JUDGMENT : Rajani Dubey, J. 1. The Appellant – South Easter Coal Field Limited filed this arbitration appeal under Section 13 (1) of the Commercial Courts, Commercial Division & Commercial Appellate Division of High Court Act, 2015 (for short “the Act of 2015”) against order dated 22.12.2017 passed by the Judge, Commercial Court (District Level), Naya Raipur (C.G.) in M.J.C. No.30/16 (SECL Vs. M/s. Bansilal Nanda & Company), whereby the application filed by appellant/applicant under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act (for short “the Act, 1996”) questioning the legality, validity and correctness of the award dated 24.06.2013 passed by the Sole Arbitrator, has been dismissed. 2. Brief facts of the case, as projected by the appellant are that the appellant had invited tender on 05.03.1991 for construction of 147 Miners’ quarters, 36 "B" type, 6 "C" type and 2 "D" type quarters including the development work at Bhatgaon Colliery of Bishrampur Area. The respondent submitted tender and his tender was accepted after price negotiation held on 03.05.1991 and work order was accordingly issued on 29.07.1991 at the estimated cost of Rs.2,11,47,497.37 (Rs. Two Crores Eleven Lakhs Forty Seven Thousand Four Hundred Ninety Seven and Thirty Seven Paise only). According to the condition of work order, time for completion of contract was fixed as 18 months from the date of issue of work order or from the actual date of handing over the site whichever is later. As per clause 9 of the contract, i.e. General Terms and Condition of Contract, all the differences arising out of contract between the parties shall be settled by the Sole Arbitrator appointed by Chairman-cum Managing Director of South Eastern Coalfields Limited. 3. Further non-applicant/respondent was directed to complete additional work (development work) which was not included in contract at an estimated cost of Rs.14,48,000/-. It was completed beyond 18 months from which extension was granted upto 30.11.1994. 4. During the subsistence of contract, a dispute arose between parties, and the respondent vide letter dated 29.04.2003, invoked arbitration clause and former Chief Engineer Shri Ramkrishnaiya of South Eastern Coalfields Limited was appointed as sole Arbitrator, however, due to personal difficulties, the sole Arbitrator withdrew from arbitration proceedings, and thereafter, Mr. Prabal Pratap Singh was appointed as sole arbitrator, who granted an award of Rs.1,03,77,901/- in favour of respondent and rejected the submission of appellant. 5. Prabal Pratap Singh was appointed as sole arbitrator, who granted an award of Rs.1,03,77,901/- in favour of respondent and rejected the submission of appellant. 5. According to the appellant, the clause VI of Annexure C/2 work order dated 29.07.1991 goes to show that contractor had delayed the work and therefore, he is responsible for same and no award could have been passed in his favour. According to letter dated 27.01.1994 (Annexure R/4) written by appellant goes to show that contractor did not complete the work within time. 6. Learned Sr. counsel appearing for the appellant submits that the Arbitrator and Commercial Court have committed an error in granting price and price difference of cement, coal and iron which were to be supplied by the contractor only, therefore, such claim was not tenable and therefore, award of arbitrator and commercial court are liable to set aside. Learned counsel further submits that the Arbitrator and Commercial Court have committed an error in granting 15% interest on the awarded sum which is not prevailing either in bank or in society, therefore, it is violative of Section 34 of the CPC. The assigned work was delayed by the Contractor, therefore, for his own default, the Contractor cannot claim anything and, as such, the Award impugned is not sustainable in the facts and law. Learned counsel also submits that according to the contract, reduction of quarters “B” type & “C” type was vested with the description of appellant, therefore, no anticipatory profit @ 15% can be granted as claimed by the contractor, as such, the award is against clause V of the General Terms and Condition. Thus, considering the terms and conditions of the contract, the award of Arbitrator and Commercial Court are not sustainable in the fact and law, therefore, liable to be set-aside. 7. Reliance has been placed on the decisions of Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of State of Goa Vs. Praveen Enterprises reported in (2012) 12 SCC 581 , State of Gujarat Vs. Kothari and Associates reported in (2016) 14 SCC 761 , and Union of India Vs. Ambica Construction reported in (2016) 6 SCC 36 . 8. 7. Reliance has been placed on the decisions of Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of State of Goa Vs. Praveen Enterprises reported in (2012) 12 SCC 581 , State of Gujarat Vs. Kothari and Associates reported in (2016) 14 SCC 761 , and Union of India Vs. Ambica Construction reported in (2016) 6 SCC 36 . 8. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for respondent supporting the impugned orders strongly opposed the submission of appellant and submits that the orders of Arbitrator and learned Commercial Court are reasonable and justified & the appellant has no legal ground to assail it before this Court in appeal under Section 13 (1) of the Act of 2015 and the Act, 1996. The provision of the Act envisages least interference from the Court in arbitration award as the award has been passed by the Arbitrator chosen by the parties and it is binding on the parties. Learned counsel further submits that the learned Commercial Court has examined the award in its supervisory capacity and not as an appellate Court to see as to whether the award is opposed to public policy of India with all its elements with reference to the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court. The learned Court has come to the definite conclusion that there was no violation of any of the elements of public policy and there is no perversity in the findings and the award is not capricious. Therefore, the learned Court refused to interfere with the award under Section 34 of the Act, 1996. There is no illegality or infirmity in the orders of learned Arbitrator and Commercial Court, therefore, the instant appeal being without any merit is liable to be dismissed. 9. Reliance has been placed on the decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of M/s Hyder Consulting (UK) Ltd. Vs. Governor, State of Orissa through Chief Engineer reported in AIR 2015 SC 856 , M/s Shahi and Associates Vs. State of U.P. reported in AIR 2019 SC 3811 , Union of India Vs. Ambica Construction reported in (2016) 6 SCC 36 , order dated 28.07.2021 passed in Civil Appeal Nos. 3699-3700 of 2018 [PSA SICAL Terminals Pvt. Ltd Vs. The Board of Trustees of V.O. Chidambranar Port Trust Tuticorin and Ors.], decision of High Court of M.P. in Northern Coalfields Ltd. Vs. M/s Saluja Construction Co. Ambica Construction reported in (2016) 6 SCC 36 , order dated 28.07.2021 passed in Civil Appeal Nos. 3699-3700 of 2018 [PSA SICAL Terminals Pvt. Ltd Vs. The Board of Trustees of V.O. Chidambranar Port Trust Tuticorin and Ors.], decision of High Court of M.P. in Northern Coalfields Ltd. Vs. M/s Saluja Construction Co. reported in 2018 (4) R.A.J. 254 (MP) and decision dated 24.07.2023 of High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in FAO (OS) (COMM) 138/2021 & CM APPLs. 39516/2021 & 39517/2021 [Steel Authority of India Ltd Vs. M/s Larsen and Tourbro Ltd & Anr.]. 10. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 11. It is an admitted position in this case that on 05.03.1991, the appellant had invited tender for construction of 147 Miner’s quarters, 26 “B” type 6 – “C” type and 2 – “D” type quarters including the development work at Bhatgaon Colliery of Bishrampur Area. The tender of the non-applicant/respondent was accepted and work order was issued on 29.07.1991 at the estimated cost of Rs.2,11,47,497.37/- and the time for completion of contract was 18 months from the date of issue of work order or from actual date of handing over the site whichever is later. It is also not disputed that non-applicant/respondent was directed to do additional work (development work) which was not included in the contract at an estimated cost of Rs.14.48 lacs. It was completed beyond the period of 18 months. Extension of time was granted upto 30.11.1994 and dispute arose between the parties as to the payment of work. It is also not in dispute that there was an arbitration agreement between both the parties and as per record, the work was completed on 30.11.1994. The applicant/appellant delayed in preparation and sanctioning of the deviation estimate and revised estimate. The revised estimate was sanctioned on 12.01.2003 and final bill was prepared on 08.02.2003. The non-applicant/respondent invoked clause 9 of the arbitration clause vide its letter dated 29.04.2003. The CMD, SECL, appointed Shri Ramkrishnaiah, a former Chief Engineer of SECL as the Sole Arbitrator to adjudicate the dispute between the parties. The sole Arbitrator owing to his personal difficulty withdrew his name from the arbitration proceedings and thereafter, Mr. The non-applicant/respondent invoked clause 9 of the arbitration clause vide its letter dated 29.04.2003. The CMD, SECL, appointed Shri Ramkrishnaiah, a former Chief Engineer of SECL as the Sole Arbitrator to adjudicate the dispute between the parties. The sole Arbitrator owing to his personal difficulty withdrew his name from the arbitration proceedings and thereafter, Mr. Prabal Pratap Singh was appointed as Sole Arbitrator, who after hearing the matter and appreciating the evidence on record, passed an award on 24.06.2013 awarding sum of Rs.1,03,77,901/- in favour of respondent. 12. It is evident from all the documents and material available on record that the learned Arbitrator having appreciated all documents minutely, considered some of the claims of respondent awarding interest also. The operative portion of the award dated 24.06.2013 is reproduced herein as under :- “12. Summary (1) The period has been taken for calculation of interest after expiry of six months from the date of completion of the work for the entire amount allowed. (2) 1st Claim: Difference between the coal price charged and recovered at the rate prevailing on the dates of issue rather than that as on 31.05.1991. Rs.3.22,788.00. allowed in favour of Claimant with interest at the rate of 15% from 1/6/1995 to 24/6/2013, which comes to Rs.8,74,711.00. The total amount awarded under this head comes to Rs.11,97,499. (3) 2nd Claim: Difference between the fixed rate of cement as contained in the Work Order and the rates in the open market. Rs.4,49,154.00. Allowed in favour the Claimant with interest at the rate of 15% per annum for the period from 1/6/1995 to 24/6/2013 which comes to Rs.12,17,146.00, The total comes to Rs.16,66,300.00. (4) 3rd Claim: Difference between the fixed rate of steel as contained in the work order and the rates at which it was purchased from the open market. Rs.3,98,018.00. Claim allowed in favour of claimant with interest at the rate of 15% from 1/6/1995 to 24/6/2013 which comes to Rs.10.78.575.00. The total comes to Rs.14,76,593.00 (5) 4th Claim: Loss of profit due to the 'cancellation of 18 quarters for which construction work was done up to the plinth level and cancellation of the work of fixing fans. Also, cancellation of work of asphalting of WBM road. Rs.7,05,804.00. No amount awarded. Claim rejected. (6) 5th Claim: Loss on account of overhead expenses. Rs.4,25,000.00. Not allowed. Also, cancellation of work of asphalting of WBM road. Rs.7,05,804.00. No amount awarded. Claim rejected. (6) 5th Claim: Loss on account of overhead expenses. Rs.4,25,000.00. Not allowed. (7) 6th Claim: (i) Total withheld payment from escalation bills of labour and materials as per annexure C-28 Page 249 of the Paper Book. This amount was withheld whimsically without any authority from the contractual provisions but included in final bill and paid. Therefore, only interest on this amount calculated @ 15% from 1/6/1995 to 31/3/2003 Rs.5,02,580.00 is awarded. (i) Withheld amount from other bills Rs.3,12,008.00. This amount was also withheld from the Running bills without any valid reason and any authority from the contractual terms (Annexure C-29 page 250). This was included in the final bill and paid on 31/3/2003. Therefore the contractor is entitled to interest for the period from 1/6/1995 to 31/3/2003 @ 15% which comes to Rs.3,66,588.00. This amount is awarded in favour of the claimant. (ii) Interest on late payment of final bill. The contract was completed on 31/3/1994. The final bill was paid on 31/3/2003 (As per Annexure C-30 Page 251 of the Paper Book. The final bill amount was Rs.33,86,609. The contractor is entitled to interest on this amount @ 15% per annum from 1/6/1995 to 31/3/2003 which comes to Rs.39,79,034.00. The contractor is entitled to this amount as preparation of final bill and payment was delayed due to the wrong on the part of the Respondents. The interest of Rs.31,83,412 is therefore awarded in favour of the claimant. (iii) Interest on late payment of running bills as claimed in C-31 page 252 & 253 of the paper book. 15% interest is awarded for the late payment of running bills as mentioned in C-31 in favour of the claimant. Total interest comes to Rs.10,43,894.00 (8) 7th Claim: Due to late preparation of running bill Nos. 8th and 10th as mentioned in Annexure C-32, the last installment of mobilization advance paid to the claimant was not recovered. The mobilization carried interest @ 18%. The interest was calculated for the entire period at that rate and recovered from the running bills which were paid very late. The claimant lost thus an amount of Rs.37,422.00. I award this amount with 15% interest for the period 30.3.1994 to 24/6/2013. The interest comes to Rs.1.07.991.00 making the total of Rs.1,45,413.00. The mobilization carried interest @ 18%. The interest was calculated for the entire period at that rate and recovered from the running bills which were paid very late. The claimant lost thus an amount of Rs.37,422.00. I award this amount with 15% interest for the period 30.3.1994 to 24/6/2013. The interest comes to Rs.1.07.991.00 making the total of Rs.1,45,413.00. This amount is due and payable to the claimant as otherwise the respondents would be taking advantage of their own mistake and the contractor would suffer the consequences which is not just and proper. I therefore award this amount to the claimant. (9) Total amount awarded with interest comes to Rs.1,03,77,901.00 (Rupees one crore three lakhs seventy seven thousand nine hundred and one only). 13. The Respondents have prayed for award of exemplary cost and cost of the arbitration expenses quantified at Rs.6.00 lakhs. Their own committee report says that the contractor was not at fault at any point of time in the execution of the contract. It can therefore safely concluded that the Responsibility for unauthorized deductions, withholding amounts due to the claimant and delaying the payment all rests with the Respondents and the contractor is entitled to be compensated. There is no justification for entertaining this prayer of the Respondents and I therefore reject it. 14. The parties will bear the cost and expenses equally. 13. The appellant challenged this award before the learned Commercial Court and the learned Commercial Court, having observed various guidelines of Hon’ble Apex Court, dismissed the application of the appellant. 14. While dealing with the question of awarding interest in an arbitral award, the Hon’ble Apex Court in M/s. Hyder (supra) held in paras 73, 74 and 75 as under :- “73. At this juncture, it may be useful to refer to Section 34 of the CPC, also enacted by Parliament and conferring the same power upon a court to award interest on an award i.e. post-award interest. While enacting Section 34, CPC, Parliament conferred power on a court to order interest "on the principal sum adjudged" and not on merely the "sum" as provided in the Arbitration Act. The departure from the language of Section 34, CPC in Section 31(7) of the Act, 1996 is significant and shows the intention of Parliament. 74. It is settled law that where different language is used by Parliament, it is intended to have a different effect. The departure from the language of Section 34, CPC in Section 31(7) of the Act, 1996 is significant and shows the intention of Parliament. 74. It is settled law that where different language is used by Parliament, it is intended to have a different effect. In the Arbitration Act, the word "sum" has deliberately not been qualified by using the word "principal" before it. If it had been so used, there would have been no scope for the contention that the word "sum" may include "interest." In Section 31(7) of the Act, Parliament has deliberately used the word "sum" to refer to the aggregate of the amounts that may be directed to be paid by the Arbitral Tribunal and not merely the "principal" sum without interest. 75. Thus, it is apparent that vide clause (a) of sub-section (7) of Section 31 of the Act, Parliament intended that an award for payment of money may be inclusive of interest, and the "sum" of the principal amount plus interest may be directed to be paid by the Arbitral Tribunal for the pre-award period. Thereupon, the Arbitral Tribunal may direct interest to be paid on such "sum" for the post-award period vide clause (b) of sub-section (7) of Section 31 of the Act, at which stage the amount would be the sum arrived at after the merging of interest with the principal; the two components having lost their separate identities.” 15. While dealing with the scope of judicial interference in an arbitral award, the High Court of Delhi in SECL (supra) held in para 12 as under :- “12. Perusal of the aforesaid shows that the award has been passed by the Arbitral Tribunal on the basis of evaluation of the evidence and material on record, which the learned Single Judge has found to be justified. “A possible view by the arbitrator on facts has necessarily to pass muster as the Arbitrator is the ultimate master of the quantity and quality of evidence to be relied upon when he delivers his arbitral award.” (see : Associate Builders Vs. DDA (2015) 3 SCC 49 ). “A possible view by the arbitrator on facts has necessarily to pass muster as the Arbitrator is the ultimate master of the quantity and quality of evidence to be relied upon when he delivers his arbitral award.” (see : Associate Builders Vs. DDA (2015) 3 SCC 49 ). It has been held time and again by courts in a catena of judgments that when there are concurrent findings by the Arbitral Tribunal and the Court in proceedings under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, then a Court dealing with an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act ought to be slow in interfering with such findings, unless there is any apparent perversity in the arbitral award that goes to the root of the case. In the present case, appellant has not been able to point to any apparent perversity.” 16. The extent of judicial scrutiny under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act 1996 is limited and scope of interference is narrow. Under Section 37, the extent of judicial scrutiny and scope of interference is further narrower. An appeal under Section 37 is like a second appeal, the first appeal being to the court by way of objections under Section 34. Where there are concurrent findings of facts and law, first by the Arbitral Tribunal which are then confirmed by the court while dealing with objections under Section 34, in an appeal under Section 37, the Appellate Court would be very cautious and reluctant to interfere in the findings returned in the award by the Arbitral Tribunal and confirmed by the court under Section 34. 17. For ready reference, Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration Act are reproduced herein as under :- “34. Application for setting aside arbitral award. 17. For ready reference, Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration Act are reproduced herein as under :- “34. Application for setting aside arbitral award. - (1) Recourse to a Court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award in accordance with sub-section (2) and sub-section (3) (2) An arbitral award may be set aside by the Court only if - (a) The party making the application 1[establishes on the basis of the record of the arbitral tribunal that] - (i) a party was under some incapacity; or (ii) the arbitration agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law for the time being in force; or (iii) the party making the application was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or (iv) the arbitral award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration: Provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, only that part of the arbitral award which contains decisions on matters not submitted to arbitration may be set aside; or (v) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, unless such agreement was in conflict with a provision of this Part from which the parties cannot derogate, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with this Part; or (b) the Court finds that - (i) the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law for the time being in force, or (ii) the arbitral award is in conflict with the public policy of India. 1[Explanation 1. 1[Explanation 1. - For the avoidance of any doubt, it is clarified that an award is in conflict with the public policy of India, only if,- (i) the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption or was in violation of section 75 or section 81; or (ii) it is in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law; or (iii) it is in conflict with the most basic notions of morality or justice. 1[Explanation 2. - For the avoidance of doubt, the test as to whether there is a contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law shall not entail a review on the merits of the dispute.] 37 Appealable orders. - (1) 1 [Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, an appeal] shall lie from the following orders (and from no others) to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decrees of the Court passing the order, namely:-- 2[(a) refusing to refer the parties to arbitration under section 8; (b) granting or refusing to grant any measure under section 9; (c) setting aside or refusing to set aside an arbitral award under section 34.] (2) Appeal shall also lie to a court from an order of the arbitral tribunal-- (a) accepting the plea referred to in sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) of section 16; or (b) granting or refusing to grant an interim measure under section 17. (3) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under this section, but nothing in this section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court. 18. As laid down by the Apex Court, the supervisory role of the court in arbitration proceedings has been kept at a minimum level and this is because the parties to the agreement make a conscious decision to exclude the courts jurisdiction by opting for arbitration as the parties prefer the expediency and finality offered by it. 19. In the light of above, in the present case also, it is apparent that the learned Arbitrator appreciated all the terms and conditions of agreement so executed between the parties and also appreciate all orders of appellant company, bills and in para 12 of its award has dealt with every claim of claimant and while rejecting some claims and awarded some claims as per his appreciation. 20. 20. It is settled law that the Arbitrator is ultimate master of quantity and quality of evidence to be relied upon when he delivers his Arbitral Award. It has been held by Hon’ble Apex Court in catena of judgments that when there are concurrent finding by the Arbitral Tribunal and the Court in the proceeding under Section 34 of Arbitration Act then a Court dealing with an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act ought to be slow in interfering with such findings unless there is any apparent perversity in the arbitral award that goes to the root of the case but in the present case, appellant has not been able to point out any apparent perversity. Interpretation of contract as given by the learned Court is to be accepted if the same is a plausible interpretation. If two views are possible then the Court will not substitute its views merely because another view or interpretation is possible. The interpretation of contract as given by the learned Court is a possible one, therefore, there is no occasion for this Court to interfere with finding of the learned Commercial Court. 21. For the reason stated herein above, the appeal being devoid of merit, the same along with pending application, if any, is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.