JUDGMENT : Heard Mr. S. D. Loda, learned counsel for the petitioners. Also heard Ms. T. Jini, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State of Arunachal Pradesh. 2. The petitioners who are the accused and informant respectively in connection with Yingkion P.S. Case No. 06/2023 under Sections 354D/500 IPC, have jointly instituted the present proceedings praying for quashing of the connected F.I.R. dated 03.02.2023, on the basis of a compromise entered into between them on resolution of the misapprehensions that had developed between them. 3. The petitioner no. 2, herein, had lodged an F.I.R. on 03.02.2023 against the petitioner no. 1, herein, before the Police of Yingkion Police Station, inter alia, alleging that the petitioner no. 1, herein, had lodged an F.I.R. against the petitioner no. 2, wherein, he had levelled unwarranted allegations against her which had the effect of defaming her reputation before the society. It was further contended by the petitioner no. 2 in the said F.I.R., that the petitioner no. 1 had been following her madly since last 8 (eight) to 9 (nine) months continuously disturbing her and causing mental harassment to her. It was further alleged that the petitioner no. 1 was continuously attempting to establish relationship with her, which she was not interested in. The petitioner no. 2 further proceeded to allege that the petitioner no. 1 was blackmailing her to have a relationship with him and marry him. Accordingly, on the basis of the said harassment, blackmailing and also spreading rumours about her, which had caused her mental agony, the F.I.R. in question was filed by the petitioner no. 2. The Police on receipt of the said F.I.R., proceeded to register Yingkion P.S. Case No. 06/2023 under Sections 354D/500 IPC and the said case is presently under investigation. 4. It is contended that after registration of the said F.I.R., the petitioner no. 1 had approached this Court by way of instituting Criminal Petition No. 38/2023 praying for quashing of the same, along with the consequential criminal proceedings. This Court had kept the investigation in the said case in abeyance. 4. It is contended that after registration of the said F.I.R., the petitioner no. 1 had approached this Court by way of instituting Criminal Petition No. 38/2023 praying for quashing of the same, along with the consequential criminal proceedings. This Court had kept the investigation in the said case in abeyance. However, in the meanwhile, with the involvement of the elders and seniors of the communities to which the petitioners belong, a resolution of the disputes and misapprehensions existing between the petitioners came to be resolved and accordingly, the petitioners on resolution of their differences, proceeded to record a compromise and settlement in the matter by executing a Deed of Compromise and Settlement on 16.10.2023. Accordingly, the pending Criminal Petition No. 38/2023 was withdrawn by the petitioners with liberty to file the same afresh. Accordingly, the present proceeding is jointly filed by the petitioners, who are the accused and the informant, respectively, in the connected criminal case. 5. It is contended by the petitioners that the misunderstanding as existing between them were resolved and the petitioner no. 2, on realising the effect of the criminal case as lodged by her against the petitioner no. 1 on his future prospects, and she not wanting the petitioner no. 1 to suffer unnecessarily, had forgiven the petitioner no. 1 and resolved to maintain a cordial relationship with him. It was contended that the petitioners on account of the intervention made in the matter by their well wishers and family members, had proceeded to arrive at a mutual resolution of their disputes and the result of which was the execution of the Deed of Compromise and Settlement, dated 16.10.2023 between the petitioners. The offence involved being not compoundable, the petitioners contend that they have instituted the present proceedings jointly praying for quashing of the same. 6. I have considered the submissions advanced by the parties and also considered the materials available on record. 7. The issue arising in the present proceedings is as to whether this Court has the power, under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash criminal proceedings involving non-compoundable offences in view of the compromise arrived at between parties. 6. I have considered the submissions advanced by the parties and also considered the materials available on record. 7. The issue arising in the present proceedings is as to whether this Court has the power, under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash criminal proceedings involving non-compoundable offences in view of the compromise arrived at between parties. The said issue, more particularly, with regard to matrimonial dispute/offences was considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of B. S. Joshi V. State of Haryana & Another reported in (2003) 4 SCC 675 and the Hon’ble Apex Court categorically held that the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code could not be inflexible or could there be lying a rigid formula to be followed by the Courts. Exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case, but with the sole purpose to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It was further held that it is well settled that these powers have no limit, of course, where there is more power; it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while exercising such powers. Having held so, the Hon’ble Apex Court observed and concluded as follows: “12. The special features in such matrimonial matters are evident. It becomes the duty of the Court to encourage genuine settlements of matrimonial disputes. 13. The observations made by this Court, though in a slightly different context, in G.V. Rao v. L.H.V. Prasad &Ors. [ (2000) 3 SCC 693 ] are very apt for determining the approach required to be kept in view in matrimonial dispute by the courts, it was said that there has been an outburst of matrimonial disputes in recent times. Marriage is a sacred ceremony, the main purpose of which is to enable the young couple to settle down in life and live peacefully. But little matrimonial skirmishes suddenly erupt which often assume serious proportions resulting in commission of heinous crimes in which elders of the family are also involved with the result that those who could have counselled and brought about rapprochement are rendered helpless on their being arrayed as accused in the criminal case. But little matrimonial skirmishes suddenly erupt which often assume serious proportions resulting in commission of heinous crimes in which elders of the family are also involved with the result that those who could have counselled and brought about rapprochement are rendered helpless on their being arrayed as accused in the criminal case. There are many other reasons which need not be mentioned here for not encouraging matrimonial litigation so that the parties may ponder over their defaults and terminate their disputes amicably by mutual agreement instead of fighting it out in a court of law where it takes years and years to conclude and in that process the parties lose their "young" days in chasing their "cases" in different courts. 14. There is no doubt that the object of introducing Chapter XX-A containing Section 498A in the Indian Penal Code was to prevent the torture to a woman by her husband or by relatives of her husband. Section 498A was added with a view to punishing a husband and his relatives who harass or torture the wife to coerce her or her relatives to satisfy unlawful demands of dowry. The hyper technical view would be counter-productive and would act against interests of women and against the object for which this provision was added. There is every likelihood that non-exercise of inherent power to quash the proceedings to meet the ends of justice would prevent women from settling earlier. That is not the object of Chapter XXA of Indian Penal Code. 15. In view of the above discussion, we hold that the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers can quash criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint and Section 320 of the Code does not limit or affect the powers under Section 482 of the Code.” 8. The decisions rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of B. S. Joshi (supra) came to be doubted when the Special Leave Petition in Gian Singh V. State of Punjab came up for hearing before a two Bench Judge and accordingly, the matter was referred to a larger Bench. The larger Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in its decision in the case of Gian Singh V. State of Punjab and Anr., reported in (2012) 10 SCC 303 has held that the case of B. S. Joshi (supra) was correctly decided and held as follows: “58. The larger Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in its decision in the case of Gian Singh V. State of Punjab and Anr., reported in (2012) 10 SCC 303 has held that the case of B. S. Joshi (supra) was correctly decided and held as follows: “58. Where High Court quashes a criminal proceeding having regard to the fact that dispute between the offender and victim has been settled although offences are not compoundable, it does so as in its opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justice in the case demands that the dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored; securing the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding factor. No doubt, crimes are acts which have harmful effect on the public and consist in wrong doing that seriously endangers and threatens well-being of society and it is not safe to leave the crime doer only because he and the victim have settled the dispute amicably or that the victim has been paid compensation, yet certain crimes have been made compoundable in law, with or without permission of the Court. In respect of serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc; or other offences of mental depravity under IPC or offences of moral turpitude under special statutes, like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, the settlement between offender and victim can have no legal sanction at all. However, certain offences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavour having arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the family dispute, where the wrong is basically to victim and the offender and victim have settled all disputes between them amicably, irrespective of the fact that such offences have not been made compoundable, the High Court may within the framework of its inherent power, quash the criminal proceeding or criminal complaint or F.I.R if it is satisfied that on the face of such settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of offender being convicted and by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated. The above list is illustrative and not exhaustive. The above list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Each case will depend on its own facts and no hard and fast category can be prescribed. 61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim’s family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.” 9. Having considered the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the context of the power of this Court to quash proceedings involving non compoundable Sections in exercise of its power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the issue involved in the present proceedings are hereby considered. 10. It is a settled law that the offences which are non-compoundable cannot be compounded by a criminal Court in purported exercise of its powers conferred under Section 320 Cr.P.C. Any such attempt by the court would amount to alteration, addition and modification of Section 320 Cr.P.C., which is the exclusive domain of legislature. Nevertheless, the limited jurisdiction to compound an offence within the framework of Section 320 Cr.P.C. is not an embargo against invoking inherent powers by the High Court vested in it under Section 482 Cr.P.C. This Court, keeping in view of the particular facts and circumstances of the case and for justifiable reasons can invoke the provisions of Section 482 Cr.P.C. in aid to prevent abuse of the process of any Court and/or to secure the ends of justice. 11. 11. This Court, therefore, having regard to the nature of offence and the fact that the parties have amicably settled their dispute and the victim has willingly consented to the nullification of criminal proceedings, can quash such proceedings in exercise of its power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., even if the offences are non-compoundable. 12. This Court, can indubitably evaluate the consequential effects of the offence beyond the body of an individual and thereafter, adopt a pragmatic approach, to ensure that the felony, even if goes unpunished, does not tinker with or paralyze the very object of the administration of criminal justice system. Criminal proceedings involving non-heinous offences or where the offences are pre-dominantly of a private nature can be annulled irrespective of the stage the criminal proceedings are at. 13. Having noticed the powers available to this Court, under the provisions of inherent powers of this Court, under Section 482 Cr.P.C., and quash the criminal proceedings existing against the petitioner no. 1 for the following reasons: (i). Firstly, the occurrence involved in the present proceedings can be categorized, given the nature of relation as disclosed to have existed between the petitioners to be a pure civil dispute having overtones of criminal proceedings of private nature. (ii). Secondly, the act on the part of the petitioner no. 1 (accused) does not appear to exhibit mental depravity and the commission of the said offence cannot be said to be of such a serious nature that quashing of which will override public interest. (iii). Thirdly, even after lodging of the said FIR dated 03.02.2023, the petitioners have reconciled their differences and they on their own volition, without any coercion or compulsion, willingly and voluntarily have buried their differences which was also reduced in writing by executing a deed of mutual agreement/settlement, dated 16.10.2023. (iv). Lastly, the cause of administration of criminal justice system would remain un-effected on acceptance of the amicable settlement between the parties; more so looking at their present age. 14. In view of the conclusions reached hereinabove and having considered the offence involved in the matter and the reconciliation arrived at between the petitioners, this Court, in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. quash the F.I.R. dated 03.02.2023, registered as Yingkion P.S. Case 15. The criminal revision petition is accordingly allowed and disposed of in terms of the above.