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2024 DIGILAW 710 (GUJ)

Dhansukhbhai Jerambhai Hirpara v. Pravinbhai Polabahi Boriya

2024-04-02

J.C.DOSHI

body2024
ORDER : 1. On 29.02.2024, this court has passed the following order:- “1. Though, the matter was called repeatedly, the learned Advocate for the petitioner did not remain present. 2. In view of the above, issue notice to the petitioner, making the same returning on 2nd April, 2024.” 2. Even today when the matter is called out, none remain present. 3. In view of the above, since the petitioner is already appearing in the Court and also, the petitioner has not surrendered to the custody before the learned trial court, this Court decided to take up the matter on the ground of revision. 4. This Criminal Revision Application is preferred under Section-397 read with Section-401 of Cr.P.C. challenging the concurrent findings recorded by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate First Class, Keshod (N.I. Act) in Criminal Case No.348 of 2015, whereby, by order dated 06.05.2022, the revisionist – accused has been convicted for the offence under Section-138 of N.I. Act and sentenced to undergo 01 year simple imprisonment and awarded to pay compensation aggregating of Rs.12,50,000/- [per cheque of Rs.2,50,000/-] under Section-357(3) of Cr.P.C. to the complainant within 60 days and in default of payment, to undergo further 03 months simple imprisonment. 5. Being aggrieved by the same, the revisionist has preferred appeal under Section-374 of Cr.P.C. before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Kesho being Criminal Appeal No.12 of 202, which was dismissed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge and confirmed the order passed by the learned JMFC, Keshod. Hence, this revision. 6. The facts of the prosecution case in nutshell as under:- 6.1 The accused is residing at Keshod and doing the trade and construction business. The complainant has been in a friendly relationship with the accused for a long time and used to go each other from time to time. The accused went to the complainant in person and said, "I need to require Rs.12,50,000/- for sometime in business, if you have it lend me the same, I will give you back this amount in a short time.” So the complainant lent Rs. 12,50,000/- in cash to the accused. Thereafter, the complainant demanded this amount back from the accused. While demanding the amount, the accused to pay the amount due to the complainant by issuing five cheques of Veraval People's Co.-Op. Bank Limited, Keshod branch, which each of Rs. 2,50,000/- given to the complainant. 12,50,000/- in cash to the accused. Thereafter, the complainant demanded this amount back from the accused. While demanding the amount, the accused to pay the amount due to the complainant by issuing five cheques of Veraval People's Co.-Op. Bank Limited, Keshod branch, which each of Rs. 2,50,000/- given to the complainant. The accused has given Cheque No.018461 to 018465, which was dated 30-11-2014. As per the conversation between the complainant and the accused, on 25-02-2015 these cheques were deposited by the complainant in his account No. 560522133069 of State Bank of India, Keshod Branch, which were returned due to "Fund Insufficient" on the same day. Therefore, the complainant met the accused face to face, but accused did not give any proper answer. Therefore, the intention of the accused appears to be not good. However, the complainant gave the accused one more chance before filing the complaint as per law. The complainant had given notice on 21.03.2015, which was sent through Reg. A. D. Post and served to the accused. Though notice was served to the accused, the accused neither paid the amount as per the cheque nor responded to the notice. Hence, the complainant has filed complaint against the accused under Section-138 of the N.I. Act and prayed to take penal action against the accused and to pay the interest accruing at 18% as per the bank rate from the date of issuance of cheque till the recovery of the amount. 7. The ground, upon which the revision is filed, is that there is error apparent on the face of the record of the orders of the learned trial Court as well as learned appellate Court that the revisionist is an agriculturist and traders and not habitual offender and he is not in a position to pay the whole amount as directed by the learned appellate court below and therefore, the impugned orders are required to be interfered and corrected by the Revisionist Court. That the impugned orders came to be passed on the basis that only cheques were deposited in time before the bank, but no other grounds were considered by the learned trial Court below, therefore, the impugned orders are missing true interpretation of the facts and the said errors are required to be interfered that the revisionist – accused is never in a position to pay the amount. The learned Court below failed to consider that the revisionist – accused is doing agricultural work and because of his poor financial condition and other liability including the responsibility of maintaining his entire family members and his entire company, under these circumstances, the impugned orders are required to be interfered. That the revisionist – accused has no other source of livelihood and in this circumstances, the learned Court below required to consider the said aspect, the revisionist even in the financial crisis and 20% of cheque amount has been already deposited. 8. For the reason stated herein-above, the revisionist did not remain present before the Court despite he is given liberty. Learned advocate for the petitioner even though sufficient time has been granted, but did not remain present before this Court. It could be noticed that five cheques each of Rs.2,50,000/- were issued by the accused in the name of the revisionist, which are produced before the learned trial Court vide Exh.34 to 38 and the same are returned vide Exh.40 to 44. The legal notice was issued on 21.03.2015 vide Exh.45. The notice was served vide Exh.45 to 47. The reply has been given by the accused and some other evidences are also produced before the learned trial Court. The accused has not produced any evidence. The further statement under Section- 313 of Cr.P.C. was recorded that by except saying that the cheques were given towards the security purpose. The revisionist has not forwarded any plausible defence. The learned trial has appreciated the evidence of the complainant at Exh.30. 9. The paragraph-10 to 12 of the impugned judgment are material, whereby, the learned trial Court has given cogent reasons for convicting the accused. The judgment and order of learned JMFC has been examined by the learned Sessions Court in appeal. A reference has been taken to the various judgments as well as sections-118, 138 and 139 of the N.I. Act. It is believed that Section-118 and 139 of the N.I. Act would apply to the facts of the case. The revisionist - accused admitted the signature on the cheuqes. It is also believed that to discharge the burden, the accused has required to lead the evidence in preponderance of probability, which may include the cross-examination offered by him to the complainant. In other words, it is also believed that the accused is not required to rebut the burden. The revisionist - accused admitted the signature on the cheuqes. It is also believed that to discharge the burden, the accused has required to lead the evidence in preponderance of probability, which may include the cross-examination offered by him to the complainant. In other words, it is also believed that the accused is not required to rebut the burden. However, on going through the impugned orders, what appears that the learned trial Court has not committed any error and the judgment and orders are well reasoned analyzing the facts vis-a vis the provisions of law, no case is made out. If we go through the ground taken up by the revisionist, the revisionist has nowhere denied the execution of the cheques, signature thereof or consideration or put any point, which may allow this Court to think otherwise. 10. In the case of Kumar Exports Vs. Sharma Carpets [ (2009) 2 SCC 513 ], the Hon'ble Apex Court examined as to when complainant discharges the burden to prove that instrument was executed and when the burden shall be shifted. Para 18 to 20 are relevant, which reads as under :- "18. Applying the definition of the word "proved" in Section 3 of the Evidence Act to the provisions of Sections 118 and 139 of the Act, it becomes evident that in a trial under Section 138 of the Act a presumption will have to be made that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration and that it was executed for discharge of debt or liability once the execution of negotiable instrument is either proved or admitted. As soon as the complainant discharges the burden to prove that the instrument, say a note, was executed by the accused, the rules of presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Act help him shift the burden on the accused. The presumptions will live, exist and survive and shall end only when the contrary is proved by the accused, that undefined is, the cheque was not issued for consideration and in discharge of any debt or liability. A presumption is not in itself evidence, but only makes a prima facie case for a party for whose benefit it exists. 19. The presumptions will live, exist and survive and shall end only when the contrary is proved by the accused, that undefined is, the cheque was not issued for consideration and in discharge of any debt or liability. A presumption is not in itself evidence, but only makes a prima facie case for a party for whose benefit it exists. 19. The use of the phrase "until the contrary is proved" in Section 118 of the Act and use of the words "unless the contrary is proved" in Section 139 of the Act read with definitions of "may presume" and "shall presume" as given in Section 4 of the Evidence Act, makes it at once clear that presumptions to be raised under both the provisions are rebuttable. When a presumption is rebuttable, it only points out that the party on whom lies the duty of going forward with evidence, on the fact presumed and when that party has produced evidence fairly and reasonably tending to show that the real fact is not as presumed, the purpose of the presumption is over. 20. The accused may adduce direct evidence to prove that the note in question was not supported by consideration and that there was no debt or liability to be discharged by him. However, the court need not insist in every case that the accused should disprove the non- existence of consideration and debt by leading direct evidence because the existence of negative evidence is neither possible nor contemplated. At the same time, it is clear that bare denial of the passing of the consideration and existence of debt, apparently would not serve the purpose of the accused. Something which is probable has to be brought on record for getting the burden of proof shifted to the complainant. To disprove the presumptions, the accused should bring on record such facts and circumstances, upon consideration of which, the court may either believe that the consideration and debt did not exist or their non-existence was so probable that a prudent man would under the circumstances of the case, act upon the plea that they did not exist" 11. Noting various judgments including well celebrated judgment in the case of Rangappa v/s. Sri Mohan [ (2010) 11 SCC 441 , the Hon'ble Apex Court in Basalingappa v/s. Mudibasappa [ 2019 (5) SCC 418 ] summarized the principle as under :- "23. Noting various judgments including well celebrated judgment in the case of Rangappa v/s. Sri Mohan [ (2010) 11 SCC 441 , the Hon'ble Apex Court in Basalingappa v/s. Mudibasappa [ 2019 (5) SCC 418 ] summarized the principle as under :- "23. We having noticed the ratio laid down by this Court in above cases on Sections 118(a) and 139, we now summarise the principles enumerated by this Court in following manner:- (i) Once the execution of cheque is admitted Section 139 of the Act mandates a presumption that the cheque was for the discharge of any debt or other liability. (ii) The presumption under Section 139 is a rebuttable presumption and the onus is on the accused to raise the probable defence. The standard of proof for rebutting the presumption is that of preponderance of probabilities. (iii) To rebut the presumption, it is open for the accused to rely on evidence led by him or accused can also rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise a probable defence. Inference of preponderance of probabilities can be drawn not only from the materials brought on record by the parties but also by reference to the circumstances upon which they rely. (iv) That it is not necessary for the accused to come in the witness box in support of his defence, Section 139 imposed an evidentiary burden and not a persuasive burden. (v) It is not necessary for the accused to come in the witness box to support his defence." 12. A recent decision of a three Judges Bench of this Court in the case of Kalamani Tex and Another vs. P. Balasubramanian [ (2021) 5 SCC 283 ], by which, the Hon’ble Apex Court has examined the scope and ambit of the presumption under Sections-118 and 139 of the N.I. Act and observed thus:- "14. Once the 2nd appellant had admitted his signatures on the cheque and the deed, the trial Court ought to have presumed that the cheque was issued as consideration for a legally enforceable debt. The trial Court fell in error when it called upon the respondent complainant to explain the circumstances under which the appellants were liable to pay. Such approach of the trial Court was directly in the teeth of the established legal position as discussed above, and amounts to a patent error of law. xx xx xx 17. The trial Court fell in error when it called upon the respondent complainant to explain the circumstances under which the appellants were liable to pay. Such approach of the trial Court was directly in the teeth of the established legal position as discussed above, and amounts to a patent error of law. xx xx xx 17. Even if we take the arguments raised by the appellants at face value that only a blank cheque and signed blank stamp papers were given to the respondent, yet the statutory presumption cannot be obliterated. It is useful to cite "Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar", where this court held that: "Even a blank cheque leaf, voluntarily signed and handed over by the accused, which is towards some payment, would attract presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, in the absence of any cogent evidence to show that the cheque was not issued in discharge of a debt." 13. At the cost of repetition, it is to be observed that the revisionist – accused has not disputed his signature on the cheques, no other dispute arise in the manner and no such ground is mentioned in the revision. 14. In view of the above, I do not find any illegality in the impugned orders. The present revision is bereft of merit and therefore, required to be dismissed. Accordingly, the present criminal revision application is hereby dismissed. It would be open for the learned trial Court to issue necessary warrant to secure the custody of the accused to serve the sentence.