JUDGMENT : 1. This second appeal, under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, filed by the appellant – original plaintiff No.1, arises from the impugned judgment and decree dated 07.07.2021 passed by the learned Principal District Judge, Sabarkantha at Himmatnagar in Regular Civil Appeal No.62 of 2012, confirming the judgment and decree dated 01.08.2011 passed by the learned Additional Civil Judge, Himmatnagar in Regular Civil Suit No.260 of 1997 dismissing the suit. 2. The brief facts of the present case are as under : 2.1 The original plaintiffs, being the representatives of village Hamirgarh, have filed a suit being Regular Civil Suit No.260 of 1997 for declaration and permanent injunction before the learned trial Court. The said suit was instituted under Section 91 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, ‘the CPC’), with the permission of the Court. The prayers, sought for in the suit, in paragraph 9, are as under (as recorded by the learned appellate Court at internal page 12 of the judgment) : “9(a) To declare that the villagers of Hamirgadh do have easement rights over the suit land and villagers of Hamirgadh are enjoying various easementary rights as mentioned in paragraph 5 (as mentioned above) of the plaint since establishment of village. (b) To declare that the defendants do not have any right or interest in the suit land as suit land is Government waste forest land, therefore, trees of berries and other forest products in the land are situated. Defendants do not give to another persons by contract or in any other way whether has give it to Rabari or Bharwad or someone else for grazing of sheep and goats and other livestock except the people of Hamirgadh. Further, the defendants do not have right to make construction work or to enter the suit land for any other purpose. Defendants do not give to another persons by contract or in any other way whether has give it to Rabari or Bharwad or someone else for grazing of sheep and goats and other livestock except the people of Hamirgadh. Further, the defendants do not have right to make construction work or to enter the suit land for any other purpose. (c) To permanently restrain the defendant that the defendant themselves or their man or agents and servants do not interfere in nay manner in enjoyment of easement rights people of Hamirgadh as mentioned in paragraph 5 nos.1 to 12 of the plaint as well as trees of berries and other forest products in the land, defendants do not give to another person as contract or by any other way as well as give it to Rabari – Bharwad or someone else for grazing to sheep and goats and other livestocks.” 2.2 The learned trial Court has, after considering the various evidence – documentary as well as oral, framed the issues at Exh.30 and decided it accordingly and thereby partly allowed the suit to the extent granting permanent injunction, restraining the respondents not to obstruct the public of Hamirgarh from grazing their cattle and from collecting the dry wood for fuel, and the other prayers of the plaintiffs have been rejected. 2.3 Being aggrieved, only plaintiff No.1 has preferred an appeal being Regular Civil Appeal No.62 of 2012 before the learned appellate Court, qua the prayers which were not granted by the learned trial Court. The learned appellate Court below has framed the points for its determination and decided it accordingly. After considering the rival submissions of the parties and also after evaluating the evidence on record, the learned appellate Court below has dismissed the appeal, on merit and confirmed the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court. 2.4 It is these judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below, which are challenged in this second appeal by the appellants – original plaintiffs before this Court. 3.1 Learned advocate Mr.Japee for the appellant has submitted that the learned Courts below have not granted various easementary rights as enumerated in the plaint, which subsists over the land in question. He has submitted that there is a way to go to other villages, crematorium, lake, temples, ukerdas, vanddas and several public amenities on the land in question. 3.1 Learned advocate Mr.Japee for the appellant has submitted that the learned Courts below have not granted various easementary rights as enumerated in the plaint, which subsists over the land in question. He has submitted that there is a way to go to other villages, crematorium, lake, temples, ukerdas, vanddas and several public amenities on the land in question. He has submitted that the learned Courts below have permitted the defendants to deprive the village people of the said public amenities which they have been enjoying for last many years. 3.2 He has further submitted that the legally crystallized rights of the village people of grazing the cattle and taking the wood for the fuel upheld by the Courts below are defeated and frustrated. He has submitted that if the defendants are allowed to raise the construction or utilize the land for any other purpose or to give the land by contact for grazing to other persons or to give the trees and forest produce to any persons or to give the trees and forest produce to any persons, then the undisputed right of the village people to graze their cattle upon the suit land stands defeated. 3.3 He has also submitted that since the Mamlatdar had passed the order under Section 37(2) of the Bombay Land Revenue Code recognizing the rights of the village people to graze the cattle and take the wood for fuel from the suit land, no other right can be given to the village people over the suit land. He has submitted that before the Mamlatdar, the village people were not the parties. He has submitted that it was a matter between the erstwhile Jagirdar and the Government regarding the right of ownership over the land. He has submitted that the village people had no locus to either contest the said proceeding or to challenge any order passed in the said proceeding. He has submitted that therefore, it cannot be said that merely because the Mamlatdar had in the said proceeding recognized the right of the village people to graze the cattle and to take the wood for fuel, it does not mean that the village people cannot claim any other right at any point of time. He has submitted that therefore, it cannot be said that merely because the Mamlatdar had in the said proceeding recognized the right of the village people to graze the cattle and to take the wood for fuel, it does not mean that the village people cannot claim any other right at any point of time. 3.4 He has also submitted that the plaintiffs have made various allegations in the suit regarding the obstruction, danger or threat to the easementary rights of the plaintiffs on the suit land, which is completely ignored by the learned Courts below. He has further submitted that the defendants cannot exercise their ownership rights in the suit land in such a manner so as to obstruct the rights of the village people to utilize the public amenities in the land which they are enjoying since the inception of the village Hamirgarh. He has submitted that the original defendants were threatening and obstructing the plaintiffs in enjoying their rights in the suit land, which can be seen from the proceedings of another suit as the defendants have sold the land to the other parties and the suit for setting aside the sale deed is filed. 3.5 He has also submitted that the title of the original defendants in the suit land is subject to the rights of the village people to graze the cattle and take the wood for fuel and also subject to various public amenities like way, crematorium, temples, lake, vadas and ukerdas, etc. The defendants cannot create any third party interest in the suit land so as to defeat the aforesaid rights of the village people. Therefore, the original defendants cannot give any part of the land on contract to third parties for grazing, for taking forest produce and they cannot raise any construction thereon. He has also submitted that since the village people have right to graze their cattle in the land, it is virtually a Gauchar land, which cannot be utilized for any other purpose. 3.6 He has suggested the following substantial questions of law for determination of this Court in this appeal : (i) Whether or not in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Courts below are justified in not granting the relies claimed in the suit which as a consequence would render the reliefs granted in the suit nugatory ? 3.6 He has suggested the following substantial questions of law for determination of this Court in this appeal : (i) Whether or not in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Courts below are justified in not granting the relies claimed in the suit which as a consequence would render the reliefs granted in the suit nugatory ? (ii) Whether or not in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Courts below are justified in not recognizing the rights of the village people to enjoy various public amenities existing upon the suit land which the village people have been enjoying since many years ? (iii) Whether or not in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Courts below are justified in allowing the original defendants to create the third-party interest in the suit land which would defeat and frustrate the legally crystallized undisputed rights of the village people to graze the cattle and take the wood for fuel which are upheld by the Courts below ? (iv) Whether or not in the facts and circumstances of the case, the judgments and orders passed by the Courts below are bad in law, arbitrary, erroneous, contrary to the evidence on record and also contrary to the settled principles of law? 3.7 He has submitted that this appeal may be allowed. 4.1 I have heard the submissions made by learned advocate Mr. Japee for the appellants. I have considered the various documents available on record. I have perused the impugned judgments passed by both the learned Courts below. 4.2 Before evaluating the findings recorded by both the learned Courts below, a few undisputed facts, which are emerged from the pleadings / record, are required to be noted here, which are as under : - The plaintiffs were the residents of village : Hamirgarh, District : Sabarkantha. - The defendants are the legal heirs of erstwhile Jagirdar and administrator of the lands in question since the inception of village : Hamirgarh. - The lands in question consist of new Revenue Survey Nos. 7, 21, 115, 211, 237 and 256 (old Revenue Survey Nos. 13, 15, 22, 32/1, 168 and 303, respectively) (for short ‘the lands in question’). - The plaintiffs are not the owners of the lands in question. - There were revenue litigation between the Government and the forefathers of the defendants. 7, 21, 115, 211, 237 and 256 (old Revenue Survey Nos. 13, 15, 22, 32/1, 168 and 303, respectively) (for short ‘the lands in question’). - The plaintiffs are not the owners of the lands in question. - There were revenue litigation between the Government and the forefathers of the defendants. - Ultimately, it was held by the Authority that the lands in question do not belong to the Government and had directed to mutate the revenue entry in the name of the forefathers of the defendants vide order dated 01.08.1954. It was further held that the village people of Hamirgarh have the right to graze their cattle and also to take dry wood for the fuel from the lands in question. - The said order is confirmed by the Collector and no one has challenged the same before any higher forum till today. Therefore, it has attained the finality. - From the inception, the village people have been grazing their cattle and have been taking the dry wood for fuel from the lands in question. - The suit was instituted by six village persons, by getting permission of the learned trial Court under Section 91 of the CPC. - Before the learned appellate Court below, only original plaintiff No.1 has filed the appeal, who is present appellant. - They were the representatives of the village, but the suit was not filed under Order I Rule 8(2) of the CPC. - Apparently, the suit was for easementary rights and not for restraining the defendants from any illegal activities. - There was no such prayer except easementary rights. 4.3.1 The learned trial Court has, after considering the various evidence – documentary as well as oral on record at Exh.47, 132, 48, 51 to 82, 108 to 199, 185, 233, 186 to 221 and 237 to 240, framed the following issues at Exh.30 for its determination and decided it accordingly, which are as under : “(i) Whether the plaintiffs prove that the people of village Hamirgarh has right to enjoy the various easementary rights on the lands in question ? (In the partially Positive) (ii) Whether the plaintiffs prove that there is no right of the defendants qua the lands in question ? (In the Negative) (iii) What order and decree ? (In the partially Positive) (ii) Whether the plaintiffs prove that there is no right of the defendants qua the lands in question ? (In the Negative) (iii) What order and decree ? (As per final order).” 4.3.2 From the record, this Court finds that the learned trial Court, while partially allowing the suit to the extent granting permanent injunction, restraining the respondents not to obstruct the public of Hamirgarh from grazing their cattle and from collecting the dry wood for fuel, and the other prayers of the plaintiffs have been rejected. The learned trial Court has specifically observed that the plaintiffs are failed to prove that the defendants are the formal occupation of the lands in question and the defendants are obstructing the public of village Hamirgarh in grazing their cattle. 4.3.3 The learned trial Court has also specifically observed that the plaintiffs have not come with the clean hands before it. Further, the learned trial Court has also observed that the cause of action, as mentioned in the suit at paragraph 7, is not clear and is not in consonance with the prayers, as prayed for in the suit by the plaintiffs and therefore, the learned trial Court has rejected other prayers of the plaintiffs as prayed for in the suit. 4.3.4 The learned trial Court has further observed that the suit is filed in the capacity of representatives of the village people – Hamirgarh, with the permission of the Court under Section 91 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short the CPC’). At this stage, it would be fruitful to refer to the provisions of Section 91 of the CPC, which is as under : “91. Public nuisances and other wrongful acts affecting the public.— (1) In the case of a public nuisance or other wrongful act affecting, or likely to affect, the public, a suit for a declaration and injunction or for such other relief as may be appropriate in the circumstances of the case, may be instituted — (a) by the Advocate-General, or (b) with the leave of the Court, by two or more persons, even though no special damage has been caused to such persons by reason of such public nuisance or other wrongful act. (2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect any right of suit which may exist independently of its provisions.” At this stage, it would also be fruitful to refer to the provisions of Order I Rule 8 of the CPC, which is as under : “O. I R. 8 : One person may sue or defend on behalf of all in same interest.— (1) Where there are numerous persons having the same interest in one suit,— (a) one or more of such persons may, with the permission of the Court, sue or be sued, or may defend such suit, on behalf of, or for the benefit of, all persons so interested; (b) the Court may direct that one or more of such persons may sue or be sued, or may defend such suit, on behalf of, or for the benefit of, all persons so interested. (2) The Court shall, in every case where a permission or direction is given under subrule (1), at the plaintiff's expense, give notice of the institution of the suit to all persons so interested, either by personal service, or, where, by reason of the number of persons or any other cause, such service is not reasonably practicable, by public advertisement, as the Court in each case may direct. (3) Any person on whose behalf, or for whose benefit, a suit is instituted, or defended, under sub-rule (1), may apply to the Court to be made a party to such suit. (4) No part of the claim in any such suit shall be abandoned under sub-rule (1), and no such suit shall be withdrawn under subrule (3), of rule 1 of Order XXIII, and no agreement, compromise or satisfaction shall be recorded in any such suit under rule 3 of that Order, unless the Court has given, at the plaintiff's expense, notice to all persons so interested in the manner specified in subrule (2). (5) Where any person suing or defending in any such suit does not proceed with due diligence in the suit or defence, the Court may substitute in his place any other person having the same interest in the suit. (6) A decree passed in a suit under this rule shall be binding on all persons on whose behalf, or for whose benefit, the suit is instituted, or defended, as the case may be. (6) A decree passed in a suit under this rule shall be binding on all persons on whose behalf, or for whose benefit, the suit is instituted, or defended, as the case may be. Explanation.—For the purpose of determining whether the persons who sue or are sued, or defend, have the same interest in one suit, it is not necessary to establish that such persons have the same cause of action as the persons on whose behalf, or for whose benefit, they sue or are sued, or defend the suit, as the case may be. 8A. Power of Court to permit a person or body of persons to present opinion or to take part in the proceedings.— While trying a suit, the Court may, if satisfied that a person or body of persons is interested in any question of law which is directly and substantially in issue in the suit and that it is necessary in the public interest to allow that person or body of persons to present his or its opinion on that question of law, permit that person or body of persons to present such opinion and to take such part in the proceedings of the suit as the Court may specify.” The learned trial Court has specifically observed that the suit is filed by the plaintiffs after taking permission of the Court under Section 91 of the CPC. Section 91 speaks for public nuisances and other wrongful acts affecting the public. The learned trial Court has observed that looking to the prayers made by the plaintiffs, the suit is for easementary rights and not for public nuisances and other wrongful acts affecting the public. If the plaintiff/s wants to file a suit under Section 91 of the CPC, the plaintiff/s has to join the Government as one of the defendants. It is a matter of record that the plaintiffs have filed a suit, with a permission under Section 91 of the CPC against the private defendants only and not joined the Government as party defendants. If they, being the representatives of village people from various castes, want to file a suit as representative suit, they have to give public notice in the newspaper, as per the provisions of Order I Rule 8 of the CPC, which is not the case of the plaintiffs here. If they, being the representatives of village people from various castes, want to file a suit as representative suit, they have to give public notice in the newspaper, as per the provisions of Order I Rule 8 of the CPC, which is not the case of the plaintiffs here. Therefore, on one hand, the plaintiffs have filed a suit under Section 91 of the CPC which speaks for public nuisance which the plaintiffs were not able to prove before the learned trial Court and on the other hand, looking to the prayers, the suit is for easementary rights and in the capacity of representative of public and no advertisement is published as the suit is not filed under Order I Rule 8 of the CPC. The learned trial Court has rejected the suit qua that prayers, which is rightly rejected. 4.3.5 Further, the learned trial Court has rightly observed the discrepancies in the plaint. It is observed that on one hand, the plaintiffs have stated in the plaint that the lands in question are the Government land and on the other hand, the plaintiffs have prayed for getting easementary rights on the lands in question against the defendants. The learned trial Court has observed that the plaintiffs have failed to establish that the lands in question are of the Government land. Whereas, the learned trial Court has observed that the lands in question are of the ownership of the defendants and not the Government. Thus, from the observations of the learned trial Court with regard to this, this Courts finds that the demeanor of the plaintiffs lacks bona fide. 4.3.6 The learned trial Court has rightly considered the evidence – documentary as well as oral on record and partially allowed the suit. 4.4 It is noted that the suit was filed by six plaintiffs. The appeal before the learned appellate Court is filed by one of the plaintiffs only, who is the appellant before this Court. Rest of the plaintiffs have not challenged the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court rejecting some of the prayers. 4.5.1 Looking to the averments made in the appeal, the learned appellate Court below has, after evaluating the various evidence – documentary as well as oral on record, framed the following points for its determination and answered it accordingly. 4.5.1 Looking to the averments made in the appeal, the learned appellate Court below has, after evaluating the various evidence – documentary as well as oral on record, framed the following points for its determination and answered it accordingly. “(i) Whether the appellant proves that the learned trial Court has committed an error in holding that in disputed suit land, the defendants have no rights or interest ? (In the Negative) (ii) Whether reasons recorded by the learned trial Court in holding that the defendants No.1 to 4 having right and interest in the suit property which are perverse, capricious, arbitrary and against the settled principles of law ? (In the Negative) (iii) What order ? (As per final order)” 4.5.2 The learned appellate Court below has observed that after the various revenue proceedings, the revenue authority has passed an order in the year 1986 and thereby name of late Balbhadrasinh Bhopalsinh and their legal heirs were entered into the revenue records. It is also observed that since then, the defendants become the absolute owners of the lands in question. Even the notification of the Forest Department does not alter this situation, which can be seen from the land records as well as by the depositions of the witnesses of the plaintiffs. 4.5.3 Further, the suit is filed under Section 91 of the CPC. Section 91 of the CPC speaks for public nuisance. The learned appellate Court has observed that this is not a case to create a public nuisance by the defendants. It is further observed there merely, based on presumptions, assumptions or apprehension, no one can say that there is a possibility of the creation of nuisance by the defendants. Further, it is also observed that in the suit, no relief is sought to declare the act on the part of the defendant, about nuisance and illegal work by the defendants. 4.5.4 Further, the learned appellate Court below has observed that the plaintiff has sought relief to restrain the defendants and sought the injunction, but as per the provisions of the Specific Relief Act, the plaintiffs have sought the discretionary relief, then person who seek the discretionary relief has to come to Court with a clean hand and should not be guilty of suppression of material facts. Further, the learned appellate Court below has observed that the plaintiffs have failed to establish their legal rights. Further, the learned appellate Court below has observed that the plaintiffs have failed to establish their legal rights. The plaintiffs have failed to fulfill the basic requirement for obtaining an injunction, as no breach or obligation on the part of the defendants and the defendants have not infringed or violated any existing rights of the plaintiffs. 4.5.5 Further the learned appellate Court below has observed that all the plaintiffs have not challenged the entire judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court. Only one plaintiff has challenged the findings partly. 4.6 In view of above, this Court finds that the demeanor of the appellant in the first appeal proceeding as well as in this second appeal speaks a lot. The suit was filed by six village representatives, as averred. The appeal is filed by only one of them and others have not challenged the same. Even before this Court also, the said single appellant before the learned appellate Court below has approached. Looking to the entire record as well as the facts and circumstances of the case, the learned trial Court has rightly balanced the equity. In the suit proceedings, whatever easementary rights the village people enjoyed from the inception of the village Hamirgarh, which are also admitted by the defendants, have been granted by the learned trial Court by way of a permanent injunction. The other rights, which the plaintiffs did not prove, have been rejected by the learned trial Court. The learned appellate Court below rightly confirmed the findings of the learned trial Court. This Court finds that both the learned Courts below have rightly come to the conclusion and passed the impugned judgments and decrees. 4.7 If the suit was instituted by the plaintiffs in capacity of representatives of the village people, without publishing any notice in the newspaper and without joining the Government as party defendants, but with permission under Section 91 of the CPC, that too in absence of any public nuisance, the learned trial Court has rightly and judiciously taken care of the interest of the village people by granting permanent injunction to the extent of grazing the cattle and take dry wood for fuel by the needy. The plaintiffs have prayed for other reliefs, which are impliedly in the nature of private interest. 5. The plaintiffs have prayed for other reliefs, which are impliedly in the nature of private interest. 5. At this stage, it would be fruitful to refer to the provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which reads as under: “[100. Second appeal.—(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any Court subordinate to the High Court, if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. (2) An appeal may lie under this section from an appellate decree passed ex parte. (3) In an appeal under this section, the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the appeal. (4) Where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question. (5) The appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated and the respondent shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be allowed to argue that the case does not involve such question: Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to take away or abridge the power of the Court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law, not formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such question.” 6. It is relevant to refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Gurbachan Singh (Dead) Through Lrs Gurcharan Singh (Dead) Through Lrs and Others., reported in 2023 SCC Online SC 875, more particularly paragraphs 7, 14 and 15 thereof, which read as under : “7. The parameters of an appeal under Section 100, CPC passing muster are well established. The section itself dictates that such an appeal shall only be maintainable when the case involves a substantial question of law or that the appellate decree has been passed ex parte. the latter, obviously is not the case. This court has, in a multitude of decisions, expounded on what may be termed as a substantial question of law to satisfy the requirements of section 100. In Nazir Mohamed v. J. Kamala (2- Judge Bench), it was observed:— “27. the latter, obviously is not the case. This court has, in a multitude of decisions, expounded on what may be termed as a substantial question of law to satisfy the requirements of section 100. In Nazir Mohamed v. J. Kamala (2- Judge Bench), it was observed:— “27. In HeroVinoth v. Seshammal [Hero Vinoth v. Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545 ], this Court referred to and relied upon Chunilal V. Mehta and Sons Ltd. [Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 1314 ] and other judgments and summarised the tests to find out whether a given set of questions of law were mere questions of law or substantial questions of law. The relevant paragraphs of the judgment of this Court in Hero Vinoth [Hero Vinoth v. Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545 ] are set out hereinbelow : (SCC p. 554, para 21) “21. The phrase “substantial question of law”, as occurring in the amended Section 100 CPC is not defined in the Code. The word substantial, as qualifying “question of law”, means— of having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable. It is to be understood as something in contradistinction with—technical, of no substance or consequence, or academic merely. However, it is clear that the legislature has chosen not to qualify the scope of “substantial question of law” by suffixing the words “of general importance” as has been done in many other provisions such as Section 109 of the Code or Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution. The substantial question of law on which a second appeal shall be heard need not necessarily be a substantial question of law of general importance. In Guran Ditta v. Ram Ditta [Guran Ditta v. Ram Ditta, 1928 SCC OnLine PC 31 : (1927-28) 55 IA 235 : AIR 1928 PC 172 ] the phrase “substantial question of law” as it was employed in the last clause of the then existing Section 100 CPC (since omitted by the Amendment Act, 1973) came up for consideration and their Lordships held that it did not mean a substantial question of general importance but a substantial question of law which was involved in the case. In Chunilal case [Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg. & Mfg. Co. In Chunilal case [Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 1314 ] the Constitution Bench expressed agreement with the following view taken by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Rimmalapudi Subba Rao v. Noony Veeraju [Rimmalapudi Subba Rao v. Noony Veeraju, 1951 SCC OnLine Mad 100 : AIR 1951 Mad 969 ] : (Chunilal case [Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 1314 ], AIR p. 1318, para 5) ‘5. … when a question of law is fairly arguable, where there is room for difference of opinion on it or where the Court thought it necessary to deal with that question at some length and discuss alternative views, then the question would be a substantial question of law. On the other hand if the question was practically covered by the decision of the highest court or if the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and the only question was of applying those principles to the particular facts of the case it would not be a substantial question of law.’ 28. To be “substantial”, a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by the law of the land or any binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case and/or the rights of the parties before it, if answered either way.” (Emphasis supplied) 14. As already noted above, another ground of objection taken by the Appellant is the fact of the impugned judgment entering into a re-appreciation of evidence. While it is true that ordinarily, in second appeal, the court must not disturb facts established by the lower court or the first appellate court. However, it is also equally well recognised that this rule is not an absolute one or in other words, it is not a rule set in stone. In Nazir Mohamed (supra) this Court has recognised three conditions in which a court in such jurisdiction, may disturb findings of fact. They are:— “(i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. They are:— “(i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. A decision based on no evidence, does not refer only to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding.” 15. A Bench of three learned Judges, recently in Balasubramanian v. M. Arockiasamy (Dead) Through LRs. , had referred to, with approval judgment rendered in Ramathal v. Maruthathal (two-Judge Bench) wherein it was observed that the restraint in interfering with questions of fact under the jurisdiction of second appeal, is not an absolute rule. Where the court is of the view that the conclusions drawn by the court below do not have a basis in the evidence led or it is of the view that the appreciation of evidence “suffers from material irregularity” the court will be justified in interfering with such findings.” 7. Thus, from the above facts and circumstances of the case and considering the impugned judgments and observations made by both the learned Courts below, this Court is of the opinion that both the learned Courts below have framed the issues/points and decided it accordingly by giving cogent and convincing reasons, as recorded in the impugned judgments. The impugned judgments of both the learned Courts below are just, proper, in accordance with law and in consonance with the material available on the record as well as after properly appreciating the documentary as well as oral evidence produced on the record. This Court finds that there is no perversity or illegality in the findings given by both the Courts below. The impugned judgments and decrees are just, proper and legal and no interference is required to be made by this Court. This Court further finds that no any question, much less any substantial question of law arises in this group of appeals for consideration of this Court. These second appeals therefore need to be dismissed and are dismissed accordingly, at the admission stage. 8. In view of above, the interim application would not survive and is disposed of accordingly.