JUDGMENT : 1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner, Shri Dharm Raj Mishra and Shri Ratnesh Singh, learned counsel for the respondents and Shri Hemant Kumar Pandey, learned State Counsel. 2. By means of the present petition, the petitioner has assailed the order dated 24.08.2023 passed by respondent No.1-Commissioner, Devi Patan Mandal, District-Gonda in the Revision instituted under Section 210 of U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 (in short "Code of 2006"), registered as Case No.1201 of 2023, (Rahul Agrawal vs. Ritesh Agrawal). 3. The brief facts are to the effect that in a Case No. 5244 of 2023 (Ritesh Kumar vs. Rahul Agrawal & Others), Computerized Case No. 20230815050244, instituted under Section 116 of the Code of 2006, the revenue court of first instance, namely, Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Payagpur, District-Bahraich (in short "S.D.M.") passed the order dated 04.08.2023, whereby the authority concerned directed the parties to maintain status-quo. The order dated 04.08.2023 being relevant on reproduction reads as under:- 4. Being dissatisfied/aggrieved by the order of status-quo dated 04.08.2023 passed by the S.D.M., the revision was preferred and the revisional authority namely, respondent No.1 after giving opportunity of hearing to the parties concerned, allowed the revision and interfered in the order dated 04.08.2023 passed by S.D.M. The relevant portion of the impugned order dated 24.08.2023 reads as under:- 5. The main ground which has been taken for interfering in the order dated 04.08.2023 is based upon the provisions indicated in the Code of 2006 i.e. Section 207 and Section 209 of the Code of 2006. 6. Impeaching the impugned order dated 24.08.2023 passed by respondent No.1, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in view of Section 207 particularly Sub-Section 2 (b) and (c), the appeal was maintainable against the order dated 04.08.2023 whereby the parties were directed to maintain 'status-quo', and the revision under Section 210 of the Code of 2006 was not maintainable and being so in entertaining and allowing the revision, the respondent No.1 committed material illegality. 7. 7. In continuation, he also stated that an order directing the parties to maintain 'status-quo' would fall under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 of C.P.C. and as such in view of Section 207, which indicates that an appeal shall lie against an order of the nature specified under Order 43 Rule 1 of the First Schedule to the said Code namely Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short 'C.P.C.'), the appeal was maintainable and not the revision. In this regard, a reference has been made to the Order 43 of C.P.C. 8. He further submitted that the expression 'Stay' under Sub-Section 209(d) is relevant. There is a difference between expression 'Injunction' and 'Stay'. As per settled principle of law, an 'Injunction' order would relate to party or parties, as the case may be, to the case/suit and 'Stay' order relates to the Court/Authority concerned. Accordingly, Section 209 would not be available to the side opposite to say that revision was maintainable. 9. Per contra, Shri D.R. Mishra, based upon Section 209 (d) and 209 (h) submitted that the interim order i.e. order dated 04.08.2023 was an ex-parte order, as such, in view of the Sub-Section (h) read with Sub-Section (d) of Section 209, the revision was maintainable. As such, no interference in the matter is required. Prayer is to dismissed the petition. 10. Considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 11. For the purposes of disposal of the present petition, this Court finds it appropriate to reproduce Section 207, Section 209 as also Section 210 of the Code of 2006. 12. Section 207 of the Code of 2006 reads as under:- "First appeal.-(1) Any party aggrieved by a final order or decree passed in any suit, application or proceeding specified in Column 2 of the Third Schedule, may prefer a first appeal to the Court or officer specified against it in Column 5, where such order or decree was passed by a Court or officer specified against it in Column 3 thereof. (2) A first appeal shall also lie against an order of the nature specified- (a) in Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; or (b) in Section 104 of the said Code; or (c) in Order XLIII Rule 1 of the First Schedule to the said Code. (2) A first appeal shall also lie against an order of the nature specified- (a) in Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; or (b) in Section 104 of the said Code; or (c) in Order XLIII Rule 1 of the First Schedule to the said Code. (3) The period of limitation for filing a first appeal under this section shall be thirty days from the date of the order or decree appealed against." 13. Section 209 of the Code of 2006 reads as under:- "209. Bar against certain appeals.- Notwithstanding anything contained in sections 207 and 208, no appeal shall lie against any order or decree- (a) made under Chapter XI of this Code; (b) granting or rejecting an application for condonation of delay under section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963; (c) rejecting an application for revision; (d) granting or rejecting an application for stay; (e) remanding the case to any subordinate Court; (f) where such order or decree is of an interim nature; (g) passed by Court or officer with the consent of parties; or (h) where has been passed ex-parte or by default: Provided that any party aggrieved by order passed ex-parte or by default, may move application for setting aside such order within a period of thirty days from the date of the order; Provided further that no such order shall be reversed or altered without previously summoning the party in whose favour order has been passed to appear and be heard in support of it." 14. Section 210 of the Code of 2006 reads as under:- "Power to call for the records.-(1) The Board or the Commissioner may call for the record of any suit or proceeding decided by any sub-ordinate Revenue Court in which no appeal lies, for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the legality or propriety of any order passed in such suit or proceeding, and if such subordinate Court appears to have- (a) exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law: or (b) failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested: or (c) acted in the exercise of such jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity: the Board, or the Commissioner, as the case may be, may pass such order in the case as it or he thinks fit. (2) If an application under this section has been moved by any person either to the Board or to the Commissioner, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them. Explanation- For the removal of doubt it is, hereby, declared that when an application under this section has been moved either to the Board or to the Commissioner, the application shall not be permitted to be withdrawn for the purpose of filing the application against the same order to the other of them.] (3) No application under this section shall be entertained after the expiry of a period of [sixty days] from the date of the order sought to be revised or from the date of commencement of this Code, whichever is later." 15. A perusal of the Section 207 of the Code of 2006 indicates that an appeal would lie against an order of the nature specified in Section 104 and also against an order of the nature specified in Order 43 Rule 1 of the First Schedule to the C.P.C. and these provisions are relevant for coming to the conclusion on the issues involved and as such, the same are being extracted hereinunder:- "Section104. Orders from which appeal lies- (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders, and save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any law for the time being in force, from no other orders:--- 1 * * * * * 2 [(ff) an order under section 35A; 3[(ffa) an order under section 91 or section 92 refusing leave to institute a suit of the nature referred to in section 91 or section 92, as the case may be; (g) an order under section 95 (h) an order under any of the provisions of this Code imposing a fine or directing the arrest or detention in the civil prison of any person except where such arrest or detention is in execution of a decree (i) any order made under rules from which an appeal is expressly allowed by rules 2[Provided that no appeal shall lie against any order specified in clause (ff) save on the ground that no order, or an order for the payment of a less amount, ought to have been made. (2) No appeal shall lie from any order passed in appeal under this section." "FIRST SCHEDULE ORDER XLIII Appeals From Order 1. (2) No appeal shall lie from any order passed in appeal under this section." "FIRST SCHEDULE ORDER XLIII Appeals From Order 1. Appeal from orders-An appeal shall lie from the following orders under the provisions of Section 104, namely:-- (a) an order under Rule 10 of Order VII returning a plaint to be presented to the proper Court [except where the procedure specified in Rule 10-A of Order VII has been followed] ; (b) [***] (c) an order under Rule 9 of Order IX rejecting an application (in a case open to appeal) for an order to set aside the dismissal of a suit ; (d) an order under Rule 13 of Order IX rejecting an application (in a case open to appeal) for an order to set aside a decree passed ex parte ; (e) [***] (f) an order under Rule 21 of Order XI ; (g) [***] (h) [***] (i) an order under Rule 34 of Order XXI on an objection to the draft of a document or of an endorsement; (j) an order under Rule 72 or Rule 92 of Order XXI setting aside or refusing to set aside a sale ; [(ja) an order rejecting an application made under sub-rule (1) of Rule 106 of Order XXI, provided that an order on the original application, that is to say, the application referred to in sub-rule (1) of Rule 105 of that Order is appealable;] (k) an order under Rule 9 of Order XXII refusing to set aside the abatement or dismissal of a suit ; (l) an order under Rule 10 of Order XXII giving or refusing to give leave ; (m) [***] (n) an order under Rule 2 of Order XXV rejecting an application (in a case open to appeal) for an order to set aside the dismissal of a suit ; [(na) an order under Rule 5 or Rule 7 of Order XXXIII rejecting an application for permission to sue as an indigent person ;] (o) [***] (p) orders in interpleader-suits under Rule 3, Rule 4 or Rule 6 of Order XXXV; (q) an order under Rule 2, Rule 3 or Rule 6 of Order XXXVIII ; (r) an order under Rule 1, Rule 2, [Rule 2-A], Rule 4 or Rule 10 of Order XXXIX; (s) an order under Rule 1 or Rule 4 of Order XL (t) an order of refusal under Rule 19 of Order XLI to readmit, or under Rule 21 of Order XLI to rehear, an appeal; (u) an order under Rule 23 [or Rule 23-A] of Order XLI remanding a case, where an appeal would lie from the decree of the Appellate Court ; (v) [***] (w) an order under Rule 4 of Order XLVII granting an application for review." 16. The power to grant interim order or temporary injunction is provided under Order 39 of C.P.C. Under this Order, the Court can grant the interim order/injunction and the Court can also grant an ex-parte interim order/temporary injunction and an order for injunction can be discharged, varied or set aside by the Court. Refereable Rules are Rule 1, Rule 2, Rule 3 and Rule 4 of Order 39 of C.P.C. The Court under this Order can also punish for disobedience/breach of injunction as appears from Rule 2A. 17. A conjoint reading of Order 43 Rule 1(r) and referred Rules of Order 39 of C.P.C., indicates that the order passed under Rule 1, Rule 2, Rule 3 and Rule 4 of Order 39 of C.P.C. is appellable. 18. An appeal against an order granting or rejecting an application for stay would therefore be barred notwithstanding anything contained under Sections 207 and 208. It is for the reason that Section 209 provides that certain orders or decrees are not appealable, and clause (d) thereof refers to an order granting or rejecting an application for a stay. 19. Thus, the question now for consideration is as to whether an order granting or refusing to grant a temporary injunction can be held to be an order granting or rejecting an application for stay so as to attract the bar under Section 209 and to hold such order to be non-appealable. 20. The question with regard to the effect of a stay order and its distinction from an order of injunction fell for consideration in the case of Mulraj vs. Murti Raghonathji Maharaj; AIR 1967 SC 1386 , wherein, it was held that an order of 'Injunction' is generally issued to a party by which it is forbidden from doing certain acts whereas a 'Stay' order is addressed to a court which prohibits it from proceeding further. The distinction between a 'Stay' order and an order of 'Injunction' was drawn by observing as follows:- "8...In effect therefore a stay order is more or less in the same position as an order of injunction with one difference. An order of injunction is generally issued to a party and it is forbidden from doing certain acts. It is well settled that in such a case the party must have knowledge of the injunction order before it could be penalised for disobeying it. An order of injunction is generally issued to a party and it is forbidden from doing certain acts. It is well settled that in such a case the party must have knowledge of the injunction order before it could be penalised for disobeying it. Further it is equally well settled that the injunction order not being addressed to the court, if the court proceeds in contravention of the injunction order, the proceedings are not a nullity. In the case of a stay order, as it is addressed to the court and prohibits it from proceeding further, as soon as the court has knowledge of the order it is bound to obey it and if it does not, it acts illegally, and all proceedings taken after the knowledge of the order would be a nullity. That in our opinion is the only difference between an order of injunction to a party and an order of stay to a court. In both cases knowledge of the party concerned or of the court is necessary before the prohibition takes effect. Take the case where a stay order has been passed but it is never brought to the notice of the court, and the court carries on proceedings ignorance thereof. It can hardly be said that the court has lost jurisdiction because of some order of which has no knowledge...... 9. It is argued that this view would introduce uncertainty inasmuch as proceedings may go on and it may take sometime — whether long or short — for the stay order to reach the court. There is in our opinion no question of uncertainty, even if we hold that the stay order must come to the knowledge of the court to which it is addressed before it takes effect. The court may receive knowledge either on receipt of an order of stay from the Court that passed it or through one party or the other supported by an affidavit or in any other way. There is in our opinion no uncertainty by reason of the fact that the court to which the stay order is addressed must have knowledge of it before it takes effect for it can always be proved that the court to which the stay order was addressed had knowledge of it and that is not a matter which should really create any difficulty or uncertainty. Once it is clear that a stay order is in the nature of a prohibitory order, knowledge of it by the court which is prohibited is essential before the court is deprived of the power to carry on the proceedings. As was pointed out in Bassesswari Chowdhurany case [(1896 -97) 1 CWN 226] “the appellate court has nothing to do with the execution of the decree; the execution proceeds under the direction of the court which made the decree and it has full authority to execute it. An order of stay does not undo anything which has been done; its utmost affect is to stop further action in the direction of execution, but it would only have that effect when it reached the court or person whose duty it was to obey it”. 10. As we have already indicated, an order of stay is as much a prohibitory order as an injunction order and unless the court to which it is addressed has knowledge of it, it cannot deprive that court of the jurisdiction to proceed with the execution before it. But there is one difference between an order of injunction and an order of stay arising out of the fact that an injunction order is usually passed against a party while a stay order is addressed to the court. As the stay order is addressed to the court as soon as the court has knowledge of it, it must stay its hand; if it does not do so, it acts illegally. Therefore, in the case of a stay order as opposed to an order of injunction, as soon as the court has knowledge of it, it must stay its hand and further proceedings are illegal; but so long as the court has no knowledge of the stay order it does not lose the jurisdiction to deal with the execution which it has under the Code of Civil Procedure." (emphasis supplied) 21. The difference between an order of 'Injunction' and an order of 'Stay' can also be taken note of from the decision of United States' Supreme Court in Jean Marc Nken, petitioner Vs. The difference between an order of 'Injunction' and an order of 'Stay' can also be taken note of from the decision of United States' Supreme Court in Jean Marc Nken, petitioner Vs. Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General; 556 U.S. 418 (2009), wherein, after considering the judgment passed in the case of Weinberger vs. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982); it was held that a 'Stay' and an 'Injunction' were not synonymous since an 'Injunction' refers to an order requiring a person to act or refrain from acting and a 'Stay' is a temporary suspension of legal proceedings. It was observed as follows:- "An injunction and a stay have typically been understood to serve different purposes. The former is a means by which a court tells someone what to do or not to do. When a court employs "the extraordinary remedy of injunction," Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, it directs the conduct of a party, and does so with the backing of its full coercive powers." 22. Thus, an order of 'Injunction' and an order of 'Stay' are different. An 'Injunction' order is usually passed against a party and operates in personam while a 'Stay' order is addressed to the Court and as such 'Stay' order operates upon the judicial proceedings. 23. In Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. vs. Church of South India Trust; MANU/SC/0501/1992: JT 1992 (3) SC 98, the Hon'ble Apex Court has explained the effect of the interim order in the following words:- "While considering the effect of an interim order staying the operation of the order under challenge, a distinction has to be made between quashing of an order and stay of operation of an order. Quashing of an order results in the restoration of the position as it stood on the date of the passing of the order which has been quashed. The stay or operation of an order does not, however, lead to such a result. It only means that the order which has been stayed would not be operative from the date of passing of the stay order and it does not mean that the said order has been wiped out from the existence." 24. The stay or operation of an order does not, however, lead to such a result. It only means that the order which has been stayed would not be operative from the date of passing of the stay order and it does not mean that the said order has been wiped out from the existence." 24. In the instant case, in the application seeking interim relief filed in a suit for division of holdings instituted under Section 116 of the Code of 2006, the petitioner herein sought the following prayer:- ^^vr% fuosnu gS fd nkSjku foHkktu okn foi{kh ua0&1 jkgqy vxzoky dks euk fd;k tkos fd tc rd foHkktu okn dk fuLrkj.k ugha gksrk gS rc rd os izkFkhZ@oknh dks tcfj;k iz'uxr oknh; Hkwfe mijksDr ls dCts ls csn[ky u djsa] rFkk tcfj;k fuekZ.k u djsa vkSj ekSds dh ;FkkfLFkr cuk;s j[ksA ftlls izkFkZh dks mfpr U;k; fey lds] d`ik gksxhA** 25. The effect of the prayer, quoted above, sought in the application seeking interim relief is to maintaining status-quo till the disposal of the suit filed under Section 116 of the Code of 2006. 26. As per the averments made in the application the defendant/Rahul Agarwal in the suit was adamant to forcibly dispossess the petitioner from the property in question and to raise construction over the same, and in view thereof an order directing status-quo was required. 27. The prayer sought in the application seeking interim relief, quoted above, also indicates that the same is not for grant of a stay order to any court or authority. The order dated 04.08.2023 passed on the application seeking interim relief preferred by the petitioner indicates that the parties to the proceedings were directed to maintain status-quo. The operative portion of the order dated 04.08.2023 reads as under:- ^^U;k;ky; ijå må?çå jktLo lafgrk 2006 dh /kkjk 116 ds vUrxZr caVokjs dk okn fopkjk/khu gSA U;k;fgr esa :dukiqj fLFkr Hkwfe dh xkVk laå 1086@0-020 gså] 1085@0-0056 gså] 1084@0-057 gså o xkVk laå 1087@0-304 gså o xkVk laå 1079 feå@0-005 gså o 1079 feå@0-009 gså xkVk la[;k 1079 dqy {ks=Qy 0-019 gså ij U;k;ky; esa okn fopkjk/khu jgrs mHk; i{kksa dks funsZf'kr fd;k tkrk gS fd ekSds ij ;FkkfLFr cuk;sa j[ksaA i=koyh fnukad 01-09-2023 dks is'k gksA** 27. It would be apt to indicate that a prayer to direct the parties to maintain status-quo during the pendency of the suit is an injunctive relief. It would be apt to indicate that a prayer to direct the parties to maintain status-quo during the pendency of the suit is an injunctive relief. 28. In the instant case, the interim order directing the parties to the proceedings to maintain status-quo was passed ex-parte on 04.08.2023 and, as such, the order dated 04.08.2023 would fall under Rule(s) 1 & 2 of Order 39 of C.P.C. Thus, to the view of this Court, the appeal under Section 207 of the Code of 2006 would lie against the order dated 04.08.2023 and being so challenging the order dated 04.08.2023 the revision filed under Section 210 of the Code of 2006 was not maintainable. 29. Accordingly, for the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order dated 24.08.2023 passed in Revision No. 1201 of 2023, Computerized Case No.C202308000001201 (Rahul Agarwal vs. Ritesh Agarwal) by the respondent No.1-Commissioner, Devi Patan Mandal, Gonda, is hereby set aside. 30. The petition is allowed. No order as to costs.