JUDGMENT : 1. This second appeal is filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (‘CPC’ for short) praying for quashing and setting aside the judgment and decree dated 2.2.2016 passed by the 2nd Additional District Judge, Navsari in Regular Civil Appeal No.102 of 2005 confirming the judgment and decree passed in Special Suit No.67 of 1983 decided on 27.3.1986 by the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Navsari. 2. This second appeal is filed in the year 2016 and still pending for admission. It also transpires that the matter is adjourned from time to time for one reason or another and after almost eight years, the matter is taken up for consideration at admission stage and heard. 3. Learned advocate Mr.Khubchandani for learned advocate Mr.Vyas is appearing on caveat for some of the respondents and therefore he is also heard in this matter. The parties are referred to in this appeal by their original status for the sake of convenience. 4. The appellants are the original defendants and the respondents are the original plaintiffs, who had filed the suit for recovery of the actual, peaceful and vacant possession of the property described in the plaint para 1, from the defendants for the recover of mesne profit for the use and occupation of the said property at the rate of Rs.200/- per month and also the cost of the suit. The said suit was decreed in favour of the plaintiff. The appellants-original defendants challenged the same by filing first appeal before this Court, which was sent back to the district Court, on coming into force of Gujarat Civil Courts Act, 2005 for decision as the claim was less than Rs.5,00,000/-. Thereafter, the appeal was renumbered as Regular Civil Appeal No.102 of 2005 and after hearing both the sides, the learned 2nd Additional District and Sessions Judge, Navsari dismissed the same by order dated 2.2.2016 and therefore this second appeal is filed by suggesting the following substantial questions of law: “(A) Whether the learned lower appellate court has substantially and materially erred in law in dismissing the appeal preferred by the present appellant in the facts and circumstances of the case? (B) Whether the learned lower appellate court had erred in law as well as in facts in not entertaining the application for framing of issues given vide Exh.120? (B) Whether the learned lower appellate court had erred in law as well as in facts in not entertaining the application for framing of issues given vide Exh.120? (C) Whether both the courts below have materially and substantially erred in law and in facts in not properly constructing the documents, at Exh.49 – Notice and its reply at Exh.50, wherein a Specific Contention, as to oral gift was taken by the present appellants and thereby a gave miscarriage of justice has been caused to the appellants? (D) Whether both the courts below have substantially erred in law as well as in facts in not properly construing the contents of Exh.52, r/w, the provisions of S.123 of the Transfer of Property Act? (E) Whether the appellate judge has substantially erred in law as well as in facts, in discussing and answering the issue not raised by the trial court, despite the application at Exh.120 given for framing of Additional Issue, by the present appellant, and thereby grave and substantial error of law has been committed by the learned Appellate Judge?” 5. Heard learned advocates for the parties. Heard learned advocates for the parties. 5.1 Learned advocate Mr.Bhatt for the appellant-original defendants has submitted that the possession of the defendants of the suit property as described in the said notice was since the year 1917 when the deceased Morar Daji asked his daughter Jamnaben and her husband to stay with them and the husband expired later in the year 1919 and thereafter the said property continued to be occupied by the said Jamnaben and her son Ratilal Tribhovandas, which the learned trial Court has failed to appreciate; that the defendants and their ancestors were continuously in possession of the suit property since 1917 and there is no evidence on the record of the case worth the name to show that the origin of the possession was that of a licensee by virtue of a license granted by Morar Daji and/or after his death by any of his sons including Rambhai and/or any of the plaintiffs; that the contention of the defendants right from the beginning that the said properties were gifted to said Jamnaben by her father was not believed and therefore error is committed by the learned trial Court; that right from 1917 till the said notice at Exh.49, there was no demand for possession made by any person including Morar Daji-plaintiff or any other son of Morar Daji; that the possession of the property continued with the defendants openly and peaceably and to the knowledge of the real owners and were in adverse possession of such property with the necessary animus to acquiring ownership by adverse possession and that too with the knowledge of the real owners; that the defendants/their predecessor in title have become owners of the suit property by adverse possession on expiry of 12 years; that the properties being of the value of less than Rs.100/- could be gifted orally by Morar Daji to his daughter Jamnaben and therefore it need not be registered. He submitted that the learned lower courts below have failed to appreciate the relevant provisions of law and the material available on the record in proper perspective and have failed to appreciate that in absence of contrary title, long possession would establish title in the person in possession and having regard to the long possession, the court should have presumed the title of the defendants. He, therefore, submitted that the learned courts below have erred in passing the impugned judgments, which need to be interfered with by way of this second appeal. 6. Per contra, learned advocate Mr.Khubchandani appearing for the respondents-original plaintiffs have strongly objected the submissions made at the bar by the appellants and also has submitted that the learned courts below have not committed error which will call for interference by this Court in this appeal. He submitted that the defendants are claiming title by virtue of gift but when Jamnaben, the mother of the original defendant-Ratilal was not the owner of the said property, she has no right to make gift in favour of Ratilal Tribhovandas and therefore the gift transaction cannot be said to be legal; that the defendants are paying the taxes of the suit property, they have made repairs in the suit property and they have been in possession and enjoyment as owner since last 65 years and therefore they have become owner of the suit property by adverse possession, which is rightly dealt with by the learned lower courts while coming to the conclusion that merely by doing so, they cannot claim ownership. He, therefore, submitted that the learned courts below have rightly dealt with each and every contention by framing the issues and by framing the points of determination, as required under the law and come to the conclusion that the plaintiffs are the owners of the suit land and the defendants cannot prove their title over it. He, therefore, prayed to dismiss this appeal. 7. Considering the submission made at the bar and considering both the judgments and material available on the record, it transpires that both the courts below concurrently found against the present appellant on finding of fact as well as regarding position of law. The learned trial Court has considered the claim of the present appellants-defendants in detail and by believing that the suit which is filed by the plaintiffs for recovery of possession of the suit premises and also for mesne profit. The learned trial Court has considered the claim of the present appellants-defendants in detail and by believing that the suit which is filed by the plaintiffs for recovery of possession of the suit premises and also for mesne profit. The court has come to the conclusion that the defence raised by the present defendants is not tenable in the eye of law and the pleadings made in the suit are proved by the plaintiff by leading cogent and convincing reasons and therefore, after framing necessary issues and after considering the necessary documents available on the record more particularly, the tax bills of the property in question produced at Exh.38 to 48, notice at Exh.49, as well as the deposition at Exh.27 of the plaintiff Navnitlal Panchal, the deposition of the defendant Harshadbhai at exh.72, the other documents like original documents of property at Exh.28 and sale deed dated 30.1.1914 at Exh.29, true copy of the document executed in favour of Naranjibhai at Exh.30, the court has considered all these documents and also considered the reply given to the notice which is produced at Exh.49 and has come to the conclusion in no uncertain terms that the cause of action has arisen on the basis of the notice issued on 23.10.1972 and reply is given to the notice and suit is filed in the year 1983. Therefore, the suit is filed much within 12 years of the period of limitation considering Article 65 of the Limitation Act and the claim on the basis of adverse possession is not believed. 8. Further, the Court has also considered the original claim of the plaintiff that he is claiming the ownership by virtue of gift. The court has considered Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act and has come to the specific conclusion that merely claiming such property by way of so called gift deed which is not produced on the record does not give any right in favour of the present defendant regarding the property in question. 9. On the other hand, the court has perused the documentary evidence produced at relevant exhibits which is registered sale deed executed in favour of the plaintiff. 9. On the other hand, the court has perused the documentary evidence produced at relevant exhibits which is registered sale deed executed in favour of the plaintiff. The court has also considered the fact that merely producing some tax receipts by the defendant cannot construe that the defendants become owners of the property and even on perusal of the said receipts, it transpires that the defendants have paid the tax on behalf of the owners of the property and not in their own name as the owner of the property. The court has also definitely come to the conclusion in no uncertain terms that the claim of the adverse possession is pleaded in very vague manner and therefore issue was also not framed to this effect by the learned trial court but since it was argued during the course of arguments, the court has dealt with it and has found that the defendants are found to be in permissive occupation of the suit property and they cannot be said to have become owners of the property by adverse possession. The court has also considered the fact that reply is given by the defendant on 21.11.1972 by claiming right contrary to the right of the plaintiff and therefore limitation will start from the date of denial and considering Article 65 of the Limitation Act, the suit is filed within period of limitation and the claim of the adverse possession is not required to be considered. 10. Thereafter, the learned lower appellate court has considered the said finding of the learned trial court in Regular Civil Appeal No.102 of 2005 in detail and also considered various issues including Section 123 of the Transfer of Properties Act and the judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Union Bank of India V/s Moksh Builders reported in AIR 1977 SC 409 , the deposition of defendant Harshad Mistri at Exh.72 wherein he has specifically stated that they are residing in the property since 1917 and neither the plaintiff nor his father has not demanded anything prior to 1972 regarding the suit property as the said property is gifted by his grandmother to his father. He has further submitted in his cross-examination that the said property is not entered into the name of his father in the revenue record. He has further submitted in his cross-examination that the said property is not entered into the name of his father in the revenue record. He has further submitted that except the claim of oral gift, no other document to show that the said property is gifted to his father by his grandmother is produced. Further, there is no other right of ownership in any other manner is created in favour of the defendant. He has specifically admitted that they are paying taxes but not regularly and most of the taxes are paid by the plaintiff and the witness has also admitted that he was never tenant of the premises in question. The court has considered these aspects and also considered other aspects in detail by reappreciating the entire evidence available on the record and also considering the judgment of the learned trial court in context of the material available on record and has come to the conclusion that the plea of adverse possession is raised by the defendant at the fag end of the trial. 11. The learned lower appellate court has referred to the judgments in the cases of Hemaji Vaghaji Jat V/s Bhikha Khengar Harijan reported in AIR 2009 SC 103 and T.Anjanappa V/s Somalingappa reported in 2006(7) SCC 570 and by referring to paragraphs 34 to 36 of that judgment, the court has come to the conclusion that merely long possession will not create any right by way of adverse possession, there should be element of definite refusal of right of ownership or title as well as hostile possession and therefore the court has not believed the case of the defendant on the case of adverse possession. 12. Now, a reference is required to be made to the judgments cited at the bar by learned advocate Mr.Ravish Bhatt, which are as under: (1) Amrendra Pratap Singh V/s Tej Bahadur Prajapati & Ors., decided in Appeal (Civil) No.11483 of 1996, wherein it is held as under: “21. In a series of decisions, the High Court of Madhya Pradesh has been consistently taking this view. To wit, see Jagdish v. State of M.P. [ AIR 1993 MP 132 : 1993 MPLJ 425 ] , Wajeram v. Kaniram [1992 Revenue Nirnaya 270] and Dinesh Kumar v. State of M.P. [1995 Revenue Nirnaya 358]. What is adverse possession? 22. Every possession is not, in law, adverse possession. To wit, see Jagdish v. State of M.P. [ AIR 1993 MP 132 : 1993 MPLJ 425 ] , Wajeram v. Kaniram [1992 Revenue Nirnaya 270] and Dinesh Kumar v. State of M.P. [1995 Revenue Nirnaya 358]. What is adverse possession? 22. Every possession is not, in law, adverse possession. Under Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, a suit for possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on title can be instituted within a period of twelve years calculated from the date when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff. By virtue of Section 27 of the Limitation Act, on the determination of the period limited by the Act to any person for instituting a suit for possession of any property, his right to such property stands extinguished. The process of acquisition of title by adverse possession springs into action essentially by default or inaction of the owner. A person, though having no right to enter into possession of the property of someone else, does so and continues in possession setting up title in himself and adversely to the title of the owner, commences prescribing title on to himself and such prescription having continued for a period of twelve years, he acquires title not on his own but on account of the default or inaction on the part of the real owner, which stretched over a period of twelve years, results in extinguishing of the latter's title. It is that extinguished title of the real owner which comes to vest in the wrongdoer. The law does not intend to confer any premium on the wrongdoing of a person in wrongful possession; it pronounces the penalty of extinction of title on the person who though entitled to assert his right and remove the wrongdoer and re-enter into possession, has defaulted and remained inactive for a period of twelve years, which the law considers reasonable for attracting the said penalty. Inaction for a period of twelve years is treated by the doctrine of adverse possession as evidence of the loss of desire on the part of the rightful owner to assert his ownership and reclaim possession. Inaction for a period of twelve years is treated by the doctrine of adverse possession as evidence of the loss of desire on the part of the rightful owner to assert his ownership and reclaim possession. 23.The nature of the property, the nature of title vesting in the rightful owner, the kind of possession which the adverse possessor is exercising, are all relevant factors which enter into consideration for attracting applicability of the doctrine of adverse possession. The right in the property ought to be one which is alienable and is capable of being acquired by the competitor. Adverse possession operates on an alienable right. The right stands alienated by operation of law, for it was capable of being alienated voluntarily and is sought to be recognised by the doctrine of adverse possession as having been alienated involuntarily, by default and inaction on the part of the rightful claimant, who knows actually or constructively of the wrongful acts of the competitor and yet sits idle. Such inaction or default in taking care of one's own rights over property is also capable of being called a manner of “dealing” with one's property which results in extinguishing one's title in property and vesting the same in the wrongdoer in possession of property and thus amounts to “transfer of immovable property” in the wider sense assignable in the context of social welfare legislation enacted with the object of protecting a weaker section.” (2) Poona Ram V/s Moti Ram (D) Th.Lrs. & Ors., decided in Civil Appeal No.4527 of 2009, wherein it is held in paragraphs 13 and 14 as under: “13.The crux of the matter is that a person who asserts possessory title over a particular property will have to show that he is under settled or established possession of the said property. But merely stray or intermittent acts of trespass do not give such a right against the true owner. Settled possession means such possession over the property which has existed for a sufficiently long period of time, and has been acquiesced to by the true owner. A casual act of possession does not have the effect of interrupting the possession of the rightful owner. A stray act of trespass, or a possession which has not matured into settled possession, can be obstructed or removed by the true owner even by using necessary force. A casual act of possession does not have the effect of interrupting the possession of the rightful owner. A stray act of trespass, or a possession which has not matured into settled possession, can be obstructed or removed by the true owner even by using necessary force. Settled possession must be (i) effective, (ii) undisturbed, and (iii) to the knowledge of the owner or without any attempt at concealment by the trespasser. There cannot be a straitjacket formula to determine settled possession. Occupation of a property by a person as an agent or a servant acting at the instance of the owner will not amount to actual legal possession. The possession should contain an element of animus possidendi. The nature of possession of the trespasser is to be decided based on the facts and circumstances of each case. 14. As mentioned supra, Purkha Ram had purchased three plots from Jagirdar Khoom Singh. In sale deed, Ext. A-6, three plots have been mentioned as plots of three houses. One of these, being Plot No. 7, was sold by Purkha Ram to the appellant, one plot being Plot No. 4 was sold to Teja Ram and the third plot being Plot No. 5 was retained by Purkha Ram.” (3) Hemaji Waghaji Jat V/s Bhikhabhai Khengarbhai Harijan & Others decided in Civil Appeal No.1196 of 2007, wherein it is held in paragraph 18 as under: “18. In Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Govt. of India [ (2004) 10 SCC 779 ] at para 11, this Court observed as under : (SCC p. 785) “11. In the eye of the law, an owner would be deemed to be in possession of a property so long as there is no intrusion. Non-use of the property by the owner even for a long time won't affect his title. But the position will be altered when another person takes possession of the property and asserts a right over it. Adverse possession is a hostile possession by clearly asserting hostile title in denial of the title of the true owner. It is a well-settled principle that a party claiming adverse possession must prove that his possession is ‘nec vi, nec clam, nec precario’, that is, peaceful, open and continuous. The possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that their possession is adverse to the true owner. It is a well-settled principle that a party claiming adverse possession must prove that his possession is ‘nec vi, nec clam, nec precario’, that is, peaceful, open and continuous. The possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that their possession is adverse to the true owner. It must start with a wrongful disposition of the rightful owner and be actual, visible, exclusive, hostile and continued over the statutory period.” The Court further observed that : (SCC p. 785, para 11) “11. … Plea of adverse possession is not a pure question of law but a blended one of fact and law. Therefore, a person who claims adverse possession should show : (a) on what date he came into possession, (b) what was the nature of his possession, (c) whether the factum of possession was known to the other party, (d) how long his possession has continued, and (e) his possession was open and undisturbed. A person pleading adverse possession has no equities in his favour. Since he is trying to defeat the rights of the true owner, it is for him to clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to establish his adverse possession.” 13. There cannot be any dispute regarding the judgments which are cited at the bar by learned advocate Mr.Bhatt but they are not squarely applicable in the facts of the present case. There is no doubt about the fact that law of adverse possession is required to be considered on the facts of each case and there is no straight jacket formula that can be applicable. 14. The judgments which are cited by learned advocate Mr.Khubchandani in the cases of Narasamma and Others V/s A.Krishnappa (dead) through representatives reported in (2020)15 SCC 218 and Maria Margadia Sequeira Fernandes and others V/s Erasmo Jack De Sequeira (dead) through lrs., reported in (2012)5 SCC 370 are squarely applicable to the facts of the present case as in the present case also, on one hand, the defendant had claimed that he has become owner by way of gift deed of the property which is gifted by his grandmother to his father and simultaneously on the other hand, the defendant has claimed adverse possession. 15. It is held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Narasamma and others (supra), in paragraphs 30 to 33 as under: “30. 15. It is held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Narasamma and others (supra), in paragraphs 30 to 33 as under: “30. We may also note that on the one hand, the appellants herein have sought to take a plea of bar of limitation vis-à-vis the original defendant claiming that possession came to them in 1976, with the suit being filed in 1989. Yet at the same time, it is claimed that the wife had title on the basis of these very documents. The claim of title from 1976 and the plea of adverse possession from 1976 cannot simultaneously hold. On the failure to establish the plea of title, it was necessary to prove as to from which date did the possession of the wife of the defendant amount to a hostile possession in a peaceful, open and continuous manner. We fail to appreciate how, on the one hand the appellants claimed that the wife of the original defendant, Appellant 1 herein, had title to the property in 1976 but on their failure to establish title, in the alternative, the plea of adverse possession should be recognised from the very date. 31. We also find that the reliance placed by the learned counsel for the appellants in Ravinder Kaur Grewal [Ravinder Kaur Grewal v. Manjit Kaur, (2019) 8 SCC 729 : (2019) 4 SCC (Civ) 453] is also misplaced. The question which arose for consideration before the three-Judge Bench was whether, a suit could be maintained for declaration of title and for permanent injunction seeking protection on a plea of adverse possession, or that it was an instrument of defence in a suit filed against such a person. In fact, if one may say, there was, for a long time a consistent view of the Court that the plea could only be of shield and not a sword. The judgment changed this legal position by opining that a plea to retain possession could be managed by the ripening of title by way of adverse possession. However, to constitute such adverse possession, the three classic requirements, which need to co-exist were again emphasised, nec vi i.e. adequate in continuity, nec clam i.e. adequate in publicity and nec precario i.e. adverse to a competitor, in denial of title and his knowledge. 32. However, to constitute such adverse possession, the three classic requirements, which need to co-exist were again emphasised, nec vi i.e. adequate in continuity, nec clam i.e. adequate in publicity and nec precario i.e. adverse to a competitor, in denial of title and his knowledge. 32. The question which confronts us is not the aforesaid, but whether simultaneously a plea can be taken of title and adverse possession i.e. whether it would amount to taking contradictory pleas. In this behalf, we may refer to the four judgments cited by the learned counsel for the respondent herein, which succinctly set forth the legal position. 33. In Karnataka Board of Wakf case [Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Union of India, (2004) 10 SCC 779 , para 11], it has been clearly set out that a plaintiff filing a title over the property must specifically plead it. When such a plea of adverse possession is projected, it is inherent in the nature of it that someone else is the owner of the property. In that context, it was observed in para 12 that “… The pleas on title and adverse possession are mutually inconsistent and the latter does not begin to operate until the former is renounced.” 16. It is held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Maria Margadia Sequeira Fernandes and others (supra), in paragraphs 67 and 68 as under: “67. In an action for recovery of possession of immovable property, or for protecting possession thereof, upon the legal title to the property being established, the possession or occupation of the property by a person other than the holder of the legal title will be presumed to have been under and in subordination to the legal title, and it will be for the person resisting a claim for recovery of possession or claiming a right to continue in possession, to establish that he has such a right. To put it differently, wherever pleadings and documents establish title to a particular property and possession is in question, it will be for the person in possession to give sufficiently detailed pleadings, particulars and documents to support his claim in order to continue in possession. 68. In order to do justice, it is necessary to direct the parties to give all details of pleadings with particulars. 68. In order to do justice, it is necessary to direct the parties to give all details of pleadings with particulars. Once the title is prima facie established, it is for the person who is resisting the title holder's claim to possession to plead with sufficient particularity on the basis of his claim to remain in possession and place before the Court all such documents as in the ordinary course of human affairs are expected to be there. Only if the pleadings are sufficient, would an issue be struck and the matter sent to trial, where the onus will be on him to prove the averred facts and documents. 17. Considering the judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court which are cited by the present respondent, the issue is squarely covered and the appellant cannot claim adverse possession on the basis of some convenience deed like gift deed and also claiming ownership on the basis of adverse possession and therefore both the courts below have not committed any error in passing the impugned orders. 18. In view of the above, I find no illegality, perversity in the findings of both the courts below and the judgments are delivered after considering all relevant material available on the record and also considering the evidence in proper manner and proper interpretation of law and the facts and circumstances of the present case. 19. Section 100 of CPC reads as under: “[100. Second appeal.— (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any Court subordinate to the High Court, if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. (2) An appeal may lie under this section from an appellate decree passed ex parte. (3) In an appeal under this section, the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the appeal. (4) Where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question. (3) In an appeal under this section, the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the appeal. (4) Where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question. (5) The appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated and the respondent shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be allowed to argue that the case does not involve such question: Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to take away or abridge the power of the Court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law, not formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such question.” 20. It is fruitful to refer the judgment in the case of Gurbachan Singh (Dead) Through Lrs Gurcharan Singh (Dead) Through Lrs and Others., reported in 2023 SCC Online SC 875 paragraphs 7, 14 and 15 which are reproduced as under: “7. The parameters of an appeal under Section 100, CPC passing muster are well established. The section itself dictates that such an appeal shall only be maintainable when the case involves a substantial question of law or that the appellate decree has been passed ex parte. the latter, obviously is not the case. This court has, in a multitude of decisions, expounded on what may be termed as a substantial question of law to satisfy the requirements of section 100. In Nazir Mohamed v. J. Kamala (2- Judge Bench), it was observed:— “27. In Hero Vinoth v. Seshammal [Hero Vinoth v. Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545 ], this Court referred to and relied upon Chunilal V. Mehta and Sons Ltd. [Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 1314 ] and other judgments and summarised the tests to find out whether a given set of questions of law were mere questions of law or substantial questions of law. The relevant paragraphs of the judgment of this Court in Hero Vinoth [Hero Vinoth v. Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545 ] are set out hereinbelow : (SCC p. 554, para 21) “21. The phrase “substantial question of law”, as occurring in the amended Section 100 CPC is not defined in the Code. The relevant paragraphs of the judgment of this Court in Hero Vinoth [Hero Vinoth v. Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545 ] are set out hereinbelow : (SCC p. 554, para 21) “21. The phrase “substantial question of law”, as occurring in the amended Section 100 CPC is not defined in the Code. The word substantial, as qualifying “question of law”, means— of having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable. It is to be understood as something in contradistinction with—technical, of no substance or consequence, or academic merely. However, it is clear that the legislature has chosen not to qualify the scope of “substantial question of law” by suffixing the words “of general importance” as has been done in many other provisions such as Section 109 of the Code or Article 133(1) (a) of the Constitution. The substantial question of law on which a second appeal shall be heard need not necessarily be a substantial question of law of general importance. In Guran Ditta v. Ram Ditta [Guran Ditta v. Ram Ditta, 1928 SCC OnLine PC 31 : (1927-28) 55 IA 235 : AIR 1928 PC 172 ] the phrase “substantial question of law” as it was employed in the last clause of the then existing Section 100 CPC (since omitted by the Amendment Act, 1973) came up for consideration and their Lordships held that it did not mean a substantial question of general importance but a substantial question of law which was involved in the case. In Chunilal case [Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 1314 ] the Constitution Bench expressed agreement with the following view taken by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Rimmalapudi Subba Rao v. Noony Veeraju [Rimmalapudi Subba Rao v. Noony Veeraju, 1951 SCC OnLine Mad 100 : AIR 1951 Mad 969 ] : (Chunilal case [Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 1314 ], AIR p. 1318, para 5) ‘5. … when a question of law is fairly arguable, where there is room for difference of opinion on it or where the Court thought it necessary to deal with that question at some length and discuss alternative views, then the question would be a substantial question of law. Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 1314 ], AIR p. 1318, para 5) ‘5. … when a question of law is fairly arguable, where there is room for difference of opinion on it or where the Court thought it necessary to deal with that question at some length and discuss alternative views, then the question would be a substantial question of law. On the other hand if the question was practically covered by the decision of the highest court or if the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and the only question was of applying those principles to the particular facts of the case it would not be a substantial question of law.’ 28. To be “substantial”, a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by the law of the land or any binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case and/or the rights of the parties before it, if answered either way.” (Emphasis supplied) 14. As already noted above, another ground of objection taken by the Appellant is the fact of the impugned judgment entering into a reappreciation of evidence. While it is true that ordinarily, in second appeal, the court must not disturb facts established by the lower court or the first appellate court. However, it is also equally well recognised that this rule is not an absolute one or in other words, it is not a rule set in stone. In Nazir Mohamed (supra) this Court has recognised three conditions in which a court in such jurisdiction, may disturb findings of fact. They are:— “(i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. A decision based on no evidence, does not refer only to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding.” 15. A decision based on no evidence, does not refer only to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding.” 15. A Bench of three learned Judges, recently in Balasubramanian v. M. Arockiasamy (Dead) Through LRs., had referred to, with approval judgment rendered in Ramathal v. Maruthathal (two-Judge Bench) wherein it was observed that the restraint in interfering with questions of fact under the jurisdiction of second appeal, is not an absolute rule. Where the court is of the view that the conclusions drawn by the court below do not have a basis in the evidence led or it is of the view that the appreciation of evidence “suffers from material irregularity” the court will be justified in interfering with such findings.” 21. It is also fruitful to refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Nazir Mohamed vs J. Kamala reported in AIR 2020 SC 4321 , wherein, it is observed in paragraphs 56, 57 and 59 as under: “56.As held by the Privy Council in Peri v. Chrishold reported in (1907) AC 73, it cannot be disputed that a person in possession of land in the assumed character of owner and exercising peaceably the ordinary rights of ownership has a perfectly good title against all the world but the rightful owner...and if the rightful owner does not come forward and assert his right of possession by law, within the period prescribed by the provisions of the statute of limitation applicable to the case, his right is forever distinguished, and the possessory owner acquires an absolute title. 57. The condition precedent for entertaining and deciding a second appeal being the existence of a substantial question of law, whenever a question is framed by the High Court, the High Court will have to show that the question is one of law and not just a question of facts, it also has to show that the question is a substantial question of law. 59. When no substantial question of law is formulated, but a Second Appeal is decided by the High Court, the judgment of the High Court is vitiated in law, as held by this Court in Biswanath Ghosh v. Gobinda Ghose. 59. When no substantial question of law is formulated, but a Second Appeal is decided by the High Court, the judgment of the High Court is vitiated in law, as held by this Court in Biswanath Ghosh v. Gobinda Ghose. Formulation of substantial question of law is mandatory and the mere reference to the ground mentioned in Memorandum of Second Appeal can not satisfy the mandate of Section 100 of the CPC.” 22. In view of the above, as there is no substantial question of law involved in the present appeal, this second appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs. As the main appeal is dismissed, civil applications are also dismissed.