Rajiv Roy, J.—‘CHIRAND’ is a place in ‘SARAN’ (with its Headquarter at ‘CHAPRA’) which has continuous archaeological record from the ‘NEOLITHIC AGE’ to the reign of PALA DYNASTY who ruled during the pre-medival period. The excavations in ‘CHIRAND’ have revealed stratified Neolithic, Chaleolithic and Iron age Settlements and transition of human habitation patterns dating from 2500 B.C. to the 30 A.D. 2. ‘SARAN’ also borders ‘VAISHALI’ district, the capital city of ancient Licchavi Clan and believed to be the first republic in the world. It is the birth place of ‘LORD MAHAVIRA’ (540 B.C.) and also a place where ‘LORD BUDDHA’ visited thrice and the Second Buddhist Council was convened by King Kala Soka in the year 383 B.C. 3. However, the place with such historical importance hardly had any effect on the elected members of the Saran Zila Parishad which brought them to the doorsteps of the Patna High Court by filing the present writ petitions. 4. Heard Mr. S.B.K. Mangalam, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Ajay, learned GA-5 for the State, Mr. Nikesh Kumar representing the Zila Parishad, Mr. Basant Kumar Chaudhary, learned Senior counsel who appears for the respondent nos. 29 and 30, Mr. Amit Shrivastava, learned Senior counsel representing the respondent nos. 10, 11, 15, 16, 22, 24, 27, 34, 40, 45 and 53 while Mr. Bindhyachal Singh, learned Senior counsel represents respondent nos. 26, 32, 37, 43, 47 and 50. 5. Since both the cases relate to the ‘No Confidence Motion’ against the Chairperson of the Zila Parishad, Saran, Chapra, the facts of CWJC No. 10942 of 2024 presented by the Chairperson herself is being incorporated hereinbelow. A:-PRAYER: 6. The writ petitioner has preferred this petition for the following reliefs:— (I) for issuance of an appropriate writ in the nature of CERTIORARI:— (a) for quashing the requisition dated 29.05.2024 submitted with the signature of 15 elected members of Saran Zila Parishad and addressed to the petitioner whereby and where under, they had made a grievance from the petitioner to fix the date of special meeting for consideration of No Confidence Motion against the petitioner; (b) for quashing the order dated 21.06.2024 issued under the signature of the Respondent no.3 and contained in his memo no.4379 dated 21.06.2024',- whereby and where under the Respondent no.3 was pleased to recall his previous order dated 18.06.2024 contained in memo no. 4313 dated 18.06.2024; (c) for quashing the order dated 15.07.2024 issued under the signature of the Respondent no.3 and contained in his memo no.5034 dated 15.07.2024, whereby and where under he has been pleased to fix the date of special meeting of Saran Zila Parishad on 30.07.2024 and has directed the Respondent no.4 to issue notice of special meeting to all the members of Zila Parishad; (d) for quashing the memo no.473 dated 15.07.2024 issued under the signature of the Respondent no.4 ,whereby and where under he has issued notice of special meeting dated 30.07.2024 to all the members of Zila Parishad and they have been requested to attend the special meeting of Zila Parishad on 30.07.2024 for consideration of No Confidence Motion against the petitioner. (II) for a declaration that since before 30.07.2024, a special meeting of Zila Parishad was convened on 15.01.2024 for consideration of No Confidence Motion against the petitioner, in view of the provisions contained under Section 70(4) (ii) of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 2006 (hereinafter referred to as the Gram Panchayat Act), there can be no second special meeting of the Zila Parishad for consideration of No Confidence Motion against the petitioner since the proceeding of the special meeting dated 15.01.2024 was already concluded on 15.01.2024 and the motion could not be put to vote by the Respondent no.4 for absence of majority of total number of elected members of Zila Parishad. (III) for issuance of any other appropriate writ/writs, order/ orders, direction/directions for which the writ petitioner would be found entitled under the facts and circumstances of the case. B. FACTS: (I) PETITIONER’S CASE: 7. The petitioner (in CWJC No. 10942 of 2024) is serving as the Chairperson of the Zila Parishad, Saran, Chapra while the petitioners (in CWJC No. 9843 of 2024) are its elected members. 8. According to the petitioner (in CWJC No. 10942 of 2024), immediately after she completed her two years tenure as the Chairperson of the Zila Parishad, Saran, Chapra, a requisition signed by its 17 elected members addressed to her was delivered on 04.01.2024 wherein a request was made by the requisitionists to convene the special meeting of the Zila Parishad, Saran, Chapra for consideration of the ‘No Confidence Motion’ against her (Annexure-P/1 to the writ petition). 9. Once she received the requisition of 17 requisitionists, vide letter no. 9. Once she received the requisition of 17 requisitionists, vide letter no. 01 dated 05.01.2024, in exercise of her statutory obligation, the petitioner fixed the date of special meeting on 15.01.2024 and informed the Respondent no.4, the Deputy Development Commissioner-cum-the Chief Executive Officer, Saran Zila Parishad in this regard. (Annexure-P/2 to the writ petition). 10. Accordingly, the Respondent no. 4 had issued notices upon all the 47 members requesting them to attend the special meeting of the Zila Parishad, Saran on 15.01.2024 convened for consideration of ‘No Confidence Motion’ against the petitioner. 11. The case of the petitioner is that despite the valid service of notices upon all the elected members of Zila Parishad, Saran, only 06 members including the petitioner attended the special meeting on 15.01.2024. 12. Since all the elected members were not in attendance in the special meeting when it was to begin, in view of the time mentioned in the notice, the members present in the special meeting were asked to wait for one more hour or till the arrival of the rest of elected members constituting Saran Zila Parishad. 13. However, still when no other member turned up to attend the special meeting, in view of the provisions contained under Section 70(4) of the Bihar Panchayat Act, 2006 (henceforth for short ‘the Act’), the special meeting commenced under the Chairmanship of Sri Chhabinath Singh. 14. After the deliberation upon the charges, the special meeting was concluded without the motion being put to vote for lack of quorum since the members present in the special meeting dated 15.01.2024 were not the majority of the elected members of the Zila Parishad, Saran. Thus, in view of the letter no. 30-149/2008-2535 dated 16.09.2008 issued by the State Election Commission, Bihar, Patna (henceforth for short ‘the SEC’), there was no requirement of voting (Annexure-P/3 to the writ petition). 15. Further, despite Section 70(4) (ii) of ‘the Act’ barring the second ‘No Confidence Motion’ during the whole tenure of Chairperson or Deputy Chairperson, once again, the 17 requisitionists, who did not turned up to attend the special meeting on 15.01.2024, submitted fresh requisition on 29.05.2024. Though it was addressed to her, was sent directly to the office of the Respondent no.4 with the request to fix the date of special meeting for consideration of the ‘No Confidence Motion’ against the Chairperson (Annexure-P/4 to the writ petition). 16. Though it was addressed to her, was sent directly to the office of the Respondent no.4 with the request to fix the date of special meeting for consideration of the ‘No Confidence Motion’ against the Chairperson (Annexure-P/4 to the writ petition). 16. Upon Knowledge of these facts, other five members, who were present in the special meeting held on 15.01.2024 filed a representation before the writ petitioner on 01.06.2024 wherein while making the same request to fix the date of meeting in view of the requisition dated 29.05.2024, the request was that it should be restricted to only those members of the Saran Zila Parishad, who were in attendance in the special meeting dated 15.01.2024 (Annexure-P/5 to the writ petition). It is to be noted that the writ petitioners in CWJC No. 9843 if 2024 (Anita Naveen vs. The State of Bihar and Ors.) have prayed for similar directions i.e. to restrict the second meeting to only those elected members who participated in the meeting dated 15.01.2024. 17. The case of the petitioner is that who will attend the second/subsequent special meeting convened for consideration of ‘No Confidence Motion’ has been decided by a Single bench of the Patna High Court in the case Anu Kumari & Anr. vs. State of Bihar and Ors (C.W.J.C. No. 1256 of 2024) and the case of Punam Kumari Singh & Ors. vs. State of Bihar and Ors. (C.W.J.C. No. 1726 of 2024) wherein it was observed that only those members of the Panchayat Samiti or Zila Parishad, who had come to participate in the first meeting has the right to attend the second special meeting as the others waived of their rights earlier by not participating in the special meeting convened for consideration of ‘No Confidence Motion’ against the Pramukh, Up- Pramukh, Adhyaksh or Up- Adhyaksh (Annexure-P/6 and P/6-1 to the writ petition). 18. As the petitioner took time in taking any decision on the requisition made on 29.05.2024, the respondent no. 26, Meena Arun, another elected member complained before the respondent no. 3, the District Magistrate, Saran, Chapra who after recording all the facts vide memo no. 4313 dated 18.06.2024 directed the respondent no. 4 to inform the petitioner to take decision in terms of Section 70(4)(i) of ‘the Act’ and fix a date failing which his office be informed so that a decision is taken in the matter under ‘the Act’. 3, the District Magistrate, Saran, Chapra who after recording all the facts vide memo no. 4313 dated 18.06.2024 directed the respondent no. 4 to inform the petitioner to take decision in terms of Section 70(4)(i) of ‘the Act’ and fix a date failing which his office be informed so that a decision is taken in the matter under ‘the Act’. (Annexure-P/8 to the writ petition). 19. The petitioner thereafter acted upon the requisition dated 29.05.2024/01.06.2024 and vide an order dated 20.06.2024 fixed the date of special meeting on 28.06.2024 with further directions to the Respondent no. 4 to issue the notice of special meeting to only those members, who had participated in the special meeting held on 15.01.2024. (Annexure-P/7 to the writ petition). 20. In view of the petitioner's direction dated 20.06.2024, the Respondent no. 4 had issued notices to only six elected members of Zila Parishad, Saran, Chapra (including the petitioner) with the request to attend the special meeting dated 28.06.2024 (Annexure-P/9 series to the writ petition). 21. Thereafter, on the complaint of the elected member, Kamlesh Kumar Singh @ Guddu Singh, the respondent no. 3 recalled its order/memo no. 4313 dated 18.06.2024 vide its office/memo no. 4379 dated 21.06.2024 taking into account the order of Full Bench of the Patna High Court in the case of Sangeeta Devi (LPA No. 125 of 2024). As such, no meeting took place on 28.06.2024. (Annexure-P/10 to the writ petition). 22. The respondent no. 4 thereafter vide office memo/ letter no. 368 dated 05.06.2024 sought guidelines from the State government which in turn vide memo no. 5697 dated 01.07.2024, under the signature of the respondent no. 2, the Additional Chief Secretary, Panchayat Raj Department, Bihar, Patna gave instructions to the Respondent nos. 3 and 4 to reject the direction of petitioner dated 20.06.2024 as the notices will have to be issued to the entire House comprising of all the members. The instructions further incorporated that the judgment dated 16.05.2024 of the Full Bench in Sangeeta Devi (supra) would apply prospectively and the proceedings concluded in the past cannot be re-opened (Annexure-P/11 to the writ petition). 23. The letter no. 5697 dated 01.07.2024 issued by the respondent no. The instructions further incorporated that the judgment dated 16.05.2024 of the Full Bench in Sangeeta Devi (supra) would apply prospectively and the proceedings concluded in the past cannot be re-opened (Annexure-P/11 to the writ petition). 23. The letter no. 5697 dated 01.07.2024 issued by the respondent no. 2 read as follows:— i=kad&10 iŒ@vadsŒ@11&01@2022@5697@iaŒjkŒ fcgkj ljdkj iapk;rh jkt foHkkx Ás"kd] fefgj dqekj flag] HkkŒÁŒlaŒ vij eq[; lfpoA lsok esa] ftyk inkfèkdkjh lkj.k] Nijk mi&fodkl vk;qDr≶&eq[; dk;Zikyd inkfèkdkjh] ftyk ifj"kn~] lkj.k] NijkA fo"k;% Jherh t;fe=k nsoh] vè;{k] ftyk ifj"kn~] lkj.k ds fo:} yxk;s x;s vfo'okl ÁLrko ij ekxZn'kZu ds lacaèk esaA Álax% mi&fodkl vk;qDr≶&eq[; dk;Zikyd inkfèkdkjh] ftyk ifj"kn~] lkj.k dk i=kad 368 fnukad 05-06-2024 egk'k;] mi;qZDr fo"k;d Áklafxd i= }kjk ;kfpr ekxZn'kZu ds lacaèk esa fofèk foHkkx dk earO; ÁkIr fd;k x;k gSA fofèk foHkkx ds earO; ls Li"V gks jgk gS fd fnukad 15-01-2024 dks vk;ksftr vfo'okl ÁLrko dh cSBd esa ikfjr ÁLrko rFkk ÁLrkfor subsequent cSBd esa dsoy 15-01-2024 dh cSBd esa mifLFkr N% lnL;ksa dks gh uksfVl fuxZr djus lacaèkh vè;{k dk vkns'k vrkfdZd ,oa voSèkkfud gSA fofèk foHkkx }kjk Li"V fd;k x;k gS fd “Notice will have to be issued to the entire house comprising of all members.” Ñi;k rnuqlkj dkjZokbZ lqfuf'pr dh tk;A 2- mi&fodkl vk;qDr≶&eq[; dk;Zikyd inkfèkdkjh dh i`PNk ds vfrfjDr foHkkx }kjk lkFk&lkFk bl fcUnq ij Hkh fofèk foHkkx dk earO; ÁkIr fd;k x;k gS fd ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; dh iw.kZ ihB }kjk fnukad 16-05-2024 dks fn;s x;s fu.kZ; dk ÁHkko Hkfo";y{kh (Prospective) gksxk ;k Hkwry{kh (Retrospective) bl fcUnq ij fofèk foHkkx dk Li"V earO; gS fd “The proceeding in the past which stands concluded cannot be reopened. Only such proceeding which is pending will have to be decided interms of Full Bench Judgment.” 3- fofèk foHkkx ls nks fcUnqvksa ij ÁkIr earO; dh Áfr i= ds lkFk layXu gSA vuqyXud% foHkkxh; lafpdk la[;k& 10 iŒ@vadsŒ@11&01@2022&esa fofèk foHkkx ls ÁkIr earO; dh Áfr ¼4 i`"B½ fo'oklHkktu ¼fefgj dqekj flag½ vij eq[; lfpo Kkikad% 10 iŒ@vadsŒ@11&01@2022@5697@ iaŒjkŒ iVuk] fnukad 01-07-2024 Áfrfyfi% vU; lHkh ftyk inkfèkdkjh] fcgkj@lHkh mi&fodkl vk;qDr≶&eq[; dk;Zikyd inkfèkdkjh] ftyk ifj"kn~] fcgkj@lHkh ftyk iapk;r jkt inkfèkdkjh] fcgkj dks fofèk foHkkx dh earO; dh Áfr ds lkFk lwpuk ,oa vko';d dkjZokbZ gsrq Ásf"krA ;g ,d vR;ar egRoiw.kZ fofèk earO; gS tks iapk;rh jkt laLFkkvksa ds Áèkku@mi&Áèkku ds Áfr vfo'okl ÁLrko ds lanHkZ esa ekxZn'kZd fl}kar ds :i esa mi;ksx esa yk;k tk ldrk gSA Ñi;k bldh tkudkjh vius {ks=kèkhu lHkh {ks=h; inkfèkdkfj;ksa dks vfoyac miyCèk djk nh tk;A ¼fefgj dqekj flag½ vij eq[; lfpo Kkikad% 10 iŒ@vadsŒ@11&01@2022@5697@iaŒjkŒ iVuk] fnukad 01-07-2024 Áfrfyfi% lHkh ÁeaMyh; vk;qDr] fcgkj dks lwpukFkZ Ásf"krA ¼fefgj dqekj flag½ vij eq[; lfpo Kkikad% 10 iŒ@vadsŒ@11&01@2022@5697@ iaŒjkŒ iVuk] fnukad 01-07-2024 Áfrfyfi% ekuuh; ea=h] iapk;rh jkt foHkkx] fcgkj ds vkIr lfpo dks lwpukFkZ Ásf"krA ¼fefgj dqekj flag½ vij eq[; lfpo (underlines by the Court) 24. After the receipt of the aforesaid instructions from the Respondent no.2, the file concerning the ‘No Confidence Motion’ was again brought before the petitioner by the Respondent no. 4 on 02.07.2024 who returned the file with her rejection order on 10.07.2024 informing the Respondent no. 4 that in view of the opinion of the department dated 01.07.2024, since the proceeding of the special meeting of Saran Zila Parishad convened for consideration of ‘No Confidence Motion’ was concluded on 15.01.2024 itself, there cannot be any scope for the second ‘No Confidence Motion’ as requested by the members on 29.05.2024 (Annexure-P/12 to the writ petition). 25. This followed the decision/order taken by the respondent no. 3 and communicated vide memo no. 5034 dated 15.07.2024 and by virtue of power vested to him under Section 70 (4) (i) of ‘the Act’, he fixed the date of the special meeting on 30.07.2024 and directed the respondent no. 4 to issue notice upon all the elected members of Zila Parishad, Saran (Annexure-14 to the writ petition). 26. It is important to incorporate the decision dated 15.07.2024 taken by respondent no. 4 to issue notice upon all the elected members of Zila Parishad, Saran (Annexure-14 to the writ petition). 26. It is important to incorporate the decision dated 15.07.2024 taken by respondent no. 3 which read as follows:— Kkikad 5034@lhŒ vkns'k fnukad% 15-07-2024 fnukad 06-06-2024 dks Jherh ehuk v:.k] lnL;] lkj.k ifj"kn~] eढkSjk] Hkkx&2 }kjk ÁkIr ifjokn&i=] tks fnukad 15-01-2024 dks ftyk ifj"kn vè;{k] Jherh t;fe=k nsoh ds fo:} yk;s x;s vfo'okl ÁLrko ls lacafèkr gS] dks cSBd esa ek=k 06 lnL;ksa dh mifLFkfr gksus ds dkj.k vè;{k lkj.k ftyk ifj"kn~ }kjk jkT; fuokZpu vk;ksx] fcgkj] iVuk ds i=kkad iŒfuŒ 30&149@2006&2535 fnukad 16-09-2008 dh dafMdk (XIII)(9) ds vkyksd esa er foHkktu u djkdj vfo'okl ÁLrko dks vLohd`r dj fn;k x;kA mDr vfo'okl ÁLrko dh cSBd ds mijkUr ftyk ifj"kn~ lkj.k ds 15 lnL;ksa }kjk iqu% fnukad 29-05-2024 dks vè;{k] lkj.k ftyk ifj"kn~ ds fo:} vfo'okl ÁLrko yk;k x;k] tks vè;{k ftyk ifj"kn~ lkj.k dks fnukad 30-05-2024 dks rkfey djk;k x;kA mDr ifjokn i= ftyk ifj"kn dh fo'ks"k cSBd cqykdj vfo'okl ÁLrko ij cgl ds mijkUr er foHkktu djk;s tkus ls lacafèkr gSA ftyk ifj"kn ds lnL;ksa ds fnukad 29-05-2024 ds ÁLrko ds vkyksd esa vè;{k ftyk ifj"kn }kjk 15-06-2024 dks frfFk fuèkkZfjr dh x;h Fkh] ijUrq Full Bench ds varfje vkns'k ds vkyksd esa LFkfxr fd;k x;k FkkA Jherh Lusgk flag ,oa vU; 12 lnL;] ftyk ifj"kn] lkj.k }kjk fnukad 10-07-2024 dks fn, x, vkosnu i= esa foHkkxh; ekxZn'kZu ds vkyksd esa vfo'okl ÁLrko lacaèkh cSBd vk;ksftr djus gsrq fuèkkZfjr djus dk vuqjksèk fd;k x;k gSA mi&fodkl vk;qDr≶&eq[; dk;Zikyd inkfèkdkjh] ftyk ifj"kn] lkj.k] Nijk ds i=kad 4457@ftŒ iŒ fnukad 10-07-2024 }kjk lwfpr fd;k x;k gS fd iapk;rh jkt foHkkx] fcgkj] iVuk ds i=kad 5697@iaŒjkŒ fnukad 01-07-2024 esa of.kZr funs'k ds vkyksd esa muds }kjk ftyk ifj"kn dh fo'ks"k cSBd dh frfFk fuèkkZfjr djus gsrq fnukad 04-07-2024 dks lafpdk vè;{k] ftyk ifj"kn] lkj.k dks gLrxr djk;h x;h Fkh] ftls foHkkxh; i= dh dafMdk 2 esa of.kZr funs'k “The proceeding in the past which stands concluded cannot be reopened.” ds vkyksd esa fnukad 15-01-2024 dh fo'ks"k cSBd ds i'pkr vfo'okl ds ÁLrko ij ppkZ gsrq dksbZ nwljh cSBd dk vk;kstu foHkkxh; funs'k ds foijhr gksxk lalwfpr djrs gq, fo'ks"k cSBd dh frfFk fuèkkZfjr djus ds ÁLrko dks vLohd`r dj fnukad 10-07-2024 dks lafpdk okil dh x;h gSA mDr ekeys ds ifjlhyu ds mijkUr rF; fuEu Ádkj gSa& iapk;rh jkt foHkkx] fcgkj] iVuk ds i=kad 5697@iaŒjkŒ fnukad 01-07-2024 ds }kjk lalwfpr egkfèkoDrk ¼,th½ dk eUrO; gS fd “….. that the proceeding in the past which stands concluded can’t be reopened. Only such proceeding which is pending will have to be decided in terms of Full Bench Judgment.” ewy Á'u ;g gS fd& D;k 15-01-2024 dks vk;ksftr vfo'okl ÁLrko dh cSBd “conclude” ekuk tk;sxk ;k ugha\ 1- iapk;rh jkt foHkkx] fcgkj] iVuk ls ÁkIr ekxZn'kZu esa fo}ku Government Advocate-V dh fVIi.kh dk voyksdu egRoiw.kZ gS ftlds vkyksd esa fo}ku egkfèkoDrk ¼,th½ }kjk earO; fn;k x;k gSA mDr ekxZn'kZu ds ÁFke fcUnq ds lacaèk esa fuEufyf[kr vafdr gS& “…… The meeting to consider the no confidence motion was held on 15/01/2024 and the motion was rejected on the strength of guideline of State Election Commission, Bihar, issued vide letter no.2535 dated 16/09/2008 which was not in effect in view of subsequent & repeated letter of Commission dated 19/07/2018, 18/07/2018 and 12/01/2024. As such action of the presiding Officer was bad and contrary to law” earO; esa Li"V gS fd& “So I am of the opinion that requisition to consider the motion of no-confidence can be considered a fresh” II. ;gka ;g fcUnq Hkh mYys[k djuk vko';d gS fd ftyk ifj"kn ds lnL;ksa ds fnukad 29-05-2024 ds ÁLrko ds vkyksd esa vè;{k ftyk ifj"kn }kjk 15-06-2024 dks frfFk fuèkkZfjr dh x;h Fkh ijUrq Full Bench ds varfje vkns'k ds vkyksd esa LFkfxr fd;k x;k FkkA mijksDr dafMd (i) and (ii) ds vkyksd esa Li"V gS fd vfo'okl ÁLrko Conclude ugha gqvk gSA vr% foHkkx ls ÁkIr ekxZn'kZu ,oa vè;{k }kjk iqu% frfFk fuèkkZfjr ugha fd;s tkus dh fLFkfr esa “The Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 2006” ds èkkjk 70(4)(i) esa ÁnÙk 'kfDr;ksa dk mi;ksx djrs gq, vfo'okl ÁLrko ij fopkj djus gsrq fnukad 30-07-2024 dks frfFk fuèkkZfjr fd;k tkrk gSA mi&fodkl vk;qDr≶&eq[; dk;Zikyd inkfèkdkjh] ftyk ifj"kn~] lkj.k] Nijk dks vkns'k fn;k tkrk gS fd fnukad 16-07-2024 rd lHkh ftyk ifj"kn lnL;ksa dks bl vk'k; dk uksfVl fuxZr dj mldk rkfeyk dj rkfeyk Áfrosnu vèkksgLrk{kjh ds voyksdukFkZ Hkstuk lqfuf'pr djsaxsA gLrk{kj& ftyk inkfèkdkjh lkj.k] Nijk Kkikad 5034@lhŒ fnukad% 15-07-2024 Áfrfyfi%& mi&fodkl vk;qDr≶&eq[; dk;Zikyd inkfèkdkjh] ftyk ifj"kn~] lkj.k] Nijk lwpukFkZ ,oa vko';d dkjZokbZ gsrq Ásf"krA Áfrfyfi%& ftyk iapk;r jkt inkfèkdkjh] lkj.k dks lwpukFkZ ,oa vko';d dkjZokbZ gsrq Ásf"krA ftyk inkfèkdkjh lkj.k] Nijk (Underlines by the Court) 27. The Respondent no. 4 thereafter, vide office memo no. 473 dated 15.07.2024 forwarded the order/memo no. 5034 dated 15.07.2024 issued by the respondent no. The Respondent no. 4 thereafter, vide office memo no. 473 dated 15.07.2024 forwarded the order/memo no. 5034 dated 15.07.2024 issued by the respondent no. 3 to all the elected members of the Saran Zila Parishad with the request to attend the special meeting on 30.07.2024 for consideration of ‘No Confidence Motion’ against the Chairperson (the petitioner herein). 28. Aggrieved by the said decision/directions of the respondent nos. 3 and 4, the present writ petitions. (II) Contention of the Petitioner: 29. Learned Counsel for the petitioner, Mr. S.B.K. Mangalam submits that the action of the Respondent nos. 3 and 4 is/are thoroughly illegal and contrary to the instructions issued by the State Government on 01.07.2024. He submits that when the State Government itself directed that the concluded proceeding shall not be re-opened and it is only the pending proceeding which shall be decided in accordance with law laid down by the Full Bench judgment in Sangeeta Devi case (supra), before taking any action on the requisition dated 29.05.2024, the Respondent no. 3 ought to have sought a clarification on the instruction vis a vis the case herein. Instead, the respondent overturned the decision of the petitioner vide memo no. 5034 dated 15.07.2024. 30. The submission is that the respondent no. 3, the District Magistrate, Saran not being the appellate authority, he thus cannot overturn the decision taken by the petitioner. 31. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that in view of the provisions contained under Section 70(4) (ii) of ‘the Act’, there cannot be any scope of second special meeting for consideration of ‘No Confidence Motion’ against a Chairperson which already stands concluded. His further submission is that in any case, the respondents having not participated in the first meeting waived of their rights to participate in any subsequent meeting on the said subject as held by the learned Single Judge in the Anu Kumari (supra) case. 32. By way of supplementary affidavit, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that on 25.07.2024, when the matter was heard by this Court, learned Senior Counsels representing the different sets of the elected members of the Saran Zila Parishad had made a statement that the notice of special meeting issued by the respondent no. 32. By way of supplementary affidavit, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that on 25.07.2024, when the matter was heard by this Court, learned Senior Counsels representing the different sets of the elected members of the Saran Zila Parishad had made a statement that the notice of special meeting issued by the respondent no. 4 was followed by a separate notice containing the reasons and charges served upon the members of Saran Zila Parishad but has not been brought to the notice of this Court by the petitioner. 33. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that considering the said submission of the learned Senior counsels, the Court has been pleased to adjourn the matter to be listed on 29.07.2024 for further consideration and the officials were directed to file their respective Counter- Affidavits. The learned counsel representing the Zila Parishad, Saran was also directed to keep with him the original records for its perusal by the Court, should occasion arise. 34. However, the contention is that it was an entirely wrong submission and after the court's proceeding was over and when information in this regard was communicated to Respondent no. 4, immediately another notice was issued vide office memo no. 511 dated 25.07.2024 (Annexure P/16 to the writ petition) wherein it was admitted that the requisition dated 29.05.2024 was not a part of the earlier notice dated 15.07.2024 which is now being attached. He as such submits that the respondent no. 4 is liable for contempt action. 35. In support of the case of the petitioner, learned counsel for the petitioner has cited the case of Meena Yadav & Anr. vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. reported in 2010 (2) PLJR 389 decided by the Patna High Court where it was held in paragraph-13 that:— 13. There is no vagueness of ambiguity in the language of the statute, be it sub-section (3)(b) of Section 44 or Sub- section (4)(i) of Section 70 of the Act so as to call for any interpretation. The relevant provisions in categorical terms require that the reasons/charges for no confidence motion shall be clearly mentioned in the notice of the meeting. Besides serving the twin purpose indicated above, the provision serves to protect and promote the meaning and purpose of true Democracy which requires meaningful debates and discussions. The relevant provisions in categorical terms require that the reasons/charges for no confidence motion shall be clearly mentioned in the notice of the meeting. Besides serving the twin purpose indicated above, the provision serves to protect and promote the meaning and purpose of true Democracy which requires meaningful debates and discussions. They improve the understanding and capability of the elected members and also educate the grass root constituents of Democracy i.e. the voters. Such laudable purpose which is sure to promote larger public good needs to be protected by all the constitutional authorities including courts. Hence, it must be held that the relevant provisions noticed above are mandatory. Whether the notice of meeting called to consider "no confidence motion" has been issued by the ice elected office bearers or in default by the concerned officials, it must clearly mention the reasons/charges, failure to do so will render the notice and the consequent meeting void. Such clear and purposive provision by text and context should not be made ineffective by holding it directory so as to be violated with impunity. Violation of such a provision cannot be condoned on the ground that somehow the reasons/charges were known to the persons concerned or they did not care to know the reasons/charges. Allowing such a state of affairs to develop would go against the clear mandate of law and shall run counter to good and basic tenets of Democracy.” 36. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has also based his case on the learned Single Judge judgment of Patna High Court in Anu Kumari (supra) (Annexure-P/6 to the writ petition) and paragraph nos. 6, 19 and 20 are quoted hereinbelow:— “6. This Court is not concerned what action the B.D.O.-cum-Executive Officer has taken but I find that the B.D.O. has wilfully disobeyed the order passed by this Court and he has failed to abide by his undertaking given before this Court even he has admitted he is now conversant with order passed in paragraph Nos.58 and 59 of the judgment passed in LPA No.113 of 2020 [: 2021 (4) BLJ 194 ] (Dharamsila Kumari vs. Hemant Kumar & Ors.) and will correct himself. For ready reference, paragraph nos. 58 and 59 of the judgment are re-produced hereinafter:— 58. For ready reference, paragraph nos. 58 and 59 of the judgment are re-produced hereinafter:— 58. The expression used "majority" in Section 44 has to be read in the context of 'total number of members of the Panchayat Samiti' for only such of those members who are elected members have a right, not only to move a motion of no confidence but also to participate, i.e. to discuss and vote thereupon. The expression 'requisition for such a special meeting' in the second part of sub- section (3) of Section 44 has to be read in the context of moving a resolution of no confidence as envisaged therein and not a special meeting envisaged under Section 46 (3). On reading the words in conjunction with one another, it can be said that the majority required is the majority of 'total number of elected members of Samiti "at" a meeting specially convened for the purpose.' Explaining through an illustration, if five members present in the meeting out of an elected body of twenty-two members, the majority required is three, not twelve. Meaning thereby, that it is not a majority qua the total number of elected members in the Samiti, but a majority qua the total number of members of the elected member of the Samiti present in the meeting convened for the purpose. In other words, the majority required to pass a resolution is a simple majority from amongst those present and voting. Similar is the position for electing the Pramukh and the Up-Pramukh [Section 40]. This interpretation is also supported by the last phrase used as ingredient (6), which specifies that 'No quorum is required for such a special meeting'. If the ingredient (7) is interpreted as "majority of the total body of elected members", that ingredient is rendered nugatory and otiose. 59. It also needs to be noted that as voting cannot be adjourned in such a meeting, the majority of the total body's prescription and the non- requirement of quorum, on the other hand, is a clear and apparent conflict. Therefore, to read these two provisions harmoniously, it becomes essential to read the phrase 'majority of total elected members present in the meeting'. Hence, it is clarified that there is no requirement of 'majority of total elected members' to form a 'Quorum.' 19. Therefore, to read these two provisions harmoniously, it becomes essential to read the phrase 'majority of total elected members present in the meeting'. Hence, it is clarified that there is no requirement of 'majority of total elected members' to form a 'Quorum.' 19. Considering the discussion made in paragraph no.22 of Smt. Shamshad Khatun (supra), the Hon'ble Division Bench has discussed in detail the principle of waiver. It has been held once a party has waived his right, they can not turn around and take a somersault to challenge the same by making statement that the charges are not clear, which has been made cautiously by the respondent nos. 11 to 18, who are requisitionists. The said view has been reiterated by the Apex Court in Padmini Singha vs. State of Assam & Ors. reported in (2018) 10 SCC 561 . 20. This Court has also clarified in paragraph nos. 58 to 59 in the case of Dharamsila Kumari case (supra) that a voting to be conducted amongst the elected members, who had participated in the special meeting of no confidence motion. As a result of withdrawal of the proceeding and the consequential order having lost his force, the special meeting of no confidence and respondent nos. 10 to18 having waived their right, the special meeting of no confidence is now required to be held in the manner prescribed in paragraph nos. 58 and 59 of Dharamsila Kumari case (supra) amongst nine elected members, who were present in the meeting dated 09.01.2024.” 37. Learned counsel next cited the judgment of Patna High Court in the case of Sheikh Hassmuddin & Anr. vs. State of Bihar & Ors. reported in PLJR 2015 (3) 203 (DB) where paragraphs 9 & 10 record as follows:— “9. We have carefully perused Annexure-5. The 2nd appellant addressed that to the 5th respondent stating that she did not receive any notice proposing to move a motion of no confidence against her either directly or through post and for the first time she received a letter addressed by the 5th respondent through post. From this it is difficult, if not impossible, to infer that the 2nd appellant has accepted that she received a copy of notice of no confidence motion. From this it is difficult, if not impossible, to infer that the 2nd appellant has accepted that she received a copy of notice of no confidence motion. For all practical purposes, the knowledge of the developments was treated as a service of notice, contemplated under proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 44 of the Act. 10. It is fairly well settled that an elected member is entitled to remain in office till the completion of the term. Any mechanism that has an effect curtailing the term must be undertaken, strictly in accordance with the prescribed procedure. It is for a definite purpose that the legislature wanted the requisitionists, first to serve a copy of the notice of the want of confidence on the Pramukh, notwithstanding the fact that he will be the person to face the heat of that. The reason is that in a given case, the Pramukh may take note of the contents of the notice and initiate action, or steps to address the grievance of the requisitionists. That may lead to giving up of the further steps. Once the important step of service of notice on the Pramukh is not taken, the entire proceedings get vitiated.” 38. The argument of learned counsel for the petitioner is that when the charges were not part of the notice and sent subsequently, the meeting dated 30.07.2024 has to be interfered with. He concludes by submitting that considering the judgments rendered by the Courts, the opinion of the State Government and ‘the Act’, no second proceeding can be called. Alternatively, it has to be restricted to only six members who earlier participated in the special meeting on 15.01.2024. As such, the writ petition be allowed. C. Case of Respondent nos. 29 and 30. 39. Mr. Basant Kumar Chaudhary, learned Senior counsel represents the respondent nos. 29 and 30 who are here to support the cause of the petitioner. 40. According to him, the respondents having failed to attend the first meeting cannot turn around and demand participation in second meeting which the petitioner rightly restricted to only those present in the first meeting. 41. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that ‘the Act’ should be strictly followed inasmuch as once the meeting was concluded on 15.01.2024 at the first place, the convening of second meeting itself is in the teeth of Section 44(3) of ‘the Act’. 41. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that ‘the Act’ should be strictly followed inasmuch as once the meeting was concluded on 15.01.2024 at the first place, the convening of second meeting itself is in the teeth of Section 44(3) of ‘the Act’. As such, the necessary directions issued by the respondent nos. 3 and 4 for convening another meeting and issuing notices upon all the elected members of Saran, Zila Parishad have to be interfered with and the writ petitioner deserves relief. D: Case of Respondent No. 26, 32, 37, 47 and 50: 42. According to the respondents-requisitionists, which is being presented here by Mr. Bindhyachal Singh, learned Senior Counsel, a requisition dated 04.01.2024 was submitted by 17 elected members of Saran Zila Parishad whereby and where under the ‘No confidence Motion’ was proposed to be moved against the writ petitioner, the Chairperson who in turn on 05.01.2024 fixed the date of the meeting as 15.01.2024. 43. The scheduled special meeting was held on 15.01.2024 wherein only six out of forty-seven members were present. However, the same came to an end without any voting and the reason cited was lack of quorum. As no voting took place, in view of Division Bench Judgment of Patna High Court rendered in the case of Dharamsheela Kumari vs Hemant Kumar & Ors. reported in 2021 (3) PLJR 346 [: 2021 (4) BLJ 194 ] (issue no. ix), there was no bar in moving a fresh ‘Motion of No Confidence.’ 44. As such, another requisition for consideration of ‘No confidence Motion’ against the writ petitioner. Chairperson was made by the requisitionsists on 29.05.2024. The petitioner however, on the request of five members who had attended the first meeting and after she was nudged by the respondent no. 3 to fix the date decided that notices be issued to only those members who were present in the first meeting while fixing the date as 28.06.2024. 45. This decision of the Chairperson was stayed by the respondent no. 3 on 21.06.2024. The said requisition further became subject matter of legal opinion which was sought by the respondents from the State Government. 46. Once, the opinion of the State Government, was received and the petitioner refused to fix the date, vide memo no. 5034 dated 15.07.2024, the Respondent No. 3 directed the Respondent no. 3 on 21.06.2024. The said requisition further became subject matter of legal opinion which was sought by the respondents from the State Government. 46. Once, the opinion of the State Government, was received and the petitioner refused to fix the date, vide memo no. 5034 dated 15.07.2024, the Respondent No. 3 directed the Respondent no. 4 to issue notice to all the members of the Saran Zila Parishad which followed the notice/memo no. 473 dated 15.07.2024 issued by the respondent no. 4 fixing the date of special meeting for the ‘No Confidence Motion’ on 30.07.2024. 47. Learned Senior Counsel, however, concede that so far as the grievance of the writ petitioner that the said notice dated 15.07.2024 does not contain the charges as stipulated under Section-70(4)(iv) of ‘the Act’, prima facie the said contention was found to be correct. 48. Further, during the course of hearing of the instant case on 25.07.2024, on instructions from the said Respondent nos. 26, 32, 37, 47 and 50, the statement was made at the Bar which led to the Court to record in para-21 of the order dated 25.07.2024 as follows:— "Their submission is that pursuant to the direction of the District Magistrate, Saran at Chapra, another notice along with list of charges were provided to all the members by the respondent no. 4, the DDC cum CEO, Zila Parishad, Saran". 49. Learned Senior Counsel submits that there was an inadvertent and bonafide miscommunication between the said respondents as communicated to their Learned Counsel on record in the morning of 25.07.2024. What ought to have been communicated should have been "were being provided" instead of "were provided" as recorded in said paragraph no. 21 of the order dated 25.07.2024. 50. The answering respondents were actually informed that the respondent no. 4 is in the process of issuing appropriate notice in consonance with provisions of Section-70 (4)(iv) of ‘the Act’. This inadvertent and bonafide miscommunication is duly regretted and the answering respondents tender unconditional and unqualified apologies to the Court. 51. 21 of the order dated 25.07.2024. 50. The answering respondents were actually informed that the respondent no. 4 is in the process of issuing appropriate notice in consonance with provisions of Section-70 (4)(iv) of ‘the Act’. This inadvertent and bonafide miscommunication is duly regretted and the answering respondents tender unconditional and unqualified apologies to the Court. 51. Learned Senior counsel submits that following Dharamsheela Kumari (supra) judgment; it can be safely concluded that:— “(i) in absence of earlier ‘No Confidence Motion’ having been put to vote, it is a fresh meeting and not the second/subsequent one and as such there cannot be any bar under Section 44 (3)(ii) of ‘the Act’ in convening it; (ii) as it is a fresh meeting, it has to be noticed to all the elected members of the Saran Zila Parishad.” 52. Learned Senior Counsel concludes by submitting that the respondents have taken the decisions in accordance with law and the present petition deserves dismissal. E: Case of the Respondent Nos. 10, 11, 15, 16, 22, 24, 27, 33, 34, 40 & 45: 53. Mr. Amit Shrivastava, learned Senior Counsel represents the above respondents. He initiated his argument with the famous words of late President of the United State of America, Abraham Lincoln: “Democracy is by the people of the people and for the people.” 54. Learned Senior counsel submits that in a democratic set up, the confidence of the majority is foremost and the petitioner should not hide herself behind the curtains by reading between the lines of orders/judgments which otherwise also is/are against her. 55. The case of these set of respondents as forwarded by the learned Senior Counsel is that the respondent nos. 3 and 4 rightly gave direction/issued notices upon all the elected members of the Zila Parishad, Saran at Chapra to attend the special meeting to be held on 30.07.2024. He submits that in absence of voting on earlier occasion, it was not a concluded meeting as per ‘the Act’. 56. Further, after the direction/notice dated 25.07.2024 issued by the Respondent No. 4 incorporating the reasons/charges, it is now in conformity with provisions of Section-70(4)(iv) of ‘the Act’ and thus the meeting convened on 30.07.2024 be not interfered with. 57. He submits that in absence of voting on earlier occasion, it was not a concluded meeting as per ‘the Act’. 56. Further, after the direction/notice dated 25.07.2024 issued by the Respondent No. 4 incorporating the reasons/charges, it is now in conformity with provisions of Section-70(4)(iv) of ‘the Act’ and thus the meeting convened on 30.07.2024 be not interfered with. 57. Learned Senior Counsel submits that as facts have already been provided by successive learned Counsels/learned Senior Counsels, he will restrict his argument to the case laws relevant in the present case. 58. He submits that the ratio of Anu Kumari (supra) and Punam Kumari Singh (supra) are not at all applicable in the instant writ petition as it is based on wrong interpretations of the Division bench judgments in Dharamsheela Kumari (supra) and Smt. Shamshad Khatoon vs The State of Bihar & Others reported in (2010) 1 PLJR 929 where the facts and the circumstances were entirely different. Here, the case is that the petitioner herself fixed the date of the fresh meeting on earlier occasion. She cannot now turn around and question the sanctity of the said meeting. 59. Learned Senior Counsel submits that in fact, the case of Smt. Shamshad Khatoon (supra) squarely applies in the present case as by fixing the date of fresh meeting, she waived of her rights to question it later. The only question thus remains is as to whether it has to be attended by only six members who earlier attended the meeting or all the 47 members of the Saran Zila Parishad, this being a fresh requisition. 60. The further stand is that any decision taken in the light of 2008 instruction of ‘the SEC’ (which already stands withdrawn) is in the teeth of the judgment rendered by the Division bench of Patna High Court in the case of Dharamsheela Kumari (supra). 61. Learned Senior Counsel submits that the writ petitioner cannot be allowed to question the action of Respondent nos. 3 & 4 as she herself was duty bound under the law to follow the mandate of section-70(4)(i) of ‘the Act’ more particularly when admittedly the so-called ‘No confidence Motion’ held on 15.01.2024 was never put to vote. As such, in the absence of any voting in the earlier meeting, it will not be considered to be a concluded meeting as the petitioner has tried to impress upon this Court. 62. As such, in the absence of any voting in the earlier meeting, it will not be considered to be a concluded meeting as the petitioner has tried to impress upon this Court. 62. He submits that the further claim of the petitioner that Sangeeta Devi (supra) case will be applicable only in prospective cases is fit to be rejected as in Dharamsheela Kumari (supra), the Division Bench of the Patna High Court already held that there is no bar under ‘the Act’ in such cases for the convening of the fresh meeting if the earlier meeting ended without the motion being put to vote. 63. So far as the averments made in paragraph no. 9 of the supplementary affidavit is concerned, the submission is that the oral instructions were given to the Learned Counsel on record representing the answering Respondents on 25.07.2024 before the instant writ petition was taken up for hearing and as the Respondent No. 4 was at an advance stage of issuing a revised notice containing the reasons and charges which are mentioned in the requisition dated 29.05.2024, inadvertently, statement was made that the charges have been issued through another letter/memo which is regretted. 64. The contention is that after the word "were", due to bonafide mistake on part of the answering Respondents two words "to be" could not be submitted on their behalf at the time of hearing of the instant writ petition on 25.07.2024 which is duly accepted with folded hands by the answering Respondents. 65. The further contention is that there was never any deliberate intention on the part of the answering Respondents to make any factually incorrect submission which was made inadvertently and due to bonafide oversight on 25.07.2024. 66. The contention is that the Respondent no. 4 on 25.07.2024 itself has issued the proper and lawful notice as per the statutory requirement of Section-70(4)(iv) of ‘the Act’, which has in fact been duly brought on record by the writ petitioner herself (Annexure-P-16 to the supplementary affidavit). Thus no prejudice has been caused to the writ petitioner as she has admittedly received the subsequent proper and correct notice which is as per the mandate of Section-70(4) (iv) of ‘the Act’. In a democratic set up, she should face the elected members and answer to their charges instead of leaving no stone unturned to stall the meeting. 67. Thus no prejudice has been caused to the writ petitioner as she has admittedly received the subsequent proper and correct notice which is as per the mandate of Section-70(4) (iv) of ‘the Act’. In a democratic set up, she should face the elected members and answer to their charges instead of leaving no stone unturned to stall the meeting. 67. Learned Senior Counsel for the respondents cited the case of Bhanumati etc. etc. vs. State of U.P. & Ors. reported in AIR 2010 SC 3796 wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court in paragraphs- 85 to 88 held as follows:— 85. Democracy demands accountability and transparency in the activities of the Chairperson especially in view of the important functions entrusted with the Chairperson in the running of Panchayati Raj Institutions. Such duties can be discharged by the Chairperson only if he/she enjoys the continuous confidence of the majority members in the Panchayat. So any statutory provision to demonstrate that the Chairperson has lost the confidence of the majority is conducive to public interest and adds strength to such bodies of self- Governance. Such a statutory provision cannot be called either unreasonable or ultra vires Part IX of the Constitution. 86. Any head of a democratic institution must be prepared to face the test of confidence. Neither the democratically elected Prime Minister of the Country nor the Chief Minister of a State is immune from such a test of confidence under the Rules of Procedure framed under Articles 118 and 208 of the Constitution. Both the Prime Minister of India and Chief Ministers of several States heading the Council of Ministers at the Centre and in several States respectively have to adhere to the principles of collective responsibilities to their respective houses in accordance with Articles 75(3) and 164(2) of the Constitution. 87. The learned counsel for the appellant therefore compared the position of the Chairperson of a Panchayat with that of the President of India and argued that both are elected for five years and President’s continuance in office is not subject to any vote of no-confidence. The post of Chairperson should have the same immunity. 88. This is an argument of desperation and has been advanced, with respect, without any regard to the vast difference in Constitutional status and position between the two posts. The two posts are not comparable at all by any standards. The post of Chairperson should have the same immunity. 88. This is an argument of desperation and has been advanced, with respect, without any regard to the vast difference in Constitutional status and position between the two posts. The two posts are not comparable at all by any standards. Even the President of India is subject to impeachment proceedings under Article 61 of the Constitution. No one is an ‘imperium in imperio’ in our Constitutional set up.” 68. He also cited the case of Dharamsheela Kumari (supra) wherein the Division Bench in paragraphs 117 and 118 held as follows:— “117. Having gone through the submissions put to this Court in detail, the Court finds that the allegation of fraud was not established and the Pramukh and the Requisitionists could not have been said to have committed a fraud on the system; the words of Section 44(3)(i) have to be read in conjunction with one another and the majority required to put a motion to vote is from amongst the members of the Samiti present and voting; the logical conclusion of a motion is 'voting upon' the same, and since no vote took place in the meeting dated 10.08.2018, the motion cannot be said to have been 'brought' and consequently, the bar of Section 44(3)(ii) is not attracted. 118. Thus the questions are answered as under:— Issue No.(i):—The provision of Section 44 of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 2006 is an independent and stand alone Section, a complete code in itself. Issue No.(ii):—The procedure prescribed under the provisions of Section 46 of the Act for convening a special meeting is neither applicable nor can it be read into for the meeting stipulated under Section 44 of the Act. Issue No.(iii):—Under Section 44(3) of the Act majority required to put the motion to vote is amongst the members of the Panchayat Samiti present and voting. No minimum quorum is required for putting the motion of no confidence to vote. Issue No.(iv):—Section 44(3) of the Act mandates a motion of no confidence to be put to vote by way of a secret ballot. Issue No.(v):—The impugned action, i.e. resolution dated 10.08.2018 is in fraction of the provisions of the Act and as such is quashed and set aside. Issue No.(iv):—Section 44(3) of the Act mandates a motion of no confidence to be put to vote by way of a secret ballot. Issue No.(v):—The impugned action, i.e. resolution dated 10.08.2018 is in fraction of the provisions of the Act and as such is quashed and set aside. Issue No.(vi):—Section 44 of the Act does not mandate the Requisitionists necessarily to be present in the meeting called to discuss and put to vote the motion of no confidence. Issue Nos. (vii) & (viii):—In the given facts, absence of the Requisitionists cannot be said to be an act of fraud with an endeavour of defeating the provisions of the Statue. Issue No.(ix):—In the absence of the motion being put to vote, the legal bar of moving a fresh motion of no confidence stipulated under Section 44(3)(ii) would not be attracted. Issue No.(x):—In the attending facts and circumstances, it cannot be said that the acts of the Executive Officer are deliberate leading to dereliction of duty warranting initiation of an enquiry with regard to his act and conduct.” 69. Learned Senior Counsel thus concludes by submitting that:— “(i) in the absence of the earlier ‘No Confidence Motion’ being put to vote, it was not a concluded meeting; (ii) following the Dharamsheela Kumari (supra) judgment, there is/was no bar in convening the fresh meeting to consider the ‘No Confidence Motion’; (iii) this being the fresh meeting, notices have to go to each and every member of the Saran Zila Parishad; (iv) the petitioner having herself fixed the date of fresh meeting earlier has waived her rights to question it; (v) the direction issued by the respondent no. 3 on 15.07.2024 to convene the fresh meeting after the petitioner failed to do so need no interference and the petition be dismissed.” F: Case of the Respondent No. 4, Zila Parishad, Saran: 70. Learned Counsel for the Zila Parishad, Saran, Mr. Nikesh Kumar submits that the copy of the present writ application was received by the counsel only on 20.7.2024 and he promptly informed the office of the Zila Parishad, Saran at Chapra on 21.7.2024. It was placed before the Respondent No. 4, the Deputy Development Commission-cum-Chief Executive Office, Zila Parishad, Saran at Chapra on 25.07.2024 when it came to the notice that the office inadvertently could not enclose the requisition of ‘No Confidence Motion’ dated 29.5.2024 along with the notice/memo no. It was placed before the Respondent No. 4, the Deputy Development Commission-cum-Chief Executive Office, Zila Parishad, Saran at Chapra on 25.07.2024 when it came to the notice that the office inadvertently could not enclose the requisition of ‘No Confidence Motion’ dated 29.5.2024 along with the notice/memo no. 473 dated 15.7.2024 which was/were sent to all the members of the Zila Parishad, Saran. 71. Having realized the aforesaid mistake, the respondent no. 4 immediately took remedial measure by issuing directions/memo no. 511 dated 25.07.2024 for sending the copy of requisition of the ‘No Confidence Motion’ dated 29.05.2024 to all the elected members of the Saran Zila Parishad in compliance of the provisions of Section 70(4)(iv) of ‘the Act’ which was duly received by all the members the same day. 72. Simultaneously, show cause notice has been issued to the Section Officer-cum-Accountant, Zila Parishad, Saran at Chapra by office letter no. 512 dated 25.7.2024 to explain within 24 hours as to under what circumstances, the copy of the requisition of ‘No confidence Motion’ (by which charges has been levelled against the petitioner) was not annexed with the memo no. 5034 dated 15.7.2024 (issued by the respondent no. 5) and memo no. 473 dated 15.07.2024 (issued by the respondent no. 4). 73. The answering respondent no. 4 seeks apology before this Court for the in-advertent mistake committed by the office of the Zila Parishad, Saran which was unintentional. 74. So far as the case in hand is concerned, all the decisions have been taken strictly in accordance with law and the respondents are fully justified in issuing direction/orders for convening the meeting on 30.07.2024 and further issuing notices upon all the elected members of Saran Zila Parishad, this being the fresh meeting. The writ petition thus is fit to be dismissed. G. STATE 75. Mr. Ajay, learned G.A.-5 represents the State and he submitted that the Department (respondent no. 2) clearly opined in the case of Saran Zila Parishad itself (Annexure P/11 to the writ petition) that notices have to go to all the elected members. He further submits that the petitioner has wrongly construed the opinion about concluded meeting to be in her favour. 76. 2) clearly opined in the case of Saran Zila Parishad itself (Annexure P/11 to the writ petition) that notices have to go to all the elected members. He further submits that the petitioner has wrongly construed the opinion about concluded meeting to be in her favour. 76. Learned counsel reiterates the version put forward by the respective counsels for the respondents that when no voting took place on 15.01.2024, it was not a concluded meeting and thus there is no bar in convening a fresh special meeting following the Dharamsheela Kumari (supra) case. 77. Learned counsel thus submits that the writ petition be dismissed. H. FINDINGS: 78. Having heard the respective parties and perusing the records as well as the cases cited, the questions that need to be answered is/are as to:— (i) whether after the Special meeting held on 15.01.2024 to consider the ‘No Confidence Motion’ against the petitioner (Jaimitra Devi) came to an end without any voting on the motion, any subsequent meeting is permissible; (ii) whether the action of the petitioner in fixing the date of subsequent meeting on 20.06.2024 but restricting it to only those six members who attended the meeting on 15.01.2024 is/was legally valid; (iii) whether the respondent no. 3, the District Magistrate, Saran at Chapra is/was justified in issuing the memo no 5034 dated 15.07.2024 fixing the date of the special meeting on 30.07.2024; (iv) whether in the absence of the charges having been made part of the notice issued by the respondent no. 4 vide memo no. 473 dated 15.07.2024, the meeting could have been allowed to convene on 30.07.2024; (v) whether the writ petitioner in the aforesaid circumstances is entitled to any relief. 79. This Court at the outset would like to record its strong displeasure on the conduct of the respondent no. 4, the Deputy Development Commissioner cum the Chief Executive Officer, Saran Zila Parishad. The respondent no. 3 passed an order communicated vide memo no. 5034 dated 15.07.2024 fixing the date of the special meeting of Saran Zila Parishad on 30.07.2024. The respondent no. 4, thereafter, in a haste issued memo no. 473 dated 15.07.2024 communicating the same to all the members of the Saran Zila Parishad. (Annexure-15 of the writ application). 80. However, a bare perusal of the memo no. 473 dated 15.07.2024 would show that while doing so, he/she simply affixed the same on the letter/memo no. The respondent no. 4, thereafter, in a haste issued memo no. 473 dated 15.07.2024 communicating the same to all the members of the Saran Zila Parishad. (Annexure-15 of the writ application). 80. However, a bare perusal of the memo no. 473 dated 15.07.2024 would show that while doing so, he/she simply affixed the same on the letter/memo no. 5034 dated 15.07.2024 issued by the respondent no. 3 instead of issuing a fresh letter/memo of the office. Naturally, the charges (submitted by the requisitionist on 29.05.2024) failed to get its place in the said document. It came to be served upon the members only ten days later vide memo no. 511 dated 25.07.2024. 81. In the process, the respondent no. 4 was poured water on the efforts taken by the respondent no. 3 and he/she being the signatory to the document cannot shrug off his/her responsibility by blaming the lower official for the said act as it was his/her duty to check whether the important document (the charges) has been attached with the memo no. 473 dated 15.01.2024 or not before putting in the signature. 82. Worse, instead of owning up the responsibility and putting the reply on affidavit himself/herself, the respondent no. 4 assigned the job to the District Engineer of the Saran Zila Parishad which is deprecable. It seems the respondent no. 4 is in the habit of shirking of his/her responsibility by passing it on to the subordinate officials. The Court however, accepts the apology tendered by the respondent no. 4 and cautions him/her to be careful in future. The apologies tendered by the other respondents appearing in the present case is/are also accepted. 83. It seems the respondent no. 4 is in the habit of shirking of his/her responsibility by passing it on to the subordinate officials. The Court however, accepts the apology tendered by the respondent no. 4 and cautions him/her to be careful in future. The apologies tendered by the other respondents appearing in the present case is/are also accepted. 83. The facts of the case are on record and is/are stitched together hereinbelow for the proper appreciation:— (i) in the year 2021, the petitioner was elected as the member of the Saran Zila Parishad and went on to become its Chairperson; (ii) two years later, after receipt of a requisition by 17 members, she fixed the date of Special meeting on 15.01.2024 to discuss the ‘No Confidence Motion’; (iii) on the date so fixed (15.01.2024), only six members (out of 47 members) attended the meeting and as such the same was concluded by the Chairman without the motion being put to vote following the 2008 circular of ‘the SEC’; (iv) on 29.05.2024, once again she received requisition of 17 elected members for convening Special meeting to consider the ‘No Confidence Motion’ against her; (v) Subsequently, five elected members too (who attended the first meeting) filed representation on 01.06.2024 with the prayer that the second meeting be restricted to only those elected members who were in the first meeting on 15.01.2024; (vi) however, as the petitioner failed to fix the date, the respondent no. 3 issued necessary directions to the respondent no. 4 vide memo no. 4313 dated 18.06.2024 to act in accordance with law immediately; (vii) accordingly, following the judgment of learned Single Judge in the case of Anu Kumari (supra) and Punam Kumari Singh (supra), the petitioner directed the respondent no. 4 vide letter dated 20.06.2024 to fix the meeting date as 28.06.2024 but the same be restricted to only those elected members who attended the first meeting on 15.01.2024; (viii) the respondent no. 4 thereafter fixed the date as 28.06.2024 and restricted it to only those six members who earlier attended the meeting on 15.01.2024; (ix) respondent no. 3 subsequently vide memo no. 4739 dated 21.06.2024 recalled his office memo no. 4313 dated 18.06.2024; (x) an opinion was sought for from the State Government by the respondent no. 4 which subsequently gave directions vide memo no. 3 subsequently vide memo no. 4739 dated 21.06.2024 recalled his office memo no. 4313 dated 18.06.2024; (x) an opinion was sought for from the State Government by the respondent no. 4 which subsequently gave directions vide memo no. 5697 dated 01.07.2024 that notices have to go to all the elected members further observing that concluded proceeding cannot be reopened as the order of the Full Bench in Sangeeta Devi (supra) shall be prospective; (xi) this Court has noted the fact that the Panchayati Raj Department, Bihar clearly held in the case of the petitioner/Siwan Zila Parishad itself that the decision to allow only those members who attended the 15.01.2024 meeting is without logic and unconstitutional; (xii) the petitioner however, read between the lines and returned the file on 10.07.2024 with the comment that the proceeding stand concluded on 15.01.2024 and as such no second meeting can be convened; (xiii) the respondent no. 3 thereafter exercising his power under ‘the Act’ vide memo no. 5034 dated 15.07.2024 fixed 30.07.2024 the date for special meeting to discuss ‘No Confidence Motion’ against the petitioner. (xiv) accordingly, vide memo no. 473 dated 15.07.2024, the respondent no. 4 communicated the same to all the elected members. (xv) however, the fact remains that the charges levelled against the petitioner (which the requisitionists had submitted on 29.05.2024) was/were not attached with the memo no. 473 dated 15.07.2024 which ultimately were sent to all the elected members only vide memo no. 511 dated 25.07.2024; (xvi) in that background, when the charges were made available to the members only on 25.07.2024 for the special meeting which was to be held on 30.07.2024, as it breached fifteen days period, on 29.07.2024, after hearing the parties and reserving the order, an interim order was passed staying the said meeting dated 30.07.2024. 84. Having recorded the facts of the case, at this stage, the Court would like to incorporate Section 70 ‘the Act’ which read as follows:— “70. Resignation or Removal of Adhyaksha and Up-adhyaksha.—(1) The Adhyaksha may resign his office by writing under his hand addressed to the District Magistrate and the Up-adhyaksha may resign his office by writing under his hand addressed to the Adhyaksha. Resignation or Removal of Adhyaksha and Up-adhyaksha.—(1) The Adhyaksha may resign his office by writing under his hand addressed to the District Magistrate and the Up-adhyaksha may resign his office by writing under his hand addressed to the Adhyaksha. (2) Every resignation under sub-section (1) shall take effect on the expiry of seven days from the date of such resignation, unless within the said period of seven days he withdraws such resignation by writing under his hand addressed to the District Magistrate or the Adhyaksha, as the case may be. (3) Adhyaksha or Up-adhyaksha shall vacate the office if he ceases to be a member of the Zila Parishad. (4)(i)Adhayaksha and Up-Adhayaksha shall be deemed to have vacated his office forthwith if a resolution expressing want of confidence in him is passed by a majority of the total number of directly elected members from territorial constituencies of the Zila Parishad at a meeting specially convened for the purpose. The requisition for such a special meeting shall be signed by not less than one fifth of the total number of directly elected members of the Zila Parishad and shall be delivered to the Adhyaksha with a copy to the District Magistrate. The Adhyaksha shall within seven days from the date of receipt of such requisition convene a special meeting of the Zila Parishad. The meeting shall be held on a day not later than fifteen days from the date of issue of the notice of the meeting.The meeting shall be presided over by the Adhyaksha if the motion is against the Up-adhayaksha; if it is against the Adhyaksha the Upadhyaksha shall preside over the meeting and if it is against Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha both then the District Magistrate shall preside over the meeting. In case of the post of Up-adhyaksha being vacant or his absence from the meeting convened for discussion on no confidence motion against the Adhyaksha or the post of Adhyaksha being vacant or his absence from the meeting convened for discussion on no confidence motion against the Up-adhyaksha, as the case may be, the meeting shall be presided over by any member elected from amongst the directly elected members from the territorial constituencies of the Zila Parishad present in the meeting. In case of failure to convene the meeting by the Adhyaksha, the District Magistrate shall convene the meeting in the same manner and the meeting shall be presided by him. No such meeting shall be postponed once the notice for the same has been issued. No quorum shall be required for the special meeting convened to discuss no confidence motion. (ii) During the first two year period of the tenure, no confidence motion shall not be moved against the Adhyaksha or the Upadhyaksha. [Such a no confidence motion may be brought only once in the whole tenure of ‘Adhayaksha or Upadhyaksha] (iii) No-confidence motion against the Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha or both, shall not be brought within six months of the expiry of the term of the Zila Parishad. (iv) Such reasons/charges, on the basis of which no confidence motion is to be moved against the Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha, shall be clearly mentioned in the notice of the meeting called to consider the no confidence motion. (v) As soon as the meeting called under this Section commences, the presiding member at the meeting shall read out the motion on which the meeting has been called to consider, before the present members and declare it open for discussion. Any discussion on the motion under this Section shall not be adjourned. (vi)During discussion, opportunity shall be given to the Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha or both against whom no confidence motion is moved, for his defence before the Zila Parishad. The motion shall be put to vote on the same day after discussion which shall take place by secret ballot in the prescribed manner by the District Magistrate. (vii)If the motion of no confidence against the Adhyaksha or the Upadhyaksha or both is once rejected, no fresh motion of no confidence against the Adhyaksha or the Upadhyaksha or both, as the case may be shall be brought before the Zila Parishad within a period of one year from the date of rejection of such motion. (5) Without prejudice to the provisions under this Act, if in opinion of the [Government] [Substituted vide Section 4 of Amdt. (5) Without prejudice to the provisions under this Act, if in opinion of the [Government] [Substituted vide Section 4 of Amdt. Act 8 of 2008.] having territorial jurisdiction over the Zila Parishad, a Adhyaksha or the Upadhyaksha of Zila Parishad absents himself without sufficient cause for more than three consecutive meetings or sittings or willfully omits or refuses to perform his duties and functions under this Act, or abuses the power vested in him or is found to be guilty of misconduct in the discharge of his duties or becomes physically or mentally incapacitated for performing his duties or is absconding being an accused in a criminal case for more than six months, the [Government] [Substituted vide Section 4 of Amdt. Act 8 of 2008.] may, after giving the Adhyaksha or the Upadhyaksha, as the case may be, a reasonable opportunity for explanation, by order, remove such Adhyaksha or the Upadhyaksha, as the case may be, from office. [The Adhyaksha or Up-Adhyaksha so removed on the charge of being found guilty of misuse of vested powers or of misconduct in the discharge of his duties shall not be eligible for election to any panchayat bodies till further five years from the date of such removal. The Adhyaksha or Up-Adhyaksha so removed on rest of the charges shall not be eligible for re-election as Adhyaksha or Up-Adhyaksha during the remaining term of office of such Zila Parishad.] [Substituted vide Section 4 of Amdt. Act 8 of 2008.] (2) An Adhyaksha or Up-adhyaksha removed from the office under subsection (1) may also be removed by the Government from the membership of the Zila Parishad.” 85. Let us now discuss the first issue as to whether after the meeting that took place on 15.01.2024 but ended without the motion being put to vote, any fresh special meeting can be convened again to discuss the ‘No Confidence Motion’ against the petitioner or not. 86. The fact remains that on 15.01.2024, when the special meeting took place, only six members attended it. The Chairman presiding the meeting, citing 2008 directive of ‘the SEC’ concluded the meeting without any voting on the motion on the ground of absence of quorum. 87. 86. The fact remains that on 15.01.2024, when the special meeting took place, only six members attended it. The Chairman presiding the meeting, citing 2008 directive of ‘the SEC’ concluded the meeting without any voting on the motion on the ground of absence of quorum. 87. Thereafter: (i) the petitioner received the requisition dated 29.05.2024/01.06.2024 preferred by the 17 elected members of the Zila Parishad, Saran/additional five members for fixing the date for the special meeting for considering ‘No confidence Motion’ against her. However, the request of the five members on 01.06.2024 was to restrict the special meeting to only those members who had attended the first meeting on 15.01.2024; (ii) the petitioner sat over the matter and acted only after being nudged by the respondent no. 3 and on 20.06.2024 fixed the date of the special meeting as 28.06.2024, though with the direction to restrict it to only six members. (iii) the respondent no. 3 thereafter armed with legal opinion and upon refusal of the petitioner on 10.07.2024 to fix the date (holding that the second proceeding cannot be allowed) using the power and duties given under ‘the Act’, fixed the meeting date as 30.07.2024 vide office memo no. 5034 dated 15.07.2024. 88. In the opinion of the Court, having herself fixed the date of the special meeting earlier on 28.06.2024, the petitioner cannot be allowed to take an U-turn and claim that the second meeting is impermissible. 89. Now, the legal aspect. Long before the special meeting took place on 15.01.2024, the Division Bench of the Patna High Court in the case of Dharamsheela Kumari (supra) held that logical conclusion of a motion is ‘voting upon it’ and in its absence, there is no bar under ‘the Act’ in making request for a fresh meeting. The Division Bench in its issue no. (ix) clearly held that ‘in the absence of the motion being put to vote, the legal bar of moving a fresh motion of no confidence stipulated under section 44(3)(ii) would not be attracted’; 90. Further, the opinion of the State Government that a concluded proceeding cannot be reopened is not applicable in the present case as in this case, no voting took place and as such, the meeting so held on 15.01.2024 cannot be declared as the concluded meeting. Further, the opinion of the State Government that a concluded proceeding cannot be reopened is not applicable in the present case as in this case, no voting took place and as such, the meeting so held on 15.01.2024 cannot be declared as the concluded meeting. In fact, the State Government dealing with the present case itself in the same order dated 01.07.2024 held that notices have to go to all the elected members further holding that the decision of the petitioner is without logic and unconstitutional. It seems the petitioner failed to go through the entire facts of the memo no. 5697 dated 01.07.2024 issued by the respondent no. 2. 91. Regarding the claim of the petitioner that the respondent no. 3 was having no power to overturn her decision dated 10.07.2024, this Court would like to incorporate section 157 of ‘the Act’ which read as follows:— “157. Power of the District Magistrate with regard to conduct of special meetings called to consider no confidence motion. —If the District Magistrate suo motu or upon information being received from any source, is of the opinion that any irregularity or mistake is being committed so far as provisions related to conduct of any special meeting of a Panchayat to consider a no confidence motion is concerned, he shall have the power to issue such directions as considered necessary for complying with the provisions of the Act in that regard. He may also depute any officer to be present in such a meeting and to call for a report from such officer.” 92. From the aforesaid facts, it is clear that the contention of the petitioner is ill founded and the respondent no. 3 is/was fully empowered to take decision. As he came to the conclusion that the petitioner has taken an illegal decision, the respondent no. 3 rightly issued memo no. 5034 dated 15.07.2024 and fixed the date of the special meeting for 30.07.2024. 93. Thus, the issue no. (i) is decided against the petitioner. This Court holds that in absence of the motion being put to vote on 15.01.2024, there is no bar in calling upon the special meeting to deliberate upon the ‘No Confidence Motion’ against the petitioner. 94. 5034 dated 15.07.2024 and fixed the date of the special meeting for 30.07.2024. 93. Thus, the issue no. (i) is decided against the petitioner. This Court holds that in absence of the motion being put to vote on 15.01.2024, there is no bar in calling upon the special meeting to deliberate upon the ‘No Confidence Motion’ against the petitioner. 94. This takes us to the second issue raised by the petitioner as to whether it can be restricted to only six members including the petitioner who attended the first meeting on 15.01.2024 as put forward by the petitioner or notices have to go to all the elected members of the Saran Zila Parishad. 95. This Court rejects the said contention of the petitioner on the following ground:— (i) it has already been held in earlier paragraphs that in the first meeting, no voting took place and as such, there is no legal bar of moving a fresh motion of no confidence as held by the Division Bench of Patna High Court in the case of Dharamsheela Kumari (supra). What the petitioner has termed as the second meeting is actually a fresh meeting as for all practical purposes, the meeting so held on 15.01.2024 cannot be termed a concluded proceeding in absence of the motion being put to vote; (ii) thus, when the fresh/special meeting is being convened to discuss the ‘No confidence Motion’ against the petitioner, each and every elected member of the Saran Zila Parishad is entitled to attend the same. By not participating in an earlier meeting, he/she has not waived of his/her subsequent right to be present in the fresh meeting; (iii) the petitioner has lay her claim on this aspect solely on the two orders of learned Single Judge in the case of Anu Kumari (supra) and Punam Kumari Singh (supra) which in turn is based on the Division Bench judgment in the case of Dharamsheela Kumari (supra) specially paragraphs 58 and 59 together with the Division Bench case of Smt. Shamshad Khatoon (supra). In that background, it is necessary to bring on record paragraph nos. 58 and 59 of Dharamsheela Kumari (supra) case. 96. Paragraphs 58 and 59 of the Dharamsheela Kumari (supra) judgment read as follows:— 58. In that background, it is necessary to bring on record paragraph nos. 58 and 59 of Dharamsheela Kumari (supra) case. 96. Paragraphs 58 and 59 of the Dharamsheela Kumari (supra) judgment read as follows:— 58. The expression used "majority" in Section 44 has to be read in the context of 'total number of members of the Panchayat Samiti' for only such of those members who are elected members have a right, not only to move a motion of no confidence but also to participate, i.e. to discuss and vote thereupon. The expression 'requisition for such a special meeting' in the second part of sub- section (3) of Section 44 has to be read in the context of moving a resolution of no confidence as envisaged therein and not a special meeting envisaged under Section 46(3). On reading the words in conjunction with one another, it can be said that the majority required is the majority of 'total number of elected members of Samiti "at" a meeting specially convened for the purpose'. Explaining through an illustration, if five members present in the meeting out of an elected body of twenty-two members, the majority required is three, not twelve. Meaning thereby, that it is not a majority qua the total number of elected members in the Samiti, but a majority qua the total number of members of the elected member of the Samiti present in the meeting convened for the purpose. In other words, the majority required to pass a resolution is a simple majority from amongst those present and voting. Similar is the position for electing the Pramukh and the Up- Pramukh [Section 40]. This interpretation is also supported by the last phrase used as ingredient (6), which specifies that 'No quorum is required for such a special meeting'. If the ingredient (7) is interpreted as "majority of the total body of elected members", that ingredient is rendered nugatory and otiose. 59. It also needs to be noted that as voting cannot be adjourned in such a meeting, the majority of the total body's prescription and the non-requirement of quorum, on the other hand, is a clear and apparent conflict. Therefore, to read these two provisions harmoniously, it becomes essential to read the phrase 'majority of total elected members present in the meeting'. Therefore, to read these two provisions harmoniously, it becomes essential to read the phrase 'majority of total elected members present in the meeting'. Hence, it is clarified that there is no requirement of 'majority of total elected members' to form a 'Quorum'.” 97. A bare perusal of the two paragraphs would show that the Division bench was actually clarifying that when a meeting is convened, the majority has to be decided amongst the elected members who were present in the meeting as voting cannot be stalled for want of quorum. In the said context, it gave an example that if five members are participating in the meeting, the majority has to be decided on the said number itself. At no point, the Division Bench dealt with the issue of who should be entitled to be present in the fresh meeting. 98. Thus, in the considered opinion of the Court, the Division Bench was neither dealing with the question as to who will attend the fresh meeting nor gave any opinion on it. It seems that the order of the Division Bench was not placed in proper perspective before the learned Single Judge in the Anu Kumari (supra) case. 99. Regarding the case of Smt. Shamshad Khatun vs. State of Bihar & Ors. reported in 2010 (1) PLJR 929 (DB), paragraphs 20 and 21 read as follows:— 20. The present factual expose has to be appreciated on the touchstone and anvil of aforesaid pronouncements. As is demonstrable, the petitioner in paragraph 6 of the writ petition has stated as follows;— "6. That the petitioner has fixed the date for convening the meeting for consideration of no confidence against her in the Register of the Panchayat Samiti for issuing the notice by the Executive Officer for 12.12.09." From the aforesaid it is perceived that she herself had fixed the date of meeting. The meeting as fixed was held on 12.12.2009. She participated in the meeting and took a chance. Thus, fixing of the meeting by the appellant and participation in the meeting would tantamount to waiver by express conduct. If the provisions contained in Section 44 and 46(4) of the Act are read appositely there can be no shadow of doubt that they provide a protective umbrella to the elected Pramukh. Thus, the same does not contravene any public policy. It does not involve any public interest. If the provisions contained in Section 44 and 46(4) of the Act are read appositely there can be no shadow of doubt that they provide a protective umbrella to the elected Pramukh. Thus, the same does not contravene any public policy. It does not involve any public interest. As we perceive the scheme and anatomy of the provisions of the Act, it is, in fact, basically a protection to the elected candidate. In this regard a Full Bench decision of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Smt. Bhulin Dewangan vs. State of M.P. & Ors., 2000 (4) M.P.H.T. 69 (FB), is apposite to refer. The Full Bench while dealing with the validity of notice calling a meeting of no confidence under M.P. Panchayat (Gram Panchayat Ke Sarpanch Tatha Up-Sarpanch, Janpad Panchayat Tatha Zila Panchayat Ke President Tatha Vice President Ke Virudh Avishwas Prastav) Niyam, 1994 speaking through D.M. Dharmadhikari, J. (as His Lordship then was) held as follows:— "15. The general rule is that noncompliance of mandatory requirement results in nullification of the Act. There are, however, several exceptions to the same. If certain requirements or conditions are provided by statute in the interest of a particular person, the requirements or conditions, although mandatory, may be waived by him if no public interest are involved and in such a case the act done will be valid even if the requirements or conditions have not been performed. This appears to be the reason for learned C.K. Prasad, J. in Dhumadhandin vs. State of M.P. (1997 (1) Vidhi Bhasvar 49) which was followed by R.S. Garg, j., in Mahavir Saket vs. Collector, Rewa (1998 (1) JLJ 113) for holding that mere non-compliance of first part of the rule in fixing a meeting beyond the prescribed days of the motion of noconfidence would not invalidate the whole proceedings. In case of Dhumadhandin (supra), the Sarpanch did not question the validity of the notice calling the meeting of no-confidence and in fact had taken chance by facing the motion. R.S. Garg, J. in Mahavir Saket (supra) placed reliance on the decision of C.K. Prasad, J., in Dhumadhandin (supra) to up-hold the passing of the no-confidence motion in the adjourned meeting as in the meeting called within the prescribed fifteen days the Presiding Officer was not available. R.S. Garg, J. in Mahavir Saket (supra) placed reliance on the decision of C.K. Prasad, J., in Dhumadhandin (supra) to up-hold the passing of the no-confidence motion in the adjourned meeting as in the meeting called within the prescribed fifteen days the Presiding Officer was not available. Sub-section (4) of Section 21 permits reference of a dispute to the Collector by Sarpanch or Up-Sarpanch against whom a notice of no confidence motion had been passed. The proceedings of the no-confidence motion or other proceedings under the Act are also assailable in this Court as Constitutional Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. As has been construed by us, even though second part of the rule requiring dispatch of notice of the meeting to the member is mandatory, yet in every case of challenge to the proceeding of noconfidence motion either before the Collector or this Court, it would still be open to the Collector or his Court to find out whether in a given case non-compliance of any part of the rule has in fact resulted in any failure of justice or has caused any serious prejudice to any of the parties. The general rule is that a mandatory provision of law requires strict compliance and the directory one only substantial. But even where the provisions is mandatory, every non-compliance of the same need not necessarily result in nullification of the whole action. In a given situation even for non-fulfillment of mandatory requirement, the authority empowered to take a decision may refuse to nullify the action on the ground that no substantial prejudice had been caused to the party affected or to any other party which would have any other substantial interest in the proceeding. This Court under Article 227 of the Constitution has also a discretion not to interfere even though a mandatory requirement of law has not been strictly complied with as thereby no serious prejudice or failure of justice has been caused. This is how various Single Bench decisions in which even after finding some infraction of the second part of Rule 3(3) of the Rules of 1994, the resolution of no-confidence motion passed was not invalidated on the ground that no substantial prejudice thereby was caused to the affected parties. The intention of the legislature has to be gathered from the provisions contained in Section 21 and the Rule 3(3) framed thereunder. The intention of the legislature has to be gathered from the provisions contained in Section 21 and the Rule 3(3) framed thereunder. The provisions do evince an intention that a meeting of the no-confidence motion be called within a reasonable period of not later than 15 days and every member has to be informed of the same seven days in advance. A notice of no-confidence motion is required to be moved by not less than 1/3rd of the total number of elected members as required by first Proviso to sub-rule (1) of Rule 3 and can be lawfully carried by a resolution passed by majority of not less than 3/4th of the Panchas present and voting and such majority has to be more than 2/3rd of the total number of Panchas constituting the Panchayat in accordance with subsection (1) of Section 21 of the Act. This being the substance of the provisions under the Act and the rules, a mere non-compliance of second part of sub-rule (3) would not in every case invalidate the action unless the Collector while deciding the dispute under sub-section (4) of Section 21 or this Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Art.227 of the constitution comes to the conclusion that such noncompliance has caused serious prejudice to the affected office bearer or has otherwise resulted in failure of justice." 16. We get some support in our conclusion on the construction of the provisions contained in the Rule from Statutory construction by Francis J. Mc. Caffrrey, 1953 Edition, Article 52, Page 110 where it stated: "Where a statute regulates the time at or within which an act is to be done by a public officer or body, it is generally construed to be permissive only as to the time, for the reason "that the public interests are not to suffer by the laches of any public officer" (Looney vs. Hughes, 26 N.Y., 514). While the Courts are inclined to hold such provisions to be directory only as to time, they will be read as mandatory if the nature of the act to be performed or the phraseology of the statute indicates an intention on the part of the legislature to exact a literal compliance with the requirement of time. While the Courts are inclined to hold such provisions to be directory only as to time, they will be read as mandatory if the nature of the act to be performed or the phraseology of the statute indicates an intention on the part of the legislature to exact a literal compliance with the requirement of time. The Courts seek to achieve a just result in not ascribing an invalidating effect to the failure of public officers to observe the time provisions of statutes; a contrary rule would operate unfairly in prejudicing the rights of persons who have no control over the conduct of the public officer." (Emphasis supplied) and from the following passage in Statutory Interpretation by Francis Bennion, Second Edition, Part I Section 10 Page 34: "Even where the duty is mandatory, the Court will not now-a-days hold it to be contravened because of a purely formal or technical defect. This may be described as a defect that does not materially impair the remedy intended to be provided by the enactment for the mischief to which it is directed." 21. Applying the aforesaid principle to the facts of the present case there can be no room for doubt that the right could be waived by the elected candidate and she has done so by her express conduct. Quite apart from the above this Court cannot be oblivious of the fact that the appellant had participated in the meeting by taking a chance and 12 members voted against her. It is also apt to note all the members had been served and they had participated. The requisite majority had voted against her. Ergo, there is no justification or warrant to interfere in the proceeding of No Confidence Motion in exercise of the extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.” 100. Thus, in the case of Smt. Shamshad Khatun (supra), the said petitioner fixed the date of meeting, participated in it and took a chance. The Division Bench in that background held that having fixed the date of the meeting and participating in it would tantamount to waiver by express conduct. Having lost thereafter, she cannot be allowed to challenge the meeting so held. 101. The facts of this case however is entirely different. The Division Bench in that background held that having fixed the date of the meeting and participating in it would tantamount to waiver by express conduct. Having lost thereafter, she cannot be allowed to challenge the meeting so held. 101. The facts of this case however is entirely different. A meeting took place on 15.01.2024 where for whatever reason, the majority of members failed to register their presence. Had the voting taken place amongst the six elected members, the rest of them, who absented themselves had no right to challenge the same having waived it of by not participating in it. 102. However, the fact remains that no voting took place on 15.01.2024 and in that background, in terms of Dharamsheela Kumari (supra) judgment, when fresh meeting is being requisitioned to discuss the ‘No Confidence Motion’ against the petitioner, each and every elected member of Saran Zila Parishad has to be noticed. This Court again feels that the facts of the Smt. Shamshad Khatoon (supra) was not properly presented before the learned Single Judge in Anu Kumari (supra) case. In any case, the Division Bench having declared in Dharamsheela Kumari (supra) judgment about the subsequent meeting to be a fresh one, all the members are even otherwise entitled to attend the fresh meeting. 103. This Court would like to deal it with a hypothetical situation. In an election to a particular Assembly Constituency, an entire village decides not to vote due to grievances against the Government. After the election is over and due to certain reasons, a by election is to take place in that particular assembly constituency where the voters of the said village had boycotted the election. Whether the voters of the said village waived of their rights by not participating in the election and thus cannot be allowed to use their franchise in the by-election. The answer will be a big ‘No’. Each and every voter of that village will have the right to participate in the by-election despite boycotting the election earlier. 104. In another situation, due to multiple reason, either illness in the family or being not at his/her home, an elected member fails to attend/participate in the special meeting. Whether he/she waived his/her right to participate in the special meeting of ‘No Confidence Motion’ which is convened afresh as the motion was not put to vote. The answer again will be in negative. 105. Whether he/she waived his/her right to participate in the special meeting of ‘No Confidence Motion’ which is convened afresh as the motion was not put to vote. The answer again will be in negative. 105. Following the Division Bench Judgment in the Dharamsheela Kumari (supra) case, this Court safely holds that the special meeting where the motion was not put to vote specially following the 2008 letter of ‘the SEC’, the legal bar of moving a fresh motion of ‘No Confidence Motion’ under ‘the Act’ would not be attracted. Further, the said meeting being a fresh requisition, each and every elected member shall be entitled to be noticed/ participate in fresh meeting so held. 106. Thus, the issue no (ii) raised by the petitioner that the fresh meeting has to be restricted to only six members (who attended the meeting on 15.01.2024) is decided against her. In the opinion of this Court, this being the fresh meeting, each and every elected member of the Saran Zila Parishad is/are entitled to be noticed so that they can participate and deliberate on the charges so made against the petitioner. 107. This takes us to the third issue as to whether after the petitioner rejected the requisition on 20.07.2024, the respondent District Magistrate, Saran at Chapra was justified in issuing the memo no. 5034 dated 15.07.2024 fixing the date of special meeting on 30.07.2024. 108. Again the admitted fact is that the respondent nos. 3 and 4 received the opinion dated 01.07.2024 of the State Government in the present matter. It clearly stated that the notice will have to be given to all the elected members of the Saran Zila Parishad. However, the petitioner chose to read between the lines for her own benefit to reject the requisition on 20.07.2024. 109. While taking the decision and rejecting the request, the petitioner missed the Dharamsheela Kumari (supra) judgment where the Division Bench clarified that any meeting where voting has not been taken place on the motion, the same is not a concluded meeting. Thus, the proceeding dated 15.01.2024 do not come within the purview of the concluded proceedings as the motion was never put to vote. 110. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances, when there is no bar in moving a fresh requisition against the petitioner, the respondent no. 3, District Magistrate, Saran at Chapra vide memo no. Thus, the proceeding dated 15.01.2024 do not come within the purview of the concluded proceedings as the motion was never put to vote. 110. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances, when there is no bar in moving a fresh requisition against the petitioner, the respondent no. 3, District Magistrate, Saran at Chapra vide memo no. 5034 dated 15.07.2024 rightly fixed the date of special meeting as 30.07.2024 with the direction that the notice be issued to all the elected members of the Zila Parishad, Saran, Chapra. 111. Thus, the third issue is also decided against the petitioner. The District Magistrate, Saran at Chapra after refusal of the petitioner to fix the date of special meeting was fully justified in issuing the memo no. 5034 dated 15.07.2024 fixing the date as 30.07.2024. 112. This takes us to the last issue as to whether in the absence of the respondent no. 4, the Deputy Development Commissioner cum the Chief Executive Officer, Zila Parishad, Saran providing the charges alongwith office memo no. 473 dated 15.07.2024 to the elected members, while forwarding the direction vide memo no. 5034 dated 15.07.2024 by the respondent no. 3, the meeting which was to be held on 30.07.2024 could have been allowed to take place, the answer is in negative for the reasons assigned hereinbelow. 113. Section 70(4) (iv) of ‘the Act’ is very clear. The reasons/charges on the basis of which a ‘No Confidence Motion’ is to be moved must be part of the notice of the meeting. The legislature has incorporated the same with the purpose so that each and every member must have first hand knowledge of the charges that have been levelled by the requisitionist to convene the special meeting to discuss and deliberate upon the ‘No Confidence Motion’. 114. The counter-affidavit of the Zila Parishad, Saran, Chapra is clear. The original notice issued vide memo no. 473 dated 15.07.2024 issued by the respondent no. 4 did not contain the charges. It was ten days later that vide memo no. 511 dated 25.07.2024, remedial measure were taken. 114. The counter-affidavit of the Zila Parishad, Saran, Chapra is clear. The original notice issued vide memo no. 473 dated 15.07.2024 issued by the respondent no. 4 did not contain the charges. It was ten days later that vide memo no. 511 dated 25.07.2024, remedial measure were taken. This Court cannot turn its eyes away from the fact that on the same day (25.07.2024), the matter was heard at length and after noticing that the charges is/are not part of the record, it was adjourned for 29.07.2024 with the direction to the learned counsel for the Zila Parishad, Saran to file counter-affidavit and clarify on this aspect. 115. It was only thereafter, that the respondent no. 4 came out of deep slumber and took remedial measures by issuing memo no. 517 dated 25.07.2024 containing the charges. It was in the aforesaid circumstances that after hearing the learned counsels on 29.07.2024 and going through the reply of the Saran Zila Parishad on this aspect, while reserving the order, this Court stayed the meeting that was to be held on 30.07.2024. 116. The fourth issue is thus decided in favour of the petitioner. In the absence of charges being part of the notice (memo no. 473 dated 15.07.2024), no meeting could have been held on 30.07.2024. 117. The matter is thus summed up in following manner:— (i) in absence of motion being put to vote in the special meeting held on 15.01.2024, there is no bar in convening the fresh meeting of Saran Zila Parishad to discuss ‘No Confidence Motion’ against the petitioner, its Chairperson; (ii) the decision of the petitioner to restrict the fresh meeting to only those elected members who attended the earlier meeting on 15.01.2024 is declared illegal; (iii) after refusal of the petitioner to fix the date of special meeting, the respondent no. 3 was well within his rights in fixing the special meeting on 30.07.2024 by issuing the office memo no. 5034 dated 15.07.2024; (iv) however, as the respondent no. 4 failed to attach the charges alongwith the memo no. 473 dated 15.07.2024 and took remedial measure only on 25.07.2024, the meeting could not have taken place on 30.07.2024. 118. Hon’ble Apex Court has repeatedly narrated the Democracy and the importance of continuous confidence of the majority of the members. 5034 dated 15.07.2024; (iv) however, as the respondent no. 4 failed to attach the charges alongwith the memo no. 473 dated 15.07.2024 and took remedial measure only on 25.07.2024, the meeting could not have taken place on 30.07.2024. 118. Hon’ble Apex Court has repeatedly narrated the Democracy and the importance of continuous confidence of the majority of the members. This Court is of the view that whether a chairperson has continuous confidence of majority of members or not can be best tested only on the floor of the house and no one in a democratic setup can be allowed to hide behind the curtains unless any illegality is detected warranting interference. 119. 30th July, 2024 is now part of the history. The issues have been decided, the petitioner has already rejected the request dated 29.05.2024 of the requisitionists to fix a date and in background, now the ball is in the Court of the respondent no. 3, the District Magistrate, Saran at Chapra who under ‘the Act’ has to fix a fresh date for the special meeting to deliberate upon the points/charges raised by the elected members of the Saran Zila Parishad against the Chairperson of the Saran Zila Parishad. 120. This Court thus directs the respondent no. 3, the District Magistrate, Saran at Chapra to fix a fresh date of special meeting to discuss the motion of no confidence against the petitioner, the Chairperson of Saran Zila Parishad in next seven days. It is made clear that the notice must be accompanied with the charges that was/were made by the requisitionist on 29.05.2024. Any inaction this time on the part of the respondents specially the respondent no. 4 shall be dealt with seriously by the Court. The notice will go to all the elected members of the Saran Zila Parishad who are entitled to participate in the fresh meeting to discuss the ‘No Confidence Motion’ against the petitioner. 121. Before parting, this Court would like to put on record its word of appreciation for the respondent no. 3, the District Magistrate, Saran at Chapra for issuing the office memo nos. 4313 dated 18.06.2024, 4379 dated 21.06.2024 as also 5034 dated 15.01.2024. 121. Before parting, this Court would like to put on record its word of appreciation for the respondent no. 3, the District Magistrate, Saran at Chapra for issuing the office memo nos. 4313 dated 18.06.2024, 4379 dated 21.06.2024 as also 5034 dated 15.01.2024. He completely went by the rule book and stepped in timely whenever the situation so arose with the sole purpose to strengthen the pillars of the democratic setup and safeguard the spirit of the Constitution which was adopted by us, the People of India on 26th November, 1949 and became effective on 26th January, 1950. 122. With the aforesaid observations and directions, both the writ petitions are dismissed.