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2024 DIGILAW 746 (MP)

Prabhat Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh

2024-12-02

VISHAL MISHRA

body2024
ORDER : Vishal Mishra, J. The present petition has been filed under Section 528 in Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (similar to Section 482 from Old CrPC) for quashment of the charge-sheet arising out of the FIR being Crime No. 113 of 2024 registered at Police Station Chandia District Umaria (M.P.) for the alleged offence under Section 376(2)(n) of IPC and all subsequent proceedings. 2. The facts of the case are that on 12.04.2024, the victim made a written complaint to the Police Station Chandia District Umaria alleging therein that the petitioner on a false pretext of marriage committed sexual intercourse with her. Thereafter, he repeatedly raped her for years. On 19.03.2024, he again raped her but refused to marry her and therefore, a written complaint was made by the victim against the petitioner to the police authorities on which an FIR being Crime No. 113 of 2024 was lodged for the offence under Section 376(2)(n) of IPC. 3. It is argued that the petitioner and the victim were known to each other. She is major on the date of lodging of report before the police authorities. It is a case of consent. She herself developed physical relations with the petitioner and was willingly staying with her in relationship. Therefore, no case under Section 376(2)(n) of IPC is made out. It is pointed out that the date of incident is reported from 19.03.2023 to 19.03.2024 and the FIR was registered against the petitioner on 12.04.2024. Hence, there is considerable delay of more than a year in lodging the report and the same is not properly explained. She herself has chosen to remain silent for a long time which creates doubt on the allegations. It is argued that if the victim's statements recorded under Sections 161 and 164 of CrPC are seen coupled with the contents of the FIR and the written complaint, then it is a clear case of consent. The petitioner's counsel has drawn attention to the written complaint dated 12.04.2024 made by the victim to the police authorities wherein she has categorically stated that the petitioner has made physical relationship with her on several occasions on pretext of marriage. She stated herself that she is aged about 20 years at the relevant time. On the basis of the said complaint, an FIR was lodged against the petitioner. She stated herself that she is aged about 20 years at the relevant time. On the basis of the said complaint, an FIR was lodged against the petitioner. The last incident was reported to be 19.03.2024 and thereafter the complaint was made. Her 164 statement recorded before the trial Court supports the prosecution story to the aforesaid extent that she herself has made physical relations with the petitioner on pretext of marriage. 4. It is further argued that 164 statement reflects that the victim as well as the petitioner were known to each other for last 2-3 years. They were in love relationship. It is further stated that the petitioner used to ask the victim for making physical relations for which she gave consent to him. Whenever he used to call her on mobile, she used to visit the place as asked by him and there they regularly made physical relations but in March, 2024, when the petitioner refused to marry her, she made complaint before the police authorities. It is argued that she is major and it is a matter of consent, therefore, no case for the offence under Section 376(2)(n) of IPC is made out. To buttress his submissions, reliance is placed on the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 9 SCC 608 and Sonu v. State of U.P., (2021) 18 SCC 517 . On these grounds, prayer is made to quash the impugned charge sheet and the consequential proceedings. 5. Counsels appearing for the State as well as the victim have vehemently opposed the petitioner's contentions and have supported the impugned charge sheet. It is argued that there is specific statement made by the victim under Section 164 of CrPC that they were known to each other since last 2-3 years and used to make physical relations. At the relevant time, when the physical relations were made for the first time, the victim was minor; therefore, no question of consent is made out and the offence is clearly made out against the petitioner. A specific question was put to the respondents' counsel regarding the age of victim whether any investigation was carried out by the authorities regarding her age. A specific question was put to the respondents' counsel regarding the age of victim whether any investigation was carried out by the authorities regarding her age. In response, State counsel has fairly submitted that as she herself declared to be major which is reflected from the written complaint made on 12.04.2024 as well as from her 164 statement, therefore, there is no requirement for the State authorities to collect the proof of victim's age. 6. Counsel appearing for the State as well as the victim have further contended that as there are specific allegations made by the victim against the petitioner regarding commission of rape upon false pretext of marriage, the matter requires detail investigation. The police authorities completed the investigation and subsequently filed the charge sheet on which the trial Court has taken cognizance into the matter and the charge under Section 376(2)(n) of IPC has been framed against the petitioner which is reflected from the order of Third Additional Sessions Judge, Umaria District Umaria in Special Case No.64 of 2024 dated 08.10.2024. The order framing charge is not put to challenge by the petitioner. Therefore, the petition itself is not maintainable. 7. In reply, petitioner's counsel submits that once the very basis of registration of the FIR is not available and if the FIR itself is quashed, then all subsequent proceedings pursuant to the said FIR are non-est and will automatically be closed. 8. Heard learned counsels for the parties and perused the record. 9. The record indicates that the written complaint was made by the victim on 12.04.2024 to the police authorities which reads as under : 10. From the perusal of the aforesaid, it may be noted that the victim is aged about 20 years. It is reflected from the complaint that the victim and the petitioner were known to each other for last 2-3 years. One year prior to lodging of the complaint, the petitioner came to her Baadi (kitchen garden), met her there and made physical relations with her. On 19.03.2024 at about 10 p.m., the petitioner has again made physical relations with her and thereafter, refused to marry her. Therefore, the matter was reported to the police authorities by making written complaint on 12.04.2024. If the averments made in the complaint are taken as it is, then it is a case wherein physical relations were made with her consent on pretext of marriage. Therefore, the matter was reported to the police authorities by making written complaint on 12.04.2024. If the averments made in the complaint are taken as it is, then it is a case wherein physical relations were made with her consent on pretext of marriage. The victim has shown herself to be 20 years of age on 12.04.2024, therefore, there was no occasion for the police authorities to collect any document regarding her age proof. She herself has stated that around one year back, for the first time physical relations were made. If her statement is taken to be true, then also she is major on the date of making physical relations. Therefore, admittedly, she is a consenting party because she is major and is well aware of all the pros and cons of making physical relations. The statements of the victim recorded under Sections 161 and 164 of CrPC are verbatim to the written complaint. 11. In the case of Naim Ahamed v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 15 SCC 385 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court had the occasion to deal with the similar issue regarding making of physical relations on false pretext of marriage. It has been held as follows : 16. In Deelip Singh v. State of Bihar [Deelip Singh v. State of Bihar, (2005) 1 SCC 88 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 253] , this Court after discussing various earlier decisions of this Court and other High Courts, further explained the observations made in Uday case [Uday v. State of Karnataka, (2003) 4 SCC 46 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 775] and observed as under : (Deelip Singh case [Deelip Singh v. State of Bihar, (2005) 1 SCC 88 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 253] , SCC p. 104, para 28) “28. The first two sentences in the above passage need some explanation. While we reiterate that a promise to marry without anything more will not give rise to “misconception of fact” within the meaning of Section 90, it needs to be clarified that a representation deliberately made by the accused with a view to elicit the assent of the victim without having the intention or inclination to marry her, will vitiate the consent. If on the facts it is established that at the very inception of the making of promise, the accused did not really entertain the intention of marrying her and the promise to marry held out by him was a mere hoax, the consent ostensibly given by the victim will be of no avail to the accused to exculpate him from the ambit of Section 375 clause secondly. This is what in fact was stressed by the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Jayanti Rani Panda [Jayanti Rani Panda v. State of W.B., 1983 SCC OnLine Cal 98 : (1983) 2 CHN 290 : 1984 Cri LJ 1535] which was approvingly referred to in Uday case [Uday v. State of Karnataka, (2003) 4 SCC 46 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 775] . The Calcutta High Court rightly qualified the proposition which it stated earlier by adding the qualification at the end (SCC OnLine Cal para 7) — ‘unless the court can be assured that from the very inception the accused never really intended to marry her.’ In the next para, the High Court referred to the vintage decision of the Chancery Court which laid down that a misstatement of the intention of the defendant in doing a particular act would tantamount to a misstatement of fact and an action of deceit can be founded on it. This is also the view taken by the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Jaladu case [N. Jaladu, In re, 1911 SCC OnLine Mad 3 : ILR (1913) 36 Mad 453 : 1914 Cri LJ 24] (vide passage quoted supra). By making the solitary observation that “a false promise is not a fact within the meaning of the Code”, it cannot be said that this Court has laid down the law differently. The observations following the aforesaid sentence are also equally important. The Court was cautious enough to add a qualification that no straitjacket formula could be evolved for determining whether the consent was given under a misconception of fact. Reading the judgment in Uday case [Uday v. State of Karnataka, (2003) 4 SCC 46 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 775] as a whole, we do not understand the Court laying down a broad proposition that a promise to marry could never amount to a misconception of fact. That is not, in our understanding, the ratio of the decision. Reading the judgment in Uday case [Uday v. State of Karnataka, (2003) 4 SCC 46 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 775] as a whole, we do not understand the Court laying down a broad proposition that a promise to marry could never amount to a misconception of fact. That is not, in our understanding, the ratio of the decision. In fact, there was a specific finding in that case that initially the accused's intention to marry cannot be ruled out.” 17. In Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana [ Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana , (2013) 7 SCC 675 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 660] , this Court gave one more dimension of the word “consent” by distinguishing “rape” and “consensual sex” and observed as under : (SCC pp. 682-84, paras 21 & 24) “21. Consent may be express or implied, coerced or misguided, obtained willingly or through deceit. Consent is an act of reason, accompanied by deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance, the good and evil on each side. There is a clear distinction between rape and consensual sex and in a case like this, the court must very carefully examine whether the accused had actually wanted to marry the victim, or had mala fide motives, and had made a false promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within the ambit of cheating or deception. There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused; and whether the consent involved was given after wholly understanding the nature and consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused, and not solely on account of misrepresentation made to her by the accused, or where an accused on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her, despite having every intention to do so. Such cases must be treated differently. An accused can be convicted for rape only if the court reaches a conclusion that the intention of the accused was mala fide, and that he had clandestine motives. 22.-23. *** 24. Such cases must be treated differently. An accused can be convicted for rape only if the court reaches a conclusion that the intention of the accused was mala fide, and that he had clandestine motives. 22.-23. *** 24. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate evidence to show that at the relevant time i.e. at the initial stage itself, the accused had no intention whatsoever, of keeping his promise to marry the victim. There may, of course, be circumstances, when a person having the best of intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The ‘failure to keep a promise made with respect to a future uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear from the evidence available, does not always amount to misconception of fact. In order to come within the meaning of the term “misconception of fact”, the fact must have an immediate relevance’. Section 90IPC cannot be called into aid in such a situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the court is assured of the fact that from the very beginning, the accused had never really intended to marry her.” 18. Again in Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra [Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 18 SCC 191 : (2020) 3 SCC (Cri) 672] , this Court interpreting the Section 90 and Clause Secondly in Section 375IPC, observed as under : (SCC p. 202, para 23) “23. Thus, there is a clear distinction between rape and consensual sex. The court, in such cases, must very carefully examine whether the complainant had actually wanted to marry the victim or had mala fide motives and had made a false promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within the ambit of cheating or deception. There is also a distinction between mere breach of a promise and not fulfilling a false promise. If the accused has not made the promise with the sole intention to seduce the prosecutrix to indulge in sexual acts, such an act would not amount to rape. There is also a distinction between mere breach of a promise and not fulfilling a false promise. If the accused has not made the promise with the sole intention to seduce the prosecutrix to indulge in sexual acts, such an act would not amount to rape. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused and not solely on account of the misconception created by the accused, or where an accused, on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her despite having every intention to do. Such cases must be treated differently. If the complainant had any mala fide intention and if he had clandestine motives, it is a clear case of rape. The acknowledged consensual physical relationship between the parties would not constitute an offence under Section 376IPC.” .. 21. The bone of contention raised on behalf of the respondents is that the prosecutrix had given her consent for sexual relationship under the misconception of fact, as the accused had given a false promise to marry her and subsequently he did not marry, and therefore such consent was no consent in the eye of the law and the case fell under Clause Secondly of Section 375IPC. In this regard, it is pertinent to note that there is a difference between giving a false promise and committing breach of promise by the accused. In case of false promise, the accused right from the beginning would not have any intention to marry the prosecutrix and would have cheated or deceited the prosecutrix by giving a false promise to marry her only with a view to satisfy his lust, whereas in case of breach of promise, one cannot deny a possibility that the accused might have given a promise with all seriousness to marry her, and subsequently might have encountered certain circumstances unforeseen by him or the circumstances beyond his control, which prevented him to fulfil his promise. So, it would be a folly to treat each breach of promise to marry as a false promise and to prosecute a person for the offence under Section 376. As stated earlier, each case would depend upon its proved facts before the court. 12. So, it would be a folly to treat each breach of promise to marry as a false promise and to prosecute a person for the offence under Section 376. As stated earlier, each case would depend upon its proved facts before the court. 12. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of XXXX v. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in [2024] 3 S.C.R. 309 has observed as under :- 11. From the contents of the complaint, on the basis of which FIR was got registered and the statement got recorded by the complainant, it is evident that there was no promise to marry initially when the relations between the parties started in the year 2017. In any case, even on the dates when the complainant alleges that the parties had physical relations, she was already married. She falsely claimed that divorce from her earlier marriage took place on 10-12-2018. However, the fact remains that decree of divorce was passed only on 13-1- 2021. It is not a case where the complainant was of an immature age who could not foresee her welfare and take right decision. She was a grown up lady about ten years elder to the appellant. She was matured and intelligent enough to understand the consequences of the moral and immoral acts for which she consented during subsistence of her earlier marriage. In fact, it was a case of betraying her husband. It is the admitted case of the prosecutrix that even after the appellant shifted to Maharashtra for his job, he used to come and stay with the family and they were living as husband and wife. It was also the stand taken by the appellant that he had advanced loan of Rs 1,00,000 to the prosecutrix through banking channel which was not returned back. 12. Similar issue was considered by this Court in Naim Ahamed case [Naim Ahamed v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 15 SCC 385 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 89] on almost identical facts where the prosecutrix herself was already a married woman having three children. The complaint of alleged rape on false promise of marriage was made five years after they had started having relations. She even got pregnant from the loins of the accused. Therein she got divorce from her existing marriage much after the relations between the parties started. The complaint of alleged rape on false promise of marriage was made five years after they had started having relations. She even got pregnant from the loins of the accused. Therein she got divorce from her existing marriage much after the relations between the parties started. This Court found that there cannot be any stretch of imagination that the prosecutrix had given her consent for sexual relationship under misconception. The accused was not held to be guilty. Relevant para 22 thereof is extracted below: “21. In the instant case, the prosecutrix who herself was a married woman having three children, could not be said to have acted under the alleged false promise given by the appellant or under the misconception of fact while giving the consent to have sexual relationship with the appellant. Undisputedly, she continued to have such relationship with him at least for about five years till she gave complaint in the year 2015. Even if the allegations made by her in her deposition before the court, are taken on their face value, then also to construe such allegations as “rape” by the appellant, would be stretching the case too far. The prosecutrix being a married woman and the mother of three children was matured and intelligent enough to understand the significance and the consequences of the moral or immoral quality of act she was consenting to. Even otherwise, if her entire conduct during the course of such relationship with the accused, is closely seen, it appears that she had betrayed her husband and three children by having relationship with the accused, for whom she had developed liking for him. She had gone to stay with him during the subsistence of her marriage with her husband, to live a better life with the accused. Till the time she was impregnated by the accused in the year 2011, and she gave birth to a male child through the loin of the accused, she did not have any complaint against the accused of he having given false promise to marry her or having cheated her. She also visited the native place of the accused in the year 2012 and came to know that he was a married man having children also, still she continued to live with the accused at another premises without any grievance. She also visited the native place of the accused in the year 2012 and came to know that he was a married man having children also, still she continued to live with the accused at another premises without any grievance. She even obtained divorce from her husband by mutual consent in 2014, leaving her three children with her husband. It was only in the year 2015 when some disputes must have taken place between them, that she filed the present complaint. The accused in his further statement recorded under Section 313CrPC had stated that she had filed the complaint as he refused to fulfil her demand to pay her huge amount. Thus, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, it could not be said by any stretch of imagination that the prosecutrix had given her consent for the sexual relationship with the appellant under the misconception of fact, so as to hold the appellant guilty of having committed rape within the meaning of Section 375 IPC. 13. When the aforesaid legal propositions are applied to the facts of the instant case, it is apparently clear that the victim was a consenting party as she was major on the date of making physical relations for the first time. Now the only aspect remains to be considered by this Court is whether the consent given by the victim was the result of misconception created in her mind as to intention of the accused to marry her. The aforesaid aspect came for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Deelip Singh v. State of Bihar, (2005) 1 SCC 88 . In this case, the Hon'ble Court framed the following two questions relating to consent : (1) "Is it a case of passive submission in the face of psychological pressure exerted or allurements made by the accused or was it a conscious decision on the part of the prosecutrix knowing fully the nature and consequences of the act she was asked to indulge in? (2) Whether the tacit consent given by the prosecutrix was the result of a misconception created in her mind as to the intention of the accused to marry her"? In this case, the girl lodged a complaint with the police stating that she and the accused were neighbours and they fell in love with each other. (2) Whether the tacit consent given by the prosecutrix was the result of a misconception created in her mind as to the intention of the accused to marry her"? In this case, the girl lodged a complaint with the police stating that she and the accused were neighbours and they fell in love with each other. One day in February, 1988, the accused forcibly raped her and later consoled her by saying that he would marry her. She succumbed to the entreaties of the accused to have sexual relations with him, on account of the promise made by him to marry her, and therefore continued to have sex on several occasions. After she be- came pregnant, she revealed the matter to her parents. Even there- after, the intimacy continued to the knowledge of the parents and other relations who were under the impression that the accused would marry the girl, but the accused avoided marrying her and his father took him out of the village to thwart the bid to marry. The efforts made by the father of the girl to establish the marital tie failed. Therefore, she was constrained to file the complaint after waiting for some time. With this factual back- ground, the Court held that the girl had taken a conscious decision, after active application of mind to the events that had transpired. It was further held that at best, it is a case of breach of promise to marry rather than a case of false promise to marry, for which the accused is prima facie accountable for dam ages under civil law. It was held thus:- "The remaining question is whether on the basis of the evidence on record, it is reasonably possible to hold that the accused with the fraudulent intention of inducing her to sexual intercourse, made a false promise to marry. We have no doubt that the accused did hold out the promise to marry her and that was the predominant reason for the victim girl to agree to the sexual intimacy with him. PW 12 was also too keen to marry him as she said so specifically. But we find no evidence which gives rise to an inference beyond rea- sonable doubt that the accused had no intention to marry her at all from the inception and that the promise he made was false to his knowledge. PW 12 was also too keen to marry him as she said so specifically. But we find no evidence which gives rise to an inference beyond rea- sonable doubt that the accused had no intention to marry her at all from the inception and that the promise he made was false to his knowledge. No circumstances emerging from the prosecution evidence establish this fact. On the other hand, the statement of PW 12 that “later on”, the accused became ready to marry her but his father and others took him away from the village would indicate that the accused might have been prompted by a genuine intention to marry which did not materialise on account of the pressure exerted by his family elders. It seems to be a case of breach of promise to marry rather than a case of false promise to marry. On this aspect also, the observations of this Court in Uday case at para 24 come to the aid of the appellant". 14. In the case of, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has drawn a distinction between rape and consensual sex. This is a case of a prosecutrix aged 19 years at the time of the incident. She had an inclination towards the accused. The accused had been giving her assurances of the fact that he would get married to her. The prosecutrix, therefore, left her home voluntarily and of her own free will to go with the accused to get married to him. She called the accused on a phone number given to her by him, to ask him why he had not met her at the place that had been pre-decided by them. She also waited for him for a long time, and when he finally arrived, she went with him to a place called Karna Lake where they indulged in sexual intercourse. She did not raise any objection at that stage and made no complaints to anyone. Thereafter, she went to Kurukshetra with the accused, where she lived with his relatives. Here too, the prosecutrix voluntarily became intimate with the accused. She then, for some reason, went to live in the hostel at Kurukshetra University illegally, and once again came into contact with the accused at Birla Mandir there. Thereafter, she went to Kurukshetra with the accused, where she lived with his relatives. Here too, the prosecutrix voluntarily became intimate with the accused. She then, for some reason, went to live in the hostel at Kurukshetra University illegally, and once again came into contact with the accused at Birla Mandir there. Thereafter, she even proceeded with the accused to the old bus-stand in Kurukshetra, to leave for Ambala so that the two of them could get married at the court in Ambala. At the bus station, the accused was arrested by the police. The Court held that the physical relationship between the parties had clearly developed with the consent of the prosecutrix as there was neither a case of any resistance nor had she raised any complaint anywhere at any time, despite the fact that she had been living with the accused for several days and had travelled with him from one place to another. The Court further held that it is not possible to apprehend the circumstances in which a charge of deceit/rape can be levelled against the accused. 15. Thus, when the facts of the present case are tested on the anvil of the aforesaid decisions, then this Court is required to carefully examine whether the petitioner has actually wanted to marry the victim or with mala fide intention or making false promise to marry, to satisfy his lust. In the present case, admittedly, the petitioner and the victim were known to each other. The victin has studied upto Class X. Her father has expired. The petitioner is resident of her village. They were known to each other and having love relationship between them for last 2-3 years. It is an allegation made by the victim that one year before lodging of the complaint, the petitioner came to her house, called her and on pretext of marrying her, has developed physical relations with her. If her statement under Section 164 of CrPC is seen, the victim has categorically stated that the petitioner belongs to her community. They developed intimacy and were in love relationship for last 2-3 years. They used to regularly talk on mobile and used to regularly meet. Whenever the petitioner asked for making physical relations, she gave consent to him. If her statement under Section 164 of CrPC is seen, the victim has categorically stated that the petitioner belongs to her community. They developed intimacy and were in love relationship for last 2-3 years. They used to regularly talk on mobile and used to regularly meet. Whenever the petitioner asked for making physical relations, she gave consent to him. Whenever he wants to make physical relations with her, he used to inform her on mobile and in turn she used to go to the place as informed by him and with her consent, developed physical relations. It is only in March, 2024, when the petitioner refused to marry her, she has made a written complaint against him to the police authorities. 16. From the aforesaid facts, it is apparently clear that the victim herself has agreed for making physical relations and was major at the relevant time. She was a consenting party to the act. Her statements as well as written complaint clearly disclose the fact that the petitioner used to ask her for making physical relations and she used to accompany him. In the facts and circumstances of the case, it cannot be said that there was any deceitful intention of the petitioner to make physical relations with the victim as it is a case wherein the physical relations were not made for one or twice but as per statements made by the victim, she herself has developed physical relations on several occasions. Under these circumstances, the offence under Section 376(2)(n) of IPC is not made out against the petitioner as the victim is major and a consenting party. 17. The parameters where exercise of inherent power under Section 482 of the CrPC can be exercised either on proof of abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice have been highlighted in several cases. In State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, (1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335), it was held that though it will not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined sufficiently channelized and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised, certain illustrative cases were indicated. In State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, (1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335), it was held that though it will not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined sufficiently channelized and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised, certain illustrative cases were indicated. They are as follows: (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizabe offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 18. A note of caution was indicated in the following words: "103. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 18. A note of caution was indicated in the following words: "103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice." 19. In view of the foregoing discussion, the case at hand falls within the category (1) and (3) of the illustrations given in Bhajan Lal's case (supra). 20. Consequently, the petition is allowed. The impugned FIR being Crime No. 113 of 2024 registered against the petitioner at Police Station Chandia District Umaria (M.P.) for the offence under Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC and all subsequent proceedings are hereby quashed. Order be communicated to the concerning trial Court.