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2024 DIGILAW 726 (TS)

Moizuddin Nizamabad Dist. v. Md. Rheemuddeen

2024-09-11

G.RADHA RANI

body2024
JUDGMENT: S.A.No.584 of 2002 is filed by the appellant – defendant No.2 aggrieved by the common judgment and decree in A.S.No.37 of 1996 on the file of the Additional District Judge, Nizamabad confirming the judgment of the Principal District Munsif, Nizamabad in O.S.No.162 of 1992 dated 22.02.1996. 2. O.S.No.162 of 1992 is filed by the respondent – plaintiff seeking declaration of title and injunction relating to Ac.3-00 guntas of land in Survey No.54 situated at Singampally Village, Makloor Mandal, Nizamabad District against the appellant herein. The said suit was filed on 12.05.1992. The plaintiff contended that he was the eldest son of one Mr.Buranuddin, who was the owner of the land comprised in Survey No.54 situated at Singampally Village to an extent of Ac.3-00 guntas. Md.Buranuddin succeeded to the property from his late father Sri Ahmed Hussain. In fact, the total extent of the land in Survey No.54 was Ac.8-11 guntas. The defendant being the youngest son of late Sri Ahmed Hussain was given an extent of Ac.2-11 guntas towards his share by his late father. After the death of Ahmed Hussain, the plaintiff and defendant were continuing their occupation, possession and ownership over their respective shares. Till Mr.Buranuddin died, he used to look after the agricultural operations. After his demise in the year 1987, the plaintiff being the eldest son succeeded to the property and was continuing his possession to an extent of Ac.3-00 guntas. During the month of April, 1992, with an intention to get his name mutated in place of his deceased father, the plaintiff submitted an application to the concerned Mandal Revenue Officer (for short “MRO”). The defendant submitted his objection for mutation and questioned the plaintiff’s possession and contended that he was the owner of the total land and claimed that the plaintiff had no share in it. The revenue records would show that the plaintiff was the owner and possessor to an extent of Ac.3-00 guntas. At no point of time, the defendant was the owner of the land to the extent of Ac.3-00 guntas owned by the plaintiff. The father of the plaintiff was only raising the crops by investing necessary amounts towards irrigation. Due to financial hazards, the father of the plaintiff could not raise any crop during the year 1988-89. As such, the land was left fallow. The father of the plaintiff was only raising the crops by investing necessary amounts towards irrigation. Due to financial hazards, the father of the plaintiff could not raise any crop during the year 1988-89. As such, the land was left fallow. But after the death of the father of the plaintiff, the plaintiff had sown maize crop. By engaging un-social elements, the defendant damaged the standing crop. In the month of April, 1992, the plaintiff again ploughed the land and while trying to make it useful for cultivation, the defendant with a malafide intention tried to interfere into the possession of the plaintiff. As such, the plaintiff filed the suit seeking declaration of his title over the suit land and consequential relief of injunction to restrain the defendant from interfering with his possession over the suit land to an extent of Ac.3-00 guntas in Survey No.54. 3. The defendant filed written statement contending that he was the owner and possessor of the entire extent of Ac.8-11 guntas in Survey No.54 of Singampally Village. In the year 1974-75, patta was granted in the name of the defendant after completing all the formalities by the revenue authorities to the entire extent of Ac.8-11 guntas in Survey No.54. He denied that he was given only an extent of Ac.2-11 guntas in Survey No.54 by his late father and denied that the plaintiff was in possession of Ac.3-00 guntas in Survey No.54 after the death of late Ahmed Hussain and contended that it was only recently the plaintiff managed to get his name entered in the revenue records in collusion with the revenue officials without notice to the defendant. The fact of the mutation and effect of patta in the name of the defendant in the year 1974-75 itself would disprove that the plaintiff’s father looked after the agricultural operations and also would disprove the factum of imaginary partition of Survey No.54 at any time prior to or after the death of Buranuddin. The plaintiff was never in possession of the suit land. It was the defendant who was in actual possession as absolute owner of the suit property. The defendant objected to the efforts of the plaintiff to knock up Ac.3-00 guntas of land in Survey No.54 and prayed to dismiss the suit. 4. The plaintiff was never in possession of the suit land. It was the defendant who was in actual possession as absolute owner of the suit property. The defendant objected to the efforts of the plaintiff to knock up Ac.3-00 guntas of land in Survey No.54 and prayed to dismiss the suit. 4. Basing on the above pleadings, the trial court framed the issues as follows: (i) Whether the plaintiff is in possession and enjoyment of Ac.3-00 guntas of land? (ii) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to permanent injunction as prayed for? (iii) To what relief? 1 An additional issue was framed on 02.02.1995 as whether the suit is maintainable as to the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court? Another additional issue was framed on 20.04.1995 as to whether the value of the suit property is correct? Another additional issue was framed on 23.02.1996 as to whether the plaintiff is the owner of the suit property to an extent of Ac.3-00 guntas of land in Survey No.54 situated at Singampally Village, Makloor Mandal, Nizamabad District? 5. S.A.No.594 of 2002 is filed by the appellant – plaintiff aggrieved by the common judgment and decree in A.S.No.38 of 1996 on the file of the Additional District Judge, Nizamabad confirming the judgment of the Principal District Munsif, Nizamabad in O.S.No.170 of 1992 dated 22.02.1996. 6. O.S.No.170 of 1992 was filed by the plaintiff seeking the relief of perpetual injunction. The defendant in O.S.No.162 of 1992 is the plaintiff in O.S.No.170 of 1992 and the plaintiff in O.S.No.162 of 1992 is the defendant No.1 in O.S.No.170 of 1992. The plaintiff in O.S.No.170 of 1992 contended that he was the owner, pattedar and possessor of the entire extent of Ac.8-11 guntas in Survey No.54 situated at Singampally Village, Makloor Mandal, Nizamabad District. The patta of the land was sanctioned in his name after completing requisite formalities by the revenue officials in the year 1974-75. He was the absolute owner and exclusive possessor of entire Survey No.54 to an extent of Ac.8-11 guntas. He was using the suit land for grazing his cattle. Only once, he had sown maize in it. At no point of time, neither the defendants 1 and 2 nor their late father Md.Buranuddin ever raised any dry crop, maize or grass in it. It was a dry land and only grass was raised used for grazing the cattle of the plaintiff alone. Only once, he had sown maize in it. At no point of time, neither the defendants 1 and 2 nor their late father Md.Buranuddin ever raised any dry crop, maize or grass in it. It was a dry land and only grass was raised used for grazing the cattle of the plaintiff alone. The defendants to usurp an extent of Ac.3-00 guntas got entered their names in the pahani as cultivators in collusion with the village officers whereas no crop of any kind was raised in it in any portion of the suit land. However, the patta of the land was retained in the name of the plaintiff. In order to deprive the plaintiff to an extent of Ac.3-00 guntas of land in Survey No.54, the defendant tried to sell it on 15.05.1992 and tried to dispossess the plaintiff from it. As such, he filed the suit for perpetual injunction to restrain the defendants 1 and 2 from interfering with his possession over the entire extent of Ac.8-11 guntas in Survey No.54. The said suit was filed on 18.05.1992 subsequent to the plaintiffs filing the suit in O.S.No.162 of 1992 for declaration of title and injunction. 7. A common written statement was filed by defendants 1 and 2 contending that the suit land was their ancestral property standing in the name of their grandfather late Sri Ahmed Hussain. After the death of Ahmed Hussain, the property was succeeded by the father of the defendants and other sons begotten to late Ahmed Hussain through his first and second wives. Before the death of the father of the defendants, there was an oral partition amongst all male family members. In the said oral partition, out of the suit land Ac.3-00 acres was given to the father of the defendants by name Buranuddin and another extent of Ac.3- 00 acres was given to the brother of the defendant’s father by name Mr.Habeebuddin and the remaining extent of Ac.2-11 guntas was given to the plaintiff. Thus, the plaintiff was the owner of the land only to an extent of Ac.2-11 guntas, but not Ac.8-11 guntas as claimed by him. The plaintiff was in physical enjoyment of the suit land only to an extent of Ac.2-11 guntas. The plaintiff never raised any crop in the total land so also in his own extent too. Thus, the plaintiff was the owner of the land only to an extent of Ac.2-11 guntas, but not Ac.8-11 guntas as claimed by him. The plaintiff was in physical enjoyment of the suit land only to an extent of Ac.2-11 guntas. The plaintiff never raised any crop in the total land so also in his own extent too. In fact, the defendant No.1 used to cultivate maize crop and other seasonal crops in his own land. After the death of the father of the defendants, the defendant No.1 being the elder brother submitted an application for mutation of his name in revenue records to the extent of his share of Ac.3-00 acres in Survey No.54. Acting upon the application submitted by defendant No.1, the MRO, Makloor conducted an enquiry under ROR Act and issued proceedings on 30.04.1992 mutating Ac.3-00 acres of land in the name of defendant No.1. In the light of revenue records also, the defendant No.1 was the absolute owner of an extent of Ac.3-00 acres of land in Survey No.54. The defendant No.1 had already filed O.S.No.162 of 1992 and obtained an injunction against the plaintiff in the present suit. Hence, the subsequent suit would act as res judicata. In column No.13 of the revenue records, to an extent of Ac.3-00 guntas, the name of Buranuddin, the father of the defendants would appear. The defendant No.1 was the absolute owner and possessor of an extent of Ac.3-00 guntas of land in Survey No.54 and plaintiff was not the owner of the total extent. The plaintiff had got no title over the suit property nor possession as on the date of filing the suit and the suit for injunction was liable to be dismissed. The plaintiff ought to have filed the suit for declaration and prayed to dismiss the suit by awarding exemplary costs. 8. Basing on the said pleadings, the following issues are settled for trial: (i) Whether the plaintiff is in possession and enjoyment of Ac.8-11 guntas of land in Survey No.54 situated at Singampally Village, Makloor Mandal, Nizamabad District? (ii) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to permanent injunction restraining the defendants from selling or mortgaging the suit property? (iii) Whether the suit as framed is maintainable? (iv) To what relief? 9. Both the suits are clubbed together and evidence was recorded in O.S.No.162 of 1992 being a comprehensive suit. 10. (ii) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to permanent injunction restraining the defendants from selling or mortgaging the suit property? (iii) Whether the suit as framed is maintainable? (iv) To what relief? 9. Both the suits are clubbed together and evidence was recorded in O.S.No.162 of 1992 being a comprehensive suit. 10. The plaintiff in O.S.No.162 of 1992 was examined as PW.1. His brotherin- law by name Mirza Khaleel Ahmed Baig was examined as PW.2. Exs.A1 to A26 were marked on behalf of the plaintiff. The defendant in O.S.No.162 of 1992 and the plaintiff in O.S.No.170 of 1992 was examined as DW.1. Exs.B1 to B11 were marked on his behalf. 11. A common judgment was delivered by the learned Principal District Munsif, Nizamabad in both the suits on 22.02.1996 decreeing the suit in O.S.No.162 of 1992 and dismissing the suit in O.S.No.170 of 1992. 12. Aggrieved by the said common judgment and decree in both the suits, the defendant in O.S.No.162 of 1992 and the plaintiff in O.S.No.170 of 1992 preferred A.S.No.37 of 1996 against the judgment and decree in O.S.No.162 of 1992 and A.S.No.38 of 1996 against the judgment and decree in O.S.No.170 of 1992. 13. The said appeals were heard by the learned Additional District Judge, Nizamabad. Vide common judgment in A.S.No.37 of 1996 and A.S.No.38 of 1996 dated 19.03.2002 dismissed both the appeals confirming the common judgment and decree dated 22.02.1996 passed by the learned Principal District Munsif, Nizamabad in O.S.No.162 of 1992 and O.S.No.170 of 1992 with costs. 14. Aggrieved by the dismissal of the appeals, the appellant preferred these Second Appeals. This Court on 11.11.2002 admitted the Second Appeals on the following substantial questions of law: (a) Whether the judgment of the Lower Appellate Court was vitiated as contrary to Order XLI Rule 31 of CPC? And whether the said judgment was not defective even though as the final court of fact the Appellate Court was required to adjudicate the appeal on all questions of law and fact? (b) Whether the courts below were justified in decreeing the suit of the plaintiff inspite of the categorical finding of the trial court that the plaintiff failed to prove oral partition as pleaded and thereby the title pleaded by the plaintiff under the said oral partition was negatived? (b) Whether the courts below were justified in decreeing the suit of the plaintiff inspite of the categorical finding of the trial court that the plaintiff failed to prove oral partition as pleaded and thereby the title pleaded by the plaintiff under the said oral partition was negatived? (c) Whether the courts below were justified in placing the burden of proof of title on the defendant, even though the plaintiff failed to discharge his initial burden? 15. Heard Smt.Manjari S.Ganu, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri P.Giri Krishna, learned counsel for the respondent. 16. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the suit of the respondent for declaration was primarily based upon the alleged oral partition pleaded by him and while the respondent – plaintiff failed to prove the oral partition, the courts below ought to have dismissed the suit. When the trial court gave a categorical finding that the plaintiff failed to prove the oral partition as pleaded by him, the Appellate Court had not touched upon the said aspect at all. The trial court placed the burden of proof on the appellant i.e. the defendant to prove title and possession. In the absence of any proof by the plaintiff, placing the burden on the appellant was totally opposed to law. The Lower Appellate Court also proceeded to think that the respondent/plaintiff’s suit deserved to be decreed as the appellant – defendant failed to prove his title. The judgments of both the courts below were vitiated on account of the aforesaid error in placing an uncalled for burden on the defendant – appellant, when the plaintiff failed to prove his basic case of oral partition and title there under. Both the courts proceeded to consider the respondent’s suit as if it was merely a suit for injunction. The possession without title would not entitle the respondent – plaintiff to succeed in a suit for declaration of his title. Even the finding with respect to possession was incorrect and the suit for declaration of title could not have been decreed merely on the same. There was no consideration of all these aspects by the Lower Appellate Court. The possession without title would not entitle the respondent – plaintiff to succeed in a suit for declaration of his title. Even the finding with respect to possession was incorrect and the suit for declaration of title could not have been decreed merely on the same. There was no consideration of all these aspects by the Lower Appellate Court. As a final Court of fact, the Lower Appellate Court was required to look into all the issues of fact and law by framing appropriate points for consideration and relied upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court in United Engineers and Contractors v. Secretary to Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others, AIR 2013 SC 2239 , H.Siddiqui (Dead) by LRs. v. A.Ramalingam, AIR 2011 SC 1492 , Madhukar and Others v. Sangram and Others, (2001) 4 SCC 756 , Shasidhar and Others v. Smt.Ashwini Uma Mathad and Another, AIR 2015 SC 1139 on the scope of Order XLI Rule 31 of CPC. She relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation & another v. Bajrang Lal, (2014) 4 SCC 693 on the aspect that there is no prohibition for the High Court to entertain the Second Appeal even on question of fact where factual findings are found to be perverse. 17. Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand contended that the appellant was claiming to be the owner of the entire extent of Survey No.54 admeasuring Ac.8-11 guntas situated at Singampally Village, Makloor Mandal, Nizamabad District on the basis of patta without bothering to file the mutation proceedings which gave rise to granting of patta. Before a patta was granted, there must be mutation proceedings of the revenue authorities. But no such mutation proceedings of the revenue authorities had been filed by the appellant. Before granting a patta to an individual, notices had to be given to all the effected parties as per Rule 5(3) of AP Rights in Land and Pattedar Pass Books Act, 1971, especially co-sharers. But in this case, no such proceedings were placed on record by the appellant. Even assuming that any such patta was issued in favor of the appellant, the same would be null and void in view of the law laid down by this Court in Chinnam Pandurangam, S/o. Late Maniah v. Mandal Revenue Officer, Serilingampally Mandal and Others, AIR 2008 AP 15 . Even assuming that any such patta was issued in favor of the appellant, the same would be null and void in view of the law laid down by this Court in Chinnam Pandurangam, S/o. Late Maniah v. Mandal Revenue Officer, Serilingampally Mandal and Others, AIR 2008 AP 15 . The suit filed by the appellant was a counter blast to the suit filed by the respondent Md.Raheemuddin. The appellant was relying upon the orders of the Revenue Divisional Officer (for short “RDO”) dated 04.05.1995 vide Proceedings No.B4/5592/93 and the respondent Md.Raheemuddin was relying on the proceedings of the Joint Collector, Nizamabad vide proceedings No.A7/2929/95 dated 20.07.1996. Once the Civil Court was seized of the matter, the revenue authorities could not adjudicate the same as per Rule 9(1)(c)(ii) of AP Rights in Land and Pattedar Pass Books Act, 1971. The revenue authorities ought to have waited for the result of the suit before taking any further action. But the RDO and the Joint Collector continued to pass orders even after filing of the suit which was impermissible in view of the law laid down by this Court in K.Pratap Reddy & Others v. Joint Collector, Rangareddy District & Others, 2008 SCC Online AP 784. As such, the proceedings before the revenue authorities had to be ignored and they were of no consequence. The appellant had not amended his plaint to include any subsequent events. As the plaint had not been amended, the events which took place after filing of the plaint could not be looked into. The law was well settled that in the absence of pleadings, no amount of evidence would help the party in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Biraji @ Brijraji & another v. Surya Pratap & Others, (2020) 10 SCC 729 . The case of the appellant rested on some entries in the revenue records. The revenue records by themselves would not confirm any title. They were only meant to enable the Government to collect land revenue from the person whose name appeared in the revenue records and relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Balwant Singh & Another v. Daulat Singh (dead) by LRs. & others, 1997 (7) SCC 137 . 18. They were only meant to enable the Government to collect land revenue from the person whose name appeared in the revenue records and relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Balwant Singh & Another v. Daulat Singh (dead) by LRs. & others, 1997 (7) SCC 137 . 18. He further contended that the courts below were justified in decreeing the suit filed by the respondent in O.S.No.162 of 1992 as the version of the respondent that his father Sri Buranuddin inherited Ac.3-00 guntas in Survey No.54 from his grandfather i.e. Sri Ahmed Hussain would appear to be more probable than the improbable claim of the appellant being the owner of the entire extent of land admeasuring Ac.8-11 guntas in Survey No.54. 19. He further contended that the courts below did not place the burden of proof on the appellant. The courts merely examined the untenable claim of the appellant being the owner of the entire extent of land admeasuring Ac.8-11 guntas and came to the conclusion that the said claim was without any legal or factual basis. None of the grounds urged by the appellant would fall within the scope and ambit of the substantial questions of law and relied upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Biswanath Ghosh (Dead) by LRs. and Others v. Gobinda Ghosh @ Gobinda Chandra Ghosh & Others, 2014 (11) SCC 605 , Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (dead) by LRs., 2001 (3) SCC 179 , Dnyanoba Bhaurao Shemade v. Maroti Bhaurao Marnor, (1999) 2 SCC 471 , Gurdev Kaur & Others v. Kaki & Others, 2007 (1) SCC 546 . 20. He further contended that Exs.A4 to A19 would show that the respondent’s father Mr.Buranuddin was in possession of Ac.3-00 guntas of land in Survey No.54 and on that premise, the suit was decreed in favor of the respondent Mr.Raheemuddin and as Mr.Moizuddin, the appellant failed to show any evidence that his father gifted the entire extent of Ac.8-11 guntas in his favor. The declaration filed by Mr.Buranuddin before the Agriculture Land Ceiling Authority would show that he was in possession of Ac.3-00 guntas of land. Even the land revenue receipts issued by the office of MRO were in the name of Mr.Raheemuddin. All these factors would go in favor of Mr.Raheemuddin. The declaration filed by Mr.Buranuddin before the Agriculture Land Ceiling Authority would show that he was in possession of Ac.3-00 guntas of land. Even the land revenue receipts issued by the office of MRO were in the name of Mr.Raheemuddin. All these factors would go in favor of Mr.Raheemuddin. Taking all these aspects into consideration, both the trial court and the Appellate Court ruled in favor of the respondent Mr.Raheemuddin and against the appellant Mr.Moizuddin. There were no palpable infirmities in the judgments rendered by both the courts warranting interference by this Court and prayed to dismiss the Second Appeals, as the grounds urged would not fall within the parameters of the substantial questions of law. 21. The 3-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (dead) by LRs. (cited supra) delineated the scope of Section 100 of CPC as follows: “12. The phrase substantial question of law, as occurring in the amended Section 100 is not defined in the Code. The word substantial, as qualifying question of law, means - of having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable. It is to be understood as something in contradistinction with - technical, of no substance or consequence, or academic merely. However, it is clear that the Legislature has chosen not to qualify the scope of substantial question of law by suffixing the words of general importance as has been done in many other provisions such as Section 109 of the Code or Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution. The substantial question of law on which a second appeal shall be heard need not necessarily be a substantial question of law of general importance. In Guran Ditta & Anr. Vs. T. Ram Ditta, AIR 1928 Privy Council 172, the phrase substantial question of law as it was employed in the last clause of the then existing Section 110 of the C.P.C. (since omitted by the Amendment Act, 1973) came up for consideration and Their Lordships held that it did not mean a substantial question of general importance but a substantial question of law which was involved in the case as between the parties. In Sir Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. v. The Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co., Ltd., [(1962) Supp (3) SCR 549], the Constitution Bench expressed agreement with the following view taken by a Full Bench of Madras High Court in Rimmalapudi Subba Rao Vs. Noony Veeraju, ILR 1952 Madras 264:- ..when a question of law is fairly arguable, where there is room for difference of opinion on it or where the Court thought it necessary to deal with that question at some length and discuss alternative view, then the question would be a substantial question of law. On the other hand if the question was practically covered by the decision of the highest Court or if the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and the only question was of applying those principles to the particular fact of the case it would not be a substantial question of law. and laid down the following test as proper test, for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial:- The proper test for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial would, in our opinion, be whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views. If the question is settled by the highest Court or the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd the question would not be a substantial question of law. 14. A point of law which admits of no two opinions may be a proposition of law but cannot be a substantial question of law. To be substantial, a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either way, in so far as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. To be substantial, a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either way, in so far as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. To be a question of law involving in the case there must be first a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by court of facts and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case. An entirely new point raised for the first time before the High Court is not a question involved in the case unless it goes to the root of the matter. It will, therefore, depend on the facts and circumstances of each case whether a question of law is a substantial one and involved in the case, or not; the paramount overall consideration being the need for striking a judicious balance between the indispensable obligation to do justice at all stages and impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation in the life of any lis.” 22. In Gurdev Kaur & Others v. Kaki & Others (cited supra), the 2-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court by referring to its earlier case in Thiagarajan v. Sri Venugopalaswamy B. Koil [ (2004) 5 SCC 762 ], held that: “53. The High Court in its jurisdiction under Section 100 C.P.C. was not justified in interfering with the findings of fact. The Court observed that to say the least the approach of the High Court was not proper. It is the obligation of the Courts of law to further the clear intendment of the legislature and not frustrate it by excluding the same. This Court in a catena of decisions held that where findings of fact by the lower appellate Court are based on evidence, the High Court in second appeal cannot substitute its own findings on re-appreciation of evidence merely on the ground that another view was possible. 62. This Court in a catena of decisions held that where findings of fact by the lower appellate Court are based on evidence, the High Court in second appeal cannot substitute its own findings on re-appreciation of evidence merely on the ground that another view was possible. 62. The question could perhaps be asked, why the litigant who wishes to have justice from the highest Court of the State should be denied the opportunity to do so, at least where there is a flaw in the conclusion on facts reached by the trial Court or by the Court of first appeal. The answer is obvious that even litigants have to be protected against too persistent a pursuit of their goal of perfectly satisfactory justice. An unqualified right of first appeal may be necessary for the satisfaction of the defeated litigant; but a wide right of second appeal is more in the nature of a luxury. 70. Now, after 1976 Amendment, the scope of Section 100 has been drastically curtailed and narrowed down. The High Courts would have jurisdiction of interfering under Section 100 C.P.C. only in a case where substantial questions of law are involved and those questions have been clearly formulated in the memorandum of appeal. At the time of admission of the second appeal, it is the bounden duty and obligation of the High Court to formulate substantial questions of law and then only the High Court is permitted to proceed with the case to decide those questions of law. The language used in the amended section specifically incorporates the words as "substantial question of law" which is indicative of the legislative intention. It must be clearly understood that the legislative intention was very clear that legislature never wanted second appeal to become "third trial on facts" or "one more dice in the gamble". The effect of the amendment mainly, according to the amended section, was: (i) The High Court would be justified in admitting the second appeal only when a substantial question of law is involved; (ii) The substantial question of law to precisely state such question; (iii) A duty has been cast on the High Court to formulate substantial question of law before hearing the appeal; (iv) Another part of the Section is that the appeal shall be heard only on that question. 23. In Biswanath Ghosh (Dead) by LRs. 23. In Biswanath Ghosh (Dead) by LRs. and Others v. Gobinda Ghosh @ Gobinda Chandra Ghosh & Others (cited supra), another 2-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court after extracting Section 100 of CPC, held that: “From a bare reading of the aforesaid provision it is manifestly clear that an appeal shall lie to the High Court from an appellate decree only if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. It further mandates that the memorandum of appeal should precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the appeal. If such an appeal is filed, the High Court while admitting or entertaining the appeal must record its satisfaction and formulate the substantial question of law involved in the appeal. The appeal shall then be heard on the questions so formulated and the respondent shall be allowed to argue only on those substantial questions of law. However, the proviso to this section empowers the court to hear on any substantial questions of law not formulated after recording reasons.” In the light of these principles, the substantial questions of law admitted by this Court need to be answered. Substantial Question No.1: Whether the judgment of the Lower Appellate Court is vitiated as contrary to Order XLI Rule 31 of CPC? And whether the said judgment is not defective even though as the final court of fact the Appellate Court was required to adjudicate the appeal on all questions of law and fact? 24. The scope of Order XLI Rule 31 of CPC was also stated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in several cases. If the First Appellate Court decides the appeal without following the procedure required under Order XLI Rule 31 of CPC, the High Court can interfere in the Second Appeal. Order XLI Rule 31 of CPC provides guidelines for the Appellate Court as to how the Court has to proceed and decide the case. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Thakur Sukhpal Singh v. Thakur Kalyan Singh & another, AIR 1963 SC 146 and Girija Nandini Devi & Others v. Bijendra Narain Choudhary, AIR 1967 SC 1124 , held that: “It must be evident from the judgment of the appellate court that the court has properly appreciated the facts/evidence, applied its mind and decided the case considering the material on record. It would amount to substantial compliance of the said provisions if the appellate court's judgment is based on the independent assessment of the relevant evidence on all important aspects of the matter and the findings of the appellate court are well founded and quite convincing. It is mandatory for the appellate court to independently assess the evidence of the parties and consider the relevant points which arise for adjudication and the bearing of the evidence on those points. Being the final court of fact, the first appellate court must not record mere general expression of concurrence with the trial court judgment rather it must give reasons for its decision on each point independently to that of the trial court. Thus, the entire evidence must be considered and discussed in detail. Such exercise should be done after formulating the points for consideration in terms of the said provisions and the court must proceed in adherence to the requirements of the said statutory provisions.” 25. The Hon’ble Apex Court in H.Siddiqui (Dead) by LRs. v. A.Ramalingam (cited supra) while referring to its earlier judgment in B.V.Nagesh & another v. H.V.Sreenivasa Murthy [JT (2010) 10 SC 551], held that: “The appellate Court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial Court. The first appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case therein is open for re-hearing both on questions of fact and law. The judgment of the appellate Court must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues arising along with the contentions put-forth and pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate Court. Sitting as a court of appeal, it was the duty of the High Court to deal with all the issues and the evidence led by the parties before recording its findings. The first appeal is a valuable right and the parties have a right to be heard both on questions of law and on facts and the judgment in the first appeal must address itself to all the issues of law and fact and decide it by giving reasons in support of the findings.” 26. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation & another v. Bajrang Lal (cited supra) held that: “19. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation & another v. Bajrang Lal (cited supra) held that: “19. … There is no prohibition for the High Court to entertain the Second Appeal even on question of fact where factual findings are found to be perverse. 20. In Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin [ (2012) 8 SCC 148 ], this Court held: “65. In Suwalal Chhogalal v. CIT, (1949) 17 ITR 269 (Nag) the Court held as under: (ITR p. 277) “… A fact is a fact irrespective of evidence by which it is proved. The only time a question of law can arise in such a case is when it is alleged that there is no material on which the conclusion can be based or no sufficient material. 67. There is no prohibition to entertain a second appeal even on question of fact provided the Court is satisfied that the findings of the courts below were vitiated by non-consideration of relevant evidence or by showing erroneous approach to the matter and findings recorded in the court below are perverse. [Vide Jagdish Singh v. Natthu Singh, AIR 1992 SC 1604 , Prativa Devi v. T.V. Krishnan, (1999) 5 SCC 353, Satya Gupta v. Brijesh Kumar, (1998) 6 SCC 423 , Ragavendra Kumar v. Firm Prem Machinery & Co., AIR 2000 SC 534 , Molar Mal v. Kay Iron Works (P) Ltd., AIR 2000 SC 1261 , Bharatha Matha v. R. Vijaya Renganathan, (2010) 11 SCC 483 and Dinesh Kumar v. Yusuf Ali, ( 2010 12 SCC 740 ] 68. In Jai Singh v. Shakuntala [ (2002) 3 SCC 634 , this Court held that (SCC p. 638, para 6) it is permissible to interfere even on question of fact but it may be only in “very exceptional cases and on extreme perversity that the authority to examine the same in extenso stands permissible — it is a rarity rather than a regularity and thus in fine it can be safely concluded that while there is no prohibition as such, but the power to scrutiny can only be had in very exceptional circumstances and upon proper circumspection”. Similar view has been taken in Kashmir Singh v. Harnam Singh, AIR 2008 SC 1749 .” (Emphasis in original) 27. In Shasidhar and Others v. Smt.Ashwini Uma Mathad and Another (cited supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court held that: 12. Similar view has been taken in Kashmir Singh v. Harnam Singh, AIR 2008 SC 1749 .” (Emphasis in original) 27. In Shasidhar and Others v. Smt.Ashwini Uma Mathad and Another (cited supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court held that: 12. The powers of the first appellate Court, while deciding the first appeal under Section 96 read with Order XLI Rule 31 of the Code, are indeed well defined by various judicial pronouncements of this Court and are, therefore, no more res integra. 13. As far back in 1969, the learned Judge - V.R. Krishna Iyer, J (as His Lordship then was the judge of Kerala High Court) while deciding the first appeal under Section 96 of the CPC in Kurian Chacko vs. Varkey Ouseph, AIR 1969 Kerala 316, reminded the first appellate Court of its duty as to how the first appeal under Section 96 should be decided. In his distinctive style of writing and subtle power of expression, the learned judge held as under: "1. The plaintiff, unsuccessful in two Courts, has come up here aggrieved by the dismissal of his suit which was one for declaration of title and recovery of possession. The defendant disputed the plaintiff's title to the property as also his possession and claimed both in himself. The learned Munsif, who tried the suit, recorded findings against the plaintiff both on title and possession. But, in appeal, the learned Subordinate Judge disposed of the whole matter glibly and briefly, in a few sentences. 2. An appellate court is the final Court of fact ordinarily and therefore a litigant is entitled to a full and fair and independent consideration of the evidence at the appellate stage. Anything less than this is unjust to him and I have no doubt that in the present case the learned Subordinate Judge has fallen far short of what is expected of him as an appellate Court. Although there is furious contest between the counsel for the appellant and for the respondent, they appear to agree with me in this observation....." (Emphasis supplied) 14. This Court in a number of cases while affirming and then reiterating the aforesaid principle has laid down the scope and powers of the first appellate Court under Section 96 of the Code. 28. This Court in a number of cases while affirming and then reiterating the aforesaid principle has laid down the scope and powers of the first appellate Court under Section 96 of the Code. 28. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the case, it is observed that the judgment of the lower Appellate Court is a cryptic judgment. Up to Para 11, the lower Appellate Court had referred to the pleadings, evidence and judgment of the trial court, from Para Nos.12 to 20 mentioned about filing of the appeal and the contentions of both the parties and in Para No.21 mentioned about filing of I.A.No.1392 of 1996 under Order XLI Rule 27 of CPC by the respondent and marking of Ex.A27, the order of the Joint Collector dated 20.07.1996. Only in Para Nos.22 and 23, the reasons for dismissing the appeal are given which are only in one page. The lower Appellate Court had mentioned that the respondent filed the suit for simplicitor injunction against the appellant in Para No.22, which was incorrect. The respondent infact had filed the suit for declaration of title and injunction relating to Ac.3-00 guntas of land in Survey No.54. The respondent who was the plaintiff in O.S.No.162 of 1992 had got the plaint amended and added the relief of declaration. The same was not observed by the lower Appellate Court. The lower Appellate Court had not given any finding relating to the aspect of oral partition pleaded by the plaintiff, on the basis of which, the plaintiff claimed to be the owner of the Ac.3-00 guntas of land out of Ac.8-11 guntas. The lower Appellate Court merely stated that the documents filed by the respondents i.e. Exs.A4 to A19 were categorically supporting that he was in possession and enjoyment of Ac.3- 00 guntas of land in Survey No.54 and on that basis dismissed both the appeals. 29. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant was that the appellant had taken ground Nos.2 and 6 in the grounds of appeal before the First Appellate Court relating to decreeing of the suit filed by the respondent in O.S.No.162 of 1992. 29. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant was that the appellant had taken ground Nos.2 and 6 in the grounds of appeal before the First Appellate Court relating to decreeing of the suit filed by the respondent in O.S.No.162 of 1992. However inspite of the plaintiff i.e. the respondent herein not proving oral partition in pursuance of which he claimed that his father had got Ac.3-00 guntas of land out of Ac.8-11 guntas in Survey No.54, the Appellate Court did not even frame a point for consideration relating to the said ground taken by the appellant and not made any discussion thereon. The Appellate Court which was the final Court of facts failed to follow the procedure prescribed under Order XLI Rule 31 of CPC while dismissing the first appeal. The First Appellate Court has to go into the entire oral and documentary evidence filed before the trial court and discuss all the points elaborately after framing points for consideration and then arrive at a finding relating to the said points framed by it by giving independent reasons to that of the trial court as observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the above cases. 30. The record would disclose that the First Appellate Court failed to frame proper points for consideration and only framed a single point for consideration as to whether the judgment and decree passed by the learned Principal District Munsif, Nizamabad in O.S.No.162 of 1992 and O.S.No.170 of 1992 dated 22.02.1996 is proper and correct or the same is liable to be set aside? It had not discussed the oral and documentary evidence filed before the trial court and had not given independent reasons for arriving at the finding and even failed to consider the nature of the suits filed by the parties and made factually incorrect observations stating that the respondent filed the suit for simplicitor injunction though he filed the suit for declaration of title and consequential injunction and held that the documents filed by the respondent were categorically supporting that he was in possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property in Survey No.54 to an extent of Ac.3-00 guntas without considering whether the respondent was having title over the suit schedule property or not and made an observation that the appellant, who filed the suit for injunction had not placed any oral evidence to substantiate that he was the absolute owner of Survey No.54 to an extent of Ac.8-11 guntas without considering that the point to be considered in the said case was with regard to the possession of the appellant at the time of filing the suit. As such, this Court considers that the First Appellate Court failed in its obligation to follow the procedure prescribed under Order XLI Rule 31 of CPC. As such, the substantial question No.1 is answered holding that the judgment of the Lower Appellate Court is contrary to Order XLI Rule 31 of CPC and as a final Court of fact failed to adjudicate the appeal on all questions of fact and law. Substantial Question No.2: Whether the courts below were justified in decreeing the suit of the plaintiff inspite of the categorical finding of the trial court that the plaintiff failed to prove oral partition as pleaded and thereby the title pleaded by the plaintiff under the said oral partition was negatived? 31. As seen from the judgment of the trial court, the trial court rightly considered that as the suit was filed by the respondent – plaintiff in O.S.No.162 of 1992 was for declaration of title and for consequential relief of perpetual injunction, the plaintiff has to prove that there was oral partition as contended by him during the lifetime of his grandfather late Ahmed Hussain in respect of Ac.8-11 guntas of land in Survey No.54 and that the plaintiff’s father Buranuddin, his brother Habeebuddin and the defendant were allotted Ac.3-00 guntas, Ac.3-00 guntas and Ac.2-11 guntas each respectively. The trial court observed that the evidence of PW.1, the plaintiff and the evidence of PW.2, the brother-in-law of the plaintiff was only adduced to prove the oral partition and no elder member of the family was examined to speak about the oral partition by late Ahmed Hussain. It also observed that PW.2 was not a competent person to speak about the oral partition that took place during the lifetime of Ahmed Hussain somewhere prior to the year 1974, his knowledge about his father-in law being in possession of Ac.3-00 guntas of land in Survey No.54 is only after his marriage and considering the evidence of PW.2 that he did not know as to in whose name the patta stands for all the Ac.8-11 guntas of land in Survey No.54 and in whose name the patta passbook was given, rejected the evidence of PW.2 as not satisfactory. 32. The trial court also observed that the exhibits filed by the plaintiff did not speak about the oral partition pleaded by the plaintiff in respect of Ac.8-11 guntas in Survey No.54, however, held that the plaintiff by examining himself and marking the pahanies under Exs.A4 to A19 proved that his father was in possession and enjoyment of Ac.3-00 guntas of land in Survey No.54 and after his death he was in possession and enjoyment of the suit property. Even though, the plaintiff failed to show the oral partition, the long possession of the plaintiff to the extent of Ac.3-00 guntas of land and considering the nature of the property as the ancestral property held that the plaintiff perfected his right and title to an extent of Ac.3-00 guntas of land in Survey No.54. The trial court further observed that the plaintiff enjoyed the suit land openly, uninterruptedly, exclusively to himself, without any plea of adverse possession taken by the plaintiff, which finding was erroneous. 33. The trial court while dismissing the suit in O.S.No.170 of 1992 filed by the appellant stated in Para No.20 that the plaintiff (appellant) has to prove his title to the suit property along with possession and that the documents marked as Exs.B8 to B10 would not show his possession to the suit land even in the year 1974-75 to 1976-77 over the entire extent of Ac.8-11 guntas. As such, he was not entitled for permanent injunction as prayed for in O.S.No.170 of 1992. As such, he was not entitled for permanent injunction as prayed for in O.S.No.170 of 1992. The said finding of the trial court was also incorrect on facts and on law. Placing the burden of proof on the appellant to prove his title in a suit for perpetual injunction and even without any evidence of title adduced by the respondent – plaintiff in O.S.No.162 of 1992, which was filed for declaration of title and consequential injunction, decreeing the said suit is considered as against the principles of law. The First Appellate Court confirming the said judgment of the trial court without considering the nature of the suits filed by the parties and without discussing the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the parties and without discussing about the oral partition raised by the respondent – plaintiff is considered as improper. Substantial Question No.3: Whether the courts below were justified in placing the burden of proof of title on the defendant, even though the plaintiff failed to discharge his initial burden? 34. Even though, the plaintiff had taken the plea of oral partition and failed to discharge the initial burden laid upon him, the trial court even on coming to the conclusion that the plaintiff failed to prove the oral partition, decreeing the suit on the basis of the long standing possession of the plaintiff without any plea of adverse possession taken by the plaintiff and placing the burden of proving the title upon the appellant – defendant in O.S.No.162 of 1992 is considered as unjustified. The First Appellate Court confirming the said judgment of the trial court without assessing the oral and documentary evidence independently and confirming the said judgment of the trial court is considered as illegal. 35. All the documents filed by the appellant as well as the respondent (Exs.A4 to A19 & Exs.B1, B8 to B10) would show the name of the appellant as pattedar to an extent of Ac.8-11 guntas. As seen from the evidence of the witnesses, the suit schedule properties are dry lands and were left fallow. The name of the respondent – plaintiff or the name of his father entered in the pahani relating to person in actual possession when the land was kept fallow or vacant, would not help him in establishing his possession. As seen from the evidence of the witnesses, the suit schedule properties are dry lands and were left fallow. The name of the respondent – plaintiff or the name of his father entered in the pahani relating to person in actual possession when the land was kept fallow or vacant, would not help him in establishing his possession. The question as to who was in possession of the land kept fallow or vacant mainly has to be decided on title. Pahanies are maintained mainly for the purpose of revenue collection and statistics as to who raised what crop and on what extent of land. Therefore, when a land is kept fallow or vacant, column regarding possession should not be filled in as the name of the person who actually cultivated the land. So merely because a person who is not the owner could manage to get his name entered in the pahani, when the land is kept fallow or when it is a vacant land, without establishing or proving his positive overt act of possession thereon cannot be held that he was in possession of such vacant land of which he was not the owner. As such, recording the name of the respondent – plaintiff or his ancestors in the possessory column in some of the pahanies when the land is kept fallow would not establish or prove his possession thereon. 36. In the result, both the Second Appeals are allowed setting aside the common judgments passed in A.S.Nos.37 and 38 of 1996 dated 19.03.2002 by the Additional District Judge, Nizamabad and in O.S.Nos.162 and 170 of 1992 dated 22.02.1996 by the Principal District Munsif, Nizamabad and the suit filed by the respondent – plaintiff in O.S.No.162 of 1992 is dismissed and the suit filed by the appellant in O.S.No.170 of 1992 is allowed. No order as to costs. As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending in these appeals, if any shall stand closed. C.C.(SR).No.2644 OF 2012: ORDER: This Contempt Case is filed by the petitioner - appellant to punish the respondents - contemnors under Sections 10 and 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act for willfully and wantonly disobeying the orders dated 11.11.2002 passed in S.A.No.584 of 2002. 2. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner - appellant and the learned counsel for the respondent No.1. 3. 2. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner - appellant and the learned counsel for the respondent No.1. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner filed the Second Appeal challenging the decree and judgment in A.S.No.37 of 1996, which was dismissed by the Lower Appellate Court confirming the judgment and decree passed by the Principal District Munsif, Nizamabad in O.S.No.162 of 1992. The respondent No.1 - plaintiff filed O.S.No.162 of 1992 for declaration of title and permanent injunction against the petitioner. The petitioner filed O.S.No.170 of 1992 against the respondent No.1 herein for permanent injunction. Both the suits were tried together and the suit filed by the respondent No.1 was decreed and the suit filed by the petitioner was dismissed. Aggrieved by the common judgment, the petitioner preferred two First Appeals vide A.S.Nos.37 and 38 of 1996. The Lower Appellate Court confirmed the decree passed by the trial court. During the pendency of the suits as well as during the pendency of the appeals, the petitioner - appellant was in possession of the suit schedule property and injunction was granted in his favor. Aggrieved by the common judgment of the Additional District Judge, Nizamabad in A.S.Nos.37 and 38 of 1996, the petitioner preferred two Second Appeals vide S.A.Nos.584 and 594 of 2002. This Court passed an interim order in C.M.P.No.14208 of 2002 in S.A.No.584 of 2002 staying the operation of the decree in O.S.No.162 of 1992. The petitioner on apprehension that the respondent No.1 might apply for deleting the name of the petitioner and adding his name, gave a representation to the Joint Collector on 22.03.2004. The petitioner also gave a representation to Tahsildar on 16.07.2011 and also on 09.01.2012. The petitioner recently came to know that the entry in the pahani for the year 2011-12 had been changed and the name of respondent No.1 was recorded without giving any opportunity and without issuing any notice to the petitioner. Inspite of a subsisting stay order by this Court, the respondent No.4 made corrections in the pahanies on 02.01.2012 on the basis of decree in A.S.No.37 of 1996, which was not permissible in law in view of the stay granted by this Court. The petitioner's name was recorded in the pahanies for the past several years. Inspite of a subsisting stay order by this Court, the respondent No.4 made corrections in the pahanies on 02.01.2012 on the basis of decree in A.S.No.37 of 1996, which was not permissible in law in view of the stay granted by this Court. The petitioner's name was recorded in the pahanies for the past several years. The pahanies for the years 2002-03, 2008-09, 2009-10, 2010-11 would show the name of the petitioner herein as pattedar for total extent of Ac.8-11 guntas, whereas in the pahanies for the year 2011-12, the name of respondent No.1 was shown as pattedar for Ac.3-00 guntas. Inspite of giving representation to the Tahsildar, the respondent No.4 willfully violated the orders of this Court and changed the names in the pahanies on 02.01.2012 without giving any notice to the petitioner and prayed to punish respondents 1 to 4 for violation of the orders of this Court in C.M.P.NO.14208 of 2002 in S.A.No.584 of 2002 dated 11.11.2002. 4. Learned counsel for the respondent No.1 on the other hand contended that parallel proceedings have run before the Revenue Authorities for rectification of records. The Mandal Revenue Officer (for short "MRO"), Makloor passed orders dated 30.04.1992 for mutation of the name of the respondent No.1 in respect of Ac.3-00 guntas in Survey No.54 as successor of late Buranuddin. Prior to 30.04.1992, the petitioner obtained patta in respect of entire extent of Ac.8-11 guntas in his name on 30.01.1978. In revenue records, the name of the father of the respondent was shown as possessor to an extent of Ac.3-00 guntas and the name of late Habeebuddin was shown as possessor to an extent of Ac.3- 00 guntas, though the name of the petitioner was shown as pattedar. The petitioner's name was shown as possessor to an extent of Ac.2-11 guntas only. All the pahanies prior to 30.04.1992 continued in the name of the father of the respondent No.1 by name late Buranuddin in respect of Ac.3-00 guntas of land in Survey No.54 as possessor. Later, the MRO passed orders mutating the name of the respondent - plaintiff and granting patta in his name to an extent of Ac.3-00 guntas by order dated 30.04.1992. Later, the MRO passed orders mutating the name of the respondent - plaintiff and granting patta in his name to an extent of Ac.3-00 guntas by order dated 30.04.1992. The respondent filed O.S.No.162 of 1992 for declaration of title in respect of Ac.3-00 guntas of land on 12.05.1992 and the petitioner filed O.S.No.170 of 1992 on 19.05.1992 for perpetual injunction in respect of entire extent of Ac.8-11 guntas. Both the suits were clubbed together and a common judgment was passed on 22.02.1996 decreeing the suit filed by the respondent - plaintiff and dismissing the suit filed by the petitioner - appellant herein. 5. He further submitted that while so, the petitioner preferred appeal in April, 1993 against the orders of MRO dated 30.04.1992. The Revenue Divisional Officer (for short "RDO") allowed the appeal ex-parte on 04.05.1995. The respondent preferred revision before the Joint Collector, Nizamabad in May, 1995 and the same was allowed on 20.07.1996. The Additional Chief Judge, Nizamabad dismissed both the appeals A.S.Nos.37 and 38 of 1996 by common judgment dated 19.03.2002. Since then, the respondent was pursuing the Revenue Authorities to mutate his name in the pahani/adangal in pursuance of the orders of the Joint Collector, Nizamabad dated 20.07.1996. After obtaining stay orders dated 11.11.2002 in C.M.P.No.14208 of 2002, the petitioner in the Contempt Case approached the Revenue Authorities and got mutated his name in the pahanies for the year 2002-03 in the possessor's column to an extent of Ac.8-11 guntas. In fact, there was no order from this Court to mutate the petitioner's name in the possessor's column. The order of the court dated 11.11.2002 would only show that the operation of the decree in O.S.No.162 of 1992 on the file of the Principal District Munsif, Nizamabad was stayed. The Joint Collector, Nizamabad passed orders on 20.07.1996, which was admittedly after the date of decree in O.S.No.162 of 1992 dated 22.02.1996. The respondent under the impression that the Revenue Proceedings were separate, approached authorities to implement the Joint Collector order dated 20.07.1996. As the petitioner got mutated his name in the possessor column after obtaining stay order dated 11.11.2002 in the pahanies, the respondent approached the Revenue Authorities for mutation of his name. But the respondent had no intention to disobey the orders of the Court. As the petitioner got mutated his name in the possessor column after obtaining stay order dated 11.11.2002 in the pahanies, the respondent approached the Revenue Authorities for mutation of his name. But the respondent had no intention to disobey the orders of the Court. In case, the action of the respondent comes under the Contempt of Court order, the action of the petitioner would also come under the Contempt of Court and further submitted that in case, the Court comes to a conclusion that the respondent acted contrary to the orders of the Court, the respondent was tendering his un-conditional apologies to the Court and prayed to excuse his mistake. 6. The respondent No.2 filed counter submitting that the copy of the interim directions issued in C.M.P.No.14208 of 2002 dated 11.11.2002 of this Court was not received in the Office of the Tahsildar, Makloor. Neither the petitioner nor the respondent had filed the copy of the interim directions issued by this Court and hence the Office of the Tahsildar, Makloor was unaware of the interim directions issued by the Court and implemented the orders passed by the lower Court i.e. the learned Additional District Judge, Nizamabad. The respondent No.1, who was working in Government Service filed a petition before the RDO, Nizamabad for implementing the orders passed by the District Court hiding the facts of the case that this Court have issued interim directions on the orders of the District Court, Nizamabad. The petitioner filed a copy of the interim directions in the Office of the Tahsildar, Makloor on 16.07.2011. The Tahsildar, Makloor implemented the orders of the Additional District Judge, Nizamabad issued in A.S.Nos.37 and 38 of 1996 without knowing the interim directions issued by this Court and prayed to close C.C. (SR).No.2644 of 2012. 7. An additional counter affidavit was also filed by respondent No.2 tendering his un-conditional apology and submitted that he retired from the post of Tahsildar, Makloor Mandal and that he was also suffering from ill-health and prayed to take a lenient view and close the Contempt Case. 8. The respondents 2 to 4 filed a memo vide U.S.R.No.11315 of 2018 dated 26.02.2018 stating that they committed mistake of altering the entry from the name of Moizuddin to the name of Raheemuddin. 8. The respondents 2 to 4 filed a memo vide U.S.R.No.11315 of 2018 dated 26.02.2018 stating that they committed mistake of altering the entry from the name of Moizuddin to the name of Raheemuddin. But they rectified the said mistake and once again mentioned the name of the appellant as pattedar and possessor to the entire extent of Ac.8-11 guntas of land and filed appropriate copies of the proceedings vide U.S.R.No.11315 of 2018 dated 26.02.2018. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the matter came up before the Hon'ble Justice Dr.B.Siva Shankar Rao on 24.01.2019 and his Lordship proposed to close the Contempt Case against all the respondents subject to respondent No.1 paying costs of Rs.2,000/- to the Army Welfare Fund, but, as the respondent No.1 was not willing to pay costs, as such his Lordship proceeded to close the Contempt Case against the Official Respondents keeping the same pending against respondent No.1 and prayed to punish respondent No.1. 10. As seen from the counter affidavit filed by respondent No.1, he stated that he was under the impression that the Revenue Proceedings were separate and as such approached the authorities to implement the orders of the Joint Collector dated 20.07.1996. However, the pahani for the year 2011-12 would disclose that the correction was made in pursuance of the order passed in A.S.Nos.37 and 38 of 1996, but not as per the orders of the Joint Collector dated 20.07.1996. The affidavit filed by the official respondent No.2 also would disclose that the respondent No.1 filed a petition before the RDO, Nizamabad for implementing the orders passed by the District Court hiding the stay order passed by this Court. As such, this Court is of opinion that the respondent No.1 violated the orders passed by this Court in C.M.P.No.14208 of 2002 in S.A.No.584 of 2002 dated 11.11.2002. The respondent No.1 being in Government Service was aware of the implications of violation of the orders passed by this Court. Though this Court had granted opportunity to him to close the Contempt Case on payment of costs of Rs.2,000/- to the Army Welfare Fund, he did not choose to pay the costs. Hence, it is considered fit to sentence the respondent No.1 to suffer imprisonment for a period of 30 days and to pay a fine of Rs.2,000/-. Though this Court had granted opportunity to him to close the Contempt Case on payment of costs of Rs.2,000/- to the Army Welfare Fund, he did not choose to pay the costs. Hence, it is considered fit to sentence the respondent No.1 to suffer imprisonment for a period of 30 days and to pay a fine of Rs.2,000/-. The petitioner is directed to pay subsistence allowance @ Rs.200/- per day to the respondent No.1/contemnor during the period of his detention in civil prison within four (04) weeks from today. 11. In the result, the Contempt Case is allowed with the above directions. As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending in this petition, if any shall stand closed.