ORDER : Per: Justice Anand Pathak 1. The present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is preferred by the petitioner seeking following reliefs: “(i) That, the recovery document (Annexure P/1) and letter dated 6.7.2021 (Annexure P/2) be directed to be quashed and set aside. (ii) That, the appellate authority may be directed to decide the appeal without insisting upon deposit of 10% for maintaining of appeal in terms of order Annexure P/2. (iii) That, it may be held that rules of 2018 are applicable, which nowhere provides for deposit of 10% as pre-deposit for maintaining of appeal. The rules of 1996 may be held to be not applicable. (iv) That, other relief which is just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case may also be granted.” 2. Present petition has been filed by the petitioner being crestfallen by the order dated 6.7.2021 (Annexure P/1) passed by the Joint Director (on behalf of Director, Geology and Mining) whereby the petitioner has been directed to deposit 10% of the outstanding/recovery amount as per rule 60(5) of the M.P. Minor Mineral, rules, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as “the MM Rules”). Petitioner is against imposition, therefore, this petition was preferred. 3. To appreciate the controversy, following dates and events are important: Dates Events 1.3.2017 to 31.3.2019 The sand quarry was granted in favour of petitioner for two years. 29.6.2019 The Collector under the provisions of rule 30 (19) of MM Rules and as per condition No.4 (3) of lease deed, the grant of quarry lease was cancelled with forfeiture of security amount of Rs.5,41,250/-. 29.1.2021 The W.P. No.2322/2021 ( M/s Om Associates v.State of M.P. ) was filed against the order dated 26.9.2019. 23.3.2021 The aforesaid writ petition No.2322/2021 was disposed of with direction that "In view of above discussion and more so that disputed questions of fact are involved for dealing with the merits of challenge to the impugned order of cancellation of lease deed, it would be appropriate that the same are raised before the Appellate Authority under the M.P. Minor Mineral rules, 1996. Since much time has elapsed and the statutory limitation for preferring an appeal has expired, this Court in the peculiar facts and circumstances prevailing herein, deems it appropriate to direct that in case petitioner prefers an appeal within one month from today before the appropriate appellate authority under M.P. Minor Mineral rules, 1996 by treating the impugned order to have been passed under M.P. Minor Mineral rules, 1996, the same would be decided by Competent Authority on merits without being dismissed on limitation alone". 6.7.21 The petitioner was directed to deposit 10% of the amount under rule 60(5) of the MM rules. 4. It is the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that grant of quarry lease was cancelled on 29.6.2019 against which writ petition bearing No.2322/2021 was filed in which the order dated 23.3.2021 was passed directing the petitioner to approach the appellate authority (Director, Geology and Mining). On 22.1.2021, the MM rules were amended by incorporating sub-clause (5) in rule 60, according to which appeal shall be accepted once 10% of the recovery amount is deposited by the appellant. Since, according to counsel for the petitioner, it is procedural rule which provides such mechanism and was inserted on 22.1.2021 whereas the case of petitioner was pending much prior to it, therefore, petitioner is not liable to pay the amount so asked for. He relied upon the judgment of apex Court in the case of ECGC Limited v. Mokul Shriram EPC JV, (2022) 6 SCC 704 and the order dated 9.7.2024 passed in Writ Petition No.6786 of 2024 and order dated 9.5.2024 passed in Writ Petition No.8113 of 2024 passed by the Coordinate Bench. 5. Learned counsel for the respondents/State opposed the above submissions. According to him, sub-clause (5) in rule 60 of the MM rules came into being on 22.1.2021 whereas the appeal was preferred by the petitioner much after that. In fact, he was given liberty to file appeal vide order dated 23.3.2021 by learned Writ Court and thereafter appeal was preferred in June-July, 2021, therefore, petitioner has to deposit the requisite amount as asked for. He relied upon the judgments of apex Court in the case of G.P. Nayyar v. State (Delhi Administration), AIR 1979 SC 602 , Lakshmi Narain Guin v. Niranjan Modak, (1990) 1 SCC 455 and Rai Bahadur Seth Shreeram Durgaprasad v. Director of Enforcement, (1987) 3 SCC 27 . 6. He relied upon the judgments of apex Court in the case of G.P. Nayyar v. State (Delhi Administration), AIR 1979 SC 602 , Lakshmi Narain Guin v. Niranjan Modak, (1990) 1 SCC 455 and Rai Bahadur Seth Shreeram Durgaprasad v. Director of Enforcement, (1987) 3 SCC 27 . 6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents appended thereto. 7. In the case in hand, question for consideration is whether petitioner is liable to deposit 10% of the recovery amount as directed by the Director of Geology and Mining on the ground that appeal was preferred subsequent to the amendment caused on 22.1.2021 by which 10% was directed to be deposited as pre condition for appeal or petitioner cannot be subjected to deposit on the ground that initial proceedings against him were initiated on 29.6.2019 when lease deed got cancelled which gives a substantive as well as vested right to the petitioner to prefer appeal. For better understanding sub-clause (5) of rule 60 of the MM rules is reproduced. Same reads as under: “60. Application for Appeal, Revision or Review:- (1) ** ** ** (2) ** ** ** (3) ** ** ** (4) ** ** ** (5) In such cases in which penalty has been imposed or amount of minerals dues remains for recovery, 10 percent of such amount, shall be deposited in the head of account as mentioned in sub rule (1). The challan of the such deposit amount shall be attached with the appeal / revision application. Only after that appeal/revision application shall be admissible.” 8. Contention of petitioner is that cause of action accrued to him for the first time on 1.3.2017 when sand quarry was granted in favour f petitioner for a period of two years. Later on, on 29.6.2019 Collector, District Vidisha exercising the power under rule 30(19) of the MM rules and as per condition 3(4) of the lease deed, the grant of quarry lease was cancelled with forfeiture of security amount of Rs.5,41,250/-. Therefore, the effective cause of action accrued to the petitioner on 29.6.2019 itself to file appeal. A right of appeal is not merely a matter of procedure. It is a matter of substantive right. Therefore, the effective cause of action accrued to the petitioner on 29.6.2019 itself to file appeal. A right of appeal is not merely a matter of procedure. It is a matter of substantive right. This right of appeal from the decision of original Court to a superior Court becomes vested in a party when proceedings are first initiated in, and before a decision is given by the inferior Court. Such a vested right cannot be taken away except by express enactment or necessary intendment. 9. The question is whether imposition of such restriction by amendment of rule can affect the petitioner's right of appeal from a decision in proceedings which commenced prior to such amendment and which right of appeal is free from such restriction under the provisions as it stood at the time of the commencement of the proceedings. Vested right continued as substantive right in appeal. 10. One can profitably refer the judgment of apex Court in the case of Hoosein Kasam Dada (India) Limited v. State of Madhya Pradesh and others, (1953) 1 SCC 299 wherein the apex Court has delineated the principles in detail in following manners: “24. The, above decisions quite firmly establish and our decisions in Janardan Reddy v. The State (1) and in Ganpat Rai v. Agarwal Chamber of Commerce Ltd. (2) uphold the principle that a right of appeal is not merely a matter of procedure. It is matter of substantive right. This right of appeal from the decision of an .inferior tribunal to a superior tribunal becomes vested in a party when proceedings are first initiated in, and before a decision is given by, the inferior Court. 25. In the language of Jenkins C.J. in Nana bin Aba v. Shaik bin Andu (supra) to disturb an existing right of appeal is not a mere alteration in procedure. Such a vested right cannot be taken away except by express enactment or necessary intendment. An [intention to interfere with or to impair or imperil such a vested right cannot be presumed unless such intention be clearly manifested by express words or necessary implication. 28. In our view the above observation is apposite and applies to the case before us. Such a vested right cannot be taken away except by express enactment or necessary intendment. An [intention to interfere with or to impair or imperil such a vested right cannot be presumed unless such intention be clearly manifested by express words or necessary implication. 28. In our view the above observation is apposite and applies to the case before us. The true implication of the above observation as of the decisions in the other cases referred to above is that the pre-existing right of appeal is not destroyed by the amendment if the amendment is not made retrospective by express words or necessary intendment. The fact that the pre-existing right of appeal continues to exist must, in its turn, necessarily imply that the old law which created that right of appeal must also exist to support the continuation of that right. As the old law continues to exist for the purpose of supporting the pre- existing right of appeal that old law must govern the exercise and enforcement of that right of appeal and there can then be no question of the amended provision preventing the exercise of that right.” 11. Later on, in the case of State of Bombay v. M/s Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd., AIR 1960 SC 980 , the same spirit echoed and it was held that impairment of the right of appeal by putting a new restriction thereon or imposing a more onerous condition is not a matter of procedure only; it impairs or imperils a substantive right and an enactment which does so is not retrospective unless it says so expressly or by necessary intendment. 12. Further the Apex Court in the case of Vitthalbhai Naranbhai Patel v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1967 SC 344 has reiterated in the same fashion. This was a Constitutional Bench judgment and incidentally all the three judgments as referred above were presided by Hon'ble Shri Justice S.K. Das J. (as he then was) in which he was author of first two judgments. 13. Recently in the case of Neena Aneja and another v. Jai Prakash Associates Limited, (2022) 2 SCC 161 , the apex Court while dealing with the amendment caused through Consumer Protection Act, 2019 and Repeal of Consumer Protection Act, 1986 pecuniary jurisdiction of Consumer Forum by virtue of new enactment was discussed in detail and Court held in the following manner: “72. In considering the myriad precedents that have interpreted the impact of a change in forum on pending proceedings and retrospectivity - a clear position of law has emerged: a change in forum lies in the realm of procedure. Accordingly, in compliance with the tenets of statutory interpretation applicable to procedural law, amendments on matters of procedure are retrospective, unless a contrary intention emerges from the statute. This position emerges from the decisions in New India Assurance (supra), Maria Cristina (supra), Hitendra Kumar Thakur (supra), Ramesh Kumar Soni (supra) and Sudhir G Angur (supra). More recently, this position has been noted in a three judge Bench decision of this Court in Manish Kumar v. Union of India 51.However, there was a deviation by a two judge bench decision of this Court in Dhadi Sahu (supra), which overlooked the decision of a larger three judge bench in New India Assurance (supra) and of a co-ordinate two judge bench in Maria Cristina (supra). The decision in Dhadi Sahu (supra) propounded a position that “21. ….....no litigant has any vested right in the matter of procedural law but where the question is of change of forum it ceases to be a question of procedure only. The forum of appeal or proceedings is a vested right as opposed to pure procedure to be followed before a particular forum. The right becomes vested when the proceedings are initiated in the tribunal.” In taking this view, the two judge bench did not consider binding decisions. Dhadi Sahu (supra) failed to consider that the saving of pending proceedings in Mohd. Idris (supra) and Manujendra Dutt (supra) was a saving of vested rights of the litigants that were being impacted by the repealing acts therein, and not because a right to forum is accrued once proceedings have been initiated. Thereafter, a line of decisions followed Dhadi Sahu (supra), to hold that a litigant has a crystallized right to a forum once proceedings have been initiated. A litigant’s vested right (including the right to an appeal) prior to the amendment or repeal are undoubtedly saved, in addition to substantive rights envisaged under section 6of the General Clauses Act. This protection does not extend to pure matters of procedure. Repeals or amendments that effect changes in forum would ordinarily affect pending proceedings, unless a contrary intention appears from the repealing or amending statute. 73. This protection does not extend to pure matters of procedure. Repeals or amendments that effect changes in forum would ordinarily affect pending proceedings, unless a contrary intention appears from the repealing or amending statute. 73. It is relevant to note in this context that the decision in Ambalal Sarabhai (supra), saved proceedings in relation to a benefit which although not vested, accrued to the landlord to evict the tenant by virtue of a proviso to a section which accorded protection to the tenant from ejectment. This Court reasoned that since the right of the landlord flows from a Section which protects the tenant, it cannot be enlarged into a vested right. However, Ambalal Sarabhai (supra), did not enunciate an absolute proposition that the right to institute proceedings at a particular forum is an accrued right, let alone a vested right. The dictum that a change of forum is a procedural matter is not altered by the decision of this Court in Ambalal Sarabhai (supra) which sought to differentiate between vested rights and accrued rights, the latter being protected under section 6(c)of the General Clauses Act, the proceedings in relation to which are protected under section 6(e).” 14. Considering the submissions and the fact that accrued right of action given to the petitioner, once the proceedings were initiated in 2019 itself. At that time vide order dated 29.6.2019 grant of lease was cancelled. Petitioner had the cause of action since then and at that point of time amended clause (5) in rule 60 of the MM rules did not exist. Therefore, accrued right or vested right in the case of petitioner cannot be altered while insisting upon to pay 10% fee as pre requisite for filing appeal. Therefore, the impugned order 6.7.2021 is hereby set aside and directed that respondent/appellate authority shall decide the appeal preferred by the petitioner without insisting upon 10% of total amount. 15. With the aforesaid directions, this writ appeal stands allowed and disposed of.