ORDER : 1. By this petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner seeks to assail the correctness and validity of the order dated 10.07.2013 passed by the learned Central Administrative Tribunal, Jodhpur Bench, Jodhpur (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Tribunal’) by which the Original Application has been dismissed. 2. Quintessential facts necessary for determination of the controversy involved in this petition are that the petitioner was initially appointed vide order dated 07.11.1991 and he joined his duties on 11.11.1991. While he was continuing in service, a termination order was issued on 08.05.1998 which gave rise to a dispute between the parties. On a reference dated 21.06.2000 made to the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Jaipur (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Labour Court’), an award was passed in favour of the petitioner on 05.11.2001 declaring termination of the petitioner as illegal and inoperative in law. On a petition (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.7175/2005) being preferred by the respondents before the Single Bench of this Court against the award, the same was dismissed vide order dated 10.03.2006, maintaining the award. Thereafter respondents preferred a writ appeal being D.B. Special Appeal Writ No.1226/2008, which was also dismissed by the Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 01.07.2011. 3. It appears that after the first round of litigation, the petitioner was reinstated in service, however, he was again terminated on 02.04.2012 on two reasons: firstly, it was stated that he was not duly selected through the Staff Selection Commission and secondly, that his services were no longer required. 4. The petitioner then approached the Central Administrative Tribunal by way of Original Application assailing correctness and validity of the order dated 02.04.2012 and also praying for regularisation, which was rejected vide order dated 10.07.2013 giving rise to the present petition. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the main reason assigned by the Tribunal to refuse the relief sought by the petitioner against the order of termination and relief of regularisation is that the termination order was passed after due compliance of the statutory requirement as envisaged in Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act of 1947’) along with compensation. 6. 6. According to learned counsel for the petitioner, once the termination order was set aside, the petitioner is deemed to have continued in service and termination of his services on the ground that his services were no longer required, is only an eyewash as the petitioner had continued to work for a very long time as a Typist and there is nothing on record to show that there was no work of Typist any more or that any other regular appointment had taken place or that the office was closed or that the use of typing was completely given up in the office. 7. It is the submission of the petitioner that his case should have been considered for regularisation, in terms of the order passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka & Ors. Vs. Uma Devi & Ors. [ (2006) 4 SCC 1 ] but the respondents dispensed with his services in the garb of retrenchment, which is illegal and unsustainable in law. 8. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents would submit that the Tribunal had dismissed the original application as the petitioner was retrenched from service after due compliance of the provisions of Section 25 F of the Act of 1947. The petitioner did not have any right to hold the post because he was not a regular employee and was only an adhoc employee. He would further submit that once the respondents have come out with a case that petitioner’s services were no longer required, further enquiry need not be done and it has to be presumed that there was no work for the petitioner. 9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned order and also gone through the record of the case. 10. We find that the petitioner has made specific averment that the respondent was in need of a Typist and therefore, upon requisition made, the name of the petitioner was sponsored by the Employment Exchange and thereafter he was subjected to a typing test leading to his appointment. Though appointment order of the petitioner says that the petitioner has been appointed in adhoc capacity, his adhoc appointment continued for about 8 years. If a person is continued in service for about 8 years, it cannot be said that the requirement is temporary. Though appointment order of the petitioner says that the petitioner has been appointed in adhoc capacity, his adhoc appointment continued for about 8 years. If a person is continued in service for about 8 years, it cannot be said that the requirement is temporary. The use of the word “adhoc” loses significance once a person is continued in service for a significant period. However, it appears that the respondents proceeded to terminate the services of the petitioner without complying with the mandate of Section 25 F of the Act of 1947. 11. On dispute being raised, the award dated 05.11.2001 was passed by the Labour Court in favour of the petitioner which was confirmed in all subsequent proceedings before the higher Courts. 12. It appears that the respondents were determined to somehow dispense with the services of the petitioner, therefore, they again took recourse to the provisions of Section 25 F of the Act of 1947 and retrenched the services of the petitioner on two grounds: firstly, that he was not selected through Staff Selection Commission and secondly, his services were no longer required. 13. In so far as the non-selection of the petitioner through Staff Selection Commission is concerned, that could not be made a ground to invoke power under Section 25 F of the Act of 1947. The petitioner was not a backdoor entrant. He was a registered unemployed youth with the Employment Exchange. It was only on the basis of the requisition made by the respondents that the name of the petitioner was sponsored through Employment Exchange. Thereafter, the petitioner was subjected to typing test and he being found suitable, came to be appointed. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the petitioner had secured an appointment as a backdoor entrant. 14. Though the petitioner was appointed in adhoc capacity, his appointment continued for a fairly long period of approximately 8 years when suddenly his services were terminated in the year 1998. Record shows that the petitioner’s case was considered for regularisation, but he was not regularised and that was the only reason to terminate the services of the petitioner that too without complying with the mandate of Section 25 F of the Act of 1947. 15. All said and done, the petitioner having been reinstated in services after the award of reinstatement, it cannot be said that services of the petitioner were no longer required. 15. All said and done, the petitioner having been reinstated in services after the award of reinstatement, it cannot be said that services of the petitioner were no longer required. He was reinstated in the year 2011. We also note that even though there was an award in his favour passed by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labor Court, Jaipur way back on 05.11.2001, the matter was under continuous litigation and only when the writ appeal was dismissed, it paved way for his reinstatement as late as in 2011 i.e. 10 years after the award of reinstatement. No sooner the order of reinstatement was passed, the order of termination followed vide impugned order dated 02.04.2012. Even though the order of termination says that the services of the petitioner were no longer required, that by itself is not the final word. In the pleadings of the respondents there is nothing to show that either the office was closed or that some other regular incumbent through process of regular recruitment was appointed and there was no other post or that work of typing was given up in the office and some other mode for preparation of documents was adopted. That means the termination of the services of the petitioner on the ground that the services were no longer required was an eyewash and only an attempt to somehow make out a case for retrenching the services of the petitioner. On facts, we have to hold that invocation of power under Section 25 F of the Act of 1947 by the respondents was wholly unjustified. The respondent is a State under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. It being a model employer, could not be allowed to mechanically exercise the powers of retrenchment unless the reasons for termination actually exist. We are of the view that this was all done to avoid regularisation of services of the petitioner after reinstatement. 16. It is not a case that the petitioner was claiming regularisation in service only on the strength of continuance of service on the basis of interim order in a pending case. Present is a case where the order of termination was set aside by the Labour Court way back on 05.11.2001. 16. It is not a case that the petitioner was claiming regularisation in service only on the strength of continuance of service on the basis of interim order in a pending case. Present is a case where the order of termination was set aside by the Labour Court way back on 05.11.2001. Once all the remedies were exhausted by the respondents, the award having attained finality, the petitioner shall be deemed to have been reinstated in services with the legal consequence flowing therefrom that he was never terminated and shall be deemed to have been in continuous service from the initial date of his appointment. If that be the legal position, in our considered view, the benefit of regularisation as one time measure as extended by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Secretary, State of Karanataka & Ors. Vs. Uma Devi & Ors. is necessarily required to be extended to the present petitioner. The view taken by the learned Tribunal that in such a case, the petitioner would not be entitled to benefit of regularisation, he being a litigant, cannot be accepted. The petitioner’s continuance in service for all legal purposes ever since the initial date of appointment definitely entitles him to be considered for regularisation. Without considering his case for regularization, terminating his services on untenable ground in the garb of provisions contained in Section 25 F of the Act of 1947, is not permissible under the law. 17. In view of the above consideration, the order passed by the Tribunal suffers from patent illegality and perversity and the same is therefore set aside. The order of termination of the petitioner is consequently set aside and he shall be reinstated in service forthwith. As the termination order in both the rounds of litigation has been found to be illegal, the petitioner shall be deemed to have continued in service. However, taking into consideration that the delay in disposing off the writ petition cannot be attributed either to the petitioner or to the respondents, in the circumstances of the case, we are inclined to confine the benefit of back wages only to the extent of 50% payable to the petitioner within a period of four months. 18. However, taking into consideration that the delay in disposing off the writ petition cannot be attributed either to the petitioner or to the respondents, in the circumstances of the case, we are inclined to confine the benefit of back wages only to the extent of 50% payable to the petitioner within a period of four months. 18. The respondents shall examine the petitioner’s case for regularisation as per the existing policy of regularisation and keeping in view the legal position that he is deemed to have been in continuous service. 19. The writ petition stands allowed accordingly.