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2024 DIGILAW 756 (GUJ)

Vishal Dineshbhai Solanki v. State Of Gujarat

2024-04-04

DIVYESH A.JOSHI

body2024
JUDGMENT : 1. Rule returnable forthwith. Learned APP waives service of notice of rule for and on behalf of the respondent-State. 2. The respondent No.2, although served with the notice issued by this Court, has chosen not to remain present either in person or through an advocate and oppose this application. 3. By this application under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the applicant seeks to invoke the inherent powers of this Court praying for quashing of the first information report being C.R. No.I-193 of 2017 registered before the Sarthana Police Station at Surat for the offence punishable under section 363 of the IPC. 4. The case of the prosecution may be summarized as under; 4.1 The impugned FIR has been filed by the respondent No.2- original complainant who happens to be the uncle of the girl stating that on 26.09.2017, when his niece Urvashi @ Gopi did not come for lunch, the complainant asked his mother Liliben about Urvashiben whereupon his mother told him that Urvashi went down for getting his Dupatta which fell down. Thereafter, when more time had been passed and yet his niece did not return back, they started searching the whereabouts of his niece. The complainant also called his brother-in-law and inquired as to whether Gopi reaches there, whereupon, the brother-in-law informed the complainant that Gopi did not reach there. Thereafter, they tried for a whole day to find out the whereabouts of his niece, however, they could not get success. It is also alleged in the complaint that almost six months ago, his niece eloped with one unknown person and returned back to her parental home after some time. Thus, having strong apprehension of his niece being kidnapped by an unknown person, the present FIR has been filed against an unknown person. 5. Learned advocate Mr. Harsh Joshi for learned advocate Mr. Hiren Modi appearing for the applicant has submitted that the complainant happens to be the uncle of the victim girl, namely, Urvashi @ Gopi who has filed the impugned FIR against an unknown person levelling allegations of kidnapping and abduction. It is submitted that the applicant and the victim developed intimacy and fell in love with each other and one fine day ran away from their respective houses as the father of the girl was against their marriage. Learned advocate Mr. It is submitted that the applicant and the victim developed intimacy and fell in love with each other and one fine day ran away from their respective houses as the father of the girl was against their marriage. Learned advocate Mr. Joshi has also submitted that thereafter the the applicant and the complainant got married with each other on 10.09.2018 and the said marriage was also registered before the Registrar of Marriage, Surat, a certificate to that effect is also annexed along with the memo of the application. It is further submitted that as soon as the applicant came to know about the registration of the impugned FIR, he immediately approached this Court and obtained order of stay on the ground that on the date of the incident, the victim girl was underaged by few months, however, subsequently they got married to each other. Learned advocate Mr. Joshi has further submitted that at the earlier point of time also, the father of the girl also filed an FIR against the applicant being C.R. No.I-110 of 2017, pursuant to which, the applicant preferred a quashing application being Criminal Misc. Application No.20082 of 2017. However, as the matter was subsequently settled, a Coordinate Bench of this Court allowed the application of the applicant and quashed the FIR. Learned advocate Mr. Joshi has also submitted that it is true that on the date of the incident, the girl was short of 18 years, however, she on her own will and volition, eloped with the applicant-accused for getting married with him as they both were in deep love with each other. The girl eloped with the applicant due to the fear of her father of not accepting their relationship. It is further submitted that the applicant and the victim girl have already been married to each other and are living happily as husband and wife. Learned advocate Mr. Joshi has also submitted that even if the entire case of the first informant is accepted as true, none of the ingredients to constitute the offence of kidnapping are spelt out and, therefore, the continuation of the criminal proceedings against the applicant-accused would be nothing, but an abuse of the process of law. Hence, the impugned FIR requires to be quashed and set aside. 6. On the other hand, this application has been vehemently opposed by Mr. Hence, the impugned FIR requires to be quashed and set aside. 6. On the other hand, this application has been vehemently opposed by Mr. L.B. Dabhi, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondent - State of Gujarat. Learned APP Mr. Dabhi would submit that the allegations levelled in the FIR are of abducting a girl from the lawful guardianship of her parents which is serious in nature. He submits that merely getting married with the girl cannot be made a ground for quashing of the FIR as the trial is going on and the law would take its own course at the end of the trial. Under the circumstances, learned APP Mr. Dabhi prays that, therefore, at this stage, the First Information Report should not be quashed and the trial should be permitted to proceed further. Hence, the present application deserved to be rejected. 7. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having considered the materials on record, the only question that falls for my consideration is whether I should quash the complaint. 8. It appears that the allegations levelled against the accused are of committing offence under Section 363 of the I.P.C. In this context, I would like to quote, with profit, the decision of the Division Bench of the Allahbad High Court in the case of Shaheen Parveen and another Vs. State of U.P. And others, Writ Petition No.3519 (M/B) of 2015 wherein the ingredients of Section 363 and 366 have been considered in the following terms; "7. Section 363 of the Indian Penal Code inheres that whoever kidnaps any person from lawful guardianship shall be punished in terms of sentence provided in the provision. 8. "Kidnapping from lawful guardianship" has been defined under Section 361 of the Indian Penal Code. The provision when extracted reads as under:- "Whoever takes or entices any minor under *[sixteen] years of age if a male, or under **[eighteen] years of age if a female, or any person of unsound mind, out of the keeping of the lawful guardian of such minor or person of unsound mind, without the consent of such guardian, is said to kidnap such minor or person from lawful guardianship. Explanation: - The words "lawful guardian" in this section include any person lawfully entrusted with the care or custody of such minor or other person. Explanation: - The words "lawful guardian" in this section include any person lawfully entrusted with the care or custody of such minor or other person. Exception: - This section does not extend to the act of any person who in good faith believes himself to be the father of an illegitimate child, or who in good faith believes himself to be entitled to the lawful custody of such child, unless such act is committed for an immoral or unlawful purpose." 9. Section 366 of the Indian Penal Code inheres that whoever kidnaps or abducts any woman with intent that she may be compelled, or knowing it to be likely that she will be compelled to marry any person against her will, or in order that she may be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse, shall be punished with a sentence, as provided in the provision. 10. At the time of considering whether on admitting the allegations made in the F.I.R., offence has been committed or not, the ingredients of the offence are required to be considered, in context of the evidence collected during the course of investigation. XXXXXXX 22. If a minor, of her own, abandons the guardianship of her parents and joins a boy without any role having been played by the boy in her abandoning the guardianship of her parents and without her having been subjected to any kind of pressure, inducement, etc and without any offer or promise from the accused, no offence punishable under Section 363 I.P.C. will be made out when the girl is aged more than 17 years and is mature enough to understand what she is doing. Of course, if the accused induces or allures the girl and that influences the minor in leaving her guardian's custody and the keeping and going with the accused, then it would be difficult for the Court to accept that minor had voluntarily come to the accused. In case the victim/ prosecutrix willingly, of her own accord, accompanies the boy, the law does not cast a duty on the boy of taking her back to her father's house or even of telling her not to accompany him. 23. In case the victim/ prosecutrix willingly, of her own accord, accompanies the boy, the law does not cast a duty on the boy of taking her back to her father's house or even of telling her not to accompany him. 23. A girl who has attained the age of discretion and was on the verge of attaining majority and is capable of knowing what was good and what was bad for her, cannot be said to be a victim of inducement, particularly when the case of the victim/girl herself is that it was on her initiative and on account of her voluntary act that she had gone with the boy and got married to him. In such circumstances, desire of the girl/victim is required to be seen. Ingredients of Section 361 I.P.C. are required to be considered accordingly, and not in mechanical or technical interpretation. 24. Ingredients of Section 361 I.P.C. cannot be said to be satisfied in a case where the minor having attained age of discretion, alleged to have been taken by the accused person, left her guardian's protection knowingly (having capacity to know the full import of what she was doing) and voluntarily joins the accused person. In such a case, it cannot be said that the victim had been taken away from the keeping of her lawful guardian. 25. So as to show an act of criminality on the part of the accused, some kind of inducement held out by the accused person or an active participation by him in the formation of the intention of the minor to leave the house of the guardian, is required to be shown. Conclusion might be different in case evidence is collected by the investigating agency to establish that though immediately prior to the minor leaving the guardian's protection, no active part was played by the accused, he had at some earlier stage solicited or persuaded the minor to do so. ( The Court in above regards takes a cue from the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India reported in (1965)1 SCR 243 S. Varadarajan versus State of Madras)." 9. ( The Court in above regards takes a cue from the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India reported in (1965)1 SCR 243 S. Varadarajan versus State of Madras)." 9. A plain reading of the aforesaid judgment reveals that If a minor, of her own, abandons the guardianship of her parents and joins a boy without any role having been played by the boy in her abandoning the guardianship of her parents and without her having been subjected to any kind of pressure, inducement, etc and without any offer or promise from the accused, no offence punishable under Section 363 I.P.C. will be made out when the girl is aged more than 17 years and is mature enough to understand what she is doing. The judgment further reveals that a girl who has attained the age of discretion and was on the verge of attaining majority and is capable of knowing what was good and what was bad for her, cannot be said to be a victim of inducement, particularly when the case of the victim/girl herself is that it was on her initiative and on account of her voluntary act that she had gone with the boy and got married to him. 10. The present application has been filed on the strength of the pleadings that the victim girl happens to be the niece of the respondent No.2 who fell in love with the applicant and wanted to marry him. The respondent No.2 and the father of the girl was not ready to accept the marital arrangement, rather they administered threat to the applicant as well as to the victim girl. The girl did not relent and left her parental house and eloped with the applicant on her free will and volition for solemnising the marriage. Thereafter, the marriage was also solemnised on 10.09.2018. In evidence of the fact that they are married, a marriage certificate has also been produced at Annexure-D to the application. Earlier also, the father of the girl filed an FIR against the applicant-accused which was assailed by the applicant by way of filing a quashing petition which was allowed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court and quashed the FIR. 11. Earlier also, the father of the girl filed an FIR against the applicant-accused which was assailed by the applicant by way of filing a quashing petition which was allowed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court and quashed the FIR. 11. Thereafter, the impugned proceedings were initiated at the instance of respondent no.2 vide impugned F.I.R. with the allegation that his niece was 17 years of age at the time of the incident and had been enticed/induced by the applicant to flee with him. 12. After registration of the impugned F.I.R., the applicant approached this Court for quashing of the F.I.R and obtained order of stay which is still in operation. 13. The victim girl Urvashi @ Gopi has also filed her affidavit in endorsement of the facts pleaded in the writ application. By virtue of the said affidavit, Urvashi @ Gopi has again reiterated her stand that she had not been enticed or induced by the applicant, rather she willingly got married to applicant. 14. I have also taken note of the law as declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rajiv Thapar and others versus Madan Lal Kapoor : (2013)3 SCC 330 . In the said judgment, the following has been held by the Supreme Court:- "29. The issue being examined in the instant case is the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., if it chooses to quash the initiation of the prosecution against an accused, at the stage of issuing process, or at the stage of committal, or even at the stage of framing of charges. These are all stages before the commencement of the actual trial. The same parameters would naturally be available for later stages as well. The power vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., at the stages referred to hereinabove, would have far reaching consequences, inasmuch as, it would negate the prosecutions/ complainants case without allowing the prosecution/ complainant to lead evidence. Such a determination must always be rendered with caution, care and circumspection. The power vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., at the stages referred to hereinabove, would have far reaching consequences, inasmuch as, it would negate the prosecutions/ complainants case without allowing the prosecution/ complainant to lead evidence. Such a determination must always be rendered with caution, care and circumspection. To invoke its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. the High Court has to be fully satisfied, that the material produced by the accused is such, that would lead to the conclusion, that his/their defence is based on sound, reasonable, and indubitable facts; the material produced is such, as would rule out and displace the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused; and the material produced is such, as would clearly reject and overrule the veracity of the allegations contained in the accusations levelled by the prosecution/ complainant. It should be sufficient to rule out, reject and discard the accusations levelled by the prosecution/ complainant, without the necessity of recording any evidence. For this the material relied upon by the defence should not have been refuted, or alternatively, cannot be justifiably refuted, being material of sterling and impeccable quality. The material relied upon by the accused should be such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the actual basis of the accusations as false. In such a situation, the judicial conscience of the High Court would persuade it to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash such criminal proceedings, for that would prevent abuse of process of the court, and secure the ends of justice. 30. Based on the factors canvassed in the foregoing paragraphs, we would delineate the following steps to determine the veracity of a prayer for quashing, raised by an accused by invoking the power vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.:- (i) Step one, whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable, and indubitable, i.e., the material is of sterling and impeccable quality? (ii) Step two, whether the material relied upon by the accused, would rule out the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused, i.e., the material is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint, i.e., the material is such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false. (iii) Step three, whether the material relied upon by the accused, has not been refuted by the prosecution/ complainant; and/or the material is such, that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the prosecution/complainant? (iv) Step four, whether proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the ends of justice? If the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative, judicial conscience of the High Court should persuade it to quash such criminal proceedings, in exercise of power vested in it under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Such exercise of power, besides doing justice to the accused, would save precious court time, which would otherwise be wasted in holding such a trial (as well as, proceedings arising therefrom) specially when, it is clear that the same would not conclude in the conviction of the accused." (Emphasised by us) X X X X X 38. We are persuaded to conclude from the facts and circumstances of the case exhaustively discussed in the foregoing paragraphs, that all the steps delineated in the paragraph 23 above, can be answered in the affirmative, on the basis of the material relied by the accused, more particularly, the post-mortem examination report dated 28.9.1992 conducted by a Medical Board comprising of four doctors, whose integrity has not been questioned by the respondent-complainant; the chemical analysis findings contained in the Central Forensic Science Laboratorys report dated 9.2.1993 which has not been disputed by the respondent-complainant; the inquest report of the SDM, Delhi, dated 6.7.1993, findings whereof have been painstakingly recorded by involving the respondent-complainant; the letter of Rajiv Kapoor (the brother of the deceased) dated 22.9.1992 addressed to Dr. Monica Thapar just four days before her death, the contents and authenticity whereof are not subject matter of challenge at the hands of the respondent-complainant; and finally, the telephone bills produced by the appellants-accused substantiating consistent and regular contact between the rival families, which have not been questioned. Monica Thapar just four days before her death, the contents and authenticity whereof are not subject matter of challenge at the hands of the respondent-complainant; and finally, the telephone bills produced by the appellants-accused substantiating consistent and regular contact between the rival families, which have not been questioned. We, therefore, have no hesitation in concluding, that the judicial conscience of the High Court ought to have persuaded it, on the basis of the material examined by it, to quash the criminal proceedings initiated against the appellants-accused. We, therefore, hereby quash the aforesaid proceedings. 39. Despite the conclusion recorded hereinabove, we are of the view, that in the facts and circumstances of this case, there should have been no difficulty whatsoever for the High Court to have exercised its judicial conscience for invoking the power vested in it under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. From the narration of the facts recorded above, it emerges, that even though the respondent- complainant Madan Lal Kapoor, in his complaint dated 6.7.1993, adopted a clear and categoric stance, that his daughter Dr. Monica Thapar had been poisoned to death, before the Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi, the respondent-complainant ventured to suggest, that the appellants-accused had strangulated her. The Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi, summoned two of the doctors who were members of the Medical Board which had conducted the post-mortem examination, and sought clarifications from them. He also recorded the statement of one of the said doctors. The Additional Sessions Judge, thereupon, ruled out the plea of strangulation. When the respondent-complainant himself was uncertain about the manner in which his daughter had allegedly died, the High Court should have viewed the matter keeping in mind the likelihood of the hurt caused to a father who had lost his daughter within one year of her marriage. The matter needed to have been evaluated, on the basis of one of the parameters laid down in State of Haryana & Ors. Vs. Bhajan Lal & Ors., 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335, namely, whether the criminal proceedings initiated by Madan Lal Kapoor (the respondent-complainant) were actuated by malice and ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused with a view to spite him due to some private/personal grudge. 40. There is yet another reason emerging from the facts of the case which needed to be kept in mind. (1) SCC 335, namely, whether the criminal proceedings initiated by Madan Lal Kapoor (the respondent-complainant) were actuated by malice and ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused with a view to spite him due to some private/personal grudge. 40. There is yet another reason emerging from the facts of the case which needed to be kept in mind. Madan Lal Kapoor (the respondent-complainant) had continued to represent before the SDM, Delhi, that he would produce the mother of the deceased, who knew the facts best of all. Despite that, the mother of the deceased did not appear in the inquest proceedings to record her statement, even though a number of opportunities were afforded to the respondent-complainant to produce her. The permissible inference is that he was himself not privy to the facts. The fact that the mother of the deceased had not appeared to record a statement against the appellants-accused has to have some reason/justification. Would a mother who believes that her daughter had been poisoned/strangulated, restrain herself from recording her statement, despite the persuasion of her husband? Probably not. The instant factual position has been recorded hereinabove, not for the sake of determination of the present controversy. In a factual situation not as clear as the one in hand, facts such as these, could be taken into consideration by a High Court for recording its satisfaction, on the parameters formulated above. 41. For the reasons recorded hereinabove, criminal proceedings against the appellants-accused are hereby set aside. The order of the High Court is accordingly also set aside, but on grounds different from those taken into consideration by the High Court. The instant appeal, accordingly succeeds." (Emphasis supplied) 15. A perusal of the above extracted portion of the judgment would indicate that the High Court can invoke jurisdiction to quash proceedings at the stage of issuing process, or at the stage of committal, or even at the stage of framing of charges. These are all stages before the commencement of the actual trial. The same parameters would naturally be available for later stages as well. The power vested in the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. at the stages referred to hereinabove, would have far reaching consequences inasmuch as, it would negate the prosecutions/complainants case, without allowing the prosecution/ complainant to lead evidence. 16. The same parameters would naturally be available for later stages as well. The power vested in the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. at the stages referred to hereinabove, would have far reaching consequences inasmuch as, it would negate the prosecutions/complainants case, without allowing the prosecution/ complainant to lead evidence. 16. Under the circumstances, I am of the considered opinion that there is no impediment of stage of proceedings at which the High Court can interfere and consider quashing of proceedings if it would prevent abuse of the process of the law and process of the court, and secure the ends of justice. 17. In the case on hand, the relevant evidences have already been collected as noticed above. The victim girl herself has stated on oath that she has not been kidnapped by the applicant. Under the circumstances, I have no hesitation in holding that case of the applicant is covered by judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in State of Haryana and others versus Ch. Bhajan Lal and others AIR 1992 SC 604 . The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the said judgment has laid down certain conditions that may be considered by the court for quashing the criminal proceedings. The following has been held in Para 108 : "108. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such powers should be exercised. 1. Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. 2. 1. Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. 2. Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. 3. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. 4. Where, the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. 5. Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 6. Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. 7. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with malafide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."(Emphasis supplied) 18. The facts and circumstances noted above make it evident that the ingredients of Section 363 of I.P.C. are not satisfied and, therefore, I am of the considered view that continuance of proceedings shall be an exercise in futility. 19. In the result, this application succeeds and is hereby allowed. The first information report being C.R. No.I-193 of 2017 registered before the Sarthana Police Station at Surat is hereby ordered to be quashed. All consequential proceedings arising from the same also stands terminated. 19. In the result, this application succeeds and is hereby allowed. The first information report being C.R. No.I-193 of 2017 registered before the Sarthana Police Station at Surat is hereby ordered to be quashed. All consequential proceedings arising from the same also stands terminated. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. Direct service is permitted.