JUDGMENT : (Venuthurumalli Gopala Krishna Rao, J.) : This Appeal, under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure [for short ‘the C.P.C.’], is filed by the Appellant/plaintiff challenging the Decree and Judgment, dated 29.08.1997, in O.S. No.51 of 1995 passed by the learned III Additional District Judge, Visakhapatnam [for short ‘the trial Court’]. The Respondent herein is the defendant in the said Suit. 2. The appellant/plaintiff filed the Suit in O.S.No.51 of 1995 for declaration that the demand of the defendant for payment of Rs.5,33,275.37 paisa is highly excessive and illegal and for consequential relief of permanant injunction restraining the defendant and its men from collecting any excess rate over and above the price already paid by the plaintiff to the Visakhapatnam Town Planning Trust under the sale deed dated 02.07.1973 and for costs. 3. Both the parties in the Appeal will be referred to as they are arrayed before the trial Court. 4. The brief averments of the plaint, in O.S. No.51 of 1995, are as under: The plaintiff society was formed for the purpose of providing house sites to its members at Visakhapatnam and it is a registered society. At its instance, the Town Planning Trust agreed to allot 66 house sites measuring Ac.3.45 cents in Maddilapalem, Visakhapatnam @ Rs.19.20 paise per square yard. The plaintiff paid an amount of Rs.66,473/- as advance at the time of applying for allotment of house site, subsequently paid an amount of Rs.1,87,071/- on 31.03.1973 and an amount of Rs.67,412.60 paise on 17.04.1973. After receipt of the above said consideration, the Town Planning Trust got executed a sale deed by its Chairman in favour of the plaintiff society on 02.07.1973 as required under Section 45 of the Town Planning Act. The Town Planning Trust acquired title to the land by virtue of the Award No.2 of 1970 dated 31.08.1970 of the special Tahsildar for land acquisition, Visakhapatnam Municipality. It is mentioned in the sale deed that the price mentioned therein is a tentative price. The land acquisition proceedings in respect of the site were pending on the date of execution of the sale deed and the compensation payable to the land owners was not finally decided. It is mentioned in the sale deed that the price mentioned therein is a tentative price. The land acquisition proceedings in respect of the site were pending on the date of execution of the sale deed and the compensation payable to the land owners was not finally decided. The plaintiff shall pay the excess price if found due over and above the tentative price by virtue of the final and conclusive computation of compensation under the land acquisition proceedings for the lands acquired and of which the property sold to the plaintiff is only a part and by virtue of the charges for development and providing amenities finally determined by the Town Planning Trust. Subsequent to the execution of the sale deed, the Town Planning Trust was abolished and Visakhapatnam Urban Development Authority was constituted in its place under A.P. Urban Areas (Development) Act, 1975. ii) The plaintiff received a letter in R.C.1508/71.E.1 dated 13.03.1986 from the defendant on 19.03.1986 wherein it is stated that final rate of the site is arrived at Rs.32.50 paise per square yard and an amount of Rs.2,22,083/- is still due from the plaintiff as on 31.03.1985 and requested the plaintiff to arrange the remittance of the amount on or before 31.05.1986 failing which it is said that further interest will be charged. In the above letter, it is alleged by the defendant that earlier letter dated 10.06.1985 was addressed to the plaintiff for the same purpose, but the plaintiff stated that no such letter was received by it. The plaintiff addressed a letter to the defendant dated 08.04.1986 requesting it to furnish the copy of the letter dated 10.06.1985. The defendant also demanded the payment of amount on or before 30.06.1986. Thereafter the plaintiff addressed a letter dated 24.06.1986 to the defendant reiterating its stand that the alleged letter dated 10.06.1985 was not received by it and requesting to send a copy of the said letter. Denying the liability to pay the enhanced amount, subsequently the plaintiff sent a detailed reply dated 29.08.1986 challenging each and every item in the work sheet attached to the letter of the defendant and stating that it is not liable to pay the enhanced amount. iii) The defendant has no right to tag on the cost of the land and development of the land acquired simultaneously along with the schedule land acquired under Award No.2 of 1970. iii) The defendant has no right to tag on the cost of the land and development of the land acquired simultaneously along with the schedule land acquired under Award No.2 of 1970. For determination of the cost of the plots of the members of the plaintiff society, the price for the entire Maddilapalem lay out cannot be taken into consideration. Initially while deciding the cost of the site, the defendant took into consideration the rate of interest of 15% p.a. awarded to the land owners in the land acquisition proceedings. In the year 1973 the prevailing rate of land per square yard in and around Maddilapalem layout area was not more than Rs.7/- and admittedly as per the cost statement of the defendant also it purchased the land in the said area at Rs.7/- per square yard under private negotiations. The final rate claimed by the defendant is very high when compared to the actual rate in the area at relevant time. 5. The defendant filed a written statement by denying the averments mentioned in the plaint and further contended as under: - The price agreed to and fixed was only a tentative price in view of the fact that the land acquisition proceedings were not completed by then. The sale deed is not unilateral as contended by the plaintiff and it is bilateral. The plaintiff was never compelled to purchase the land from the defendant. Having voluntarily agreed to pay the final price as determined by the defendant, the plaintiff is bound to pay the same as per clause 15 of the sale deed. The plaintiff was only assured by the defendant to provide amenities such as formation of roads, protected drinking water supply, drainages and electricity on condition of the plaintiff bearing the expenditure. ii) The entire land that was allotted to the plaintiff among other lands was acquired under award No.2 of 1970 and as such it is impossible to determine the cost of the land that was allotted to the plaintiff in seclusion with the other lands and the claim of the plaintiff to be intimated about the land acquired through private negotiations is uncalled for. The final price could only be fixed on the entire land acquired irrespective of the manner of acquisition and the claim of the plaintiff that the land acquired by compulsory acquisition should be taken as such for fixation of final price is not tenable. The entire land including the plaint schedule property was acquired under the same award i.e., Award No.2 of 1970 but the different claimants preferred various claims in the same award. The plaintiff at any rate cannot disown its liability to pay the final price on the ground that it was not a party to the land acquisition proceedings for the reason that the plaintiff cannot be impleaded in the said acquisition proceedings. The defendant will only fix the final sale price basing on the compensation, seclusion and interest awarded by the civil court to the land owners and the development charges and communicate the same to the plaintiff. Accordingly the plaintiff was furnished with all the details as to how the final sale price was arrived at and no objection was raised by the plaintiff to the same. As such it is preposterous to allege that the plaintiff was never communicated. iii) Because of the erroneous calculation, the defendant asked the plaintiff to pay an amount of Rs.2,22,083/- in the first instance at the rate of Rs.32.50 paise per square yard, but subsequently it was found that the plaintiff has to pay an amount of Rs.4,23,795/- at the rate of Rs.44.58 paise per square yard. The plaintiff was furnished with the detailed and correct statement of account annexed to the letter dated 27.05.1986. The figure in the said letter is not an enhanced figure but only a corrected figure. iv) Interest accrued on the tentative sale price paid by the plaintiff was duly given credit to while calculating the final price and the allegation that the defendant dragged on the matter without paying the compensation and as such the plaintiff is not liable to pay interest is preposterous for the simple reason that the matter is pending before the High Court and the same cannot be attributed to the defendant alone and hence the objections of the plaintiff on the said ground are not sustainable. 6. 6. Based on the above pleadings, the trial Court framed the following issues: (i) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a declaration that the demand of the defendant for payment of Rs.5,33,275.37 paise is highly excessive, illegal, arbitrary and unenforceable? (ii) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for permanent injunction as prayed for? (iii) To what relief? 7. During the course of trial in the trial Court, on behalf of the Plaintiff, PW1 and PW2 were examined and Ex.A1 and Ex.A31 were marked. No oral and documentary evidence was adduced on behalf of defendant. 8. After completion of the trial and on hearing the arguments of both sides, the trial Court dismissed the suit with costs vide its judgment, dated 29.08.1997, against which the present appeal is preferred by the appellant/plaintiff in the Suit questioning the Decree and Judgment passed by the trial Court. 9. Heard Sri Pamidigantam Patanjali, learned counsel representing Sri P.Sri Raghu Ram, learned counsel for appellant and Sri A.Vamsi Krishna, learned counsel representing Sri V.Surya Kiran Kumar, learned standing counsel for VMRDA and VUDA, appearing for respondents. 10. Learned counsel for appellant would contend that the Court below erred in not deciding the consensus adidum between the parties cannot be determined by a factor by a third party contingency i.e., the amount of compensation to be paid by the land holders. He would further contend that the Court below should have seen the variation in the payment of compensation is a factor which has to be considered not in terms of contract but by putting the said offer to the plaintiff once more for consideration. He would further contend that the Court below should have seen that finding on the variation of price even if permissible is not unilateral action permissible in realm of contract. The learned counsel for appellant would contend that the Court below should have seen that legal expenses claimed by the defendant cannot be part of the price escalation. 11. Per contra, the learned counsel for respondent would contend that on appreciation of the entire evidence on record, the learned trial Judge rightly dismissed the suit and there is no need to interfere with the finding given by the learned trial Judge and the appeal may be dismissed. 12. 11. Per contra, the learned counsel for respondent would contend that on appreciation of the entire evidence on record, the learned trial Judge rightly dismissed the suit and there is no need to interfere with the finding given by the learned trial Judge and the appeal may be dismissed. 12. Having regard to the pleadings in the suit, the findings recorded by the trial Court and in the light of rival contentions and submissions made on either side before this Court, the following points would arise for determination: i. Whether the appellant/plaintiff is entitled for relief of declaration that the demand of the defendant for payment of Rs.5,33,275.37 paise is arbitrary and unenforceable? ii. Whether the appellant/plaintiff is entitled for consequential relief of permanent injunction as prayed for? iii. Whether the trial Court is justified in dismissing the suit? 13. Point No.1: Whether the appellant/plaintiff is entitled for relief of declaration that the demand of the defendant for payment of Rs.5,33,275.37 paise is arbitrary and unenforceable? The undisputed facts are after payment of consideration of Rs.3,20,953.60 paise, the plaintiff obtained a sale deed from Visakhapatnam Town Planning Trust in respect of schedule property mentioned in the plaint schedule and it was specifically mentioned in the sale deed that the price mentioned in the sale deed is tentative only and it was further specifically mentioned that the land acquisition proceedings in respect of site was pending on the date of acquisition of sale deed and the compensation payable to the land owners was not finally decided. It was also not disputed that the plaintiff shall pay the excess price if found due over and above the tentative price by virtue of the final and conclusive computation of compensation under the land acquisition proceedings for the lands acquired under which the property sold to the plaintiff is only a part and by virtue of the charges for development and providing amenities finally determined by the Town Planning Trust. It is also an admitted fact that subsequent to the execution of sale deed, the Town Planning Trust was abolished and Visakhapatnam Urban Development Authority was constituted in its place under A.P.Urban Development Authority. It is also an admitted fact that subsequent to the execution of sale deed, the Town Planning Trust was abolished and Visakhapatnam Urban Development Authority was constituted in its place under A.P.Urban Development Authority. There was a letter correspondence from the defendant to the plaintiff with regard to the demand of amount to be paid by the plaintiff, finally the defendant sent a letter dated 28.10.1986 to the plaintiff demanding to pay the amount of Rs.4,23,795/- with interest from 31.03.1985 to 31.03.1986 within 15 days and that the plaintiff is constrained to file the suit. 14. The defendant severely contended that the price agreed to and fixed was only a tentative price, in view of the fact that land acquisition proceedings was not completed by then and the sale deed is not a unilateral as contended by the plaintiff and it is a bilateral. The defendant further pleaded that the plaintiff was never compelled to purchase the land from the defendant, having voluntarily agreed to pay final price as determined by the defendant which is incorporated in the sale deed itself and the plaintiff is bound to pay the same as per clause 15 of the sale deed. 15. The learned counsel for appellant would contend that the learned trial judge came to wrong conclusion that the appellant cannot question the enhanced final price of the plots fixed by the defendant on the ground that fixation is unreasonable and arbitrary and only the constitutional courts are empowered to get into the question of arbitrariness and unreasonableness of escalation of cost of the plots and the appellant can enforce only the rights arose out of the contract in a Civil Court and nothing more and the observation made by the trial Court is that only the constitutional Courts are empowered to go into the question of point involved in the suit and he would further contend that the civil Court is having jurisdiction to entertain the suit and the learned trial Judge came to wrong conclusion and dismissed the suit and the said finding of the trial Judge is contrary to law. 16. The learned counsel for appellant relied on a decision in Ramendra Kishore Biswas vs. State of Tripura and others, (1999) 1 SCC 472 . 16. The learned counsel for appellant relied on a decision in Ramendra Kishore Biswas vs. State of Tripura and others, (1999) 1 SCC 472 . The facts in the said case law relates to the service matter, whereas the subject matter of the present suit is for relief of declaration as sought by the plaintiff. Therefore, the facts and circumstances cited in the case law are different to the instant case. 17. The learned counsel for appellant also relied on a decision in Dhulabhai etc., vs., State of Madhya Pradesh and another, (1968)3 SCR 662 . The facts and circumstances in the cited case law is relates to the recovery of sale tax but whereas the subject matter of the present suit is different to the facts of the case cited in the aforesaid case law. 18. The learned counsel for appellant also relied on a decision in P.R.Murlidharan and others vs. Swami Dharmananda Theertha Padar and others, (2006) 4 SCC 501 . The relief claimed by the party in the subject matter of the case law is to amend the deed of trust so as to abolish the post of Sthiradhyakshan and to vest his powers and duties in the president of the Seva Sangham. Whereas the subject matter of the present suit is different. 19. The learned counsel for appellant placed another reliance in P.N.Verma and others vs. Union of India and others, MANU/DE/0561/1984. The facts in the case law are the Delhi Development Authority had agreed to provide houses at their actual cost to the petitioner and that the Delhi Development Authority is not be allowed to go back the promise made by the authority. But in the case on hand, as per the sale deed the price is tentatively fixed and there was agreement between the parties in the sale deed that the purchaser has agreed to pay the excess price if found due over and above the tentative price paid and further the land acquisition proceedings with regard to the subject matter of the property are pending before the various Courts and the purchaser by agreeing the terms and conditions of the sale deed singed on it, the same is not at all disputed by the appellant, therefore, the facts and circumstances in the cited case law are different to the instant case. 20. 20. The learned counsel for appellant also placed another reliance in Karnataka Industrial areas development board and another vs. Prakash Dal Mill and others, (2011) 6 SCC 714 The facts and circumstances in the case law cited by the appellant is relates to for allotment of industrial sites, whereas the subject matter of the present case on hand is different to the case law cited by the learned counsel for appellant. 21. The learned counsel for appellant placed another reliance in Punjab State Electricity Board and another vs. Ashwani Kumar, (1997) 5 SCC 120 , in that decision, it was held as follows: Section 9 of C.P.C. provides that Civil Court shall try all suits of civil nature, subject to pecuniary jurisdiction, unless their cognizance is expressly or by necessary implication is barred. Such suit would not be maintainable. It is true that ordinarily, the Civil Court has jurisdiction to go into and try the disputed questions of civil nature…... 22. The learned counsel for appellant also placed another reliance in Swamy Atmananda and others vs. Sri Ramakrishna Tapovanam and others, (2005) 10 SCC 51 . In that decision it was held as follows: Indisputably a dispute with regard to the title over immovable property will have to be adjudicated in the Civil Court alone. Section 53 merely postulates that the Civil Court will have no jurisdiction to decide or deal with any question which is by or under the said Act required to be decided or dealt with by any authority or officer mentioned in the said Act. Section 5 of the Act whereupon reliance has been placed by Mr. Sukumaran for advancing the contention that the matter relating to recognition of schools is required to be decided by an authority created thereunder cannot be accepted. Section 5 lays down a procedure as regard necessity to file an application and the contents thereof for permission to run such schools. Section 4 of the Act prohibits every person from establishing any school without obtaining permission of the competent authority save and except in accordance with the terms and conditions specified in such permission. 23. Section 5 lays down a procedure as regard necessity to file an application and the contents thereof for permission to run such schools. Section 4 of the Act prohibits every person from establishing any school without obtaining permission of the competent authority save and except in accordance with the terms and conditions specified in such permission. 23. In a case of State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Manjeti Laxmi Kantha Rao (dead) by L.Rs, (2000) 3 SCC 689 , the Apex Court held as follows: The normal rule of law is that civil courts have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature except those of which cognizance by them is either expressly or impliedly excluded as provided under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure but such exclusion is not readily inferred and the presumption to be drawn must be in favour of the existence rather than exclusion of jurisdiction of the civil courts to try civil suit. The test adopted in examining such a question is (i) whether the legislative intent to exclude arises explicitly or by necessary implication, and (ii) whether the statute in question provides for adequate and satisfactory alternative remedy to a party aggrieved by an order made under it. In Dhulabhai & Ors. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr.1, it was noticed that where a statute gives finality to the orders of the special tribunals jurisdiction of the civil courts must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil courts would normally do in a suit and such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. There can be no dispute to the settled legal proposition that the matters/ disputes relating to the contract cannot be agitated nor terms of the contract can be enforced through writ jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution, thus the writ Court cannot be a forum to seek any relief based on the terms and conditions incorporated in the agreement by both the parties. Here, in the case on hand, admittedly, there was a sale deed in between both the parties and the contract in between both the parties is bilateral not unilateral and the terms and conditions in the sale deed are also not denied by any of the party to the case on hand. Therefore, the Civil Court is having jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Furthermore, the relief sought by the plaintiff in the suit is to declare the demand of the defendant for payment of Rs.5,33,275.37 paisa is highly excessive and illegal and for consequential relief of permanant injunction restraining the defendant and its men from collecting any excess rate over and above the price already paid by the plaintiff to the Visakhapatnam Town Planning Trust under the sale deed dated 02.07.1973. Except the civil Court no Court can grant such relief of declaration. For the aforesaid reasons, I am of the considered view that the jurisdiction of the civil Court is not at all ousted, the civil court is having jurisdiction to try the suit. 24. As stated supra, the relief sought by the plaintiff in the main suit is to declare the demand of the defendant for payment of Rs.5,33,275.37 paisa is highly excessive and illegal and for consequential relief of permanant injunction restraining the defendant and its men from collecting any excess rate over and above the price already paid by the plaintiff to the Visakhapatnam Town Planning Trust under the sale deed dated 02.07.1973. To resolve the subject matter of the dispute, the sale deed dated 02.07.1973 is a crucial document and the contents has to be looked into. Here, the plaintiff is not asking the relief of declaration of title in respect of subject matter of the immovable property in the plaint schedule, basing on the alleged sale deed, the plaintiff executed different sale deeds in favour of members of the plaintiff society. 25. Ex.A2 is the copy of sale deed said to have been executed by Chairman, Town Planning Trust, represented by S.N.Achanta, I.A.S., Visakhapatnam (vendor), in favour of the plaintiff, later the Town Planning Trust was abolished and Visakhapatnam Urban Development Authority was constituted in its place under A.P.Urban Development Authorities Act 1975. 25. Ex.A2 is the copy of sale deed said to have been executed by Chairman, Town Planning Trust, represented by S.N.Achanta, I.A.S., Visakhapatnam (vendor), in favour of the plaintiff, later the Town Planning Trust was abolished and Visakhapatnam Urban Development Authority was constituted in its place under A.P.Urban Development Authorities Act 1975. In a sale deed it was recited that at the request of vendee 66 plots measuring Ac.3.45 cents in the area was sold to the plaintiff subject to the terms and conditions therein and the price is also fixed tentatively, in view of the fact that land acquisition proceedings in respect of lands of which the property is only a part are not yet over and the compensation for the lands acquired has not been completely, finally and conclusively adjudicated. There was another specific recital in the sale deed that the purchaser has agreed to pay the excess price if found due over and above the tentative price paid under the indenture by virtue of final and conclusive computation under land acquisition proceedings for the lands acquired as referred supra. There was another specific recital in the sale deed that the purchaser has agreed to sign the present deed of sale in acknowledgment of having to abide by the terms and conditions of the same. The terms and conditions mentioned in Ex.A2 sale deed are not been disputed by either of the parties and both are admitting about the terms and conditions. Therefore, the terms and conditions in Ex.A2 are binding on both the parties to the suit. Therefore, now it is not proper to the plaintiff to re-agitate the terms and conditions of the contract between the parties. The plaintiff examined its Secretary as PW1, he is working as a Secretary of the plaintiff Society since 1979-1980, the sale deed in between both the parties is dated 02.07.1973, therefore, PW1 is not a Secretary of the society by the date of contract and he is not having any personal knowledge about the case facts. Moreover, in cross examination, he admits agreeing to the terms and conditions mentioned in the sale deed, the plaintiff society also signed in the sale deed and by the date of sale under Ex.A2 and he does not know whether the acquisition proceedings were finalized or not. Moreover, in cross examination, he admits agreeing to the terms and conditions mentioned in the sale deed, the plaintiff society also signed in the sale deed and by the date of sale under Ex.A2 and he does not know whether the acquisition proceedings were finalized or not. Another admission made by him is that in Ex.A2 it is mentioned that the value of the land is Rs.19.20 paisa per square yard and it is also mentioned in Ex.A2 that the acquisition proceedings are not yet completed and the amount to spent for providing amenities was yet to be arrived. He further admits that there is no condition in Ex.A2 that the Town Planning Trust has to inform the plaintiff society about the pendency of land acquisition proceedings. Another admission made by him is that up to 1986 there was no correspondence between plaintiff and VUDA and final price was fixed on the total layout of Ac.97.10 cents and for the entire Ac.97.10 cents, the composite High Court enhanced the price of Rs.7/- per square yard as per annexure Ex.A6. He also further admits that there is an agreement between plaintiff Society and VUDA that the land acquisition proceedings are pending and those are have to be finalized. 26. PW2 is one of the member of the plaintiff. As per his evidence, he is also one of the member of the plaintiff society. As per his evidence, in his cross examination, he admits that the plots were allotted by Tirupati Private Trust by the defendant to the plaintiff society members and a sale deed was also executed in favour of the plaintiff and he also admits that there were total 66 plots and he obtained a sale deed in his favour from the plaintiff society. Now the said document is kept with MMTC and he obtained a loan for construction of the house. He further admits at the time of sale, the defendant mentioned in the sale deed that the value was fixed tentatively. 27. Now the said document is kept with MMTC and he obtained a loan for construction of the house. He further admits at the time of sale, the defendant mentioned in the sale deed that the value was fixed tentatively. 27. The above admissions of PW1 and PW2 categorically goes to show that the price of plots was fixed tentatively in view of the pendency of the land acquisition matter before the composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh and that the price is tentatively fixed by incorporating the certain terms and conditions, the sale deed was executed and the same was not in dispute by both the parties. In the case on hand, the sale deed is not unilateral and it is a bilateral, having voluntarily agreed to pay the final price as determined by the defendant as per clause 15 of the sale deed, the plaintiff is bound to pay the amount to the defendant. The entire land including the plaint schedule property was acquired under the land acquisition Award No.2 of 1970, but the different claimants preferred various claims in the same award and it is also fact that the plaintiff at any rate cannot disown its liability to pay the final price on the ground that the plaintiff was not a party to the land acquisition proceedings. It is also further relevant to say that the plaintiff was furnished with all details by the defendant as to how the final sale price was arrived at and at any point of time no objection was raised by the plaintiff and there was a letter correspondence in between the plaintiff and the defendant prior to institution of the suit itself. 28. It was contended by the learned counsel for appellant that the defendant never informed the plaintiff about the details of land acquisition proceedings and the defendant was not diligent about the land acquisition proceedings pertaining to the plaint schedule land. It was admitted by PW1 in cross examination that there is no terms and conditions in Ex.A2 sale deed that the defendant has to inform the stage of land acquisition proceedings to the plaintiff. Admittedly, it was contended by the learned counsel for appellant that in order to prove the alleged oral contention of the plaintiff no prima facie evidence is produced by the plaintiff. Admittedly, it was contended by the learned counsel for appellant that in order to prove the alleged oral contention of the plaintiff no prima facie evidence is produced by the plaintiff. In fact, no evidence is produced to prove the said allegations as pleaded by the plaintiff. 29. The law is well settled that once the parties committed themselves to a written contract, whereby they reduced the terms and conditions agreed upon by them to writing the same would be binding upon them in the event such a written contract provided for the consequences that are to follow in the event of breach of conditions by the one or the other of the parties thereto, such consequences must necessarily follow and if resisted they would be legally enforceable. 30. In a case of General Assurance Society Limited vs. Chandumull Jain and another, AIR 1966 SC 1644 , the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court held as follows: In interpreting documents relating to a contract of insurance, the duty of the Court is to interpret the words in which the contract is expressed by the parties because it is not for the Court to make a new contract, however reasonable, if the parties have not made it themselves. 31. In a case of Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment Corporation vs. Diamond and Gem Development Corporation Limited, (2013) 5 SCC 470 , the Apex Court held as follows: A contract being a creature of an agreement between two or more parties, is to be interpreted giving the actual meaning to the words contained in the contract and it is not permissible for the Court to make a new contract, however reasonable, if the parties have not made it themselves. 32. In a case of Shree Ambika Medical Stores vs. Surat People’s Cooperative Bank Limited, (2020) 13 SCC 564 , the Apex Court held as follows: Through its interpretative process, the Court cannot rewrite or create a new contract between the parties and has to simply apply the terms and conditions of the agreement as agreed between the parties. It was contended by the learned counsel for appellant that the officials of the defendant without caring to know the position of law on the aspect paid solatium to the land owners at higher rate of 30% of the market value. It was contended by the learned counsel for appellant that the officials of the defendant without caring to know the position of law on the aspect paid solatium to the land owners at higher rate of 30% of the market value. In the case on hand, the defendant paid the price to the land owners only as per the rate fixed by the composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh in A.S.No.1024 of 1977 and other batch cases. Having agreed the terms and conditions in Ex.A2, the authorities are liable to pay the final price fixed by the government and the allotees cannot escape the liability by showing baseless allegations. As noticed supra, Ex.A2 is a crucial document to decide the subject matter of the suit. The recitals in Ex.A2 are as follows: - Whereas the vendor at the request of the vendee allotted 66 plots measuring Ac.3.45 cents in the aforesaid area and agreed to convey full title by means of a sale deed of the sites sold by it, subject to the terms and conditions mentioned herein. The recitals in Ex.A2 are as follows: - Whereas the vendor at the request of the vendee allotted 66 plots measuring Ac.3.45 cents in the aforesaid area and agreed to convey full title by means of a sale deed of the sites sold by it, subject to the terms and conditions mentioned herein. - Whereas the sale consideration shown in the present sale deed is tentatively fixed in view of the fact that the land acquisition proceedings in respect of the lands of which the property is only a part, are not yet over and the compensation for the lands acquired has not been completed finally and conclusively and in view of the fact the cost of development charges and provision of amenities etc., for the area has not yet been finally determined; - Whereas the purchaser has agreed to pay the excess price if found due over and above the tentative price paid under this indenture by virtue of the final and conclusive computation of compensation under the land acquisition proceedings for the lands acquired as referred to above and by virtue of the final determination of development charges and provisions of amenities, subsequently at any time and to have the requisite documents executed for that purpose by the vendors and registered if so required, all at the purchaser’s cost; - Whereas the purchaser has agreed to sign the present deed of sale in acknowledgment of having to abide by the terms and the conditions of the sale; - The vendors do covenant with the purchaser that the vendors have now the full right to convey and assign the property hereby conveyed and the purchaser shall hereafter peaceably and quietly possess and enjoy the said property without any interruption, claim or demand from or by the vendors or any one lawfully or equitably claiming from, under or in trust for them; - The purchaser doth hereby declare and covenant with the vendors that the purchaser shall construct a building for which property was allotted and hereby sold under the housing scheme within a period of two years; - The purchaser doth hereby declare and covenant with the vendors that he shall pay the excess price if found due, over and above the tentative price paid under this indenture, by virtue of the final and conclusive computation of compensation under the land acquisition proceedings, for the lands acquired and of which property hereby sold is only a part; The above recitals in the sale deed are not at all disputed by both the parties and by admitting the terms and conditions, both the parties signed on the sale deed, now the appellant cannot plead that the said sale deed is unilateral but not bilateral. Therefore, the plaintiff is not entitled the relief of declaration as sought for, accordingly point No.1 is answered against the appellant. 33. Point No.2: Whether the appellant/plaintiff is entitled for consequential relief of permanent injunction as prayed for? It was held in point No.1, the plaintiff is not entitled the main relief of declaration, therefore, question of granting consequential relief of permanent injunction does not arise, accordingly, point No.2 is answered. 34. Point No.3: Whether the trial Court is justified in dismissing the suit? In view of my findings in point Nos.1 and 2, I do not find any illegality in dismissing the suit by trial Court and the decree and judgment passed by the trial Court is perfectly sustainable under law and there is no need to interfere with the findings given by the learned trial Judge, accordingly the point No.3 is answered. 35. In the result, the Appeal Suit is dismissed, confirming the decree and Judgment dated 29.08.1997, in O.S.No.51 of 1995 passed by the learned III Additional District Judge, Visakhapatnam. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, each party do bear their own costs in the appeal. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in the Appeal shall stand closed.