JUDGMENT : Rohit Ranjan Agarwal, J. 1. Through this writ petition a challenge has been made to the award dated 22.08.2016, published on 05.09.2016, by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal (CGIT) cum Labour Court, Kanpur exercising power under Section 11A of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called as “Act of 1947”) modifying punishment of dismissal to that of compulsory retirement with superannuation benefits. 2. Facts, giving rise to the present petition, are that respondent No.2 late R.P.Singh was appointed as a Clerk on 11.01.1971 in Central Bank of India. He was promoted to the post of Special Assistant in the year 1992 with retrospective effect since 1987. While posted as Special Assistant at Extension Counter of main branch, Aligarh at Kshetriya Shri Gandhi Ashram (KSGA), Aligarh during the period October, 2003 to February, 2004, some misconduct was committed by him. He was put under suspension on 17.02.2004. A charge sheet was served on 16.03.2004 alleging ten charges against him, which are as under : “CHARGE NO. 1 Current Account No 176 of M/s Rajesh & Co. was opened with the address, 101, President, Railway Road, Aligarh, which Sh. Singh has tempered with malafide intention and ulterior motive as 7/107, Railway Road, Algarh. CHARGE NO. 2 On 8.10.2003 the account of M/s Rajcsh & Co. was allowed to be closed for which relevant record is not available in the branch except an entry of Rs.2900/- in C/D A/c 176. Ledger Folio No. 99. The account was closed by payment through cash for Rs.2900/ as noted in the ledger. On perusal of the ledger folio it is specific that Cheque Book was not issued in the account and loose Cheque Book also was not issued, payment was also not made through pay slip/Banker's cheque/Debit Note. Thus Sh. Singh has allowed the closure of the account in unusual manner violating Bank's rules to facilitate the Account holder with obvious reason. CHARGE NO. 3 The account opening form, signature card and debit voucher Dt. 8.10.2003 in C/D account 176 of M/s Rajesh & Co. are not available in the branch record. Sh. Singh has taken way all these documents with malafide intention to suppress his misdoings. CHARGE NO. 4 On 9.10.2003 Sh. Rajesh Kisher opened a HSS A/c No. 3825 and provided copy of PAN Card, Driving Licence as proof of identity and address. 8.10.2003 in C/D account 176 of M/s Rajesh & Co. are not available in the branch record. Sh. Singh has taken way all these documents with malafide intention to suppress his misdoings. CHARGE NO. 4 On 9.10.2003 Sh. Rajesh Kisher opened a HSS A/c No. 3825 and provided copy of PAN Card, Driving Licence as proof of identity and address. The date of Birth as noted in PAN Cord and Driving Licence differs which Sh. Singh intentionally ignored to facilitate Sh. Rajesh Kishor to commit the fraud with the Bank. The address in account opening application form, Driving Licence, letter of thanks dated 09.10.2003 in the handwriting of Mr. Rajesh Kishore and Receipt no.520 dated 09.10.2003 of Speed Post mention the address of Mr. Rajesh Kishore differently, which Mr. Singh ignored to notice with ulterior motive and rather actively facilitated Mr. Rajesh Kishor to open the account and commit fraud with the Bank. Thus aforesaid facts speak loudly the connivance of Mr. Singh with Mr Rajesh Kishor in his design to defraud Bank. CHARGE NO. 5 Sh. Rajesh Kishor has given his address as 101, President, Sadar Chungi Ke Pass, Railway Road, Aligarh, which is not the correct address. Sh. Singh being local of Aligarh has failed to apply ordinary prudence with malafide intention to facilitate Sh. Rajesh Kishor to disappear after committing the fraud. CHARGE NO. 6 Sh Rajesh Kishor has opened the account on 9.10.2003 and immediately thereafter the deposited cheques of heavy amount for collection as under: AMOUNT DATE OF DEPOSIT RS.160000/- 14.10.2003 RS 310000/- 4.12.2003 RS 320000/- 11.12.2003 Sh. Singh has forwarded all the cheques for collection to B/o Panchkula, Chandigarh and also allowed the withdrawals against Central Office guidelines to be vigilant in the operation of the account All the cheques were drawn on HDFC Bank and Sh. Singh failed to apply his ordinary prudence to enquire the purpose of collection in newly opened account. With all these collections, fraud has been committed and the Bank has suffered a loss of Rs 7.90 lac. CHARGE NO. 7 With a deceit motive Sh. Singh has used the Courier Service for collection of aforesaid 3 (three) cheques while he was using the Postal Service for sending the Letter of Thanks. The intentions of Sh. Singh were more grave as to find out that Courier Service was not approved one. CHARGE NO. 8 Sh. CHARGE NO. 7 With a deceit motive Sh. Singh has used the Courier Service for collection of aforesaid 3 (three) cheques while he was using the Postal Service for sending the Letter of Thanks. The intentions of Sh. Singh were more grave as to find out that Courier Service was not approved one. CHARGE NO. 8 Sh. Singh with a malafide intention has not issued Letter of Thanks to the Introducer Sh. Jeet Pal Singh HSS A/c 3550 who has reportedly introduced the HSS account 3825 of Sh. Rajesh Kishor Sh. Singh has also not verified the signature of Sh. Jeet Pal Singh. Later on Sh. Jeet Pal Singh has disowned his signature for introducing the account. The Bank has lost an opportunity to identify and locate Sh. Rajesh Kishor, the Account holder has committed the fraud, due to intentionally committed lapses on the part of Sh. Singh. CHARGE NO. 9 In HSS A/c 3825 of Sh. Rajesh Kishor, the first cheque book was issued on 28.10.2003 containing 10 leaves, of which 3 cheques bearing No. 30682 to 30684 were returned due to insufficient funds in the account on 13.11.2003. Sh. Singh has issued second cheque book of 25 leaves on 1.12.2003 ignoring the material facts of returning of cheques while the credit balance in the account was only Rs.3829/-. Sh. Singh has issued second cheque book containing 25 leaves while cheque book of 10 leaves was available in the branch. Sh. Singh has also ignored the fact that all cheques from the first cheque book were not presented for payment at the branch. It clearly confirms Sh. Singh's connivance with Sh. Rajesh Kishor in whose account a fraud has committed for Rs.7.90 lac and the Bank has suffered the loss. CHARGE NO. 10 Sh. Singh has acted in a deceitful manner while issuing the Letter of Thanks to Account holder HSS A/c 3825 Sh. Rajesh Kishor wherein tempering is made in a word written just before President in Letter of Thanks Dt. 9.10.2003. The intention of Sh. Singh is confirmed by Speed Post Receipt No. 0520 Dt. 9.10.2003, wherein address is noted 101, Hotel President. This shows that Sh. Singh has knowingly opened the account of a person not having permanent address, collected cheques of heavy amount and connived with Sh Rajesh Kishor to commit a fraud of Rs.7.90 lac and make loss to the Bank.” 3. Singh is confirmed by Speed Post Receipt No. 0520 Dt. 9.10.2003, wherein address is noted 101, Hotel President. This shows that Sh. Singh has knowingly opened the account of a person not having permanent address, collected cheques of heavy amount and connived with Sh Rajesh Kishor to commit a fraud of Rs.7.90 lac and make loss to the Bank.” 3. A reply was filed to the said charges, after which an inquiry was conducted. The disciplinary authority passed order of dismissal under Regulation 6(a) of Memorandum of Settlement of Disciplinary Action, Procedure for Workmen dated 10.04.2002 dismissing the petitioner from service on 20.10.2005. The order was challenged before the Appellate Authority who confirmed the same vide order dated 09.01.2006. The order of dismissal as well as appellate order were challenged before the writ Court through Writ Petition No.7726 of 2006 which was dismissed vide order dated 16.02.2006. Against the said order, Special Appeal No.251 of 2006 was preferred which was dismissed on 27.03.2006. 4. Thereafter, respondent No.2 raised an industrial dispute and the matter referred to CGIT cum Labour Court, Kanpur, which was registered as Industrial Dispute No.24 of 2007. The dispute referred to the Tribunal for adjudication was, “Whether the action of the management of Central Bank of India, Regional Office, Agra dismissing Sri R.P. Singh son of Late Sri Kalyan Singh from the bank services vide orer dated 20.10.05 of disciplinary authority and confirming the same by appellate authority vide order dated 09.01.06 is legal and fair? If not what relief the workman concerned is entitled?” 5. CGIT, vide order impugned, made an award modifying the punishment of dismissal from service to that of compulsory retirement from service with superannuation benefits. Hence the present writ petition. 6. Sri Vishnu Pratap, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-Bank submitted that charges against respondent No.2 were grave and serious and stood proved in the disciplinary proceedings, which stood affirmed by the order of Appellate Authority. Both the orders of disciplinary as well as appellate authorities were subject matter of challenge before this Court in writ petition and special appeal. This Court found that inquiry conducted was fair and charges do not appear to be moon shine and, therefore, no interference was required. 7. Both the orders of disciplinary as well as appellate authorities were subject matter of challenge before this Court in writ petition and special appeal. This Court found that inquiry conducted was fair and charges do not appear to be moon shine and, therefore, no interference was required. 7. According to counsel for the Bank, once the charges stood proved and it was held that inquiry conducted was fair, the Tribunal, while exercising power under Section 11A of Act of 1947 could not have modified the order of dismissal on the basis of new material on record as proviso clearly prohibits for the same. Moreover, no reason has been assigned by the Tribunal in modifying the punishment from dismissal to compulsory retirement with superannuation benefits except comparing the punishment awarded to the co-delinquent Surendra Kumar against whom charges were not grave and serious. 8. Reliance has been placed upon a decision of Apex Court in State Bank of India vs. Tarun Kumar Banerjee and others 2000 (4) A.W.C. 3304 (S.C.) : (2000) 8 SCC 12 (Para 3), which is extracted hereasunder : “3. The Tribunal having held that the domestic enquiry was fair and valid, the scope of interference was very limited. This Court in Workmen of Messrs. Firestone Tyre and Rubber Company of India (P.) Ltd. v. Management and others (1973) 3 SCR 587 stated the law as follows: “32. (1) The right to take disciplinary action and to decide upon the quantum of punishment are mainly managerial functions, but if a dispute is referred to a Tribunal, the latter has power to see if action of the employer is justified. (2) Before imposing the punishment, an employer is expected to conduct a proper enquiry in accordance with the provisions of the Standing Orders, if applicable, and principles of natural justice. The enquiry should not be an empty formality. (3) When a proper enquiry has been held by an employer, and the finding of misconduct is a plausible conclusion flowing from the evidence adduced at the said enquiry, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to sit in judgment over the decision of the employer as an appellate body. The interference with the decision of the employer will be justified only when the findings arrived at in the enquiry are perverse or the management is guilty of victimisation, unfair labour practice or mala fide. The interference with the decision of the employer will be justified only when the findings arrived at in the enquiry are perverse or the management is guilty of victimisation, unfair labour practice or mala fide. (4) Even if no enquiry has been held by an employer or if the enquiry held by him is found to be defective, the Tribunal in order to satisfy itself about the legality and validity of the order, had to give an opportunity to the employer and the employee to adduce evidence before it. It is open to the employer to adduce evidence for the first time justifying his action, and it is open to the employee to adduce evidence contra. (5) The effect of an employer not holding an enquiry is that the Tribunal would not have to consider only whether there was a prima facie case. On the other hand, the issue about the merits of the impugned order of dismissal or discharge is at large before the Tribunal and the latter, on the evidence adduced before it, has to decide for itself whether the misconduct alleged is proved. In such cases, the point about the exercise of managerial functions does not arise at all. A case of defective enquiry stands on the same footing as no enquiry. (6) The Tribunal gets jurisdiction to consider the evidence placed before it for the first time in justification of the action taken only, if no enquiry has been held or after the enquiry conducted by an employer is found to be defective. (7) It has never been recognised that the Tribunal should straight away, without anything more, direct reinstatement of a dismissed or discharged employee, once it is found that no domestic enquiry has been held or the said enquiry is found to be defective. (8) An employer, who wants to avail himself of the opportunity of adducing evidence for the first time before the Tribunal to justify his action, should ask for it at the appropriate stage. If such an opportunity is asked for, the Tribunal has no power to refuse. The giving of an opportunity to an employer to adduce evidence for the first time before the Tribunal is in the interest of both the management and the employee and to enable the Tribunal itself to be satisfied about the alleged misconduct. If such an opportunity is asked for, the Tribunal has no power to refuse. The giving of an opportunity to an employer to adduce evidence for the first time before the Tribunal is in the interest of both the management and the employee and to enable the Tribunal itself to be satisfied about the alleged misconduct. (9) Once the misconduct is proved either in the enquiry conducted by an employer or by the evidence placed before a Tribunal for the first time, punishment imposed cannot be interfered with by the Tribunal except in cases where the punishment is so harsh as to suggest victimisation. (10) In a particular case, after setting aside the order of dismissal, whether a workman should be reinstated or paid compensation is, as held by this Court in Panitole Tea Estate v. Workmen [ (1971) 1 SCC 742 ], within the judicial discretion of a Labour Court or Tribunal. The above was the law as laid down by this Court as on 15-12-1971, applicable to all industrial adjudications arising out of orders of dismissal or discharge.” 9. According to learned counsel, Tribunal has no jurisdiction to sit in judgment over the decision of employer as an appellate body and the interference with the decision will only be justified in case the finding is arrived that inquiry was perverse or management is guilty of victimization, unfair labour practice or mala fides. The Tribunal can take into evidence the documents placed before it for the first time only when no enquiry has been held or the inquiry held by the employer is found defective. 10. Reliance has also been placed upon a decision of Apex Court in Tripura Gramin Bank and others vs. Tarit Baran Roy and another 2001 (2) AWC 1125 (SC) and judgment of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Harinarayn Seet vs. Andhra Bank 2022 LiveLaw (AP) 125. 11. Sri Indra Mani Tripathi, learned counsel appearing for legal heirs of respondent No.2 submitted that respondent No.2 was placed at the Extension Counter and Surendra Kumar, the other delinquent employee, who was at the main branch, had sent the advise to the Extension Counter after passing FSCM(s) and on the basis of the same, worker had no authority to further verify the same except giving credit of the amount of cheque. According to him, both respondent No.2 as well as Surendra Kumar were collectively responsible for loss of Rs.7.90 lakhs while in the disciplinary proceedings initiated against Surendra Kumar, the disciplinary authority has proposed punishment of discharge from service but later on, in the final order passed by the disciplinary authority, punishment of reduction by two stages in time scale of pay for a period of five years was awarded. 12. According to counsel for respondent No.2, once it was found that it was a collective mistake of both respondent No.2 and Surendra Kumar and the punishment awarded was different, the Tribunal, finding the punishment awarded to respondent No.2 being disproportionate to the gravity of charges, reduced the same from dismissal to compulsory retirement with superannuation benefits. Reliance has been placed upon a Full Bench judgment of Rajasthan High Court in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation vs. Gopal Singh 1998(2) SCT 277; decision of Telangana and Andhra Pradesh High Court in Depot Manager, TSRTC vs. Mohd. Fakruddin and other 2017(155) FLR 263; decisions of Apex Court in Management of Hindustan Machine Tools Ltd. Bangalore vs. Mohd. Usman and another 1984 AIR (SC) 321 and Jitendra Singh Rathor vs. Shri Baidyanath Ayurved Bhawan Ltd. and another 1984 AIR (SC) 976. 13. I have heard the respective counsel for the parties and perused the material on record. 14. The short question engaging attention of the Court is, as to the power of CGIT-cum-Labour Court under Section 11A of Act of 1947 in modifying the punishment of dismissal to that of compulsory retirement with superannuation benefits in the facts of the case. 15. It is an admitted case that respondent No.2 was an employee of the Bank. He was posted at the Extension Counter of the main branch at KSGA, Aligarh during the period October, 2003 to February, 2004. It is during this period that respondent No.2 had opened current account No.176 of M/s Rajesh & Company and also HSS Account No.3825 of Rajesh Kishore. It is during this period that three cheques of Rs.1,60,000/-deposited on 14.10.2003; Rs.3,10,000/- deposited on 04.12.2003; and Rs.3,20,000/- deposited on 11.12.2003 were forwarded for collection to branch office Panchkula, Chandigarh. An amount of Rs.7,90,000/- was withdrawn. Surendra Kumar, who was posted at branch office Panchkula, had cleared these three cheques without tallying the signatures. It is during this period that three cheques of Rs.1,60,000/-deposited on 14.10.2003; Rs.3,10,000/- deposited on 04.12.2003; and Rs.3,20,000/- deposited on 11.12.2003 were forwarded for collection to branch office Panchkula, Chandigarh. An amount of Rs.7,90,000/- was withdrawn. Surendra Kumar, who was posted at branch office Panchkula, had cleared these three cheques without tallying the signatures. When the matter came into light, respondent No.2 was posted as Special Assistant at Regional Office Agra, firstly, he was suspended and thereafter a charge sheet containing ten charges were given to him. On 28.09.2004, the charge sheet was also issued to Surendra Kumar containing one charge, which is as under : Charge No. 1 While working as Special Assistant at B/o Aligarh, Mr. Surendra Kumar has passed the following FSCMs on the date mentioned against the FSCM Nos without tallying the signature of officials of B/o Panchkula in the FSCM with the Specimen Signature Album FSCM No. Amount of FSCM Date on which FSCM passed 23755 Rs.1,60,000/- 17.11.2003 23792 Rs. 3,10,000/- 20.12.2003 23797 Rs. 3,20,000/- 01.01.2004 Total Rs. 7,90,000/- The signatures of the officials of B/o Panchkula on the above FSCMs are not tallying with their signatures those given in specimen signature album. Mr. Surendra Kumar has passed the credit voucher of FSCM No. 23792 for Rs.3,10,000/- but not passed the manifold with obvious intention. Mr. Surendra Kumar has also not ensured the 2nd signature (counter signature) on all the aforesaid manifolds as per bank's rules. Later on B/o Panchkula has disowned the manifolds and therefore bank has suffered a loss of Rs.7,90,000/- due to negligence of Mr. Surendra Kumar. Thus Mr. Surendra Kumar is charged with gross misconduct for the above acts under para 5(j) of Memorandum of settlement on Disciplinary Action Procedure for Workmen Dt. 10.04.2002.” 16. During the enquiry, charges stood proved against respondent No.2 and the disciplinary authority recommended for dismissal which was approved and the order of dismissal was passed on 20.10.2005, which was affirmed by the Appellate Authority on 09.01.2006. The Division Bench of this Court in Special Appeal No.251 of 2006 declined to interfere in the matter and found that the enquiry was conducted fairly and charges so proved did not require any interference. 17. The Division Bench of this Court in Special Appeal No.251 of 2006 declined to interfere in the matter and found that the enquiry was conducted fairly and charges so proved did not require any interference. 17. The Labour Tribunal also while passing the order impugned had recorded a clear finding to the effect that there was no discrepancy in the enquiry as held against the worker which was done in fair and proper manner and the enquiry officer had rightly arrived at the conclusion. The Labour Tribunal further found charges proved against worker. It is only in the light of the punishment awarded to other co-delinquent Surendra Kumar that the Labour Tribunal proceeded to exercise power under Section 11A and modified the punishment. 18. The question, which arises for consideration by this Court is to the scope and power of Labour Tribunal to interfere in the punishment awarded by the disciplinary authority and modify the same having been confirmed by the Division Bench of this Court when no illegality, perversity, victimization or unfair labour practice has been found or recorded against the employer/petitioner. 19. Proviso to Section 11A of Act of 1947 clearly restricts the power of Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal in admitting additional evidence or material, while invoking power under Section 11A and the entire scope of Labour Court rest on the material on record. The satisfaction which a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal is to record while modifying the order of discharge or dismissal is only on the basis of material on record and no external aid can be taken. 20. In Chairman and Managing Director, United Commercial Bank and others vs. P.C.Kakkar (2003) 4 SCC 364 , the Apex Court held that Court should not interfere with administrative decision unless it is illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety. The punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or appellate authority shocks the conscience of the Court/Tribunal then only the order can be interfered. Relevant paras 11, 12 and 13 of the judgment are extracted hereas under : “11. The common thread running through in all these decisions is that the court should not interfere with the administrator's decision unless it was illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the conscience of the court, in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or moral standards. The common thread running through in all these decisions is that the court should not interfere with the administrator's decision unless it was illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the conscience of the court, in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or moral standards. In view of what has been stated in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn., (1948) 1 KB 223 : (1947) 2 All ER 680 (CA) the court would not go into the correctness of the choice made by the administrator open to him and the court should not substitute its decision to that of the administrator. The scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in decision-making process and not the decision. 12. To put it differently, unless the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the court/tribunal, there is no scope for interference. Further, to shorten litigation it may, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment by recording cogent reasons in support thereof. In the normal course if the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate it would be appropriate to direct the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed. 13. In the case at hand the High Court did not record any reason as to how and why it found the punishment shockingly disproportionate. Even there is no discussion on this aspect. The only discernible reason was the punishment awarded in M.L. Keshwani case. As was observed by this Court in Balbir Chand v. Food Corpn. of India Ltd. (1997) 3 SCC 371 even if a co-delinquent is given lesser punishment it cannot be a ground for interference. Even such a plea was not available to be given credence as the allegations were contextually different.” 21. The Court further held that a bank officer is required to exercise higher standards of honesty and integrity. He deals with money of depositors and the customers. Every officer/employee of the bank is required to take all possible steps to protect the interests of the bank and to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and to do nothing which is unbecoming of a bank officer. 22. He deals with money of depositors and the customers. Every officer/employee of the bank is required to take all possible steps to protect the interests of the bank and to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and to do nothing which is unbecoming of a bank officer. 22. In Canara Bank vs. V.K.Awasthy (2005) 6 SCC 321 , the Apex Court while dealing with scope of interference with quantum of punishment held that such interference cannot be a routine matter and held as under : “24. Lord Greene said in 1948 in the famous Wednesbury case [Associated Provincial Picture Houses v. Wednesbury Corpn., (1948) 1 KB 223 : (1947) 2 All ER 680 (CA)] that when a statute gave discretion to an administrator to take a decision, the scope of judicial review would remain limited. He said that interference was not permissible unless one or the other of the following conditions was satisfied, namely, the order was contrary to law, or relevant factors were not considered, or irrelevant factors were considered; or the decision was one which no reasonable person could have taken. These principles were consistently followed in the UK and in India to judge the validity of administrative action. It is equally well known that in 1983, Lord Diplock in Council for Civil Services Union v. Minister of Civil Service [(1984) 3 All ER 935 : 1985 AC 374 : (1984) 3 WLR 1174 ] (called CCSU case) summarised the principles of judicial review of administrative action as based upon one or the other of the following viz. illegality, procedural irregularity and irrationality. He, however, opined that “proportionality” was a “future possibility”.” “27. In Union of India v. G. Ganayutham (1997) 7 SCC 463 this Court summed up the position relating to proportionality in paras 31 and 32, which read as follows : (SCC pp. 478-80) “31. The current position of proportionality in administrative law in England and India can be summarised as follows: (1) To judge the validity of any administrative order or statutory discretion, normally the Wednesbury test is to be applied to find out if the decision was illegal or suffered from procedural improprieties or was one which no sensible decision-maker could, on the material before him and within the framework of the law, have arrived at. The court would consider whether relevant matters had not been taken into account or whether irrelevant matters had been taken into account or whether the action was not bona fide. The court would also consider whether the decision was absurd or perverse. The court would not however go into the correctness of the choice made by the administrator amongst the various alternatives open to him. Nor could the court substitute its decision to that of the administrator. This is the Wednesbury [Associated Provincial Picture Houses v. Wednesbury Corpn., (1948) 1 KB 223 : (1947) 2 All ER 680 (CA)] test. (2) The court would not interfere with the administrator's decision unless it was illegal or suffered from procedural impropriety or was irrational — in the sense that it was in outrageous defiance of logic or moral standards. The possibility of other tests, including proportionality being brought into English administrative law in future is not ruled out. These are the CCSU [(1984) 3 All ER 935 : 1985 AC 374 : (1984) 3 WLR 1174 ] principles. (3)(a) As per Bugdaycay [R. v. Secy. of State for Home Deptt., ex p Bugdaycay, 1987 AC 514 : (1987) 1 All ER 940 (HL)], Brind [(1991) 1 AC 696 : (1991) 1 All ER 720 : (1991) 2 WLR 588 (HL)] and Smith [R. v. Ministry of Defence, ex p Smith, (1996) 1 All ER 257 : 1996 QB 517 : (1996) 2 WLR 305 (CA)] as long as the Convention is not incorporated into English law, the English courts merely exercise a secondary judgment to find out if the decision-maker could have, on the material before him, arrived at the primary judgment in the manner he has done. (3)(b) If the Convention is incorporated in England making available the principle of proportionality, then the English courts will render primary judgment on the validity of the administrative action and find out if the restriction is disproportionate or excessive or is not based upon a fair balancing of the fundamental freedom and the need for the restriction thereupon. (4)(a) The position in our country, in administrative law, where no fundamental freedoms as aforesaid are involved, is that the courts/tribunals will only play a secondary role while the primary judgment as to reasonableness will remain with the executive or administrative authority. (4)(a) The position in our country, in administrative law, where no fundamental freedoms as aforesaid are involved, is that the courts/tribunals will only play a secondary role while the primary judgment as to reasonableness will remain with the executive or administrative authority. The secondary judgment of the court is to be based on Wednesbury and CCSU principles as stated by Lord Greene and Lord Diplock respectively to find if the executive or administrative authority has reasonably arrived at the decision as the primary authority. (4)(b) Whether in the case of administrative or executive action affecting fundamental freedoms, the courts in our country will apply the principle of ‘proportionality’ and assume a primary role, is left open, to be decided in an appropriate case where such action is alleged to offend fundamental freedoms. It will be then necessary to decide whether the courts will have a primary role only if the freedoms under Articles 19 and 21 etc. are involved and not for Article 14. 32. Finally, we come to the present case. It is not contended before us that any fundamental freedom is affected. We need not therefore go into the question of ‘proportionality’. There is no contention that the punishment imposed is illegal or vitiated by procedural impropriety. As to ‘irrationality’, there is no finding by the Tribunal that the decision is one which no sensible person who weighed the pros and cons could have arrived at nor is there a finding, based on material, that the punishment is in ‘outrageous’ defiance of logic. Neither Wednesbury nor CCSU tests are satisfied. We have still to explain ‘Ranjit Thakur [Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India, (1987) 4 SCC 611 ].” (emphasis in original) 23. In State Bank of India (supra), Apex Court had laid down the scope of interference by the Tribunal. The Court found that interference with the decision of an employer will be justified only when the findings arrived at in the inquiry are perverse or management is guilty of victimization, unfair labour practice or mala fides. It was further held that the Tribunal can only take into consideration the evidence placed before it for the first time in case no inquiry was held or after the enquiry was conducted by the employer it was found to be defective. 24. It was further held that the Tribunal can only take into consideration the evidence placed before it for the first time in case no inquiry was held or after the enquiry was conducted by the employer it was found to be defective. 24. In the instant case, the Labour Tribunal had categorically recorded in para 12 of its judgment that whole inquiry proceedings held against the delinquent employee was in a fair and proper manner and the enquiry officer has rightly come to the conclusion that charges stood proved against the worker. Once such finding was recorded by the Tribunal, it had no power to proceed further to modify the punishment awarded from dismissal to that of compulsory retirement with superannuation benefits. 25. The judgment of the Tribunal is against the dictum of Apex Court not only in case of State Bank of India (supra) but also in other catena of judgments. Reliance placed upon decision of disciplinary authority awarding punishment to Surendra Kumar cannot be taken into consideration in the instant case while modifying the punishment since the charges against both the delinquent employees are different. Moreover, ten serious charges have been levelled against respondent No.2, while only one charge was against Surendra Kumar. The parity drawn by the Tribunal cannot be justified at any cost. The Tribunal sailed beyond its power vested under Section 11A of the Act of 1947. 26. The comparison drawn by the Tribunal cannot be accepted looking to the gravity of charges levelled against the two delinquent employees of the Bank. The wisdom of the disciplinary action of the bank cannot be questioned as the charges are different. Respondent No.2 was responsible for opening the two accounts one being current account No.176 of M/s Rajesh & Company and the second account in the name of Rajesh Kishore being HSS Account No.3825, while Surendra Kumar had only cleared the cheques without tallying the signature. The misconduct on the part of respondent No.2 was greater having caused loss to the bank. 27. The Apex Court in case of P.C. Kakkar (supra) held that a bank officer is required to exercise higher standard of honesty and integrity. The parity drawn by the Tribunal does not come under the category that punishment awarded was shockingly disproportionate to the offence which required the interference by the Tribunal under Section 11A of Act of 1947. 28. The Apex Court in case of P.C. Kakkar (supra) held that a bank officer is required to exercise higher standard of honesty and integrity. The parity drawn by the Tribunal does not come under the category that punishment awarded was shockingly disproportionate to the offence which required the interference by the Tribunal under Section 11A of Act of 1947. 28. Thus, I find that the Tribunal was not justified in modifying the punishment awarded by the disciplinary authority having been confirmed by the Appellate Authority as well as by the Division Bench of this Court in Special Appeal No.251 of 2006 from that of dismissal to compulsory retirement with superannuation benefits. 29. Considering the facts and circumstances of this case, I find that the impugned award dated 22.08.2016 published on 05.09.2016 is unsustainable in the eyes of law and the same is hereby set aside. The order passed by disciplinary authority dismissing respondent No.2 from services stands confirmed. 30. The writ petition succeeds and is hereby allowed.