat. However, from the deposition of P.W.3 it is clearly elicited that the petitioner was threatened to be put inside the hazat. Therefore, if at all, there was mistake in perceiving whether the petitioner, in fact, was confined inside hazat or threatened by the opposite party to be taken inside the hazat. Thus, it could not be proved by leading evidence before the trial Court that damage has been caused to his reputation by the action of the opposite party. It cannot be said that the petitioner has lost his reputation as advocate; rather he appears to have misled the Court(s) to believe that he was, in fact, confined inside the hazat, which caused damage to his reputation. 9.2. In the opinion of this Court, it remained disputed fact whether, in fact, the petitioner was confined in hazat, which caused damage to his reputation in the society. Such disputed fact was required to be proved by cogent evidence. 9.3. The finding of fact of the trial Court can be overturned by the Appellate Court by re-appreciating evidence on record as is conferred under Section 107 of the CPC. In this respect the following observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Manisha Mahendra Gala Vrs. Shalini Bhagwan Avatramani, (2024) 4 SCR 357 = 2024 INSC 293 is worthy of notice: 'Therefore, on the simple reading of the above provision (Section 107 of the CPC), it is evident that the first appellate court is empowered to exercise powers and to perform nearly the same duties as of the courts of original jurisdiction. Therefore, the first appellate court has the power to return findings of fact and law both and in so returning the finding, it can impliedly overturn the findings of the court of first instance if it is against the evidence on record or is otherwise based upon incorrect interpretation of any document or misconstruction of any evidence adduced before the court of first instance.' 9.4. It may be noteworthy that the Appellate Court has found that the petitioner was never confined inside hazat. Therefore, it cannot be said that the alleged act of the opposite party led to cause damage to the reputation of the petitioner. It may be noteworthy that the Appellate Court has found that the petitioner was never confined inside hazat. Therefore, it cannot be said that the alleged act of the opposite party led to cause damage to the reputation of the petitioner. The Appellate Court has acted neither with material irregularity nor can it be said, in the circumstances obtained on record, that he has exercised his jurisdiction illegally. 10. This Court may now discuss as to what is 'reputation' and its recognition in the society. 10.1. Reputations are often attributed to companies and products and to social and institutional groups. Reputations are mostly dependent on the views of the members of the community or group within which they exist; they do not depend on some property that is human-specific. Furthermore, a reputational object need not be aware of its own reputation, and many evaluative properties of reputable persons are shared by groups and companies. Reputations always have to be relativized to a group. A single individual's private opinion does not constitute a reputation. Reputations must be public and have a social existence. A person's reputation can exist among a large group of people that the subject does not know, but who are able to identify him or her by name or facial image. 10.2. In order to have clear view of what constitutes 'reputation', this Court refers to S. Nambi Narayanan Vrs. Siby Mathews, (2018) 12 SCR 51, wherein it has been observed as follows: '31. *** The liberty and dignity of the appellant which are basic to his human rights were jeopardized as he was taken into custody and, eventually, despite all the glory of the past, he was compelled to face cynical abhorrence. This situation invites the public law remedy for grant of compensation for violation of the fundamental right envisaged under Article 21 of the Constitution. In such a situation, it springs to life with immediacy. It is because life commands selfrespect and dignity. *** 33. From the aforesaid, it is quite vivid that emphasis has been laid on mental agony when a person is confined within the four walls of a police station or lock up. There may not be infliction of physical pain but definitely there is mental torment. In Joginder Kumar Vrs. State of U.P., (1994) 4 SCC 260 , the Court ruled: '8. The horizon of human rights is expanding. There may not be infliction of physical pain but definitely there is mental torment. In Joginder Kumar Vrs. State of U.P., (1994) 4 SCC 260 , the Court ruled: '8. The horizon of human rights is expanding. At the same time, the crime rate is also increasing. Of late, this Court has been receiving complaints about violation of human rights because of indiscriminate arrests. How are we to strike a balance between the two? 9. A realistic approach should be made in this direction. The law of arrest is one of balancing individual rights, liberties and privileges, on the one hand, and individual duties, obligations and responsibilities on the other; of weighing and balancing the rights, liberties and privileges of the single individual and those of individuals collectively; of simply deciding what is wanted and where to put the weight and the emphasis; of deciding which comes first- the criminal or society, the law violator or the law abider. ***' 34. In Kiran Bedi Vrs. Committee of Inquiry, (1989) 1 SCC 494 , this Court reproduced an observation from the decision in D.F. Marion Vrs. Davis, 217 Ala. 16 (Ala. 1927): '25. *** The right to the enjoyment of a private reputation, unassailed by malicious slander is of ancient origin, and is necessary to human society. A good reputation is an element of personal security, and is protected by the Constitution equally with the right to the enjoyment of life, liberty, and property. ' 5. Reputation of an individual is an insegregable facet of his right to life with dignity. In a different context, a two Judge Bench of this Court in Vishwanath Agrawal Vrs. Sarla Vishwanath Agrawal, (2012) 7 SCC 288 , has observed: '55. *** reputation which is not only the salt of life, but also the purest treasure and the most precious perfume of life. It is extremely delicate and a cherished value this side of the grave. It is a revenue generator for the present as well as for the posterity. ' 36. From the aforesaid analysis, it can be stated with certitude that the fundamental right of the appellant under Article 21 has been gravely affected. In this context, we may refer with profit how this Court had condemned the excessive use of force by the police. In Delhi Judicial Service Association Vrs. State of Gujarat, (1991)4 SCC 406 , it said: '39. In this context, we may refer with profit how this Court had condemned the excessive use of force by the police. In Delhi Judicial Service Association Vrs. State of Gujarat, (1991)4 SCC 406 , it said: '39. The main objective of police is to apprehend offenders, to investigate crimes and to prosecute them before the courts and also to prevent commission of crime and above all to ensure law and order to protect the citizens' life and property. The law enjoins the police to be scrupulously fair to the offender and the Magistracy is to ensure fair investigation and fair trial to an offender. The purpose and object of Magistracy and police are complementary to each other. It is unfortunate that these objectives have remained unfulfilled even after 40 years of our Constitution. Aberrations of police officers and police excesses in dealing with the law and order situation have been subject of adverse comments from this Court as well as from other courts but it has failed to have any corrective effect on it. The police has power to arrest a person even without obtaining a warrant of arrest from a court. The amplitude of this power casts an obligation on the police ... [and it] must bear in mind, as held by this Court that if a person is arrested for a crime, his constitutional and fundamental rights must not be violated. *** 37. *** The dignity of a person gets shocked when psycho-pathological treatment is meted out to him. A human being cries for justice when he feels that the insensible act has crucified his self-respect. That warrants grant of compensation under the public law remedy. We are absolutely conscious that a civil suit has been filed for grant of compensation. That will not debar the constitutional court to grant compensation taking recourse to public law. The Court cannot lose sight of the wrongful imprisonment, malicious prosecution, the humiliation and the defamation faced by the appellant. In Sube Singh Vrs. State of Haryana, (2006) 3 SCC 178 , the three-Judge Bench, after referring to the earlier decisions, has opined: 38. It is thus now well settled that the award of compensation against the State is an appropriate and effective remedy for redress of an established infringement of a fundamental right under Article 21, by a public servant. State of Haryana, (2006) 3 SCC 178 , the three-Judge Bench, after referring to the earlier decisions, has opined: 38. It is thus now well settled that the award of compensation against the State is an appropriate and effective remedy for redress of an established infringement of a fundamental right under Article 21, by a public servant. The quantum of compensation will, however, depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Award of such compensation (by way of public law remedy) will not come in the way of the aggrieved person claiming additional compensation in a civil court, in the enforcement of the private law remedy in tort, nor come in the way of the criminal court ordering compensation under Section 357 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. ' 10.3. !n the light of aforesaid Judgment, from the analysis of evidence on record as reduced to writing in the Judgment of the trial Court as also the Appellate Court, it is manifest that the petitioner was not confined inside the hazat; but as per the deposition of P.W.3, the District Correspondent of the Odia newspaper Dharitri, the petitioner was threaten to be taken inside the hazat while the opposite party was asking him to leave the police station. No clear fact being available on record to show that the petitioner-plaintiff was confined inside hazat, it cannot, thus, be said that the opposite partydefendant had acted out of malice and without just and reasonable cause. It was for the petitioner-plaintiff to show and prove that the opposite party-defendant had acted in such manner which caused great pain, agony, shock and mental torture to the plaintiff, besides financial losses and also causing his reputation to be lowered in the estimation of his known professional circle, friends and relations, by leading evidence in the suit. It is for the trial Court to look into the evidence and decide, if any, malice existed or not. The plaintiff must demonstrate that the fact of confinement in hazat caused actual harm to his reputation. This harm can be quantifiable, such as financial losses, or non-quantifiable, such as damage to professional relationships or emotional distress. 10.4. As per Section 101 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, whosoever desires any Court to give Judgment as to any legal right or law dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist. This harm can be quantifiable, such as financial losses, or non-quantifiable, such as damage to professional relationships or emotional distress. 10.4. As per Section 101 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, whosoever desires any Court to give Judgment as to any legal right or law dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist. Depending on the status of the plaintiff (public figure or private individual), different standards of proof may be applied. Public figures often need to prove actual malice, meaning thereby the falsity in fact was made with conscious knowledge or reckless disregard for the truth. 10.5. The petitioner-plaintiff, an individual, has, thus, merely made allegations without any material to substantiate the reputation he enjoyed in the society and the petitioner-plaintiff has also failed to discharge burden by proving that in fact he was confined in hazat. In absence of such fact being established it could not be said with affirmation that the action of the DCO had lowered his reputation in the society. 10.6. This Court may hasten to add that the learned trial Court in absence of testimony of individuals, professional colleagues, clients or industry peers or such other person who could attest the damage caused to the reputation coupled with any emotional distress, anxiety, or mental anguish experienced because of the confinement in hazat the trial Court should not have jumped to the conclusion that damage was caused to the plaintiff which warrants award of Re.l/- as token damage. The trial Court also conspicuously ignored to take stock of comparative reputation before and after the alleged incident. 10.7. Having appreciated the evidence on record, the Appellate Court has come to just and proper conclusion that the petitioner was confined inside the hazat is not correct statement of fact and thereby there is no loss of reputation so as to sustain order of the trial Court directing payment of Re.l/- to the petitioner as token damage for loss of his prestige and dignity. 11. In fine, this Court does not find any merit in the revision petition and, therefore, the civil revision petition is dismissed, but in the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs.