ORDER : 1. Heard leaned advocate Mr. S. P. Majmudar for the petitioners, learned Senior Advocate Mr. Dhaval C. Dave with learned advocate Mr. Jigar M. Patel for respondent Nos.3 to 5 and learned advocate Ms. Pooja H. Bhardwaj for K. J. Brahmbhatt for respondent No.2. 2. Upon joint request and consent of learned advocates for respective parties, this matter is taken up for final hearing. 3. By way of this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the present petitioners have prayed for the following reliefs. “(A)The Hon’ble Court be Court be pleased to quash and set aside the impugned order dated 18.06.2016 passed below Exhibit 26 in Special Civil Suit No.447 of 2014 by the 16th Additional Senior Civil Judge, Surat. (B) During pendency and final disposal of the present petition the Hon’ble Court be pleased to stay any further proceedings in Special Civil Suit No.447 of 2014 before the 16th Additional Senior Civil Judge, Surat. (C) ...xxx” 4. Brief facts of the case are as under. 4.1. The petitioners original plaintiffs have filed Special Civil Suit No.447 of 2014 against the present respondent Nos.1 and 2 for a relief of specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 14.08.2013 and sauda chitti dated 26.07.2013 and for other consequential reliefs. The suit property which is bearing Survey No.34/D of Village Ved having T.P. Scheme No.50, belongs to the ownership of respondent Nos.1 and 2. The respondent No.1 is an individual party and respondent No.2 is HUF. During the pendency of the suit, the respondent Nos.3 to 5 herein filed an application below Exhibit-26 under Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and sought a relief to be impleaded as defendants in the said suit. Respondent No.3 is wife of defendant No.2-Nainesh Jayantilal Vadiwala and respondent Nos.4 and 5 are children of respondent Nos.2 and 3. The application was contested and the learned 16th Additional Senior Civil Judge, Surat allowed the said application and respondent Nos.3 to 5 were directed to be added as defendants. 4.2. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with said order, present petitioners are before this Court. 4.3. The undisputed fact is that the suit property is owned by the respondent Nos.1 and 2 jointly and out of which the respondent No.2 is HUF being represented by the Karta Nainesh Jayantilal Vadiwala. 4.2. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with said order, present petitioners are before this Court. 4.3. The undisputed fact is that the suit property is owned by the respondent Nos.1 and 2 jointly and out of which the respondent No.2 is HUF being represented by the Karta Nainesh Jayantilal Vadiwala. Respondent Nos.3 to 5 are the members of HUF family and they are co-parceners in the said HUF. The suit property was proposed to be alienated by an agreement to sell dated 14.08.2013. 5. Leaned advocate Mr. S. P. Majmudar for the petitioners has submitted that the learned trial Judge has committed gross error of law. Respondent Nos.3 to 5 have no privity of contract with the petitioners-original plaintiffs and the agreement to sell was executed by respondent Nos.2 and 3 in capacity of Karta and Karta has every right to sell or alienate the property belongs to the HUF. It is submitted that the respondent Nos.3 to 5 are not necessary and proper parties and instead of being impleaded in the suit, the proposed parties should have filed a separate suit for their assertion of rights in the suit property. It is further submitted that in the agreement to sell, the factual aspect regarding the loan being taken on the suit property is mentioned and after the property is released from the charge, title clearance may be obtained. Thus, there was a clear legal necessity for selling the property. It is further submitted that while adding the respondent Nos.3 to 5 as defendants in the suit and looking to the contentions as raised by the respondent Nos.3 to 5, if the application is allowed, it would amount to change in the nature of the suit. The original suit is more specific performance of the agreement to sell and Sauda Chitthi, whereas by adding respondent Nos.3 to 5 as defendants, the suit would be converted into a title suit, which is not permissible under the law. In view of catena of decisions relied upon by the learned advocate for the petitioners, it is further submitted that the petitioners are dominus litius. To whom plaintiff wishes to sue is the sole discretion of plaintiff, if plaintiff chooses not to add any party, plaintiff can take that stand on his own risk. In view of catena of decisions relied upon by the learned advocate for the petitioners, it is further submitted that the petitioners are dominus litius. To whom plaintiff wishes to sue is the sole discretion of plaintiff, if plaintiff chooses not to add any party, plaintiff can take that stand on his own risk. Thus, the submission of learned advocate for the petitioners is that the order passed below Exhibit-26 is completely ignoring the provisions of Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 5.1 In support of his submissions, learned advocate for the petitioners has relied upon the decisions, which are as under. “(1) Sudhamayee Pattnaik and Others Vs. Bibhu Prasad Sahoo and others reported in 2022 Live Law (SC) 773. (2) Gurmit Singh Bhatia Vs. Kiran Kant Robinson and Others reported in (2020) 13 SCC 773 . (3) Kammana Sambamurthy (dead) by LRS. Vs. Kalipatnapu Atchutamma (dead) and Others reported in (2011) 11 SCC 153 . (4) Bhartiben S. Jhaveri Vs. Controller of Estate Duty reported in 1998 SCC Online Guj 486. (5) E. Ajay Kumar Vs. Smt. Tulsabai and Another reported in AIR 1973 Bombay 330. (6) Raj K. Mehra Vs. Mrs. Anjali Bhaduri reported in 1981 SCC Online Del 105. (7) Beereddy Dasaratharami Reddy Vs. V. Manjunath and Another reported in 2021 SCC Online SC 1236. (8) N. S. Balaji Vs. Presiding Officer, Debt Recovery Tribunal and Others reported in 2023 SCC Online SC 1266. 6. On the other hand, learned Senior Advocate Mr. Dhaval C. Dave has vehemently submitted that the order passed below Exhibit-26 does not require any interference as the same is based on the factual matrix of the case. It is further submitted that the contentions of the respondent Nos.3 to 5 are undisputed facts and there was no legal necessity for the Karta of HUF to alienate the suit property by executing an agreement to sell and sauda chitthi in favour of the plaintiffs. It is further submitted that there was no financial crisis, which compelled the Karta to sell the suit property. It is also submitted that being co-parceners of HUF, respondent Nos.3 to 5 have a direct interest in the suit property and they are not only proper, but also necessary party in the present suit. It is further submitted that there was no financial crisis, which compelled the Karta to sell the suit property. It is also submitted that being co-parceners of HUF, respondent Nos.3 to 5 have a direct interest in the suit property and they are not only proper, but also necessary party in the present suit. It is further submitted that if any adverse order is passed in the suit, respondent Nos.3 to 5 would be directly prejudiced. To counter the submission of learned advocate for the petitioners regarding filing of the separate suit, learned Senior Advocate has submitted that the respondent Nos.3 to 5 are not challenging the title of defendant No.2. The fact remains that the challenge will be against the agreement to sell and sauda chitthi. Hence the nature of defence would not change. Even, the original defendants have resisted the suit and in the same way, the respondent Nos.3 to 5 would resist the suit. The learned Senior Advocate has submitted that even after adding the parties as defendants, the suit would remain a suit for specific performance. The learned Senior Advocate for the respondent No.3 to 5 has further submitted that this Court has no jurisdiction to exercise the power under Article 227 in the background of the facts involved in the present petition. Even if, there is any error in the order of the learned trial Court, the High Court under Article 227 has no power to reassess or reevaluate the findings. 7. Learned advocate Ms. Pooja H. Bhardwaj for respondent No.2 has given support to the submissions advanced by the learned Senior Advocate. In addition, she has submitted that according to the observations made by the learned trial Court, respondent Nos.3 to 5 have a right in the suit property as a member of HUF. She has further submitted that the scope under Article 227 of the Constitution is very narrow and this Court may not interfere in the findings arrived at by the learned trial Court, which are purely on factual aspects. 8. I have considered the rival submissions of all the parties. the certain admit facts, which are culled out from the record in the present petition, are that the suit property is owned by the respondent No.1 and respondent No.2, respondent No.2 is the Karta of Nainesh Jayantilal Vadiwala HUF and said HUF has a half undivided share in the suit property. the certain admit facts, which are culled out from the record in the present petition, are that the suit property is owned by the respondent No.1 and respondent No.2, respondent No.2 is the Karta of Nainesh Jayantilal Vadiwala HUF and said HUF has a half undivided share in the suit property. The respondent Nos.3 to 5 are the members of the said HUF and also the family of respondent No.2. At this stage, the provisions of under Order 1 Rule 10(2) of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 referred as under. “Court may strike out or add parties. -The Court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the Court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be struck out, and that the name of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added.” 9. The said provision clearly envisages that the Court has power to add any person whose presence before the court is necessary in order to enable the Court effectively and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the question involved in the suit. It is a discretionary power vested with the Court to add any party in the suit proceedings. In the present case, learned trial Court has exercised the discretionary powers vested in it and has allowed the application. The observations made by the learned trial Court while granting the application are purely on the basis of facts and it has been observed that the proposed defendants are members of HUF and they have rights and interests in the suit property. Whether the agreement to sell and the sauda chitthi were executed to over come financial constraint and was there a legal necessity, is a question of fact which can be tried during the trial. At this stage, such issues cannot be considered while deciding the application under Order 1 Rule 10 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Whether the agreement to sell and the sauda chitthi were executed to over come financial constraint and was there a legal necessity, is a question of fact which can be tried during the trial. At this stage, such issues cannot be considered while deciding the application under Order 1 Rule 10 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. What is required to be considered is whether the proposed parties have any direct right in the suit property and in absence of the proposed parties whether the Court would adjudicate the controversy prevailing in the suit. In the opinion of this Court, the proposed defendant Nos.3 to 5 are proper and necessary parties and they are rightly joined in the suit. 10. The decisions relied upon by the learned advocate for the petitioners are on different set of facts. (i). In the case of Sudhamayee Pattnaik (supra) the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed that plaintiffs are the dominus litis & non-impleading the subsequent purchasers as defendant on the objection shall be at the risk of plaintiffs. (ii). In the case of Gurmit Singh Bhatia (supra) the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed that application to be impleaded of subsequent transferee of suit property cannot be allowed against the wishes of the plaintiffs in a suit for specific performance of contract. (iii). In the case of Kammana Sambamurthy (supra) the vendor having only half of the share in the poverty in question execution contract for sale of entire property. (iv). In the case of Bhartiben S. Jhaveri (supra) the issue was for determination of the principal value of the estate that prayed to the heirs and also pertaining to estate duty chargeable on coparcenary properties. (v). In the case of E. Ajay Kumar (supra) the non-applicant party contended that the defendant was incompetent to enter into an agreement of sale in favour of plaintiff. Thus, the case set up by the non-applicant was oppose to the title which was set up by defendant. (vi). In the case of Raj K. Mehra (supra) the case of the defendant was that the property was built out of the funds of wife & children have share in the property. And since the property is fetching more price, defendant would resile from the agreement and further disputed about the ownership of defendant herself. (vi). In the case of Raj K. Mehra (supra) the case of the defendant was that the property was built out of the funds of wife & children have share in the property. And since the property is fetching more price, defendant would resile from the agreement and further disputed about the ownership of defendant herself. And the defendant moved an application under Order 1 Rule 10 of CPC to implead her children in the suit proceedings. (vii). In the case of Beereddy Dasaratharami Reddy (supra) the suit for specific performance was decreed suit to the seller did not challenge the decree, however, son of seller challenged the decree by way of Regular First Appeal. And the challenge in the First Appeal was on the ground that agreement to sell is unenforceable as the suit property belongs to the Joint Hindu Family. (viii). In the case of N. S. Balaji (supra) the issue was whether Karta of HUF can mortgage the property and it was held that father being Karta can mortgage the HUF property. In all the above decisions, the question even about a right of the Karta to either sell or mortgage the HUF property. In the present case, the respondent Nos.3 to 5 is that there was no legal necessity to execute agreement to sell in favour of plaintiff. 11. In the case of Mumbai International Airport (P) Ltd. Vs. Regency Convention Centre & Hotels (P) Ltd. reported in (2010) 7 SCC 417 , by referring para Nos.13, 14, 15, 18 and 19, which are as under. “13. The general rule in regard to impleadment of parties is that the plaintiff in a suit, being dominus litis, may choose the persons against whom he wishes to litigate and cannot be compelled to sue a person against whom he does not seek any relief. Consequently, a person who is not a party has no right to be impleaded against the wishes of the plaintiff. But this general rule is subject to the provisions of Order I Rule 10(2) of Code of Civil Procedure ('Code' for short), which provides for impleadment of proper or necessary parties. The said sub-rule is extracted below: ‘10.(2) Court may strike out or add parties. But this general rule is subject to the provisions of Order I Rule 10(2) of Code of Civil Procedure ('Code' for short), which provides for impleadment of proper or necessary parties. The said sub-rule is extracted below: ‘10.(2) Court may strike out or add parties. - The court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the Court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be struck out, and that the name of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added. 14. The said provision makes it clear that a court may, at any stage of the proceedings (including suits for specific performance), either upon or even without any application, and on such terms as may appear to it to be just, direct that any of the following persons may be added as a party: (a) any person who ought to have been joined as plaintiff or defendant, but not added; or (b) any person whose presence before the court may be necessary in order to enable the court to effectively and completely adjudicate upon and settle the question involved in the suit. In short, the court is given the discretion to add as a party, any person who is found to be a necessary party or proper party. 15. A 'necessary party' is a person who ought to have been joined as a party and in whose absence no effective decree could be passed at all by the Court. If a 'necessary party' is not impleaded, the suit itself is liable to be dismissed. A 'proper party' is a party who, though not a necessary party, is a person whose presence would enable the court to completely, effectively and adequately adjudicate upon all matters in disputes in the suit, though he need not be a person in favour of or against whom the decree is to be made. If a person is not found to be a proper or necessary party, the court has no jurisdiction to implead him, against the wishes of the plaintiff. If a person is not found to be a proper or necessary party, the court has no jurisdiction to implead him, against the wishes of the plaintiff. The fact that a person is likely to secure a right/interest in a suit property, after the suit is decided against the plaintiff, will not make such person a necessary party or a proper party to the suit for specific performance. 18. In Kasturi this Court reiterated the position that necessary parties and proper parties can alone seek to be impleaded as parties to a suit for specific performance. This Court held that necessary parties are those persons in whose absence no decree can be passed by the court or those persons against whom there is a right to some relief in respect of the controversy involved in the proceedings; and that proper parties are those whose presence before the court would be necessary in order to enable the court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit although no relief in the suit was claimed against such person. 19. Referring to suits for specific performance, this Court held that the following persons are to be considered as necessary parties: (i) the parties to the contract which is sought to be enforced or their legal representatives; (ii) a transferee of the property which is the subject matter of the contract. This Court also explained that a person who has a direct interest in the subject matter of the suit for specific performance of an agreement of sale may be impleaded as a proper party, on his application under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC. This Court concluded that a purchaser of the suit property subsequent to the suit agreement would be a necessary party as he would be affected if he had purchased it with or without notice of the contract, but a person who claims a title adverse to that of the defendant-vendor will not be a necessary party.” 12. This Court concluded that a purchaser of the suit property subsequent to the suit agreement would be a necessary party as he would be affected if he had purchased it with or without notice of the contract, but a person who claims a title adverse to that of the defendant-vendor will not be a necessary party.” 12. In the case of Mumbai International Airport (supra), it has been observed that “a ‘necessary party’ is a person, who ought to have been joined as a party and in whose absence no effective decree could be passed at all by the Court” “proper party is a party who, though not a necessary party, is a person whose presence would enable the court to completely, effectively and adequately adjudicate upon all matters in dispute in the suit, though he need not be a person in favour of or against whom the decree is to be made.” 13. The plaintiff being dominus litis of his suit is not an absolute principle of rule, the provisions of Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure are exceptions to this rule. The governing provisions relating to parties to the suit are contemplated under Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Whether the applicant is a necessary or proper party in the suit. Discretionary powers of the Court and while exercising such discretionary power, the Court has to see whether a party interested would be directly affected as a result of culmination of any judgment and decree. In the case of Baluram Versus P. Chellathangam and others reported in (2015) 13 SCC 579 , the decision of Mumbai International Airport Private Limited Versus Regency Convention Centre and Hotels Private Limited and Other reported in (2010) 7 SCC 417 has been considered. 14. In the case of Krishan Lal and another Vs. Sudesh Kumari and others reported in AIR 1998 Punjab and Haryana 168 in para Nos.8, 15, 16 and 23 are reproduced. “8. The Code of Civil Procedure provides as to how a suit has to be instituted and how would it end. The Code provides a thread of continually, which would regulate various stages of the suit. In other words, the intention of the legislation must and has to be gathered from the various provisions of the Code read collectively and in conjunction with each other. The Code provides a thread of continually, which would regulate various stages of the suit. In other words, the intention of the legislation must and has to be gathered from the various provisions of the Code read collectively and in conjunction with each other. Whereas Order 1, Rules 1 and 3 of the Code provides who are the persons who could be joined as plaintiffs and/or defendants, Rule 10 gives power to the Court to add parties to direct addition and impleadment of parties and Rule 8-A gives right to a party to approach the Court for being impleaded as a party, if the applicant has an interest in any question which directly and substantially arise in the suit. The provisions regulating impleadment of necessary and proper parties, whose presence is necessary before the Court for proper and final adjudication, must be construed in a wider perspective, as the provisions of Order 2, Rule 1 of the Code clearly indicate that every suit, as for as practicable, be framed so as to afford grounds for final decision upon the subjects in disputes and to prevent further litigation concerning them. To hold that avoidance of multiplicity of litigation in regard to the same subject matter is not even relevant factor while considering the application for impleadment, to my mind, would be an approach not in line with the spirit of the procedural law. 15. The mere fact that a party could bring a suit in its own right by itself or could not be the sole reason for refusing impleadment of a party who may otherwise satisfy the criterion referred supra. Wide discretion is vested in the Court and so far such an exercise of jurisdiction is not arbitrary, such an order may not call for interference. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Arjan Singh v. Kartar Singh, AIR 1975 Punj & Har 184, held as under (at Page 185):-- "Order 1, Rule 10(2) gives wide discretion to the Court to meet every case of defect of parties, but the power must be exercised on judicial principles and not arbitrarily. One of the well-known principles is that the person to be added must be necessary to effectually and completely adjudicate upon and settle all the points in the suit and that a party should not be added merely to avoid multiplicity of suits." 16. One of the well-known principles is that the person to be added must be necessary to effectually and completely adjudicate upon and settle all the points in the suit and that a party should not be added merely to avoid multiplicity of suits." 16. The jurisdiction of the Court under this Rule has been held to be not one of initial jurisdiction of the Court, but one of judicial discretion, which has to be exercised keeping in view the facts and circumstances of a given case. At this stage, it may be more appropriate to refer to the following observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Ramesh Hirachand Kundamal v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, 1992 (2) SCC 524 : (1992 AIR SCW 846) as under (at Page 849 of AIR SCW):-- "Though the plaintiff-appellant is dominus litis and is not bound to sue every possible adverse claimant in the same suit and he may choose to implead only those persons as defendants against whom he wishes to proceed, but the Court may at any stage of the suit direct addition of parties: A party can be joined as defendant even though the plaintiff does not think that he has any cause of action against him. The question of impleadment of a party has to be decided on the touchstone of Order 1, Rule 10 which provides only a necessary or a proper party may be added. In the light of the clear language of the rule, it is not open to the appellant to contend that a person cannot be added as defendant even in a case where his presence to enable the Court to decide the matter effectively. A necessary party is one without whom no order can be made effectively. A proper party is one in whose absence an effective order can be made effectively. A proper party is one in whose absence an effective order can be made but whose presence is necessary for a complete and final decision on the question involved in the proceeding. The addition of parties is generally not a question of initial jurisdiction of the Court but of a judicial discretion which has to be exercised in view of all the facts and circumstances of a particular case. The addition of parties is generally not a question of initial jurisdiction of the Court but of a judicial discretion which has to be exercised in view of all the facts and circumstances of a particular case. The Court is empowered to join a person whose presence is necessary for the prescribed purpose and cannot under the rule direct the addition of a person whose presence is not necessary for that purpose. If the intervener has a cause of action against the plaintiff relating to the subject-matter of the existing action, the Court has power to join the intervener so as to give effect to the primary object of the order which is to avoid multiplicity of actions." 23. All co-owners are necessary party to a suit to recover properly belonging to them jointly was so held by the Supreme Court in the case of Kanakarathanammal v. V. S. Loganatha Mudaliar, AIR 1965 Supreme Court 271, as under (at page 276) :-- "It is unfortunate that the appellant's claim has to be rejected on the ground that she failed to implead her two brothers to her suit. xx xx xx xx xx Once it is held that the appellant's two brothers are co-heirs with her in respect of the properties left intestate by their mother, the present suit filed by the appellant partakes of the character of a suit for partition and in such a suit clearly the appellant alone would not be entitled to claim any relief against the respondents." 15. In the case of Moreshar Yadaorao Mahajan Versus Vyankatesh Sitaram Bhedi (D) thr. Lrs. and Others reported in 2022 SCC Online SC 1307, again case of Mumbai International Airport Private Limited Versus Regency Convention Centre and Hotels Private Limited and Others reported in (2010) 7 SCC 417 has been considered and in para 20 the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed. “It can thus be seen that what has been held by this Court is that for being a necessary party, the twin test has to be satisfied. The first one is that there must be a right to some relief against such party in respect of the controversies involved in the proceedings. The second one is that no effective decree can be passed in the absence of such a party.” 16. The next question is the scope of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The second one is that no effective decree can be passed in the absence of such a party.” 16. The next question is the scope of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. In the Catena of decisions it has been observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court that in the exercising the its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court does not act as an Appellate Court or Tribunal and cannot review or reassess the evidence upon which the inferior Court has passed the order. 17. In the case of Rajkumar Bhatia Vs. Subhash Chander Bhatia reported in (2018) 2 SCC 87 , in para 12 the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed hereinbelow. “This being the position, the case which was sought to be set up in the proposed amendment was an elaboration of what was stated in the written statement. The High Court has in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution entered upon the merits of the case which was sought to be set up by the appellant in the amendment. This is impermissible. Whether an amendment should be allowed is not dependent on whether the case which is proposed to be set up will eventually succeed at the trial. In enquiring into merits, the High Court transgressed the limitations on its jurisdiction under Article 227. In Sadhna Lodh v National Insurance Company, this Court has held that the (2003) 3 SCC 524 supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under Article 227 is confined only to see whether an inferior court or tribunal has proceeded within the parameters of its jurisdiction. In the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227, the High Court does not act as an appellate court or tribunal and it is not open to it to review or reassess the evidence upon which the inferior court or tribunal has passed an order. The Trial Court had in the considered exercise of its jurisdiction allowed the amendment of the written statement under Order 6 Rule 17 of the CPC. There was no reason for the High Court to interfere under Article 227. Allowing the amendment would not amount to the withdrawal of an admission contained in the written statement (as submitted by the respondent) since the amendment sought to elaborate upon an existing defence. There was no reason for the High Court to interfere under Article 227. Allowing the amendment would not amount to the withdrawal of an admission contained in the written statement (as submitted by the respondent) since the amendment sought to elaborate upon an existing defence. It would also be necessary to note that it was on 21.9.2013 that an amendment of the plaint was allowed by the Trial Court, following which the appellant had filed a written statement to the amended plaint incorporating its defence. The amendment would cause no prejudice to the Plaintiff.” 18. In the case of Mohd. Yunus vs. Mohd. Mustaquim and others reported in (1983) 4 SCC 566 , in the case of Subodh Kumar Gupta and Others Versus Alpana Gupta and Others reported in (2005) 11 SCC 578 , in the case of Rajkumar Bhatia Versus Subhash Chander Bhatia reported in (2010) 2 SCC 87 and in the case of Garment Craft Vs. Prakash Chand Goel reported in (2022) 4 SCC 181 , the scope under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has been discussed. The observations of the Hon’ble Apex Court is that the High Court is not to substitute its own decision on facts and conclusion, for that of inferior Court or Tribunal power under Article 227 is to be exercised sparingily in appropriate cases, like when there is no evidence at all to justify, or finding is so perverse that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion that Court or tribunal has come too. 19. In view of above discussions, the party who seeks to be impleaded as a defendant must satisfy two tests. (i) there must be a right to some relief against such party in respect of the controversies involved in the proceedings (ii) no effective decree can be passed in the absence of such a party. In the present case, the respondent Nos.3 to 5 have satisfied two tests. 20. Thus, in the totality of the facts of the case, this Court is of the view that the learned trial Court has not committed any error in allowing the application Exhibit-26. There is no perversity or arbitrariness in the impugned order. Thus, this petition lacks merit and the same is dismissed. 21. At this stage, Mr. S. P. Majmudar for the petitioners has prayed for stay of this order. The learned Senior Advocate Mr. There is no perversity or arbitrariness in the impugned order. Thus, this petition lacks merit and the same is dismissed. 21. At this stage, Mr. S. P. Majmudar for the petitioners has prayed for stay of this order. The learned Senior Advocate Mr. Dhaval C. Dave appearing for respective respondents could not deny. In view of above, the said order is stayed for six months.