JUDGMENT : PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI, J. 1. This criminal revision under Sections 379/401 Cr.P.C. has been preferred by the petitioner (complainant), claiming the following reliefs: “It is therefore, most humbly and respectfully prayed that the revision petition of the petitioner may kindly be allowed and judgment passed by the learned trial Court be set aside and direct to the learned trial Court to pass appropriate order according to law in the facts and circumstances of the case.” 2. The matter pertains to an incident which had occurred in the year 2007 and the present revision petition has been pending since the year 2009. 3. By way of the instant revision petition, the petitioner-complainant laid a challenge to the judgment dated 25.08.2008 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track) No. 2, Jodhpur in Sessions Case 3/2008 (State of Rajasthan Vs. Smt. Gendu Kanwar & Anr.) whereby the accused-respondents-Gendu Kanwar & Tej Singh have been acquitted under Section 120-B & 302 IPC (Smt. Gendu Kanwar) and 120-B IPC & 302 IPC read with Section 120-B IPC (Tej Singh). 4. Brief facts of the case, as placed before this Court by learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner (complainant), are that the petitioner-complainant-Inder Singh submitted a written complaint before the Police Station, Bhopalgarh, District Jodhpur, stating therein that his daughter-Bhawan Kanwar (deceased) was married to accused-respondent-Tej Singh, whereafter, on 20.04.2007, Sonu-daughter of deceased (grand daughter - Dohiti - of complainant) informed over the phone to complainant’s son-Lokpal that the deceased was burnt, and she was admitted in the Mahatma Gandhi Hospital, whereupon the complainant came from Bikaner to Jodhpur; thereafter, reached to the hospital and the deceased told she was burnt by her sister-in-law (Jethani). 4.1. On the next day i.e. 21.04.2007 at around 7:00 a.m., the complainant’s daughter died; he further stated that Sonu told him that deceased’s sister-in-law (Jethani) indulged into a fight with the deceased, during course of which, she (Jethani) had burnt the deceased. 4.2. On the basis of the aforementioned written information (Ex.P/1) given by the complainant, an FIR (Ex.P/12) dated 26.05.2007 was registered at Police Station, Bhopalgarh, District Jodhpur for the offence under Section 302 IPC, and the investigation accordingly commenced. 5. 4.2. On the basis of the aforementioned written information (Ex.P/1) given by the complainant, an FIR (Ex.P/12) dated 26.05.2007 was registered at Police Station, Bhopalgarh, District Jodhpur for the offence under Section 302 IPC, and the investigation accordingly commenced. 5. The learned Trial Court framed the charges under Sections 302 alongwith 120-B & 120-B IPC against the accused-respondents, which were read over to the accused-respondents; the same were denied by the accused-respondents, and they sought due trial, and the trial accordingly commenced thereafter before the learned Trial Court. 6. During the course of trial, the evidence of 10 prosecution witnesses were recorded and 13 documents were exhibited on behalf of the prosecution, and one witness was examined as Court witness (CW-1) whereas, the accused-respondents in support of defence produced total of 1 witness as well as 9 documents were exhibited in defence; whereafter, the accused-respondents were examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C., in which they pleaded innocence and their false implication in the criminal case in question. 7. Thereafter, upon hearing the contentions of both the parties as well as considering the material and evidence placed on record, the learned Trial Court passed the impugned judgment of acquittal dated 25.08.2008 as above, against which the present revision, has been preferred on behalf of the Complainant. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner (complainant) submits that the evidence rendered by PW-1, PW-2, PW-3 & PW-5, are in corroboration with each other and the same fully support the prosecution story. 8.1. Learned counsel further submits that the prosecution witnesses categorically stated that accused-respondent-Gendu Kanwar had illicit relationship with the husband of the deceased i.e. accused-respondent-Tej Singh, and therefore, she burnt the deceased, which resulted into her death. Learned counsel also submits that all the evidence oral as well as documentary so as also the medical evidence fully support the prosecution story. 8.2. Learned counsel also submits that the delay in registration of the FIR is not fatal to the prosecution case, in the given circumstances, and therefore, the learned Trial Court was not justified in passing the impugned judgment of acquittal. 9. On the other hand, learned Public Prosecutor opposed the revision petition. 10. Heard learned counsel for the parties as well as perused the record of the case. 11. This Court observes that the petitioner-complainant has challenged the impugned judgment dated 25.08.2008, whereby the accused-respondents have been acquitted by the learned Trial Court. 9. On the other hand, learned Public Prosecutor opposed the revision petition. 10. Heard learned counsel for the parties as well as perused the record of the case. 11. This Court observes that the petitioner-complainant has challenged the impugned judgment dated 25.08.2008, whereby the accused-respondents have been acquitted by the learned Trial Court. 12. This Court further observes that as per the statement of PW-5-Sonu (daughter of deceased), aged 13 years, at the time of the incident in question, when she heard the sound of blast, she came home and saw her mother burning, and said that her sister-in-law (accused respondent) burnt her. PW-5 also stated that when she reached home, at that time, 4-5 persons were putting her mother (deceased) in a jeep to take her to hospital, which clearly shows contradiction in the statements of the said witness. 12.1. PW-5 also stated that thereafter, she went to the neighbour’s house and called her father (accused-respondent-Tej Singh) and her maternal uncle (Mama)-PW-1-Lokpal, the house of her Aunt (Mausi) is her about 10 feet but despite of that the PW-5 called from neighbor house, which is very informal and not reliable. 13. This Court also observes that PW- 2-Gajendra Singh, stated that when he met the deceased in the hospital, he was told by the deceased that accused-respondent-Gendu Kanwar burnt her, but the information whereof was not given by the said witness to the Police Chauki, situated in Mahatma Gandhi, Hospital and not even to doctor of the hospital. Therefore, the credibility of such deposition is doubtful on the face of it. 14. This Court further observes that as per statement of PW-4, he was the first person to reach the place of incident, and that, he clearly stated that PW-5-Sonu came at the time when the deceased was about to be taken to the hospital in the jeep. Therefore, such contradictions in the depositions made by PW- 4 and PW-5 render the same doubtful. 15. This Court also observes that as per PW-9 -Dr. Suryaprakash Sharma, when the deceased was brought to the hospital, at that time, she was unconscious, and remained in the said state till she breathed her last, thus, was not in the position to give any statement. 15. This Court also observes that as per PW-9 -Dr. Suryaprakash Sharma, when the deceased was brought to the hospital, at that time, she was unconscious, and remained in the said state till she breathed her last, thus, was not in the position to give any statement. This Court further observes that C.W.1-Malukaram-A.S.I. Police Station, Bhopalgarh stated in her statement that the deceased was not in position to give any statement at the time of treatment and he further stated that he informed Lokpal (brother of deceased) and Inder Singh (father of deceased) to file complaint regarding the incident in question, but they showed no suspicion about the culpability of anyone in connection with the incident in question. 15.1. This Court also observes that PW-5-Sonu gave information of the incident in question to Lokpal (brother of deceased) through phone, to the effect that accused-respondent/Gendu Kanwar burnt the deceased, but the incident in question was not reported either to C.W.-1 or any other police authority, and therefore, also in view of the statements of PW- 9 and C.W.1, the prosecution story cannot be said to be worthy of being believed. 16. This Court further observes that during the entire ceremony of the death of deceased, the complete family i.e. the complainant party and the accused-respondents, alongwith other family members, were very much present, but after 35 days of the incident in question, the FIR was registered after an inordinate delay without any sufficient explanation therefor. This Court also observes that there is series of the contradictions at each and every stage of the proceedings, which casts a shadow of doubt on the prosecution story, and therefore, the learned Trial Court had rightly acquitted the accused-respondents vide the impugned judgment dated 25.08.2008. 17. At, this juncture, this Court deems it appropriate to reproduce the relevant portions of the judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the cases of Mallappa & Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 1162/2011, decided on 12.02.2024) and Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 985/2010, decided on 19.04.2024), as hereunder: Mallappa & Ors. (Supra): “36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. Vs. State of Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 985/2010, decided on 19.04.2024), as hereunder: Mallappa & Ors. (Supra): “36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. The principles which come into play while deciding an appeal from acquittal could be summarized as: (i) Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a criminal trial and such appreciation must be comprehensive – inclusive of all evidence, oral or documentary. (ii) Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may result in a miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground of challenge. (iii) If the Court, after appreciation of evidence, finds that two views are possible, the one in favour of the accused shall ordinarily be followed. (iv) If the view of the Trial Court is a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal. (v) If the appellate Court is inclined to reverse the acquittal in appeal on a re-appreciation of evidence, it must specifically address all the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal and must cover all the facts. (vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the appellate Court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in the decision of the Trial Court. Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Ors. (Supra): 38. Further, in the case of H.D. Sundara & Ors. vs. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581 this Court summarized the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of CrPC as follows: “8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence: 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to re-appreciate the oral and documentary evidence. 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after re-appreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible. 8.5. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible. 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 39. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate Court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial Court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: (a) That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity. (b) That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record. (c) That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record. 17.1. This Court also considers it appropriate to reproduce the relevant portion of the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of this Hon’ble Court in the case of State of Rajasthan Vs. Shiv Narayan & Ors. (D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 250/1992, decided on 13.12.2022), as hereunder: “In Yogesh Singh Vs. Mahabeer Singh and Ors. AIR 2016 SC 5160 , Hon’ble the Supreme Court held that one of the golden threads which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if there are two perspectives arising from the evidence adduced in a matter, one inclining towards the guilt of the accused and another inclining towards the innocence of the accused, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. In a recent judgment dated 28th July, 2022 passed in Criminal Appeal No. 2119 of 2010 titled State of Rajasthan Vs. Kistoora Ram, the Apex Court has held that the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal is limited unless the view taken by Court is impossible or perverse. It was opined that if two views are possible, then the order of acquittal cannot be discarded only because the Appellate Court is of the view that conviction is more probable. Kistoora Ram, the Apex Court has held that the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal is limited unless the view taken by Court is impossible or perverse. It was opined that if two views are possible, then the order of acquittal cannot be discarded only because the Appellate Court is of the view that conviction is more probable. The order of acquittal would warrant interference only when the view taken by the lower court is not possible at all. In light of the above observations and considering the arguments advanced at the bar, this Court does not find any room for interference in the order passed by the learned trial Court. The story of the prosecution is not found proved beyond reasonable doubt and the plea of the accused regarding right to private defense is found to be reasonable and worth accepting.” 18. This Court also observes that the learned Trial Court passed the impugned judgment of acquittal of the accused-respondents under Section 120-B & 302 IPC (Smt. Gendu Kanwar) and 120-B IPC & 302 IPC read with Section 120-B IPC (Tej Singh), which in the given circumstances, is justified in law, because as per the settled principle of law as laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforementioned judgments, particularly in category of VI, to the effect that the judgment of the Trial Court can be reversed by the Appellate Court only when it demonstrates an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in arriving at such decision; but in the present case, the learned Trial Court, before passing the impugned judgment, examined each and every witnesses at a considerable length and duly analyzed the documents produced before it, coupled with examination of the oral as well as documentary evidence, and thus, the impugned judgment suffers from no perversity or error of law or fact, so as to warrant any interference by this Court in the instant revision petition. 19. 19. This Court further observes that the scope of interference in the acquittal order passed by the learned Trial Court is very limited, and if the impugned judgment of the learned Trial Court demonstrates a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal as held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in aforementioned judgment, and thus, on that count also, the impugned judgment deserves no interference by this Court in the instant revision petition. 20. Thus, in light of the aforesaid observations and looking into the factual matrix of the present case as well as in light of the aforementioned precedent laws, this Court does not find it a fit case warranting any interference by this Court in the impugned judgment of acquittal passed by the learned Trial Court. 21. Consequently, the present revision petition is dismissed. All pending applications stand disposed of. Record of the learned Trial Court be sent back forthwith.