JUDGMENT : Raja Vijayaraghavan V., J. This Original Petition is filed assailing the order dated 19.6.2024 in O.A.(CAT) No. 181/329/2024 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam. The Tribunal, by the aforesaid order, considered the interim prayer made by the petitioner for issuing directives to the 3rd respondent to implement the decision of the Governing Body to grant ‘Secondment Leave’ and rejected the same. 2. In view of the urgency involved, this matter was taken up for disposal with the consent of both sides. 3. For understanding the grievance of the petitioner, brief facts of the case, as is borne out from the Original application needs to be stated: a) The petitioner is an Interventional Radiologist who has been working as a Professor in the Sree Chitra Tirunal Institute of Medical Sciences and Technology, Thiruvananthapuram (‘Institute’ for the sake of brevity). He joined the Institute as an Assistant Professor in the year 2012 and, after completing his probation period, has gone up the career path to the post of Professor. b) Medical professionals like the petitioner, who aspire to hone their professional skills even more, avail sabbatical leave or Secondment Leave and join other specialized medical institutions in India and abroad. Provisions for the same are available in the Sree Chitra Tirunal Institute for Medical Sciences and Technology, Thiruvananthapuram, Service and Personnel Conduct Rules (‘Rules’ for the sake of brevity), which are framed in tune with the provisions of the Sree Chitra Tirunal Institute for Medical Sciences and Technology, Thiruvananthapuram, Act, 1980 (‘The Act’ for the sake of brevity). Sree Chitra Tirunal Institute for Medical Sciences and Technology Regulations, 1981, (‘Regulations’ for the sake of brevity) have also been framed for regulating the functioning of the Institute. c) The petitioner being a professor has been included in the category of academic staff as per the Rules. The Governing Body is the appointing authority as per Rule 2 of the Rules and the said authority is empowered to grant various categories of leave to the academic staff in terms of the Act, Rules, and Regulations. d) In terms of the provisions of Rule 26A of Chapter IV of the Rules, the petitioner is entitled to apply for Secondment Leave. The leave is granted for a maximum period of one year once in four years and as stipulated in the Rules. d) In terms of the provisions of Rule 26A of Chapter IV of the Rules, the petitioner is entitled to apply for Secondment Leave. The leave is granted for a maximum period of one year once in four years and as stipulated in the Rules. The Governing Body as per Resolution No. 11 dated 6.10.2021 has incorporated a condition that those officers who avail Secondment Leave exceeding six months shall execute a bond for a sum of Rs. 10 lakhs on non-judicial stamp paper of Rs. 200/- binding him to serve the Institute for a minimum period of three years from the date of rejoining the Institute. e) The petitioner, accepting the terms of the Rules and Regulations, and hoping that he would be granted Secondment Leave, applied for the post of Consultant in the Department of Clinical Radiology in the Barking, Havering, and Redbridge University Hospitals, NHS Trust, United Kingdom (‘UK Hospital’ for the sake of brevity). His application was accepted and he was issued with a Sponsorship Certificate. As per the said Certificate, he was required to complete the submission of the application within three months from the date of the certificate appending a copy of the certificate granting leave to the petitioner by the Institute. f) He states that on receipt of Annexure-A2, he submitted an application seeking Secondment Leave for joining the UK Hospital as a Consultant and Interventional Neuro Radiologist. The Governing Body of the Institute convened in the month of January, 2023 and granted Secondment Leave on 19.01.2024. However, the same was communicated by a mail dated 4.3.2024. As per the provisions of the Rules and Regulations, the Director of the Institute, being the executive authority, was required to communicate the decision to the petitioner in the form of an order and grant leave to the petitioner to take up the assignment in the U.K. g) Time being the essence, the petitioner was required to produce the order granting leave within three months from 23.10.2023. However, the 3rd respondent is alleged to have delayed the matter. The petitioner was left with no alternative, but apply to the UK Hospital seeking further extension. By a communication dated 3.6.2024, produced as Annexure-A5, the UK Hospital granted extension of time to the petitioner for submitting the order granting Secondment Leave. However, the 3rd respondent is alleged to have delayed the matter. The petitioner was left with no alternative, but apply to the UK Hospital seeking further extension. By a communication dated 3.6.2024, produced as Annexure-A5, the UK Hospital granted extension of time to the petitioner for submitting the order granting Secondment Leave. The grievance of the petitioner is that the 3rd respondent is intentionally delaying the issuance of the order despite the decision taken by the Governing Body as early as on 19.1.2024. He asserts that by Annexure-A5(a) communication, the UK Hospital has requested the petitioner to join the hospital as early as possible. h) According to the petitioner, he has received reliable information from the Administrative Section that the 3rd respondent intends to place additional conditions in the order granting Secondment Leave for which, the matter is to be placed before the Governing Body. He asserts that such an exercise is unwarranted as the Governing Body has already taken a decision to grant leave based on the extant Rules and Regulations. Though Annexure-A7 representation was submitted before the Chairperson of the Employees Grievance Committee, no action has been taken. It was in the said circumstances that he had moved the Central Administrative Tribunal for urgent orders. 4. The Central Administrative Tribunal, after hearing the matter, was satisfied that the 3rd respondent had no authority to incorporate any additional condition, but could only have implemented the decision of the Governing Body. However, the Tribunal taking the view that the interim relief sought for by the petitioner would amount to grant of final relief, rejected his prayer. 5. The above order passed by the Tribunal is under challenge in this petition. 6. Sri Elvin Peter, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, instructed by Sri Ganesh, the learned counsel, submitted before us that the Tribunal, after evaluating the entire facts, held that the contentions raised by the petitioner were meritorious. A prima facie finding was made that even if the Director were to take up the matter with the Governing Body for the imposition of fresh conditions, such conditions could not operate retrospectively. It was further noted that the 3rd respondent was expected to act in accordance with the decision of the General Body. However, on the sole ground that the Apex Court has disapproved of granting interim orders that effectively provide the main relief, the Tribunal rejected his request. It was further noted that the 3rd respondent was expected to act in accordance with the decision of the General Body. However, on the sole ground that the Apex Court has disapproved of granting interim orders that effectively provide the main relief, the Tribunal rejected his request. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that the Tribunal has seriously erred in coming to such a conclusion as the Apex Court in Deoraj v. State of Maharashtra : (2004) 4 SCC 697, has taken note of situations where withholding of interim relief would tantamount to dismissal of the main petition itself; for, by the time the main matter comes up for hearing there would be nothing left to be allowed as relief to the petitioner though all the findings may be in his favour. It is contended that the Tribunal ought to have appreciated that the availability of a very strong prima facie case should have been the consideration that should have prevailed in addition to balance of convenience and irreparable hardship. 7. In response, Sri V. Sajith Kumar, the learned counsel for the 3rd respondent, submitted that the order passed by the Tribunal is not liable to be overturned in a petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He argued that although the decision of the Governing Body was communicated to the petitioner on 4.3.2024, the delay in the matter was due to the petitioner's failure to produce necessary documents, including the Sponsorship Certificate. Due to this delay, the Director had no option but to obtain fresh sanction orders from the Governing Body to grant the leave requested by the petitioner for a new period. The Governing Body is scheduled to meet on 15th July 2024, and a decision will be made on that day. He drew the Court's attention to Annexure-A5, which shows that the Sponsorship Certificate is valid until 4.9.2024. To support his argument, the learned counsel referred to the law established by the Apex Court in Shalini Shyam Shetty and Another v. Rajendra Shankar Patil : (2010) 8 SCC 329 , which elucidates the parameters for the exercise of the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227. 8. In response, Sri. To support his argument, the learned counsel referred to the law established by the Apex Court in Shalini Shyam Shetty and Another v. Rajendra Shankar Patil : (2010) 8 SCC 329 , which elucidates the parameters for the exercise of the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227. 8. In response, Sri. Elvin Peter would refer to Chapter IV of the Rules relating to leave and specifically to Rule 3 and it is submitted that the period of leave begins from the date on which leave is actually availed of and ends on the day preceding the day on which duty is resumed. He would also refer to Rule 26A with regard to grant of Secondment Leave and it is urged that sufficient safeguards have been laid down therein and it is after considering all these aspects that the Governing Body had proceeded to grant leave. According to the learned counsel, there is absolutely no justification on the part of the 3rd respondent in insisting for imposition of fresh conditions. 9. We have carefully considered the submissions advanced and have perused the entire records. 10. It is undisputed that the Governing Body is the authority to grant leave to the academic staff like the petitioner. The 3rd respondent is the Executive authority and he is bound to implement the decision of the Governing Body and issue consequential order granting leave to the petitioner. It also cannot be disputed that the Governing Body has granted leave sanction strictly in tune with the provisions of the Rules and Regulations as no contrary contention is raised before this Court. The Tribunal has also appreciated the above position and after analysing the entire facts, has observed as under: 5. ………………… I have no doubt that there is substance in the various contentions raised by the learned Senior Counsel touching the authority of the 3rd respondent, the Director, to incorporate additional conditions in the bond expected to be executed by the applicant as a prelude to availing leave. The Governing Body has already sanctioned leave and what is expected from the 3rd respondent is to facilitate execution of the bond in terms of the extant Rules governing the subject. Prima facie the 3rd respondent does not have any authority to add or incorporate fresh conditions without taking the Governing Body into confidence. The Governing Body has already sanctioned leave and what is expected from the 3rd respondent is to facilitate execution of the bond in terms of the extant Rules governing the subject. Prima facie the 3rd respondent does not have any authority to add or incorporate fresh conditions without taking the Governing Body into confidence. As rightly pointed out, even if the Governing Body is consulted and fresh conditions are imposed, it is doubtful that such conditions can operate retrospectively. Whatever it may be, suffice it to say that the 3rd respondent is expected to perform in line with the decision taken by the Governing Body. 11. As duly noted by the Tribunal, when the Governing Body sanctioned the Secondment Leave in strict accordance with the extant Rules and Regulations, the 3rd respondent was unequivocally bound to implement the said order in its entirety and with utmost fidelity. As highlighted by the learned Senior Counsel any delay in the issuance of the order would precipitate serious injury, substantial financial loss, significant deprivation in career advancement, and irreparable prejudice to the petitioner, who is undisputedly a highly skilled professional. On his part, the petitioner has acted in complete conformity with the Rules and Regulations, aspiring to refine his professional skills and knowledge through an engagement in a well-reputed Hospital in the United Kingdom. With the Sponsorship Certificate having been duly issued, there cannot be any doubt that any failure on the part of the petitioner to commence the employment as scheduled would result in unavoidable financial loss. 12. However, the relief sought for by the petitioner for issuance of directions to the 3rd respondent was rejected on the ground that the interim relief if granted would tantamount to granting the main relief. The reliefs sought for by the petitioner before the Tribunal are as under: (i) Issue a direction to the 3rd respondent to forthwith issue an order granting Secondment Leave to the applicant in implementation of the decision of the Governing Body dated 19.1.2024; (ii) To declare that the action of the 3rd respondent in not issuing an order granting Secondment Leave to the applicant in implementation of the decision of the Governing Body which is the competent authority to grant leave is without any authority of law, manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 13. 13. The petitioner had also sought an interim prayer for forthwith issuance of the secondment leave order. The Tribunal ought to have noted that the petitioner had, as the main prayer, sought substantive relief by way of a declaratory prayer and a consequential relief of directing the 3rd respondent to issue the leave order. As the petitioner had to join the UK Hospital within a short span of time, he could not have waited till the matter was decided finally. The specific case of the petitioner in the Original application filed on 12.6.2024 is that unless he joins the UK Hospital immediately, it would cause serious financial loss and would also deprive him of an opportunity to apply for the same post in the future. We have no doubt in our minds that the denial of the interim relief would result in a situation tantamount to denying the petitioner any relief at all. 14. In this context, the Apex Court in Deoraj (supra), has laid down the principles and the manner in which discretion has to be exercised in such matters. It was held as follows in paragraphs 11 and 12 of the judgment: 11. The courts and tribunals seized of the proceedings within their jurisdiction take a reasonable time in disposing of the same. This is on account of fair-procedure requirement which involves delay intervening between the previous and the next procedural steps leading towards preparation of case for hearing. Then, the courts are also overburdened and their hands are full. As the conclusion of hearing on merits is likely to take some time, the parties press for interim relief being granted in the interregnum. An order of interim relief may or may not be a reasoned one but the factors of prima facie case, irreparable injury and balance of convenience do work at the back of the mind of the one who passes an order of interim nature. Ordinarily, the court is inclined to maintain status quo as obtaining on the date of the commencement of the proceedings. However, there are a few cases which call for the court's leaning not in favour of maintaining the status quo and still lesser in percentage are the cases when an order tantamounting to a mandamus is required to be issued even at an interim stage. There are matters of significance and of moment posing themselves as moment of truth. However, there are a few cases which call for the court's leaning not in favour of maintaining the status quo and still lesser in percentage are the cases when an order tantamounting to a mandamus is required to be issued even at an interim stage. There are matters of significance and of moment posing themselves as moment of truth. Such cases do cause dilemma and put the wits of any judge to test. 12. Situations emerge where the granting of an interim relief would tantamount to granting the final relief itself. And then there may be converse cases where withholding of an interim relief would tantamount to dismissal of the main petition itself; for, by the time the main matter comes up for hearing there would be nothing left to be allowed as relief to the petitioner though all the findings may be in his favour. In such cases the availability of a very strong prima facie case — of a standard much higher than just prima facie case, the considerations of balance of convenience and irreparable injury forcefully tilting the balance of the case totally in favour of the applicant may persuade the court to grant an interim relief though it amounts to granting the final relief itself. Of course, such would be rare and exceptional cases. The court would grant such an interim relief only if satisfied that withholding of it would prick the conscience of the court and do violence to the sense of justice, resulting in injustice being perpetuated throughout the hearing, and at the end the court would not be able to vindicate the cause of justice. Obviously such would be rare cases accompanied by compelling circumstances, where the injury complained of is immediate and pressing and would cause extreme hardship. The conduct of the parties shall also have to be seen and the court may put the parties on such terms as may be prudent. 15. In other words, it is not a rigid rule that interim orders must be denied if they effectively grant the final relief sought. In this case, withholding the order would have rendered the petition infructuous, as the petitioner would be unable to join the UK Hospital despite the fact that no fault could be attributed to him. 15. In other words, it is not a rigid rule that interim orders must be denied if they effectively grant the final relief sought. In this case, withholding the order would have rendered the petition infructuous, as the petitioner would be unable to join the UK Hospital despite the fact that no fault could be attributed to him. The balance of convenience was in his favor, and he has specifically outlined the financial loss and deprivation of career advancement that he would suffer. We are fully satisfied that the petitioner has made out a strong and compelling case for the grant of interim relief. 16. We are not impressed with the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the respondent that this Court after having found that denial of relief to the petitioner would result in gross and manifest failure of justice should wash off his hands and refuse interference. The Tribunal, while refusing the grant of interim relief, failed to advert to the binding precedent in Deoraj (supra), which has resulted in a serious failure of justice. We are of the view that this is a fit case wherein interference is warranted to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the Tribunals and Courts. 17. Resultantly, this petition will stand allowed. Ext.P2 order passed by the CAT, Ernakulam will stand quashed. There will be a direction to the 3rd respondent to forthwith issue an order granting ‘Secondment Leave’ to the petitioner in implementation of the decision of the Governing Body as borne out from Annexure - A4. The parties are directed to bear their costs.