JUDGMENT : MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA, J. 1. The Appeal Suit arises out of the order and decree dated 06.01.2024 rejecting the appellants’ plaint in O.S. No. 80 of 2021 on an Application made by the defendants (respondents herein) under Order VII Rule 11 (a) and (d) of The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (C.P.C.). 2. The appellants (plaintiffs) had approached this Court in an earlier Appeal Suit in 2023 (A.S. No. 327 of 2023) challenging the order dated 05.06.2023 passed by the Trial Court rejecting the plaint on the respondents’ Application under Order VII Rule 11 of the C.P.C. A Co-ordinate Bench disposed of the said Appeal by the judgment dated 09.10.2023 by setting aside the order dated 05.06.2023, impugned in that Appeal, and remanding the matter to the Trial Court for re-examining the Application filed by the respondents/ defendants under Order VII Rule 11 of the C.P.C. and pass a fresh order in accordance with law. 3. The present Appeal is therefore from a second-look at the respondents’ Application for rejection of the appellants’ plaint on the ground of the plaint not disclosing a cause of action and being barred by law: Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) of the C.P.C. respectively. 4. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants submits that the Trial Court misdirected itself in considering the pleadings and material of the respondents/defendants in determining whether the plaint should be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the C.P.C. Counsel submits that the impugned order does not contain any reasons for arriving at the conclusion that the appellants’ plaint should be rejected. 5. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents/ defendants submits that the Trial Court correctly exercised its discretion in rejecting the plaint and only considering the pleadings and documents in the plaint. Counsel submits that the impugned order contains reasons in support of the conclusion. 6. We have considered the impugned order passed by the Trial Court allowing the Application filed by the respondents and rejecting the Suit filed by the appellants under Order VII Rule 11 of the C.P.C. 7. The Trial Court recorded the case made out by the defendants (respondents herein) in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the impugned order. Paragraph 2 consists of sub-paragraphs (a-g). The Trial Court recorded the case made out by the defendants (respondents herein) in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the impugned order. Paragraph 2 consists of sub-paragraphs (a-g). The Trial Court considered the allegations made in the plaint that the ‘Society’ (plaintiff No. 2) passed a Resolution in the General Body Meeting dated 15.06.1981 to establish a Trust namely Vidya Vikas Samithi Trust, Tandur and that an unregistered Trust Deed dated 27.01.1982 was executed by the President, Vice-President of the Society with 2 of the Trustees. The Society subsequently executed a registered Deed of Trust dated 16.05.1994 represented by the Secretary, the Chairman/Managing Trustee and other Trustees. The Chairman/Managing Trustee executed a Deed of Reconstitution of Trust on 19.01.2012 consisting of himself and other Trustees including a permanent Trustee. The Trial Court proceeded to record that the Reconstituted Trust Deed dated 19.01.2012 states that the plaintiff No. 2 (Society) shall not interfere in the activities of the Trust and in the case of any vacancy, the remaining Trustees shall make necessary appointments to fill up the vacancy. The Trial Court also recorded that the person who was claiming to be the Managing Trustee of the Trust was not nominated or appointed as a Trustee and hence the said person has no locus standi to sue as the Managing Trustee or on behalf of the Trust. The Trial Court further recorded the allegations in the plaint regarding the creation of a duplicate Trust by the plaintiff No. 1 without any authority and that the original Trust was established by the unregistered Deed of Trust dated 27.01.1982 which is entirely different from the subsequent reconstitution established vide a Deed of Trust dated 11.12.2020. 8. In the continuing sub-paragraphs of paragraph 2, the Trial Court referred to an impleadment petition filed by the person claiming to be the Managing Trustee of the Trust which is contrary to the allegations made in the plaint filed in the Suit. The Trial Court also refers to a perpetual injunction granted by the High Court in A.S. No. 680 of 2014 which runs contrary to the ex parte injunction granted in O.S. No. 80 of 2021 by the appellants/plaintiffs. 9. The Trial Court also refers to a perpetual injunction granted by the High Court in A.S. No. 680 of 2014 which runs contrary to the ex parte injunction granted in O.S. No. 80 of 2021 by the appellants/plaintiffs. 9. In paragraphs 3 and 4, the Trial Court referred to the counter affidavit filed by the plaintiffs/appellants reiterating the material averments made in the plaint in O.S. No. 80 of 2021 claim for dismissal of the Application filed under Order VII Rule 11 of the C.P.C. by the respondents herein. 10. In paragraph 8, the Trial Court reiterated that in an application for rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the C.P.C. the Court is only required to consider the statements in the plaint. 11. In paragraph 9 and the sub-paragraphs thereunder, the Trial Court reiterated the contents of paragraphs 1 and 2 as stated above with regard to the averments made in the plaint. Paragraph 9 (g) concluded that O.S. No. 80 of 2021 has been filed by the plaintiffs questioning the deed of Reconstitution of Trust dated 07.07.2021 by the defendant No. 1 who has no power or authority to ‘knock-away’ (the Court assumes the expression to mean dissipate) the properties of the Trust by nominating outsiders as Trustees. 12. In paragraph 10 (a-k), the Trial Court however referred to the material on record and the arguments made by the plaintiffs and the defendants. The Trial Court considers in great detail on the alleged activities of the Managing Trustee and other Trustees and the alleged activities of the defendants in encroaching upon the property of the Trust and demolishing the superstructure for the purpose of grabbing the land. 13. Paragraphs 11-15 refer to the law with regard to the rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the C.P.C. Paragraphs 16-18 contain repetition of the facts. Paragraph 18 refers to Ex.B-6 being the registered deed of Reconstitution of Trust dated 19.01.2012. Paragraph 19 is the penultimate paragraph where the Trial Court refers to Colonel Shrawan Kumar Jaipuriyar vs. Krishna Nandan Singh, (2020) 16 SCC 594 to hold that the plaintiff must have a clear right to sue in the form of a cause of action failing which the plaint is liable to be rejected. Paragraph 19 is the penultimate paragraph where the Trial Court refers to Colonel Shrawan Kumar Jaipuriyar vs. Krishna Nandan Singh, (2020) 16 SCC 594 to hold that the plaintiff must have a clear right to sue in the form of a cause of action failing which the plaint is liable to be rejected. The Trial Court concluded that the plaintiffs do not have a right to sue the defendants who are the Trustees and that the cause of action shown by the plaintiffs is a result of clever drafting. 14. The Court has carefully read the impugned order several times but is constrained to say that, it is indeed difficult, if not impossible, to separate the averments in the plaint and the case made out by the defendants. The impugned order contains repetition of facts, refers to evidence and also the submissions made on behalf of the defendants [including in paragraph (10-a)]. 15. The narration of facts is so convoluted that the exercise of determining whether the plaint discloses a cause of action becomes a mix-up of the plaint’s case + evidence read with the defence of the defendants. To complicate the matter further, the conclusion of the Trial Court that the plaint does not disclose a clear right to sue or a cause of action in paragraph 19 of the impugned order is not buttressed by any reason for coming to that conclusion. Contrary to the submissions made on behalf of the respondents/defendants, this Court tried to locate the reason for holding in favour of the defendants that the plaint should be dismissed. In fact, there is no reason given in paragraph 19 of the impugned order as to why the defendants’ application for rejection of the plaint should succeed. 16. The law with regard to rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the C.P.C. is that the plaint must disclose a clear right to sue and whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree from the statements made in the Court: Liverpool & London S.P. & I. Association Ltd. vs. M.V. Sea Success-I, (2004) 9 SCC 512 . There are several decisions of the Courts that only the statements made in the plaint must be seen and not the Written Statement: Sopan Sukhdeo Sable vs. Assistant Charity Commissioner, 2004 (3) SCC 137 . There are several decisions of the Courts that only the statements made in the plaint must be seen and not the Written Statement: Sopan Sukhdeo Sable vs. Assistant Charity Commissioner, 2004 (3) SCC 137 . The law further declares that Order VII Rule 11 of the C.P.C. circumvents trial for Suits which are manifestly vexatious and meritless: T. Arivandandam vs. T.V. Satyapal, (1977) 4 SCC 467 . The word ‘shall’ in Order VII Rule 11 of the C.P.C. makes rejection mandatory in such cases. 17. In the recent judgment of the Supreme Court in Dahiben vs. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gajra), (2020) 7 SCC 366 the test under Order VII Rule 11 of the C.P.C was explained with reference to decisions in that respect. 18. The respondents/defendants relied on Dahiben (supra) to urge that a document referred to in the plaint should also be taken into consideration for deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11(a) - where the plaint does not disclose a cause of action. This judgment however would not come to the assistance of the respondents/defendants since the impugned order does not contain the necessary clarity for separating the statements made in the plaint and the case of the defendants. 19. The point is not whether the Court was right in considering documents annexed to the plaint - Exs.B.1-8 - but whether the impugned order offers coherent reasons for rejecting the plaint from the averments made in the plaint as opposed to the case of the respondents/defendants. After all, an order of rejection of a plaint cannot be a value-judgment or one which reflects pre-conceived thinking by the Court on the perceived infirmities of the Suit. 20. As stated above, the facts are jumbled up in a manner to make this separation difficult for us. 21. Needless to say, the exercise required under Order VII Rule 11 of the C.P.C. is to see whether the plaint establishes a cause of action and whether from the averments, by itself, would invite a decree. It is not necessary for the Court to consider the overall defect of the case of the plaintiff as well as the defendant for arriving at the conclusion as to whether the plaint should be sustained or rejected. 22. It is not necessary for the Court to consider the overall defect of the case of the plaintiff as well as the defendant for arriving at the conclusion as to whether the plaint should be sustained or rejected. 22. The respondents/defendants also do not have any ground to oppose the present Appeal since this Court is not able to find any link between the narration of facts from paragraphs 1-18 of the impugned order and the conclusion in paragraph 19 that the plaint should be rejected. There is no reason at all in support of the ground that the plaint does not disclose a cause of action and is hence liable to be rejected or that the plaintiffs attempted to create a cause of action by clever drafting. 23. It would indeed be extraordinary for a plaintiff to demolish its own cause of action in the plaint by making statements which are inconsistent with the relief claimed or more specifically to aver that documents annexed to the plaint are “spurious” (Para 10(i) of the impugned order). Most curious indeed. 24. Order VII Rule 11 (a) and (d) of the C.P.C. reflect two distinct grounds, namely, of the plaint not disclosing a cause of action and the Suit appearing from the statement in the plaint to be barred by law respectively. Therefore, the Trial Court should have indicated its reasons for holding that the plaint is also liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 (d) of the C.P.C. 25. The suggestion made on behalf of the respondents that the remarks of the Trial Court may be expunged is not acceptable in view of the nature of the present proceeding. The findings are not unparliamentary or objectionable in a moral/ethical sense to merit deletion. 26. We, therefore agree with the appellants/plaintiffs that the impugned order does not disclose the reasons for rejecting the plaint. The reasons for coming to this conclusion are stated in the foregoing paragraphs. 27. A.S. No. 362 of 2024 is accordingly allowed. The impugned order dated 06.01.2024 is set aside. All connected applications are disposed of in terms of this judgment.