ORDER : (per Hon'ble Sri Justice R.Raghunandan Rao) Heard Sri Manikanta Thota, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and learned Advocate General appearing on behalf of the respondents. 2. The detenue was named as an accused in four criminal cases, whose details are given below: Sl.No. Crime No. Police Station Offences under Sections 1. Crime No.653/2023 Dated 22-06-2023 Nallapadu Police Station U/S 384 of I.P.C 2. Crime No.210/2023 Dated 23.06.2023 Lalapet Police Station U/S 384 of I.P.C 3. Crime No.214/2023 Dated 26.06.2023 Lalapet Police Station U/S 386 altered to Section 394 of I.P.C. 4. Crime No.212/2023 Dated 26.06.2023 Kothapet Police Station U/S 386 r/w 34 of I.P.C. 3. He was arrested in all the above four cases on 29.06.2023. While he was in judicial custody, an order of detention, dated 14.07.2023, was passed by the 2nd respondent. This was approved by the 1st respondent on 25.07.2023 and subsequently confirmed, on 19.09.2023, after receiving the recommendations of the Advisory Committee. 4. The 2nd respondent in his order, dated 14.07.2023, had directed detention of the detenue in Central prison, Rajamahendravaram, for a period of one year. The grounds of detention were that the detenue had been involved in four separate crimes in a matter of four days between 21-06-2023 to 26.06.2023 and the said crimes were committed by targeting isolated areas during night hours, which caused disturbance in public order. The 2nd respondent had also recorded that there was every likelihood of the detenue being enlarged on bail in the above criminal cases and his release would result in further commission of offences, which would be detrimental to the public order. 5. The mother of the detenue moved the present writ petition challenging the order of detention dated 14.07.2023 as well as the subsequent proceedings of approval and confirmation. 6. Sri Manikanta Thota, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that even though the order of detention was passed on 14.07.2023, the actual period of detention started from 22.07.2023 when the detenue was transferred to Rajahmahendravaram Central Jail. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner raised the following grounds for challenging the said order of detention. a) The 2nd respondent had not recorded any satisfaction that there was a likelihood of the detenue being released from judicial custody and the absence of recording such satisfaction would be fatal to the detention order. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner raised the following grounds for challenging the said order of detention. a) The 2nd respondent had not recorded any satisfaction that there was a likelihood of the detenue being released from judicial custody and the absence of recording such satisfaction would be fatal to the detention order. For this purpose, he relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Champion R. Sangma vs. State of Meghalaya and Anr., (2015) 16 SCC 253 and the judgments of a Division Bench of this Court in W.P.No.1803 of 2021 and W.P.No.3359 of 2024. b) The offences set out in the detention order are offences of ordinary nature, which can be dealt with by the regular Criminal Law provisions and there is no need to invoke the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land-Grabbers Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). c) The offences set out in the detention order do not affect the public order and in any event there is no discussion on the question of whether such offences alleged to have been committed by the detenue affected the public order. d) Section 9 of the Act requires the detention order to be confirmed by an Advisory Committee consisting of persons, who had been Judges of the High Court or were eligible to be appointed as High Court Judges. However, neither the detention order nor any of the subsequent proceedings give details of members of such Advisory Committee and it should be taken that the members of the Advisory Committee except the Chairman, did not meet the requirements of Section 9 of the Act and as such the conformation by the Advisory Committee is invalid. e) No material was placed by the sponsoring authority before the 2nd respondent to show the involvement of the detenue in any of the crimes mentioned above. As such the necessary material to show that the detenue was involved in any of these crimes was never before the 2nd respondent. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner, apart from raising the above grounds, also submitted that the detenue had been acquitted in three of the above cases and no charge sheet has yet been filed in the last case. 9. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner, apart from raising the above grounds, also submitted that the detenue had been acquitted in three of the above cases and no charge sheet has yet been filed in the last case. 9. Sri Vishnu Teja, learned counsel appearing for the learned Advocate General would draw the attention of this Court to the order of the 2nd respondent, wherein the 2nd respondent had specifically stated that there was a likelihood of the detenue being enlarged on bail in the four cases mentioned in the detention order. He would submit that in view of the same, the central argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that no satisfaction of imminent release of the detenue from the judicial custody has been recorded would have to be rejected. 10. Sri Vishnu Teja had also taken this Court through the detention order to contend that the nature of crimes committed by the detenue would show that these were crimes in which persons in isolated areas were being targeted and as such fear had enveloped the area. He would submit that such offences are sufficient to make out a case that public order had been affected. 11. The counter filed by the 2nd respondent would show that the detenue had been released on bail in all the four crimes. However, these were orders passed after the order of detention had been passed by the 2nd respondent. Consideration of the Court: 12. A Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Rameshwar Shaw vs. District Magistrate, Burdwan, AIR 1964 SC 334 had held, on the question of whether a detention order could be passed against a person in judicial custody, in the following manner: 12. As abstract proposition of law, there may not be any doubt that Section 3(1)(a) does not preclude the authority from passing an order of detention against a person whilst he is in detention or in jail; but the relevant facts in connection with the making of the order may differ and that may make a difference in the application of the principle that a detention order can be passed against a person in jail. Take for instance, a case where a person has been sentenced to rigorous imprisonment, for ten years. Take for instance, a case where a person has been sentenced to rigorous imprisonment, for ten years. It cannot be seriously suggested that soon after the sentence of imprisonment is pronounced on the person, the detaining authority can make an order directing the detention of the said person after he is released from jail at the end of the period of the sentence imposed on him. In dealing with this question, again the considerations of proximity of time will not be irrelevant. On the other hand, if a person who is undergoing imprisonment, for a very short period, say for a month or two or so, and it is known that he would soon be released from jail, it may be possible for the authority to consider the antecedent history of the said person and decide whether the detention of the said person would be necessary after he is released from jail, and if the authority is bond fide satisfied that such detention is necessary, he can make a valid order of detention a few days before the person is likely be released. The antecedent history and the past conduct on which the order of detention would be based would, in such a case, be proximate in point of time and would have a rational connection with the conclusion drawn by the authority that the detention of the person after his release is necessary. It may not be easy to discover such rational connection between the antecedent history of the person who has been sentenced to ten years' rigorous imprisonment and the view that his detention should be ordered after he is released after running the whole of his sentence. Therefore, we are satisfied that the question as to whether an order of detention can be passed against a person who is in detention or in jail, will always have to be determined in the circumstances of each case. This principle was followed by another Constitution Bench in Makhan Singh Tarsikka vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 1120 . 13. Another Constitution bench judgement of the hon'ble Supreme Court has to be noticed in HaradhanSaha v. State of W.B., (1975) 3 SCC 198 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 816 at page 209 , the bench had held as follows: 34. The recent decisions of this Court on this subject are many. 13. Another Constitution bench judgement of the hon'ble Supreme Court has to be noticed in HaradhanSaha v. State of W.B., (1975) 3 SCC 198 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 816 at page 209 , the bench had held as follows: 34. The recent decisions of this Court on this subject are many. The decisions in Borjahan Gorey v. State of W.B. [ (1972) 2 SCC 550 : 1972 SCC (Cri) 888] , Ashim Kumar Ray v. State of W.B. [ (1973) 4 SCC 76 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 723] ; Abdul Aziz v. District Magistrate, Burdwan [ (1973) 1 SCC 301 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 321] and DebuMahato v. State of W.B. [ (1974) 4 SCC 135 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 274] correctly lay down the principles to be followed as to whether a detention order is valid or not. The decision in Biram Chand v. State of U.P. [ (1974) 4 SCC 573 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 609] which is a Division Bench decision of two learned Judges is contrary to the other Bench decisions consisting in each case of three learned Judges. The principles which can be broadly stated are these. First, merely because a detenu is liable to be tried in a criminal court for the commission of a criminal offence or to be proceeded against for preventing him from committing offences dealt with in Chapter VIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure would not by itself debar the Government from taking action for his detention under the Act. Second, the fact that the Police arrests a person and later on enlarges him on bail and initiates steps to prosecute him under the Code of Criminal Procedure and even lodges a first information report may be no bar against the District Magistrate issuing an order under the preventive detention. Third, where the concerned person is actually in jail custody at the time when an order of detention is passed against him and is not likely to be released for a fair length of time, it may be possible to contend that there could be no satisfaction on the part of the detaining authority as to the likelihood of such a person indulging in activities which would jeopardise the security of the State or the public order. Fourth, the mere circumstance that a detention order is passed during the pendency of the prosecution will not violate the order. Fourth, the mere circumstance that a detention order is passed during the pendency of the prosecution will not violate the order. Fifth, the order of detention is a precautionary measure. It is based on a reasonable prognosis of the future behaviour of a person based on his past conduct in the light of the surrounding circumstances. 14. It has been argued that this judgement is an authority for the principle that an order of preventive detention cannot be passed against a person who is already in prison. A reading of the above passage would show that no such absolute bar has been placed. The observations made above are merely reiterating the principle laid down in Rameshwar Shaw vs. District Magistrate, Burdwan. 15. Subsequent judgements of the Hon'ble Supreme Court had followed this line of reasoning. However, there have been some variations in the manner in which this principle had been followed. There have also been submissions made, at various points of time, that the Hon'ble Supreme Court had taken the view that orders of detention cannot be passed when a person is in judicial custody or otherwise in jail. 16. A 3 judge bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Rekha v. State of T.N., (2011) 5 SCC 244 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 596 : 2011 SCC OnLine SC 571 at page 250 after noticing both trends had held as follows: 8. It has been held in T.V. Sravanan v. State [ (2006) 2 SCC 664 : (2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 593] , A. Shanthi v. Govt. of T.N. [ (2006) 9 SCC 711 : (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 371] , Rajesh Gulati v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi [ (2002) 7 SCC 129 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 1627] , etc. that if no bail application was pending and the detenu was already, in fact, in jail in a criminal case, the detention order under the preventive detention law is illegal. These decisions appear to have followed the Constitution Bench decision in HaradhanSaha v. State of W.B. [ (1975) 3 SCC 198 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 816] wherein it has been observed: (SCC p. 209, para 34): “34. These decisions appear to have followed the Constitution Bench decision in HaradhanSaha v. State of W.B. [ (1975) 3 SCC 198 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 816] wherein it has been observed: (SCC p. 209, para 34): “34. … where the person concerned is actually in jail custody at the time when an order of detention is passed against him and is not likely to be released for a fair length of time, it may be possible to contend that there could be no satisfaction on the part of the detaining authority as to the likelihood of such a person indulging in activities which would jeopardise the security of the State or public order.” 9. On the other hand, Mr Altaf Ahmed, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the State of Tamil Nadu, has relied on the judgments of this Court in A. Geetha v. State of T.N. [ (2006) 7 SCC 603 : (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 324] and Ibrahim Nazeer v. State of T.N. [ (2006) 6 SCC 64 : (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 17] wherein it has been held that even if no bail application of the petitioner is pending but if in similar cases bail has been granted, then this is a good ground for the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority to pass the detention order. 10. In our opinion, if details are given by the respondent authority about the alleged bail orders in similar cases mentioning the date of the orders, the bail application number, whether the bail order was passed in respect of the co-accused in the same case, and whether the case of the co-accused was on the same footing as the case of the petitioner, then, of course, it could be argued that there is likelihood of the accused being released on bail, because it is the normal practice of most courts that if a co-accused has been granted bail and his case is on the same footing as that of the petitioner, then the petitioner is ordinarily granted bail. However, the respondent authority should have given details about the alleged bail order in similar cases, which has not been done in the present case. A mere ipse dixit statement in the grounds of detention cannot sustain the detention order and has to be ignored. 17. However, the respondent authority should have given details about the alleged bail order in similar cases, which has not been done in the present case. A mere ipse dixit statement in the grounds of detention cannot sustain the detention order and has to be ignored. 17. These principles were reiterated in the case of Champion R. Sangma vs. State of Meghalaya and Anr., (1 supra). 9. Coming to the ground on which we intend to allow this appeal, we may point out that even if the appellant is in jail in connection with some criminal case(s) there is no prohibition in law to pass the detention order. Law on this aspect is well settled and stands crystallised by a plethora of judgments of this Court. However, a reading of those very judgments also clarifies that there are certain aspects which have to be borne in mind by the detaining authority and satisfaction on those aspects is to be arrived at while passing the detention order. 10. There are three such factors which were restated in Kamarunnissa v. Union of India [Kamarunnissa v. Union of India, (1991) 1 SCC 128 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 88] : (SCC pp. 140-41, para 13) “13. From the catena of decisions referred to above it seems clear to us that even in the case of a person in custody a detention order can validly be passed (1) if the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that he is actually in custody; (2) if he has reason to believe on the basis of reliable material placed before him (a) that there is a real possibility of his being released on bail, and (b) that on being so released he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activity; and (3) if it is felt essential to detain him to prevent him from so doing. If the authority passes an order after recording his satisfaction in this behalf, such an order cannot be struck down on the ground that the proper course for the authority was to oppose the bail and if bail is granted notwithstanding such opposition, to question it before a higher court. If the authority passes an order after recording his satisfaction in this behalf, such an order cannot be struck down on the ground that the proper course for the authority was to oppose the bail and if bail is granted notwithstanding such opposition, to question it before a higher court. What this Court stated in Ramesh Yadav [Ramesh Yadav v. District Magistrate, Etah, (1985) 4 SCC 232 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 514] was that ordinarily a detention order should not be passed merely to pre-empt or circumvent enlargement on bail in cases which are essentially criminal in nature and can be dealt with under the ordinary law. It seems to us well settled that even in a case where a person is in custody, if the facts and circumstances of the case so demand, resort can be had to the law of preventive detention. This seems to be quite clear from the case law discussed above and there is no need to refer to the High Court decisions to which our attention was drawn since they do not hold otherwise. We, therefore, find it difficult to accept the contention of the counsel for the petitioners that there was no valid and compelling reason for passing the impugned orders of detention because the detenus were in custody.” 18. The law, as can be seen from the above, can be summarised in the following manner. There is no bar against passing an order of preventive detention merely on the ground that the detenue is already in prison. However, the question of whether such an order can be passed, would be dependent on the facts of each case. The detaining authority, before passing an order of detention should find that there was a possibility of the proposed detenue being released from jail. This possibility can be gleaned from various sources and factors. A non exhaustive list would be where the detaining authority finds that, the proposed detenue has applied for bail; the proposed detenue has obtained bail in similar cases and consequently bail, if applied for in future could be granted on this ground; a co accused of the detenue, who is placed in a situation similar to the proposed detenue, has obtained bail, and there is a possibility of the proposed detenue getting bail if he applied, etc. The said finding would have to be given on the basis of cogent factors and a mere statement to that effect, without explaining and enumerating the factors which gave rise to such a finding, would not be sufficient discharge of that duty by the detaining officer. 19. In the circumstances, this Court would have to look at the question of whether the detention order had been passed after considering the likelihood of the release of the detenue from judicial custody or whether it has been passed without taking this factor into account. 20. Paragraph 17 of the counter affidavit filed by the 2nd respondent would show that the detenue was granted bail in the above four cases on the following dates. Sl.No. Crime No. Date of bail granted 1. Crime No.214/2023 02.08.2023 2. Crime No.210/2023 15.07.2023 3. Crime No.653/2023 19.07.2023 4. Crime No.212/2023 24.07.2023 21. However, no details have been given as to when the applications for bail had been moved before the respective Magistrates. The only mention of the possibility of imminent release of the detenue, in the detention order, reads as follows: “Shaik Mustakin @ Munna, S/o Basha, 21 years, muslim by caste, 23/2 lane, Nallacheruvu, Guntur town. Now residing at Darga Manyam 1st lane, Bommala centre, Guntur town, who is in judicial remand in pursuance of Cr.No. 214/2023 of Lalapet P.S. and likely to be enlarged on bail in the above four (4) criminal cases shall be detained….” 22. The above finding, without furnishing any details of any pending bail applications or other factors, in the light of the judgement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rekha vs. State of T.N., and Champion R. Sangma vs. State of Meghalaya and Anr., can only be treated as a mere ipse dixit of the detaining officer and cannot be sustained. Consequently, the order of detention passed on 14.07.2023 and the subsequent proceedings cannot sustain and have to be set aside. In the light of the above finding, there would be no need for this Court to go into the other grounds raised by the petitioner. 23. Consequently, the order of detention passed on 14.07.2023 and the subsequent proceedings cannot sustain and have to be set aside. In the light of the above finding, there would be no need for this Court to go into the other grounds raised by the petitioner. 23. For the above reasons, this Writ petition is allowed and the order of detention, dated 14.07.2023, passed by the 2nd respondent, in R.C.No.55/2023/C4, the confirmation order bearing G.O.Rt.No.1844, dated 19.09.2023 issued by the 1st respondent are set aside and consequently the detenue Shaik Mustakin @ Munna, S/o Basha, 21 years, Muslim by caste, 23/2 lane, Nallacheruvu, Guntur town, now residing at Darga Manyam 1st lane, Bommala Centre, Guntur town, shall be, forthwith, set at liberty, if he is not required in any other case. There shall be no order as to costs. As a sequel pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, in this writ petition shall stand closed.