ORDER : 1. This Civil Revision Petition is filed by the petitioner aggrieved by the order dated 13.11.2009 passed in E.P.No.36 of 1993 in O.S.No.852 of 1978 on the file of X Additional Senior Civil Judge( FTC), City Civil Court, Court. 2. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for respondents and also perused the written arguments filed by both. 3. The suit was initially filed by Mr.Harbanslal Bhanote as plaintiff. After his death, his wife Smt.Mathura Devi was impleaded as plaintiff. Thereafter, Smt.Kanta Rani was impleaded as plaintiff since Smt.Mathura Devi also died. The name of The Telangana State Dairy Development Co-operative Federation Limited was impleaded in the place of A.P.Dairy Development Co-operative Federation Limited vide orders in I.A.No.1 of 2021 dated 16.09.2021. The said Telangana State Dairy Development Co-operative Federation Limited is third defendant in the suit and also the Execution Petition. 4. The back ground of the case leading to filing of the present petition by petitioner herein, who is respondent No.3 in the suit is that in the year 1961, the Government (R5 herein and defendant in the suit) acquired the land of Mr.Harbhanslal Bhanote up to 4.27 gts in Sy.No.136 of Lalapet Village. In the year 1968, O.P.No.126 of 1968 was referred by the Land Acquisition Officer (R4 herein) to decide issues regarding the compensation and extent of the acquired property. The learned Judge in O.P.No.126 of 1968 held that the Government took possession of excess land to the extent of 1609 sq.yds i.e., 5.30 gts instead of permitted 4.27 gts. Thereafter, Harbhanslal Bhanote filed O.S.No.852 of 1978 against the respondents 4 and 5 herein for recovery of possession of excess property of 1609 sq.yds in Sy.No.136, Lalapet, Hyderabad (disputed property) from the Government. Petitioner/Telangana Dairy Development Co-operative Federation Limited (presently TDDCF) came on record in O.S.No.852 of 1978 as the concerned land was vested in it. The learned Judge passed decree in O.S.NO.852 of 1978 on 12.10.1981 directing the petitioner to deliver possession of the disputed property. Aggrieved by the same, CCCA No.33 of 1982 was filed by the petitioner and CCCA No.58 of 1982 by the respondents 4 and 5 (plaintiff). Both appeals were dismissed by the Court on 17.02.1992. 5. The 1st respondent/plaintiff filed E.P.No.36 of 1993 for execution of decree passed in O.S.No.852 of 1978 on 26.04.1993. Aggrieved by the same, CCCA No.33 of 1982 was filed by the petitioner and CCCA No.58 of 1982 by the respondents 4 and 5 (plaintiff). Both appeals were dismissed by the Court on 17.02.1992. 5. The 1st respondent/plaintiff filed E.P.No.36 of 1993 for execution of decree passed in O.S.No.852 of 1978 on 26.04.1993. Along with petition, E.A.No.88 of 2009 was filed for conducting survey on the property. The Court passed order on 28.08.2009 dismissing the E.A giving the following options for obliging with the decree; i) demolish the structures over 1609 sq.yds and deliver vacant site with road on one side; ii) Deliver the site with structures, without receiving the cost of the structures; iii) to pay market value of the disputed property. 6. On 13.11.2009, order was passed in E.P.No.36 of 1993 directing the petitioner to pay the decree-holder/R1 amount of Rs.2,89,62,000/- for value of the disputed property without three months with interest at the rate of 9% p.a from the date of default. Aggrieved by the same, present revision petition is filed. On 13.03.2010, this Court granted interim stay in CRPMP No.1369 of 2010 in favour of the petitioner. This Court passed order on 03.03.2011 directing the Commissioner of Survey and Settlements, Andhra Pradesh to depute an officer to survey the property and demarcate 1609 sq.yds to be delivered to the respondents. On 16.07.2021, the survey report along with location sketch was brought on record by the petitioner. In the said survey report, it was concluded that the Dy.Inspector of Survey could not identify the area of the disputed property and his efforts to survey the same have gone in vain. 7. The petitioner filed the present revision petition mainly on the following grounds: i) The trial court directing three various modes of execution is beyond its jurisdiction. ii) The court below ought to have seen that under Order 21 Rule 13 of CPC, the decree holder has to furnish the details of the schedule property with clear boundaries for proper execution in the E.P., filed for re-delivery of possession of 1609 sq.yds. iii) The Court below failed to notice that in the absence of clear boundaries by the decree holder, the same will become inexecutable. iv) The court below ought to have seen that in order to execute the decree conducting of survey for proper identification of the land is essential. 8. iii) The Court below failed to notice that in the absence of clear boundaries by the decree holder, the same will become inexecutable. iv) The court below ought to have seen that in order to execute the decree conducting of survey for proper identification of the land is essential. 8. Learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner argued that as per the directions of this Court, the Deputy Director (Survey and Land Records), Hyderabad District conducted a survey and filed report before this Court vide letter No.A4/269/2011, dated Nil. 07.2021. The copy of survey report is part and parcel of the record. He submits that as per the Survey Report, the property in Sy.No.136, the then Deputy Inspector of Survey started to survey of respondents’ land i.e., 1609 sq.yds in Sy.No.136 of Lalaguda Village. But his efforts to survey for identification 1609 sq.yds went vain, as such, the Deputy Inspector of Survey could not identify such area neither the respondents nor his counsel could identify their land. Hence, he could not trace out 1609 sq.yds. 9. Learned counsel further argued that the Survey Report clearly show that the respondent and his counsel are not able to find out their land an extent of 1609 sq.yds, in Sy.No.136 of Lalaguda village. He submits that if the respondent’s land to an extent of 1609 sq.yds in Sy.No.136 of Lalaguda village, cannot be identified, recovery of possession does not arise, particularly the respondent’s land to an extent of 1609 sq.yds is not in possession of the revision petitioner. He submits that contrary to the settled principle that the executing court does not pass order behind judgment and decree, the impugned order passed by the VII Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad in E.P.No.36/1993, contrary to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in the case of Radhey Shyam Gupta v. Punjab National Bank and another (2009) 1 Supreme Court Cases 376) and against the settled principle of law. Accordingly, the order in E.P.No.36 of 1993, dated 13.11.2009 has to be set aside. 10. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent Nos.6 to 10 would submit that the impugned order is an order by consent as the petitioner did not object to the mode of execution before the executing court. Therefore, the petitioner is not only bound by the impugned order but is estopped from reagitating the issue before this Court. 10. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent Nos.6 to 10 would submit that the impugned order is an order by consent as the petitioner did not object to the mode of execution before the executing court. Therefore, the petitioner is not only bound by the impugned order but is estopped from reagitating the issue before this Court. He further submits that the executing court, in right exercise of its jurisdiction and its duty to truly construe the decree, examined the circumstances of the case that the disputed property could not be identified and passed the impugned order directing the petitioner to pay market value of the disputed property to enforce the decree in the civil suit. 11. The counsel for the respondents further argued that the petitioner did not object for the payment of market value of the disputed property before the executing Court. Thus, the petitioner has consented to the impugned order. The impugned order is essentially a judgment by consent, thereby creating an estoppel by judgment and is binding on the parties. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in P.T.Thomas v. Thomas Job (2005) 6 SCC 478 ) wherein it was held as follows: “25. In Sailendra Narayan Bhanja Deo v. State of Orissa [ 1956 SCR 72 : AIR 1956 SC 346 ] the Constitution Bench held as follows: (SCR p. 82) A judgment by consent or default is as effective an estoppel between the parties as a judgment whereby the court exercises its mind on a contested case. (South American and Mexican Co., ex p Bank of England, In re [(1895) 1 Ch 37 : (1891-94) All ER Rep 680 : 71 LT 594 (CA)] & Kinch v. Walcott [1929 AC 482 : 1929 All ER Rep 720 : 98 LJPC 129 (PC)] ) “In South American and Mexican Co., ex p Bank of England, In re [(1895) 1 Ch 37 : (1891-94) All ER Rep 680 : 71 LT 594 (CA)] , it has been held that a judgment by consent or default is as effective an estoppel between the parties as a judgment whereby the court exercises its mind on a contested case. Upholding the judgment of Vaughan Williams, J., Lord Herschell said (Ch p. 50): ‘The truth is, a judgment by consent is intended to put a stop to litigation between the parties just as much as is a judgment which results from the decision of the Court after the matter has been fought out to the end. And I think it would be very mischievous if one were not to give a fair and reasonable interpretation to such judgments, and were to allow questions that were really involved in the action to be fought over again in a subsequent action.’” 12. The petitioner’s consent is evident in the impugned order passed by the executing Court: “In response thereto, learned counsel for DHR submitted on 05.10.2009, that his party accept any of these three modes or any other way this court feels proper. Learned counsel for JDR retrieved his old contention and added that he too will abide order of this Court.” According to the counsel for respondents, the petitioner is estopped from challenging the impugned order passed by the executing court when it expressly consented for the same before the executing court. Reliance is placed on the Government of A.P v. M/s.S.V.Contractors (1991 SCC OnLine AP 284). 13. According to counsel, by virtue of the doctrine of constructive resjudicata, the petitioner was bound to raise all objections in regard to the executability of the decree before the executing order had passed the impugned order. The petitioner is barred from reagitating its objections after the order is passed. Accordingly, counsel sought for dismissal of the CRP. 14. The decree in O.S.No.852/1978 for recovery of possession of the disputed property has attained finality. The Respondent Nos.6 to 10 are prevented from enjoying the fruits of the decree dated 12.10.1981 passed in O.S.No.852 of 1978. The accurate details of the disputed property with clear boundaries were impossible to be located. The same is evident from the proceedings in O.P., OS and E.A. The survey report submitted by the Inspector of Survey subsequent to this Court’s direction dated 03.03.2011 to the Inspector of Survey to demarcate the disputed property clearly reflects that the same could not be identified. 15. The same is evident from the proceedings in O.P., OS and E.A. The survey report submitted by the Inspector of Survey subsequent to this Court’s direction dated 03.03.2011 to the Inspector of Survey to demarcate the disputed property clearly reflects that the same could not be identified. 15. The executing court considering the fact that the disputed property could not be located in view of the erected structures therein and the decree in the civil suit cannot be executed by delivery of possession, therefore, the executing court directed the petitioner to pay the market value of the disputed property i.e., Rs.2,89,62,000/- to the respondents. 16. The main contention of the revision petitioner herein is that they have not admitted in the E.A.No.88 of 2009 that they accepted to abide by the order of the Court regarding compensation to be granted to respondents. The said undertaking before the Court in the EA is incorrect. Further, the land to an extent of 1609 sq.yds is not in possession of the revision petitioner since the said land could not be identified by the Deputy Inspector of Survey nor the counsel could identify the land. 17. At this juncture, the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak and others (1982) 2 SCC 463 ) would be relevant, wherein it is held as under: “4. When we drew the attention of the learned Attorney-General to the concession made before the High Court, Shri A.K. Sen, who appeared for the State of Maharashtra before the High Court and led the arguments for the respondents there and who appeared for Shri Antulay before us intervened and protested that he never made any such concession and invited us to peruse the written submissions made by him in the High Court. We are afraid that we cannot launch into an enquiry as to what transpired in the High Court. It is simply not done. Public policy bars us. Judicial decorum restrains us. Matters of judicial record are unquestionable. They are not open to doubt. Judges cannot be dragged into the arena. We are afraid that we cannot launch into an enquiry as to what transpired in the High Court. It is simply not done. Public policy bars us. Judicial decorum restrains us. Matters of judicial record are unquestionable. They are not open to doubt. Judges cannot be dragged into the arena. “Judgments cannot be treated as mere counters in the game of litigation.” [Per Lord Atkinson in Somasundaram Chetty v. Subramanian Chetty, AIR 1926 PC 136 : 99 IC 742] We are bound to accept the statement of the Judges recorded in their judgment, as to what transpired in court. We cannot allow the statement of the Judges to be contradicted by statements at the Bar or by affidavit and other evidence. If the Judges say in their judgment that something was done, said or admitted before them, that has to be the last word on the subject. The principle is well-settled that statements of fact as to what transpired at the hearing, recorded in the judgment of the court, are conclusive of the facts so stated and no one can contradict such statements by affidavit or other evidence. If a party thinks that the happenings in court have been wrongly recorded in a judgment, it is incumbent upon the party, while the matter is still fresh in the minds of the Judges, to call the attention of the very Judges who have made the record to the fact that the statement made with regard to his conduct was a statement that had been made in error. [ Per Lord Buckmaster in Madhu Sudan Chowdhri v. Chandrabati Chowdhrain, AIR 1917 PC 30 : 42 IC 527] That is the only way to have the record corrected. If no such step is taken, the matter must necessarily end there. Of course a party may resile and an appellate court may permit him in rare and appropriate cases to resile from a concession on the ground that the concession was made on a wrong appreciation of the law and had led to gross injustice; but, he may not call in question the very fact of making the concession as recorded in the judgment. 8. So the Judges' record is conclusive. Neither lawyer nor litigant may claim to contradict it, except before the Judge himself, but nowhere else.” 18. 8. So the Judges' record is conclusive. Neither lawyer nor litigant may claim to contradict it, except before the Judge himself, but nowhere else.” 18. In D.P.Chadha v. Triyugi Narain Mishra and others (2001) 2 SCC 221 ), wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows: “18. The record of the proceedings made by the court is sacrosanct. The correctness thereof cannot be doubted merely for asking. In State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak [ (1982) 2 SCC 463 : 1982 SCC (Cri) 478 : AIR 1982 SC 1249 ] this Court has held: (AIR Headnote) “[T]he Judges' record was conclusive. Neither lawyer nor litigant may claim to contradict it, except before the Judge himself, but nowhere else. The court could not launch into inquiry as to what transpired in the High Court. The Court is bound to accept the statement of the Judges recorded in their judgment, as to what transpired in court. It cannot allow the statement of the Judges to be contradicted by statements at the Bar or by affidavit and other evidence. If the Judges say in their judgment that something was done, said or admitted before them, that has to be the last word on the subject. The principle is well settled that statements of facts as to what transpired at the hearing, recorded in the judgment of the court, are conclusive of the facts so stated and no one can contradict such statements by affidavit or other evidence. If a party thinks that the happenings in court have been wrongly recorded in a judgment, it is incumbent upon the party, while the matter is still fresh in the minds of the Judges, to call the attention of the very Judges who have made the record to the fact that the statement made with regard to his conduct was a statement that had been made in error. That is the only way to have the record corrected. If no such step is taken, the matter must necessarily end there.” 19. Again in Bhagwati Prasad v. Delhi State Mineral Development Corpn. That is the only way to have the record corrected. If no such step is taken, the matter must necessarily end there.” 19. Again in Bhagwati Prasad v. Delhi State Mineral Development Corpn. [ (1990) 1 SCC 361 : 1990 SCC (L&S) 174 : AIR 1990 SC 371 ] this Court has held: (SCC p. 364, para 5) “It is now settled law that the statement of facts recorded by a court or quasi-judicial tribunal in its proceedings as regards the matters which transpired during the hearing before it would not be permitted to be assailed as incorrect unless steps are taken before the same forum. It may be open to a party to bring such statement to the notice of the court/tribunal and to have it deleted or amended. It is not, therefore, open to the parties or the counsel to say that the proceedings recorded by the tribunal are incorrect.” 19. The submission by the counsel for the petitioner has no merit. The proceedings before the Court and its decorum are sacrosanct and the party cannot be permitted to state that the Judge recording during proceedings are incorrect. Even in the grounds of revision that was filed at the time of filing the present revision petition, no such ground was raised regarding the petitioner not accepting the observation made in the impugned order that the counsel has undertaken to abide by the order of the Court. For the first time, it is argued before this Court and also stated in the written submissions filed on 18.08.2023 that the observation of the learned Judge in the impugned order is incorrect. The petitioner is now also arguing for the first time that the extent of 1609 sq.yds is not in possession of the revision petitioner, which is contrary to the judgment of the Court below and the fact that the revision petitioner was in possession of excess land of 1609 sq.yds has attained finality in view of the appeals filed against lower Court order being dismissed by this Court and the trial Court’s order of revision petitioner being in possession of 1609 sq.yds cannot be disputed. 20. 20. It is well established that the jurisdiction of revision either under Section 115 of CPC or under Section 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court cannot correct errors of fact however gross or errors of law unless the said errors are related to the jurisdiction of the Court to try the dispute itself. It is not the case of the revision petitioner that there is any such jurisdictional issue. The errors that could be rectified in revision can only relate to any breach of provision of law or any material defects which affected the ultimate decision of the Court below. 21. As already discussed the revision petitioner having undertaken to accept before the Execution Court that he would abide by the order of the Execution Court and if it is incorrect, ought to have taken up his grievance before the Execution Court itself and not before this Court that too for the first time after 14 years. 22. There are no reasons to interfere with the impugned order and accordingly, Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Consequently, miscellaneous applications, if any, pending, shall stand dismissed.