ORDER : (Ravi Nath Tilhari, J.) Heard Sri R. Gopi Mohan, learned counsel for the petitioner appearing through virtual mode and Sri Srinivas, learned Assistant Government Pleader for Services-I for the respondents. 2. This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed challenging the order dated 18.12.2017 passed in O.A.No.6769 of 2015, by which the A.P Administrative Tribunal at Hyderabad (in short, the Tribunal) has dismissed the present petitioner?s O.A. 3. The petitioner retired from service as Sub-Registrar Grade-II while working at Allur of Sri Potti Sreeramulu Nellore District on 31.10.2010 on attaining the age of superannuation. 4. Before retirement the petitioner was issued with the charge memo dated 25.01.2010 by the Deputy Inspector General of Registration and Stamps, Nellore. The charges read as under:- “Charge-I:- That Sri P.Ramamohan Rao, Sub-Registrar, Allur formerly Joint Sub- Registrar-II, Registrar Office (O.B), Nellore while discharging the duties as Joint Sub Registrar-II, Registrar Office (O.B), Nellore had committed a grave misconduct by deliberately Registering 44 Documents by violating the Market Value Guidelines and adopting in correct classification of the Documents as remarked in the internal Audit Report Numbers 11, 28, 46 and 79 of 2008 and 1 and 36 of 2009 causing huge loss of revenue of Rs.9,19,870/- to the Government exchequer, thereby violating Departmental instructions and contravened Rule 3 of Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (CC&A) Rules, 1964. Thus, Sri P.Ramamohan Rao, Sub Registrar, Allur while discharging duties as Joint Sub Registrar-II, Registrar Office (OB), Nellore by his above mentioned Acts has exhibited lack of integrity, devotion to duty and conduct unbecoming of a Public Servant and thereby contravened Rule-3 of Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (CC&A) Rules, 1974. Charge No-ll: Thus Sri.P.Ramamohan Rao, Sub Registrar, Allur while discharging the duties as Joint Sub Registrar-II, Registrar Office (O.B), Nellore had committed a grave misconduct by deliberately registering the Government Lands as remarked in the Internal Audit Report Nos.46 and 79 of 2008 and 1 and 36 of 2009 at Registrar Office (O.B), Nellore by colluding with the parties by violating the Section 22-A of Registration Act and instructions in Circular Memos Nos.G1/38719/93, dated 13.07.1995 and Memo No.G1/15653/06, dated 13.11.2006 without obtaining the Mandal Revenue Officers No Objection Certificates/without duly confirm the same by the District Collectors concerned, with ulterior motive registered the Government Lands and thereby contravened Rule-3 of Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Conduct) Rules. 1964." 5. 1964." 5. The District Registrar, Nellore was appointed as Enquiry Officer. He submitted the enquiry report on 08.12.2011, after making enquiry. The copy of the enquiry report was supplied to the petitioner and the petitioner filed his representation/written statement. Thereafter, the Deputy Inspector General of Registration and Stamps submitted report to the Government for taking necessary action, as the applicant had retired from service in the meantime, the Government issued G.O.Ms.No.104 Revenue (VIG.VI) Department, dated 15.02.2013 imposing penalty of withholding of 100% pension permanently, besides recovery of loss of revenue of Rs.9,19,870/- to the Government exchequer. The punishment was imposed after consultation with the Andhra Pradesh Public Service Commission. 6. The petitioner filed the revision upon which the Government vide G.O.Rt.No.1108 Revenue (vig.II) Department dated 08.12.2014 modified the punishment to the extent of recovery which was limited to Rs.1,45,580/- instead of Rs.9,19,870/-. The punishment of 100% cut in pension was confirmed. The petitioner?s review petition was also rejected on 28.05.2015. 7. Challenging the order dated 28.05.2015, the petitioner filed O.A.No.6769 of 2015 before the Tribunal which has been dismissed by the order dated 18.12.2017 impugned in the writ petition. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner was not afforded any opportunity of hearing before imposing the punishment of 100% cut in pension. In this regard, he has referred to Ex.P4, letter No.A1/5/2010, dated 14.03.2012, and referring to Para No.9 thereof he contends that the proposed punishment therein was 5% cut in pension for a period of 5 years, under Rule 9 (2) (a) of Andhra Pradesh Revised Pension Rules, 1980, but instead of the punishment as proposed, the order of punishment of 100% cut in pension was passed for which no opportunity of hearing was afforded. 9. Learned Assistant Government Pleader submits that against the proposed punishment of 100% cut in pension, the petitioner was issued a show cause notice dated 13.07.2012 granting the petitioner opportunity to file response and the petitioner also filed the response. After considering the petitioner?s response the order of punishment was passed. 10. The petitioner has not annexed the copy of the memo dated 13.07.2012 by which opportunity was afforded to him to show cause with respect to the proposed punishment of 100% cut in pension. However, the same has been brought on record by the counter affidavit. 11. After considering the petitioner?s response the order of punishment was passed. 10. The petitioner has not annexed the copy of the memo dated 13.07.2012 by which opportunity was afforded to him to show cause with respect to the proposed punishment of 100% cut in pension. However, the same has been brought on record by the counter affidavit. 11. A perusal of the memo dated 13.07.2012 shows, in paragraph Nos.5 and 6 thereof that, the proposed punishment was withholding of 100% pension permanently, besides recovery. It further shows that the petitioner was issued the show cause notice. Those paragraphs read as under:- “5. Government have examined the final Written Statement of Defence of the Charged Officer in the light of the findings of the Regular Enquiry Officer and therefore Government have provisionally decided to impose a penalty of withholding of 100% pension permanently besides recovery of huge loss of revenue of Rs.9,19,870/- to the Government exchequer, against Sri P.Ramamohan Rao, Sub Registrar Grade-II (Retired) under Rule 9 of Andhra Pradesh Revised Pension Rules, 1980. 6. Sri P.Ramamohan Rao, Sub Registrar Grade-II (Retired) is, therefore, directed to show cause as to why a penalty of withholding of 100% pension permanently besides recovery of huge loss of revenue of Rs.9,19,870/- to the Government exchequer should not be imposed on him for the above said lapses within (15) days from the date of receipt of this memo. He is also informed that if no reply is received within the stipulated time of 15 days, it will be construed that he has no explanation to offer and further action will be taken based on the material available without any notice. A copy of Regular Enquiry Officer report is enclosed herewith.” 12. The order of punishment dated 15.02.2013 also makes reference of the proposed punishment of 100% cut in pension as also the opportunity afforded to the petitioner and the response to the show cause notice filed by the petitioner. 13. In view of the above, the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the order of 100% cut in pension has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice is contrary to record and being misconceived is rejected. 14. Both the charges against the petitioner have been proved in departmental enquiry. 13. In view of the above, the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the order of 100% cut in pension has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice is contrary to record and being misconceived is rejected. 14. Both the charges against the petitioner have been proved in departmental enquiry. In the exercise of the writ jurisdiction we do not find any scope of interference with those finding, as nothing has been brought on record nor argued that those findings suffer from perversity or illegality or on any of the grounds on which judicial review may be permissible. 15. In B.C. Chaturvedi (supra), the Hon?ble Apex Court held that the Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to re-appreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding. 16. Para No.12 of B. C. Chaturvedi (supra) reads as under:- “12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to re- appreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case.” 17. Learned counsel for the petitioner next submits that the punishment is disproportionate to the proved charges. 18. In Chairman and Managing Director, United Commercial Bank and others vs. P.C.Kakkar, (2003) 4 SCC 364 , the Honble Apex Court on the point of proportionality in administrative law after summarizing the position observed and held that unless the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the Court/Tribunal, there is no scope for interference. It was further observed that to shorten the litigation, it may in exceptional and rare cases impose appropriate punishment by recording cogent reasons in support thereof. In the normal course if the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate it would be appropriate to direct the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed. The Hon?ble Apex Court further observed that a Court feels that the punishment is shockingly disproportionate, it must record reasons for coming to such a conclusion. Mere expression that the punishment is shockingly disproportionate would not meet the requirement of law. 19. It is apt to refer Paragraph Nos.10 to 14 of Chairman (supra) as under:- “10. In Union of India and Anr. vs. G. Ganayutham, this Court summed up the position relating to proportionality in paragraphs 31 and 32, which read as follows: (SCC pp. Mere expression that the punishment is shockingly disproportionate would not meet the requirement of law. 19. It is apt to refer Paragraph Nos.10 to 14 of Chairman (supra) as under:- “10. In Union of India and Anr. vs. G. Ganayutham, this Court summed up the position relating to proportionality in paragraphs 31 and 32, which read as follows: (SCC pp. 478-80, paras 31-32) "31. The current position of proportionality in administrative law in England and India can be summarized as follows: (1) To judge the validity of any administrative order or statutory discretion, normally the Wednesbury test is to be applied to find out if the decision was illegal or suffered from procedural improprieties or was one which no sensible decision-maker could, on the material before him and within the framework of the law, have arrived at. The court would consider whether relevant matters had not been taken into account or whether irrelevant matters had been taken into account or whether the action was not bona fide. The court would also consider whether the decision was absurd or perverse. The court would not however go into the correctness of the choice made by the administrator amongst the various alternatives open to him. Nor could the court substitute its decision to that of the administrator. This is the Wednesbury test. (2) The court would not interfere with the administrator's decision unless it was illegal or suffered from procedural impropriety or was irrational in the sense that it was in outrageous defiance of logic or moral standards. The possibility of other tests, including proportionality being brought into English administrative law in future is not ruled out. These are the CCSU ( 1985 AC 374 ) principles. (3)(a) As per Bugdaycay, Brind and Smith as long as the Convention is not incorporated into English law, the English courts merely exercise a secondary judgment to find out if the decision-maker could have, on the material before him, arrived at the primary judgment in the manner he has done. (3)(b) If the Convention is incorporated in England making available the principle of proportionality, then the English courts will render primary judgment on the validity of the administrative action and find out if the restriction is disproportionate or excessive or is not based upon a fair balancing of the fundamental freedom and the need for the restriction thereupon. (3)(b) If the Convention is incorporated in England making available the principle of proportionality, then the English courts will render primary judgment on the validity of the administrative action and find out if the restriction is disproportionate or excessive or is not based upon a fair balancing of the fundamental freedom and the need for the restriction thereupon. (4)(a) The position in our country, in administrative law, where no fundamental freedoms as aforesaid are involved, is that the courts/tribunals will only play a secondary role while the primary judgment as to reasonableness will remain with the executive or administrative authority. The secondary judgment of the court is to be based on Wednesbury and CCSU principles as stated by Lord Greene and Lord Diplock respectively to find if the executive or administrative authority has reasonably arrived at his decision as the primary authority. (4)(b) Whether in the case of administrative or executive action affecting fundamental freedoms, the courts in our country will apply the principle of 'proportionality? and assume a primary role, is left open, to be decided in an appropriate case where such action is alleged to offend fundamental freedoms. It will be then necessary to decide whether the courts will have a primary role only if the freedoms under Articles 19, 21 etc. are involved and not for Article 14. 32. Finally, we come to the present case. It is not contended before us that any fundamental freedom is affected. We need not therefore go into the question of „proportionality?. There is no contention that the punishment imposed is illegal or vitiated by procedural impropriety. As to „irrationality?, there is no finding by the Tribunal that the decision is one which no sensible person who weighed the pros and cons could have arrived at nor is there a finding, based on material, that the punishment is in "outrageous" defiance of logic. Neither Wednesbury nor CCSU tests are satisfied. We have still to explain "Ranjit Thakur". 11. The common thread running through in all these decisions is that the Court should not interfere with the administrator's decision unless it was illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the conscience of the Court, in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or moral standards. We have still to explain "Ranjit Thakur". 11. The common thread running through in all these decisions is that the Court should not interfere with the administrator's decision unless it was illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the conscience of the Court, in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or moral standards. In view of what has been stated in the Wednesbury's case the Court would not go into the correctness of the choice made by the administrator open to him and the Court should not substitute its decision to that of the administrator. The scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in decision-making process and not the decision. 12. To put difference unless the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the Court/Tribunal, there is no scope for interference. Further to certain litigations it may, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment by recording cogent reasons in support thereof. In a normal course if the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate it would be appropriate to direct the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed. 13. In the case at hand the High Court did not record any reason as to how and why it found the punishment shockingly disproportionate. Even there is no discussion on this aspect. The only discernible reason was the punishment awarded in M.L. Keshwani's case. As was observed by this Court in Balbir Chand vs. Food Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors., even if a co-delinquent is given lesser punishment it cannot be a ground for interference. Even such a plea was not available to be given credence as the allegations were contextually different. 14. A Bank officer is required to exercise higher standards of honesty and integrity. He deals with money of the depositors and the customers. Every officer/employee of the Bank is required to take all possible steps to protect the interests of the Bank and to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and to do nothing which is unbecoming of a Bank officer. Good conduct and discipline are inseparable from the functioning of every officer/employee of the Bank. Every officer/employee of the Bank is required to take all possible steps to protect the interests of the Bank and to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and to do nothing which is unbecoming of a Bank officer. Good conduct and discipline are inseparable from the functioning of every officer/employee of the Bank. As was observed by this Court in Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional Manager v. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik, it is no defence available to say that there was no loss or profit resulted in case, when the officer/employee acted without authority. The very discipline of an organization more particularly a Bank is dependent upon each of its officers and officers acting and operating within their allotted sphere. Acting beyond one's authority is by itself a breach of discipline and is a misconduct. The charges against the employee were not casual in nature and were serious. These aspects do not appear to have been kept in view by the High Court.” 20. In B. C. Chaturvedi vs. Union of India and others, (1995) 6 SCC 749 , the Hon?ble Apex Court held that the disciplinary authority and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. It the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof. 21. In Union of India and others vs. Ex. Constable Ram Karan, (2022) 1 SCC 373 , the Hon?ble Apex Court held that the well-ingrained principle of law is that it is the disciplinary, or the appellate authority in appeal, which is to decide the nature of punishment to be given to the delinquent employee, keeping in view the seriousness of the misconduct committed by such an employee. It is not open for the Courts to assume and usurp the function of the disciplinary authority. It is not open for the Courts to assume and usurp the function of the disciplinary authority. The Hon?ble Apex Court in the said case observed that the High Court fell in error in interfering with the punishment, which could lawfully be imposed by the departmental authorities for the proven misconduct. The High Court should not have substituted its own discretion for that of the authority. What punishment was required to be imposed, in the facts and circumstances of the case, was a matter which fell exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority and the interference made by the High Court was found not sustainable in law. 22. It is apt to refer Para Nos.23 to 27 of Union of India (supra) as under:- “23. The well ingrained principle of law is that it is the disciplinary authority, or the appellate authority in appeal, which is to decide the nature of punishment to be given to the delinquent employee. Keeping in view the seriousness of the misconduct committed by such an employee, it is not open for the Courts to assume and usurp the function of the disciplinary authority. 24. Even in cases where the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is found to be shocking to the conscience of the Court, normally the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority should be directed to reconsider the question of imposition of penalty. The scope of judicial review on the quantum of punishment is available but with a limited scope. It is only when the penalty imposed appears to be shockingly disproportionate to the nature of misconduct that the Courts would frown upon. Even in such a case, after setting aside the penalty order, it is to be left to the disciplinary/appellate authority to take a call and it is not for the Court to substitute its decision by prescribing the quantum of punishment. However, it is only in rare and exceptional cases where the court might to shorten the litigation may think of substituting its own view as to the quantum of punishment in place of punishment awarded by the competent authority that too after assigning cogent reasons. 25. The principles have been culled out by a three Judge Bench of this Court way back in B.C. Chaturvedi vs. Union of India and Others wherein it was observed as under: “18. 25. The principles have been culled out by a three Judge Bench of this Court way back in B.C. Chaturvedi vs. Union of India and Others wherein it was observed as under: “18. A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof.” 26. It has been further examined by this Court in Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank (Now Allahabad, Uttar Pradesh Gramin Bank) and Another vs. Rajendra Singh as under: “19. The principles discussed above can be summed up and summarised as follows: 19.1. When charge(s) of misconduct is proved in an enquiry the quantum of punishment to be imposed in a particular case is essentially the domain of the departmental authorities. 19.2. The courts cannot assume the function of disciplinary/departmental authorities and to decide the quantum of punishment and nature of penalty to be awarded, as this function is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority. 19.3. Limited judicial review is available to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, only in cases where such penalty is found to be shocking to the conscience of the court. 19.4. Even in such a case when the punishment is set aside as shockingly disproportionate to the nature of charges framed against the delinquent employee, the appropriate course of action is to remit the matter back to the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority with direction to pass appropriate order of penalty. The court by itself cannot mandate as to what should be the penalty in such a case. 19.5. The court by itself cannot mandate as to what should be the penalty in such a case. 19.5. The only exception to the principle stated in para 19.4 above, would be in those cases where the codelinquent is awarded lesser punishment by the disciplinary authority even when the charges of misconduct were identical or the codelinquent was foisted with more serious charges. This would be on the doctrine of equality when it is found that the employee concerned and the codelinquent are equally placed. However, there has to be a complete parity between the two, not only in respect of nature of charge but subsequent conduct as well after the service of chargesheet in the two cases. If the codelinquent accepts the charges, indicating remorse with unqualified apology, lesser punishment to him would be justifiable.” 27. Adverting to the facts of the instant case, the High Court, in our considered view, fell in error in interfering with the punishment, which could lawfully be imposed by the departmental authorities for his proven misconduct. The High Court should not have substituted its own discretion for that of the authority. What punishment was required to be imposed, in the facts and circumstances of the case, was a matter which fell exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority and the interference made by the High Court is in a cavalier manner while recording the finding of penalty to be disproportionate without taking into consideration the seriousness of the misconduct committed by the respondent which is unpardonable and not sustainable in law.” 23. The learned Tribunal has observed that the proved Charge No-II is a case of registration of documents relating to prohibited lands covered by Section 22-A of the Registration Act, 1908, without obtaining no objection certificate or confirmation from the District Collector. The petitioner contravened Section 22-A of the Registration Act deliberately. Considering the gravity of the proved Charges I and II, the learned Tribunal found the punishment of 100% cut in pension, as not disproportionate. The recovery for loss to the exchequer has already been reduced to Rs.1,45,580/- from Rs.9,19,870/-. 24. The case of Chairman (supra) related to a Bank Officer and it was observed that a Bank Officer is required to exercise higher standards of honesty and integrity. The recovery for loss to the exchequer has already been reduced to Rs.1,45,580/- from Rs.9,19,870/-. 24. The case of Chairman (supra) related to a Bank Officer and it was observed that a Bank Officer is required to exercise higher standards of honesty and integrity. Every officer/employee of the Bank is required to take all possible steps to protect the interests of the Bank and to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and to do nothing which is unbecoming of a Bank officer. 25. In our view, the petitioner in the present case was also required to exercise higher standards of honesty and integrity. He was dealing with the property of the State and was required to take all possible steps to protest the interests of the State, which was in the list under Section 22-A of the Registration Act. In view of the findings recorded on the charges and the gravity of the charges we do not feel that the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate. 26. We are of the considered view that in the matters of the present nature, where the charge is proved against the petitioner, a Sub- Registrar in the Registrar Office that he deliberately registered the Government land colluding with the parties and violating Section 22-A of the Registration Act, 1908 and the memo, the punishment as imposed is not disproportionate. Considering the gravity of the charges the punishment imposed on the petitioner does not touch our consciousness so as to make out a case for interference in the exercise of writ jurisdiction. 27. We do not find any illegality in the order of the Tribunal. The Writ Petition is dismissed. 28. No order as to costs. As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous petitions, if any pending, shall also stand closed.