Joy Deb Gorai, son of Sri Probodh Gorai v. Shambhu Nath Gorai, son of Late Laksmi Narayan Gorai
2024-08-16
SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
body2024
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : Sujit Narayan Prasad, A.C.J. Prayer: 1. The instant petition has been filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against the order dated 16.02.2023 passed in Misc. Civil Application No. 370 of 2022 corresponding to Original Suit No. 230 of 2022, whereby and whereunder, the petition dated 16.08.2022 filed under Order I Rule 10(2) read with Section 151 of CPC has been allowed. Facts: 2. The brief facts of the case, required to be referred herein, is as follows: The petitioner instituted suit for a declaration of right, title and interest and recovery of possession as also for a decree of perpetual injunction stating inter alia that the suit property situated in mouza Kapasara, Mouza No. 255, Khata No. 60, Plot No. 315, Area 6 decimals belong to Prabodh Chandra Gorai, who purchased the aforesaid property vide registered deed of sale being deed no. 11947 dated 14.07.1965. The said Prabodh Chandra Gorai died leaving behind the plaintiff as legal heir and successor. The part of the aforesaid property has been forcefully occupied by the defendants, as such, notices were issued to the defendants, however, despite service of notice no defendant is appeared in the suit. During pendency of the suit, the intervenor, i.e., respondent 1st set filed a petition under Order I Rule 10(2) of CPC dated 16.08.2022 stating that the intervenor purchased the disputed property from the father of the plaintiff by virtue of registered sale deed being deed no.1858 dated 27.02.1981. The intervenor further stated that the defendant no.1 was inducted as a tenant by the intervenor on 01.01.2019 on a monthly rent of Rs.800/-and the defendant no.2’s deceased husband was the tenant of the intervenor since 2002 and after his death, defendant no.2 entered into a fresh agreement for tenancy on 24.01.2020 on a monthly rent of Rs.1000/-per month. The defendant no. 3 was also a tenant who vacated the premises on 09.08.2022. The intervenor therefore prayed to be impleaded as defendant no. 4 in the suit. The petitioner filed an objection-cum-rejoinder dated 07.11.2022 to the aforesaid petition stating inter alia that the averments made in the application for intervention is false and frivolous, which is evident from the fact that the alleged registered deed being deed no. 1858 dated 27.02.1981 is void ab initio as the purchaser was just nine years old at the relevant time and he was a minor.
1858 dated 27.02.1981 is void ab initio as the purchaser was just nine years old at the relevant time and he was a minor. The petitioner further stated that no such sale deed was ever executed by the father of the petitioner. The petitioner further disputed the rent agreement dated 11.08.2022 as the same was manufactured and created after institution of the suit on 26.05.2022. It is the case of the petitioner that the learned court below without taking into consideration the aforesaid facts and circumstances, has allowed the petition of the intervenor vide order dated 16.02.2023, which is under challenge in this petition. 3. It is evident from the factual aspect that a suit for declaration of right and title over the land in question, thereafter, a petition has been filed on 16.08.2022 on behalf of the respondent no.1, namely, Shambhu Nath Gorai, for impleadment as party as per the provision made under Order I Rule 10(2) of CPC on the ground that he claims the ownership over the property by virtue of registered sale deed being deed no. 1858 dated 27.02.1981. Further, he also claims possession over the scheduled land since then. He has further claimed that the tenants in the scheduled property who are the tenants are the current tenant of the petitioner. Objection has been filed on behalf of the plaintiff on 07.11.2022 wherein inter alia ground has been taken regarding its maintainability as also the prayer which has been sought for for impleadment which is based upon two deeds, one being deed no. 1858 dated 27.02.1981 and another being adoption deed no. 161 dated 19.12.1988 which according to the plaintiff, the petitioner herein, are ab initio void reason being that the purchaser was a minor boy of nine years and secondly there is no signature of the vendor. The learned trial court, after taking into consideration the rival submissions, has allowed the said petition against which the present petition has been filed. The learned trial court has taken into consideration the necessity of the impleadment of the applicant to the suit based upon the documents, i.e., registered sale deed being deed no. 1858 dated 27.02.1981 and adoption deed no. 161 dated 19.12.1988 which is under challenged in this petition. Argument on behalf of the Petitioner: 4. Mr.
The learned trial court has taken into consideration the necessity of the impleadment of the applicant to the suit based upon the documents, i.e., registered sale deed being deed no. 1858 dated 27.02.1981 and adoption deed no. 161 dated 19.12.1988 which is under challenged in this petition. Argument on behalf of the Petitioner: 4. Mr. Rohitashya Roy, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the order impugned dated 16.02.2023 suffers from patent illegality. Such submission has been made based upon the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Mumbai International Airport Private Limited vs. Regency Convention Centre and Hotels Private Limited and Ors., (2010) 7 SCC 417 wherein ratio has been laid down with respect to general rule in regard to impleadment of parties that the plaintiff in a suit, being dominus litis, may choose the persons against whom he wishes to litigate and cannot be compelled to sue a person against whom he does not seek any relief. 5. It has been contended that here, in the present case also the plaintiff, the petitioner herein, is not seeking any relief against the applicant, the respondent no.1 rather contesting against the defendants who are the respondent nos.2 to 4 in the present petition, therefore, applying the principle of dominus litis, the respondent no.1 is not a necessary party but without taking into consideration the aforesaid fact, the petition has been allowed, hence, the same is not sustainable in the eyes of law. Analysis: 6. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and gone across the finding recorded by the learned trial court in the impugned order. 7. The issue which has been raised with respect to scrutinizing the propriety of the order passed by the learned trial court, whereby and whereunder, the relief sought for for impleadment by filing application under Order I Rule 10(2) of CPC has been allowed. 8. The question of dominus litis has been taken by advancing the argument that it is the wish of the plaintiff to implead a party to whom the plaintiff wants to contest. 9. It is evident from paragraph-13 of the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Mumbai International Airport Private Limited vs. Regency Convention Centre and Hotels Private Limited and Ors.
9. It is evident from paragraph-13 of the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Mumbai International Airport Private Limited vs. Regency Convention Centre and Hotels Private Limited and Ors. (supra), wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has laid down the proposition which is general that it is the wish of the plaintiff to implead a party against whom the plaintiff wants to contest but in the said paragraph itself, the observation has been made that the said general rule will be subject to exception as has been carved out by considering the implication of Order I Rule 10(2) of CPC. For ready reference, paragraph-13 is being referred as under: “13. The general rule in regard to impleadment of parties is that the plaintiff in a suit, being dominus litis, may choose the persons against whom he wishes to litigate and cannot be compelled to sue a person against whom he does not seek any relief. Consequently, a person who is not a party has no right to be impleaded against the wishes of the plaintiff. But this general rule is subject to the provisions of Order 1 Rule 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure (“the Code”, for short), which provides for impleadment of proper or necessary parties. The said sub-rule is extracted below: “10. (2) Court may strike out or add parties.—The court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be struck out, and that the name of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the court may be necessary in order to enable the court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added.”” 10. It further needs to refer herein that the Hon'ble Apex Court has also interpreted the meaning of necessary party as under paragraph-15 wherein it has been observed that a “necessary party” is a person who ought to have been joined as a party and in whose absence no effective decree could be passed at all by the court. If a “necessary party” is not impleaded, the suit itself is liable to be dismissed.
If a “necessary party” is not impleaded, the suit itself is liable to be dismissed. A “proper party” is a party who, though not a necessary party, is a person whose presence would enable the court to completely, effectively and adequately adjudicate upon all matters in dispute in the suit, though he need not be a person in favour of or against whom the decree is to be made. If a person is not found to be a proper or necessary party, the court has no jurisdiction to implead him, against the wishes of the plaintiff. For ready reference, paragraph-15 is being referred as under: “15. A “necessary party” is a person who ought to have been joined as a party and in whose absence no effective decree could be passed at all by the court. If a “necessary party” is not impleaded, the suit itself is liable to be dismissed. A “proper party” is a party who, though not a necessary party, is a person whose presence would enable the court to completely, effectively and adequately adjudicate upon all matters in dispute in the suit, though he need not be a person in favour of or against whom the decree is to be made. If a person is not found to be a proper or necessary party, the court has no jurisdiction to implead him, against the wishes of the plaintiff. The fact that a person is likely to secure a right/interest in a suit property, after the suit is decided against the plaintiff, will not make such person a necessary party or a proper party to the suit for specific performance.” Further, paragraph-22 is also required to be referred herein, wherein, the scope and ambit of Order I Rule 10(2) of CPC has been taken into consideration. It has been observed that the said sub-rule is not about the right of a non-party to be impleaded as a party, but about the judicial discretion of the court to strike out or add parties at any stage of a proceeding. The discretion under the sub-rule can be exercised either suo motu or on the application of the plaintiff or the defendant, or on an application of a person who is not a party to the suit. The court can strike out any party who is improperly joined.
The discretion under the sub-rule can be exercised either suo motu or on the application of the plaintiff or the defendant, or on an application of a person who is not a party to the suit. The court can strike out any party who is improperly joined. The court can add anyone as a plaintiff or as a defendant if it finds that he is a necessary party or proper party. Such deletion or addition can be without any conditions or subject to such terms as the court deems fit to impose. In exercising its judicial discretion under Order 1 Rule 10(2) of the Code, the court will of course act according to reason and fair play and not according to whims and caprice. For ready reference, paragraph-22 is being referred as under: “22. Let us consider the scope and ambit of Order 1 Rule 10(2) CPC regarding striking out or adding parties. The said sub-rule is not about the right of a non-party to be impleaded as a party, but about the judicial discretion of the court to strike out or add parties at any stage of a proceeding. The discretion under the sub-rule can be exercised either suo motu or on the application of the plaintiff or the defendant, or on an application of a person who is not a party to the suit. The court can strike out any party who is improperly joined. The court can add anyone as a plaintiff or as a defendant if it finds that he is a necessary party or proper party. Such deletion or addition can be without any conditions or subject to such terms as the court deems fit to impose. In exercising its judicial discretion under Order 1 Rule 10(2) of the Code, the court will of course act according to reason and fair play and not according to whims and caprice. 11. Coming to the factual aspect based upon which the ratio has been examined on the analogy given as under paragraph-24 thereof, wherefrom it is evident that the said case was on the backdrop of the fact that if the owner of a tenanted property enters into an agreement for sale of such property without physical possession, in a suit for specific performance by the purchaser, the tenant would not be a necessary party.
But if the suit for specific performance is filed with an additional prayer for delivery of physical possession from the tenant in possession, then the tenant will be a necessary party insofar as the prayer for actual possession. If a person makes an application for being impleaded contending that he is a necessary party, and if the court finds that he is a necessary party, it can implead him. If the plaintiff opposes such impleadment, then instead of impleading such a party, who is found to be a necessary party, the court may proceed to dismiss the suit by holding that the applicant was a necessary party and in his absence the plaintiff was not entitled to any relief in the suit. 12. It is, thus, evident from the aforesaid discussion made by the Hon'ble Apex Court about the implication of the provision as contained under Order I Rule 10(2) of CPC that the discretion lies with the court to implead a party but that will not be based upon the whims and wish of the concerned court rather the discretion is to be applied with all rationality, i.e., if the court comes to the conclusion that the impleadment of such a party is necessary for effective adjudication of the case then the impleadment is required to be there. 13. This Court, based upon the aforesaid proposition and adverting to the factual aspect of the present case, wherein it is the admitted fact that in a declaratory suit which has been set at motion by the plaintiff, the petitioner herein, which is for declaration of right and title over the suit property situated in mouza Kapasara, Mouza No. 255, Khata No. 60, Plot No. 315, Area 6 decimals, the same has been claimed by the respondent no.1 based upon the registered sale deed being deed no. 1858 dated 27.02.1981 and adoption deed no. 161 dated 19.12.1988. 14. The learned trial court by making reference of the implication of the provision as contained under Order I Rule 10(2) of CPC and being conscious with its implication has made an observation in the impugned order that although the applicant is a third party claiming that he has purchased the suit land from the father of the plaintiff and he is in peaceful possession of the suit land.
The ground has also been taken that the premise has been let out by him and the tenants are his tenants. 15. The learned trial court has considered that the principle for impleading a third party is avoidance of multiplicity of proceeding and hence, the court has no jurisdiction to add a party, unless it is a necessary party or proper party. The ‘necessary party’ has also been taken into consideration and based upon that, the petition filed under Order I Rule 10(2) of CPC has been allowed. 16. This Court has considered the implication/purport of the Order I Rule 10(2) of CPC as has been discussed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Mumbai International Airport Private Limited vs. Regency Convention Centre and Hotels Private Limited and Ors. (supra), and has also considered the finding so recorded by the learned trial court wherein the petition filed under Order I Rule 10(2) of CPC has been allowed based upon the application filed by the respondent no.1 claiming his title based upon the registered sale deed being deed no. 1858 dated 27.02.1981 and adoption deed no. 161 dated 19.12.1988 as also based upon that, the possession over the land in question has been claimed. 17. If such application would not have been allowed then the question would be that the requirement for the respondent no.1 will be to file a separate suit and, in that circumstances, there will be chances of two conflicting decree and further the respondent no.1 will be deprived from the legitimate right to contest the suit for the purpose to establish his right to have a title over the along with the possession. 18. This Court is exercising the power conferred under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and it is the settled position of law regarding the jurisdiction which is to be exercised by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India as has been settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Shalini Shyam Shetty Vrs. Rajendra Shankar Patii, reported in (2010) 8 SCC 329 has been pleased to laid down therein regarding the scope of Article 227 which relates to the supervisory powers of the High Courts and by taking aid of the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Full Bench of Calcutta High Court in the case of Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. Vrs.
Rajendra Shankar Patii, reported in (2010) 8 SCC 329 has been pleased to laid down therein regarding the scope of Article 227 which relates to the supervisory powers of the High Courts and by taking aid of the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Full Bench of Calcutta High Court in the case of Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. Vrs. Sukumar Mukherjee, reported in AIR 1951 Calcutta 193, wherein it has been laid down that Article 227 of the Constitution of India does not vest the High Court with limitless power which may be exercised at the court’s discretion to remove the hardship of particular decisions. The power of superintendence confers power of a known and well recognized character and should be exercised on those judicial principles which give it its character. In general words, the High Court’s power of superintendence is a power to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of the authority, to see that they do what their duty requires and that they do it in a legal manner. 19. The power of superintendence is not to be exercised unless there has been; (a) An unwarranted assumption of jurisdiction, not vested in a court or tribunal; or (b) gross abuse of jurisdiction; or (c) an unjustifiable refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in courts or tribunals. 20. Further, in the aforesaid judgment the Hon’ble Apex Court has taken aid of a judgment rendered in the case of Mani Nariman Daruwala Vrs. Phiroz N. Bhatena, reported in (1991) 3 SCC 141 wherein it has been laid down that in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227, the High Court can set aside or reverse finding of an inferior court or tribunal only in a case where there is no evidence or where no reasonable person could possibly have come to the conclusion which the court or tribunal has come to. 21. The Hon’ble Apex Court has made it clear that except to this limited extent the High court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the finding of facts. 22. Further, the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Laxmikant Revchand Bhojwani Vrs. Pratapsing Mohansingh Pardeshi, reported in (1995) 6 SCC 576 it has been laid down that the High Court under Article 227 cannot assume unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong decisions.
22. Further, the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Laxmikant Revchand Bhojwani Vrs. Pratapsing Mohansingh Pardeshi, reported in (1995) 6 SCC 576 it has been laid down that the High Court under Article 227 cannot assume unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong decisions. Its exercise must be restricted to grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law and justice. 23. Although while exercising the power conferred under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, least interference is to be given of the order passed by the competent court of civil jurisdiction and as such, the interference can only be made if there is manifest error available on the face of the order. Conclusion: 24. This Court, applying the said principle and based upon the aforesaid discussion, is of the view that the impugned order needs no interference. 25. Accordingly, the instant civil miscellaneous petition is, hereby, dismissed. 26. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.