JUDGMENT : DEVASHIS BARUAH, J. 1. This is an Appeal under Section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short ‘the Code’) challenging the judgment and decree dated 16.09.2022 passed in Title Appeal No. 43/2018 whereby the learned First Appellate Court, i.e. the Court of Civil Judge Kamrup (Amingaon) had dismissed the Appeal thereby affirming the judgment and decree dated 13.03.2018 passed in Title Suit No. 73/2015 by the learned Munsiff, Kamrup (Amingaon). 2. The instant Appeal is being taken up at the stage of Order XLI Rule 11 of the Code to ascertain as to whether any substantial question of law can at all be formulated in terms with Section 100(4) of the Code. For the purpose of the above, this Court finds it relevant to take note of brief facts which lead to the finding of the instant Appeal. 3. One Duma Rabha (since deceased) was the owner and possessor of a plot of land measuring 4 bighas 1 katha 5 lechas covered by Dag No. 213 and 6 bighas 3 kathas 15 lechas covered by Dag No. 214 of K.P No. 60 of Village-Joypur under Luki Mouza in the district of Kamrup. The said Late Duma Rabha had three sons, i.e. Kuntha Rabha, Chana Rabha and Gopal Rabha. Kuntha Rabha had two sons, Mona Rabha and Dona Rabha. Dona Rabha expired unmarried at an early age. Dona Rabha inherited the share of his father, i.e. Kuntha Rabha. The plaintiff is the legal heir of Chana Rabha and he inherited the share of his father. Pabitra Rabha, i.e. the proforma defendant No. 3 was the son of Late Gopal Rabha and he inherited the property of his father. In terms with the division amongst the legal heirs of the three sons of Late Duma Rabha, the plaintiff was entitled to 1/3rd and therefore his share was 1 bigha 2 kathas 1 lecha covered by Dag No. 213 and 2 bighas 1 katha 5 lechas covered by Dag No. 214 totalling to 3 bighas 3 kathas 6 lechas which were both included in patta No. 16. It was the case of the plaintiff that though the property left behind by Late Duma Rabha was not perfectly partitioned, but the legal heirs of the sons of Late Duma Rabha cultivated in their respective shares of the properties. It was the case of the plaintiff that though the property left behind by Late Duma Rabha was not perfectly partitioned, but the legal heirs of the sons of Late Duma Rabha cultivated in their respective shares of the properties. The said share of the plaintiff was specifically described in Schedule-A to the plaint. It is the further case of the plaintiff that the defendant met the plaintiff and requested to allow him to cultivate in the suit land on adhi basis taking into account that the plaintiff used to reside at that point of time in Rangjuli. It is the further case of the plaintiff that for the first 3/4 years, the defendants duly gave the paddy crops to the plaintiff but the same became irregular since 2010. It is also stated in the plaint that in the year 2015 when the plaintiff came over for the purpose of updating the NRC data, he was shocked to learn that the name of the defendant had been mutated in the concerned Jamabandi as a share holder in place of the plaintiff on the basis of an order dated 11.04.1990 passed by the Circle Officer, Boko. It is under such circumstances taking into account the action of the defendant the suit was filed for declaration of the plaintiff’s right, title and interest over the Schedule-A land; for recovery of khas possession of the land from the defendant as well as for permanent injunction etc. 4. The defendant filed his written statement and in the written statement it was stated that the plaintiff never cultivated upon the Schedule-A land. It was specifically stated that in the year 1990, the defendant purchased the rights over the Schedule-A land from the plaintiff and on the basis thereof got his name mutated in the records. The allegation as regards the defendant cultivating on adhi basis was denied. It was also denied that the defendant had illegally dispossessed the plaintiff rather it was stated that the plaintiff was disturbing the peaceful possession of the defendant over the Schedule land. 5. On the basis of the said pleadings as many as 7 Issues were framed by the learned Trial Court of which Issue No. (iii) was as to whether the plaintiff allowed the defendant to cultivate the land on adhi basis. 5. On the basis of the said pleadings as many as 7 Issues were framed by the learned Trial Court of which Issue No. (iii) was as to whether the plaintiff allowed the defendant to cultivate the land on adhi basis. Issue No. (iv) was as to whether the plaintiff sold the suit land to the defendant and Issue No. (v) was as to whether the plaintiff had right, title and interest over the suit land. 6. Both sides adduced evidence. The learned Trial Court vide the judgment and decree dated 30.03.2018 decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff by granting the relief as sought for. In doing so the Issue No. (iii) was decided in favour of the plaintiff holding that the defendant was cultivating on adhi basis. As regards the issue No. (iv) as to whether plaintiff sold the land to the defendant, it was stated that there was no evidence brought on record to show the plaintiff sold the land to the defendant. As regards the Issue No. (v), the learned Trial Court observed that the plaintiff had the right, title and interest over the suit land. 7. Being aggrieved, the defendant preferred an Appeal before the Court of the Civil Judge, Kamrup (Amingaon) which was registered and numbered as Title Appeal No. 43/2018. The said Appeal was dismissed vide judgment and decree dated 16.09.2022 thereby affirming the judgement and decree passed by the learned Trial Court. It is under such circumstances the present Appeal has been filed and the question which arises in the present proceedings now is as to whether the any substantial question of law so proposed can be formulated in the present Appeal. 8. This Court has also taken note of that three substantial questions of law when have been proposed by the appellant. In that regard, this Court has duly heard Mr. N.N. Upadhyaya, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant. The counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 1, Mr. A.C. Sharma, has also been duly heard. Their respective contentions have also been given due consideration. 9. In the backdrop of the above, let this Court therefore consider as to whether the proposed substantial questions of law duly can be at all formulated in the instant Appeal. The counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 1, Mr. A.C. Sharma, has also been duly heard. Their respective contentions have also been given due consideration. 9. In the backdrop of the above, let this Court therefore consider as to whether the proposed substantial questions of law duly can be at all formulated in the instant Appeal. It is seen that though three questions of law are proposed but a reading of the said questions of law proposed transpires that the issue of limitation was not properly considered by both the Courts below taking into account that from the evidence of record, more particularly the evidence of PW-2, the plaintiff resided at Golaghat from 1992 to 2005 and at that point of time, the defendant was in possession of suit land. 10. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant/defendant having been in possession of the suit land from 1992 to 2005 and such the appellant has been in possession for such a long period of time, the learned Courts below were not justified in decreeing the suit as the suit was barred by the limitation. 11. The question therefore arises as to whether the suit is barred by limitation. There is no doubt that the plaintiff had right, title and interest over the Schedule-A land which both the Courts below have conclusively held. Section 3 of the Limitation Act 1963 also envisages that whether the defence of limitation is taken or not, a suit filed, Appeal preferred or an application made beyond the prescribed period has to be dismissed even though a defence is not specifically taken. But the question arises as to whether in a suit which is based on title there is any period of limitation. In the opinion of this Court, a suit based on title, there is no period of limitation unless and until the defendant pleads adverse possession. It is only when the defendant pleads and proves adverse possession, the period of twelve years has to be counted from the date the possession becomes adverse. This is the mandate of Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963. In the instant case, if the materials on record are taken into account, more particularly the written statement, there are no pleadings to the effect that the defendant had been adversely possessing the suit land to the knowledge of the plaintiff. This is the mandate of Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963. In the instant case, if the materials on record are taken into account, more particularly the written statement, there are no pleadings to the effect that the defendant had been adversely possessing the suit land to the knowledge of the plaintiff. The three elements mandatorily required to be pleaded and proved that the possession had been open, hostile and continuous to the notice and interest of the true owner is missing. The case set out by the defendant is plain and simple to the effect that the defendant purchased the suit land from the plaintiff and has been possessing. The above plea so set out in the pleadings is destructive to the plea of adverse possession which is sought to be taken before this Court. It is well settled that possession however long cannot be construed as adverse possession sans the elements constituting adverse possession is present. 12. Accordingly, this court is of the opinion that the question of law so proposed by the learned counsel for the appellant are not substantial questions of law that can be formulated in terms with Section 100(4) of the Code. 13. Consequently, this Court finds no merit in the instant Appeal for which the Appeal stands dismissed. However, in the facts of the case, this Court is not inclined to impose costs.