ORDER : 1. This appeal is directed against the order dated 23.01.2023, passed by the learned Single Bench in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3714/2018 (LRs of Shrikishan Sharma Vs. Chittorgagh Central Cooperative Bank & Anr.), whereby the writ petition filed by the petitioners (respondents herein) was allowed with a direction to the respondent (appellant herein) to pay the entire salary and benefits due for the period from 30.03.2014 to 24.04.2015 to the petitioners, after due determination and computation thereof. 2. Facts in nutshell for adjudication of the present appeal are that the respondent-writ petitioner Shrikrishan Sharma was initially employed and worked as a Manager in a village level Cooperative Society/Bank. Vide order dated 03.10.2013, passed by the Managing Director, the petitioner was appointed as Loan Supervisor in Chittorgarh Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. Later on vide order dated 29.03.2014, services of the petitioner were terminated as his appointment order was withdrawn. The action of the petitioner Bank was assailed by the respondent by way of filing a writ petition being S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2635/2014. In the aforesaid petition an interim order was passed on 07.04.2014 by which the effect and operation of the termination order dated 29.03.2014 was stayed. 3. It appears that pursuant to this interim order, the writ petitioner was reinstated on 24.04.2015 on which he continued till his retirement on 31.07.2017. 4. The petitioner filed a second writ petition being S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3714/2018, seeking issuance of mandamus for payment of salary with interest @ 12 % per annum for the period from 30.03.2014 to 24.04.2015 on the ground that though the interim order was passed by this Court on 07.04.2014, reinstatement took place only with effect from 24.04.2015. Once, there was an interim order passed by this Court, the employer was obliged under the law to reinstate him forthwith and, therefore, until the date of actual reinstatement i.e. 24.04.2015, the entire salary is liable to be paid. 5. Though, S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2635/2014 was dismissed by the learned Single Judge, other writ petition being S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3714/2018 was allowed with the direction for payment of salary with respect to the period from 30.03.2014 to 24.04.2015. 6. 5. Though, S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2635/2014 was dismissed by the learned Single Judge, other writ petition being S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3714/2018 was allowed with the direction for payment of salary with respect to the period from 30.03.2014 to 24.04.2015. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the writ petition being S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2635/2014 having been dismissed and the order of termination having been upheld, the writ petitioner was not entitled for any salary for the period during which he had actually not worked. It is submitted that though there was an interim order passed on 07.04.2014, the fact remains that the writ petitioner was allowed to work only from 24.04.2015. If the action of the respondent in terminating the services of the writ petitioner is found to be just and valid, the interim order, which merged in the final order, would justify the action of the respondent in not reinstating the petitioner and, therefore, except the period for which he had actually worked, he would not be entitled to payment of salary. 7. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance upon the judgments rendered in the cases of Jagpal Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. 2023 SCC Online SC 1080, State of Haryana & Anr. Vs. S.K. Khosla & Ors. (2007) 15 SCC 777 and Shri Chamundai Mopeds Ltd. Vs. Church of South India Trust Assn. (1992) 3 SCC 1 . 8. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents submits that though, the writ petition was dismissed, the appellant was under obligation to reinstate the respondent-petitioner forthwith under the interim order which was delayed until 24.04.2015. As there was an order of this Court for reinstatement, staying effect and operation of the termination order, with effect from the date of the order, the writ petitioner was entitled to work and salary. Due to inaction on the part of the appellant, the writ petitioner was not reinstated. Therefore, in respect of the period during which he was not reinstated, starting from the date of the interim order, till the date of actual reinstatement, it has been rightly ordered by the learned Single Judge to pay salary for the said period. 9. In respect of his submissions, learned counsel for the respondents placed reliance on the cases of Jagdish Prasad Sharma & Ors. Vs. 9. In respect of his submissions, learned counsel for the respondents placed reliance on the cases of Jagdish Prasad Sharma & Ors. Vs. State of Bihar & Ors. (2013) 8 SCC 633 , Prithawi Nath Ram Vs. State of Jharkhand & Ors. AIR 2004 SC 4277 and Collector of Madras & Anr. Vs. K. Rajamanickam, (1995) 2 SCC 98 . 10. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 11. The services of the respondent-petitioner were terminated vide order dated 29.03.2014 which was assailed in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2365/2014. The order passed by the learned Single Judge shows that the order of termination was upheld and the writ petition was dismissed. That means no illegality was found in the order of the termination. 12. The question, however, arising for consideration is whether the writ petitioner would be entitled to payment of salary in respect of the period during which the interim order remained in force. 13. In the present case, this period is required to be divided in two categories. The first would be one during which the reinstatement did not take place despite the interim order and second would be the period during which the writ petitioner worked by virtue of interim order, after reinstatement. 14. In so far as the payment of salary in respect of period during which the respondent actually worked is concerned, he has been paid salary, so that period is not in dispute. Even the appellant has not assailed the order of learned Single Judge in so far as the grant of salary in respect of the period, during which the writ petitioner actually worked, is concerned. 15. The question which arises for consideration is whether the writ petitioner is entitled for salary for the period between 30.03.2014 to 24.04.2015 during which, though interim order was in force, writ petitioner was actually not allowed to work. 16. It is well settled that the interim order merges with the final order. True it is that there was an interim order operating in favour of the writ petitioner, passed on 07.04.2014 but at the same time it is also clear that the writ petitioner was not allowed to work till 24.04.2015. That means during that period, the writ petitioner did not work. 17. True it is that there was an interim order operating in favour of the writ petitioner, passed on 07.04.2014 but at the same time it is also clear that the writ petitioner was not allowed to work till 24.04.2015. That means during that period, the writ petitioner did not work. 17. Had it been a case that the writ petition was ultimately allowed, declaring termination order as illegal, this Court would have granted the benefit of payment of salary in respect of the period from 30.03.2014 to 24.04.2015, even though the writ petitioner had not worked as that order would have merged in the final order. However, in the present case, situation is different. At the final adjudication, no illegality was found in the order of termination. Therefore, in such a situation, in our opinion, the writ petitioner would not be entitled for payment of salary for the period during which he had actually not worked. 18. None of the decisions, which have been cited by learned counsel for the parties, is relevant in so far as the aspect with regard to the claim of salary in respect of the period from 30.03.2014 to 24.04.2015 is concerned. 19. The fundamental principle that no party would be entitled to the benefit by virtue of interim order, if ultimately, the relief has not been granted and the petition has been dismissed, would be applicable. Since the writ petitioner had actually worked for a certain period while the interim order was in force, salary has been paid to him, we are not inclined to disturb what has already been received by the writ petitioner, particularly when there is no challenge to that part by the appellant. 20. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The order dated 23.01.2023 passed by learned Single Bench directing the appellant to pay to the respondent-petitioner the salary and benefits for the period from 30.03.2014 to 24.04.2015 is set aside. Consequently, the writ petition stands dismissed.