JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Mr. K. Gogoi, learned counsel for the petitioners. Also heard Mr. A. Zahid, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 & 2 and Mr. S. Islam, learned counsel for the respondent No.3. 2. By filing this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners are seeking for setting aside and quashing of the impugned selection of respondent No.3 as Durgam Kshetriya Vitrak at Bilpar under Shyampur Gaon Panchayat as L.P.G. distributor of respondent company, Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. 3. Pursuant to an advertisement published in the Assamese daily newspaper “Axomiya Pratidin” on 12.06.2018, the respondent authorities along with Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. and Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd., for appointing distributors for liquid petroleum gas (LPG) cylinders in various areas with various type of market under various categories in the State, the petitioners who belonged from Shyampur Gaon Panchayat applied for the category of Durgam Kshetriya Vitrak for the place of Bilpar under Shyampur Gaon Panchayat at Dalgaon under Darrang district, submitted online application forms on 13.07.2018. 4. The respondent authorities in terms of the brochure published on unified guidelines for selection of L.P.G. distributors (hereinafter referred to as ‘guidelines’) for Sheheri Vitrak, Rurban Vitrak, Gramin Vitrak was required to conduct the selection. 5. Clause 15(c) of the said guidelines provided the manner in which inter-se priority is to be adopted at the time of draw of lots which is as follows- "Inter se' priority in draw of lots for Durgam kshetriya Vitrak. C. Inter se' priority is given in the draw of lots to the eligible applicants for the Durgam Kshetriya Vitrak locations only as per the following order: i. Eligible applicants, residing in the concerned Gram panchayat of the advertised location. ii. Eligible applicants, residing in the concerned Revenue Sub-Division of the advertised location. iii. Eligible applicants, not residing in the concerned Gram Panchayat or in the concerned Revenue Sub-Division of the advertised location." For Sheheri Vitrak, Rurban Vitrak, Gramin Vitrak, the inter se' priority based on residence of candidate in the concerned Gram Panchayat or concerned Revenue Sub-Division will not be applicable.” 6. iii. Eligible applicants, not residing in the concerned Gram Panchayat or in the concerned Revenue Sub-Division of the advertised location." For Sheheri Vitrak, Rurban Vitrak, Gramin Vitrak, the inter se' priority based on residence of candidate in the concerned Gram Panchayat or concerned Revenue Sub-Division will not be applicable.” 6. The list of applicants found eligible for draw of lot for selection of L.P.G. distributors by giving Inter-se Priority List 1 (applicants residing in the concerned Gram Panchayat of the advertised location), Inter-se Priority List 2 (applicants residing in the concerned revenue sub-division of the advertised location) and Inter-se Priority List 3 (applicants not residing in the concerned Gram Panchayat or in the concerned revenue sub-division of the advertised location) was published. 7. Pertinent, that the petitioner’s names were included in the Inter-se Priority List 1. 8. Thereafter, the petitioners were also informed vide a letter dated 20.07.2018 that they have been qualified for online computerized draw of lots to be held on 27.07.2018 at the Deputy Commissioner’s Office, Kamrup. 9. On 27.07.2018, when the petitioners attended the draw of lots, it came to their notice that in the Inter-sePriority List 1 the names of three (3) candidates appeared who does not belong to stipulated area of Shyampur Gaon Panchayat. Accordingly, the petitioners verbally objected before the authority that the candidate at Sl. No.1, i.e., Ujjal Ghosh belongs to Mangaldoi town, the candidate at Sl. No. 2, Abdul Latif Mandal belongs to Kopati Gaon Panchayat and candidate at Sl. No. 4, i.e., Nokibul Islam (respondent No.3) belongs to Baligaon Gaon Panchayat. 10. After the objection raised by the petitioners, the draw of lots held on 27.07.2018 was cancelled and was again held on 10.10.2018. However, without considering the objection raised by the petitioner, the respondent No.3, i.e., Nokibur Islam was declared selected to be appointed as the L.P.G. distributor at Bilpar under Shyampur Gaon Panchayat in the said draw of lots for the Durgam Kshetriya Vitrak. 11. Accordingly, the petitioners submitted a complaint before the Chief Area Manager, Guwahati area office of Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. bringing to notice, inter alia, that the respondent No.3 whose name appears in the Inter Priority List 1 does not belong to the stipulated area of Shyampur Gaon Panchayat. However, the respondent authorities have not taken any steps for consideration of the same till date. However, the respondent authorities have not taken any steps for consideration of the same till date. Aggrieved by the selection of the respondent No.3 in contravention of the guidelines, this writ petition is filed. 12. Mr. K. Gogoi, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the respondent No.3 is a resident of Baligaon Gaon Panchayat and not from Shyampur Gaon Panchayat. In support of the aforesaid submission, the voter list of 2018 of Dalgaon Assembly Constituency reflecting the name of respondent No.3 is enclosed as a residence of Balipur Gaon Panchayat. He accordingly submits that the inclusion of the name of the respondent No.3 in the Inter-se Seniority List 1 is in total violation of the guidelines. In support of the aforesaid submission, he submits the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Bhagwan Dass and Anr. Vs. Kamal Abrol and ors., reported in (2005) 11 SCC 66 and the decisions of this Court in the following cases- (1) Bikramjit Singha, S/o Shri Bipin Bihari Singha Vs. The Indian Oil Corporation, Rep. by Its Chairman Cum Managing Director & 4 Ors., in WP(C) No.505/2021, (2) Dayal Ch. Paul Vs. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and 3 Ors. represented by the Chairman cum Managing Director, in WP(C) 8669/2019 and, (3) Dayal Ch. Paul Vs. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and 3 Ors. represented by the Chairman cum Managing Director, in WA 325/2023. 13. Mr. A. Zahid, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 & 2 (Indian Oil Corporation Ltd.) submits that in the 2nd draw of lots, the respondent No.3 was selected. He further submits that in support of the residential proof, the respondent No.3 had submitted a certificate issued by the Secretary, Shyampur Gaon Panchayat and also a certificate issued by the Circle Officer, Dalgaon Revenue Circle, to the effect that respondent No.3 is residing at his own land at Bilpar Village under Shyampur Gaon Panchayat. He accordingly submits that the respondent No. 3 is under Clause 15(c) of the guidelines for selection. 14. Mr. S. Islam, learned counsel for the respondent No.3 submits that the respondent No.3 being the local resident of village Bilpar is eligible for the subject selection. He accordingly submits that the respondent No. 3 is under Clause 15(c) of the guidelines for selection. 14. Mr. S. Islam, learned counsel for the respondent No.3 submits that the respondent No.3 being the local resident of village Bilpar is eligible for the subject selection. He further submits that though the birth place of the respondent No.3 was village Namati under Revenue Circle Dalgaon in the district of Darrang but, presently he has been permanently residing at Village Bilpar after purchasing a plot of land in the month of April, 2018. He further draws the attention of the Court to the copies of Jamabandi, NOC of Gaon Panchayat and residential certificate issued by the Circle Officer, Dalgaon Revenue Circle dated 08.10.2018 in support of his contentions. 15. I have heard the parties at length and perused the materials available on record. 16. The issue which falls for consideration is whether respondent No.3 is a resident of the territorial jurisdiction of Shyampur Gaon Panchayat in terms of Clause 15(c) of the guidelines. 17. Clause 15(c) of the guidelines which is extracted above provides the manner of inter-se priority in the draw of lots for the Durgam Kshetriya Vitrak location. As per the aforesaid inter-sepriority, first priority is given to the eligible applicants who are residing in the concerned Gram Panchayat of the advertised location. Reading of the aforesaid clause indicates that preference is given first to the residents of the concerned Gram Panchayat for appointment of L.P.G. dealership. The object of giving priority to local residents can be culled down from the guidelines itself, which is to provide employment and source of earning for the persons residing in the locality. Since the word ‘residing’ is not defined in the guidelines it has to be understood in the context of Clause 15(c) of the guidelines. 18. Reference is made to Black’s Law Dictionary Tenth Edition, wherein ‘residence’ is defined as “1. The act or fact of living in a given place for some time, 2. The place where one actually lives, as distinguished from a domicile, 3. A house or other fixed abode, a dwelling 4. The place where a corporation or other enterprise does business or is registered to do business.” 19. The act or fact of living in a given place for some time, 2. The place where one actually lives, as distinguished from a domicile, 3. A house or other fixed abode, a dwelling 4. The place where a corporation or other enterprise does business or is registered to do business.” 19. Thus, in order to confer the status of ‘residence’, it is not required that one is permanently living but one has to establish that he is actually living for some time. This meaning to the word ‘residence’ will be in consonance with the objects of Clause 15(c) of the guidelines. 20. Reference is made to the case of Bhagwan Dass (supra), wherein the Apex Court held that ordinarily residence denotes actual dwelling in a place for a considerable period as distinguished from a mere temporary residence because of a casual connection with the place on account of possession of some property there. Relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid decision are quoted hereunder- “6. The word ‘resident’ is in common usage and many definitions were attributed to it in different decisions. Nevertheless, it is difficult to give an exact definition for the term is flexible, elastic and somewhat ambiguous. The meaning of the word ‘resident’ in itself creates certain doubts. It does not have any technical meaning and no fixed meaning, would be applicable in all the facts and circumstances. It is used in various senses and has received various interpretations by the Courts. Generally, the construction of the term is governed by the connection in which it is used and it is dependent on the context of the subject matter, and the object, the purpose or result designed to be accompanied by its use, and the meaning has to be adduced from the facts and circumstances taken together in each particular case. The word ‘resident’ as defined in Oxford Dictionary is “to dwell permanently or for considerable time, to have one’s stay or usual abode, to live in or at a particular place”. Similarly, the Webster’s Dictionary has defined it as “to dwell permanently and for any length of time” and words like dwelling place or abode are held to be synonymous. From the above it can be seen that the term ‘residence’ makes it clear that the word ‘residents’ includes two types which are: 1) a permanent residence and 2) a temporary residence. From the above it can be seen that the term ‘residence’ makes it clear that the word ‘residents’ includes two types which are: 1) a permanent residence and 2) a temporary residence. First type of residence form all the permanent dwelling which means that the person has settled down at a particular place permanently and regularly for some purpose. The second type refers to a situation that the person is not residing at a place forever but residing at a place for a temporary period or not for a considerable length of time. This is also referred to a temporary living in a place. Hence, in one place the word ‘residence’ is interpreted in the strict sense to include only permanent living at a place which may be referred to a domicile and in the second place the word is interpreted flexible sense to show a temporary or tentative residence. 9. The court has further said in paragraph 13 that it is plain in the context of clause (ii) of Section 19 of the Act, that the word ‘resides’ meant actual place of residence and not a legal or constructive residence. It clearly does not indicate the place of origin. The words residence is flexible and has many shades of meaning but it must take its colour and content from the context in which it appears and it cannot be read in isolation. By this decision another dimension was added to the concept of residence in the form of concept of de facto residence and the concept of de jure residence. The Supreme Court in this case has clearly distinguished between the concept of actual residence or de facto residence and legal residence or de jure residence. The actual residence means the place where the person is residing actually at a given point of time. On the other hand concept of de jure residence or the legal residence means the place at which the person is residing in law. The latter form of residence may or may not be the actual residence or the place where the person actually stays or reside. On the other hand concept of de jure residence or the legal residence means the place at which the person is residing in law. The latter form of residence may or may not be the actual residence or the place where the person actually stays or reside. A person holding property or land in a particular place or city or having some ancestral roots to the city may be a resident of that particular place in the legal sense, but his actual residence will be the place where he is presently residing and coupled with the fact of animus manedi or an intention to stay for a considerable period. The concept of de facto and de jure residence can also be understood by the following example. If a person suppose has the residency certificate of a place say ‘A’, but actually for his living he stays at the place ‘B’. Then de jure he can be said to be the resident of place ‘A’ but de facto he is the resident of the place ‘B’. 13. For the aforesaid reasons we are of the view that the High Court has committed an error in construing the term ‘resident of Kangra District’ does not require a person to be a permanent resident of that place and his casual connection to the district would fulfill the necessary mandatory criteria provided in the ad. notice. As the approach of the High Court in deciding the second appeal against the appellant was based on its interpretation of the criterion of residence and as we have taken a different view of the matter, we set aside the judgment and decree passed by the High Court and remand the matter back to the Court for fresh consideration of the appeals in the light of interpretation given by us to the term ‘resident of Kangra’. The appeals are disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.” 21. Reference is also made to the decision of a co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Dayal Ch. Paul(supra) , wherein this Court has held that in the context of similar clause providing inter-se priority for appointment of L.P.G. Distributorship, the definition of residence as held in the case of Bhagwan Dass (supra) has to be applied. Pertinent to state that the facts of the case of Dayal Ch. Paul(supra) , wherein this Court has held that in the context of similar clause providing inter-se priority for appointment of L.P.G. Distributorship, the definition of residence as held in the case of Bhagwan Dass (supra) has to be applied. Pertinent to state that the facts of the case of Dayal Ch. Paul(supra) fits in the context of the present case. In the case of Dayal Ch. Paul (supra), the respondent No.4 pursuant to the issuance of the advertisement on 12.06.2018 entered into an agreement for lease on 04.07.2018 and registered agreement for lease on 12.07.2018 just one day prior to the last date of submission of the application. The co-ordinate Bench accordingly set aside the selection of respondent No.4. The aforesaid decision of the coordinate Bench was taken up in appeal in Division Bench in Dayal Ch. Paul (supra), wherein the Division Bench of this Court upheld the decision of the coordinate Bench. 22. In the present case, it appears from the residential certificate issued by the Secretary, Shyampur Gaon Panchayat dated 22.10.2018 that the respondent No.3 is residing at his own land at village Bilpar under Shyampur Gaon Panchayat and the residential certificate dated 08.10.2018 issued by the Circle Officer, Dalgaon Revenue Circle that the respondent No.3 is a resident of village Bilpar under Shyampur Gaon Panchayat since last six (6) months. 23. However, from the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the respondent No.3, it appears that the respondent No.3 after purchasing a plot of land at village Bilpar under Shyampur Gaon Panchayat vide Deed No.181, Patta No.36 in the month of April, 2018, shifted his residence from village Namati to Bilpar and since then is residing at Bilpar. It further appears that the said plot of land has been mutated in the name of the respondent No.3 as per order dated 12.07.2018 issued by the Circle Officer, Dalgaon Revenue Circle. 24. Thus, it is abundantly clear from the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the respondent No.3 that he has purchased a plot of land in Shyampur Gaon Panchayat after the advertisement dated 12.06.2018. 25. Furthermore, it appears from the reply given by the Public Information Officer, Dalgaon Revenue Circle vide letter dated 20.10.2020 in response to an information sought under Right to Information Act, 2005 that no person in the name of Md. Nobikul Islam (respondent No.3) is found in Shyampur Gaon Panchayat. 25. Furthermore, it appears from the reply given by the Public Information Officer, Dalgaon Revenue Circle vide letter dated 20.10.2020 in response to an information sought under Right to Information Act, 2005 that no person in the name of Md. Nobikul Islam (respondent No.3) is found in Shyampur Gaon Panchayat. Further, it appears from the voter list of 2019-2020 and certificate of Gaonburah forwarded from the Office of the Public Information Officer, S.P., Darrang, Mangaldoi to the petitioner that no name of Md. Nobikul Islam (respondent No.3) is found in the voter list of village Bilpar during 2019-2020 and the same is also confirmed by the certificate issued by the Government Lot Gaonburah, Bilpar. 26. Admittedly, the advertisement for appointment of subject distributorship for L.P.G. was issued on 12.06.2018 and after issuance of the said advertisement it appears that the respondent No.3 has purchased a plot of land within the territorial jurisdiction of Shyampur Gaon Panchayat. The mere possessing of land in the advertised location cannot, in the opinion of this Court, confer residential status to a person under Clause 15(c) of the guidelines, unless it is shown that one is continuously leaving in that land for a long period of time. 27. The decision of this Court in the case of Dhiraj Sankar Sarmah Vs. Indian Oil Corporation, reported in (2018) 5 GLT 709 relied by the respondent No.3 is in the context of the facts of that case. Relevant paragraph of the said judgment is quoted hereunder for ready reference- “ ......The same is not the position in the present case. What is being contended by the petitioner is that while respondent No. 2 has land at Morangaon, he ordinarily resides at Biswanath Chariali wherein he was enrolled as a voter. Field inquiry report from the revenue authority revealed that respondent No. 2 is a resident of Village Morangaon where he resides with his joint family, besides having another plot of land in the same village measuring 1 bigha. It is not the case of the petitioner that respondent No. 2 had purchased this land post the advertisement or on the eve of advertisement to confer eligibility on him. A person may be a resident of more than one location; that would not divest him of his residentship in either of the two places. It is not the case of the petitioner that respondent No. 2 had purchased this land post the advertisement or on the eve of advertisement to confer eligibility on him. A person may be a resident of more than one location; that would not divest him of his residentship in either of the two places. Eligibility required under Clause-3(b) is simply being a 'resident' of the advertised location in contradistinction to being a 'permanent resident' or even being an 'ordinarily resident'. In such situation, this Court in Vidyut Bikash Bora (supra), where residentship certificate was submitted at a later date, this Court held that an inquiry as to whether the candidate is a permanent resident of the concerned gaon panchayat area or not cannot be made in a writ petition, since determination of such an issue would depend upon several disputed questions of fact. As long as permanent residentship certificate issued in favour of the candidate holds the field, writ petitioner would not have any locus to assail the selection of the candidate on the ground of residential status. In that judgment, learned Single Judge referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in Air India Ltd. (supra), observed that if the decision making process does not suffer from arbitrariness or unreasonableness, interference by the writ court only on the making out of a legal point would not be justified.” 28. A perusal of the aforesaid decision indicates that the coordinate Bench of this Court has given the status of residents to the respondent No.2 at Moran Gaon where he has been residing for a considerable long time. In fact, it is categorically held by the coordinate Bench that this is not a case where the respondent No.2 had purchased the subject land post the advertisement in order to be eligible for the distributorship. It is a settled law that observations and precedent must be read in the context in which they appear and must not be read out of context. As such, the said decision is not applicable to the facts of the present case. 29. In the present case, the respondent No.3 has purchased the said plot of land within the territorial jurisdiction of the concerned advertised location post advertisement and before the initial last date of submission, i.e., 25.06.2018. 30. As such, the said decision is not applicable to the facts of the present case. 29. In the present case, the respondent No.3 has purchased the said plot of land within the territorial jurisdiction of the concerned advertised location post advertisement and before the initial last date of submission, i.e., 25.06.2018. 30. It is thus clear that the same has been done in order to be eligible under the subject advertisement. Clause 15(c) contemplates continuous residing in the advertised location in order to be eligible for inter-se-priority for the selection of the L.P.G. distributorship. 31. It is manifestly apparent on the face of the record that the respondent No.3 after the advertisement dated 12.06.2018 purchased the subject land by a deed of agreement dated 12.07.2018. 32. In fact, the residence certificate dated 08.10.2018 issued by the Circle Officer, Dalgaon Revenue Circle certifying that the respondent No.3 has been residing in village Bilpar under Shyampur Gaon Panchayat since last 6 months appears to be doubtful. 33. It is manifest that as per Circle Officer order dated 12.07.2018 passed in Mutation Case No. DAR/DAL/2018-19/69/FMUT, the name of respondent No.3 has been mutated along with the Muslimuddin for the land measuring 1 Katha 5 Lecha of Dag No. 181. 34. Further, it is apparent from the information received pursuant to the RTI queries from the Office of the Public Information Officer, Dalgaon Revenue Circle that no person in the name of respondent No.3 is found under Shyampur Gaon Panchayat. 35. The action of the respondent authorities in selecting the respondent No.3 on the basis of the residential certificate issued by the Circle Officer alone despite receipt of complaint to the effect that the respondent No.3 is not residing within the territorial advertised Gaon Panchayat, is arbitrary and illegal. 36. It is imperative for the respondent authorities to enquire into the aspect as to whether the respondent No.3 is continuously living in the land situated within the territorial advertised Gaon Panchayat for a considerable period of time, after receiving complaint thereof. The non action of the respondent authorities in enquiring into the matter of residence of the respondent No.3, after the receipt of complaint amounts to frustrating the object of the Clause 15(c) of the guidelines. 37. The respondent authorities ought to have effectuated the object and purpose of inter-se priority clause under Clause 15(c) and not to defeat the same. 38. 37. The respondent authorities ought to have effectuated the object and purpose of inter-se priority clause under Clause 15(c) and not to defeat the same. 38. Further, from the materials placed before this Court, it appears that the respondent No.3 has purchased the plot of land within the territorial jurisdiction of the Gaon Panchayat from the authorities in order to qualify himself in the First Priority List for appointment of L.P.G. distributorship. 39. Further more, there are no materials on record to show that respondent No.3 is continuously living in the advertised land for a long period of time. The respondent No.3 thus cannot be said to have been residing in the said location merely because he has purchased the land and as such the selection of the respondent No.3 is in contravention of Clause 15(c) of the guidelines. Therefore, the same is arbitrary, illegal and bad in law. 40. In view of the above, the selection of the respondent No.3 as Durgam Kshetriya Vitrak at Bilpar under Shyampur Gaon Panchayt as L.P.G. distributor of the respondent company is set aside and quashed. The writ petition is accordingly disposed of.